CHINA'S DIPLOMATS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE MATURING OF AN EMBASSY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-01133R000100050002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence o 25X1
of an Embassy
China's Diplomats in The
United States: The Maturing
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FORD CENTER
JOB NUMBER
LDA 86-12092
September 1986
438
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of an Embassy
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
China's Diplomats in the
United States: The Maturing
This paper was prepared by Ithe
Office of Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated
wit the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, China Branch, Office of Leadership Analysis,
Secret
LDA 86-12092
September 1986
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 5 September 1986
was used in this report.
of an Embass
China's Diplomats in the
United States: The Maturing
cooperation since the normalization of relations in 1979.
Since 1983 Beijing has transformed its Embassy in Washington from a
fledgling establishment designed merely to monitor bilateral relations into
an organization that pursues China's national interests with increasing
effectiveness: The motivation for the changes was the signing of the
Shanghai Communique on 1 August 1982. The communique downplayed
the question of US arms sales to Taiwan, removing what had been the pri-
mary obstacle to broader political, commercial, technological, and military
Affairs.
Expanding relations between the United States and China necessitated
major changes in the quality, number, and variety of Embassy personnel.
First, the Embassy needed a competent ambassador, experienced in
international affairs and Sino-US relations. It also required a more
apolitical staff, able to provide the kind of objective analysis needed by
Beijing to shape policy toward the United States and to deal with an
increasing number of complex technical issues, such as nuclear fuel
development, satellite technology, and textile quotas. To meet these needs,
Beijing has since 1983:
? Twice replaced its Ambassador.
? Sent officials with greater experience in Sino-US affairs and with more
technical training.
? Increased the Embassy staff by 47 percent (from 77 in 1983 to 113 in
1986).
? Appointed more non-Foreign Ministry officials (in 1983 only 21 percent
were not diplomats; now 58 percent, or 68 of the 113, come from outside
the Ministry).
? Reduced the Political Affairs Section's authority over specialized trade
and S&T issues, giving more responsibility to the technical personnel in
sections such as Commercial Affairs and Science and Technology
By putting more experienced, specialized diplomats in the four major
sections-Political Affairs, Commercial Affairs, Science and Technology
Affairs, and the Defense Attache's Office-Beijing has greatly improved
the Embassy's ability to report on US policy and to promote Chinese
interests:
? Political officers now meet regularly with a wide variety of US officials
in Washington and no longer base their analysis primarily on US media
reports. They have developed a better understanding of US politics and
are more effective lobbyists than were their predecessors.
Secret
LDA 86-12092
September 1986
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? The commercial section, despite internal coordination difficulties, now
has a cadre of highly trained specialists who are better equipped to
handle the nuances of trade negotiations, military procurement, and
investment.
? To keep up with Beijing's growing demand for technology and military
information, the Science and Technology Affairs Section and the
Defense Attache's Office have sharply increased the number and sophis-
tication of their employees. These new officials have a better understand-
ing of complex scientific and military subjects
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Changing Ambassadors: In Search of Excellence
The Sections: Meeting New Needs
New and Improved Reporting
9
The New Lobbyists on Capitol Hill
11
Science and Technology Affairs: Active Technology Collectors
13
Defense Attache's Office: Growing Awareness of
International Affairs
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China's Diplomats in the
United States: The Maturing
of an Embassy
The signing of the Shanghai Communique in August
1982 opened a new phase in Sino-US relations by
removing obstacles to broader political, commercial,
technological, and military cooperation. Beijing, how-
ever, entered this new phase with an ambassador-
Chai Zemin-who was unable to effectively direct an
embassy with growing responsibilities. US State De-
partment officials say Chai was appointed more for
his Chinese Communist Party (CCP) credentials than
for his expertise in US affairs; moreover, he relied
heavily on Foreign Ministry instructions, showed little
energy or creativity in administration, and discour-
aged his staff from meeting with US counterparts.
The April 1983 appointment of Ambassador Zhang
Wenjin put a seasoned diplomat in charge of the
Embassy. A US affairs expert, Zhang had participat-
ed in meetings leading to the 1972 visit to China of
then President Richard Nixon. He was highly regard-
ed by senior Chinese leaders and his Foreign Ministry
peers for his administrative skills and his understand-
ing of international affairs, as well as for the quality
of his political analysis, according to US diplomats in
Beijing.
Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have told US
diplomats that Zhang was assigned to Washington to
invigorate Embassy reporting, which until then had
been drawn primarily from the US media. He made
two personnel decisions that enabled the Embassy to
develop a broader range of sources and upgrade the
quality of its reporting. In June 1983 Zhang trans-
ferred then San Francisco Consul General Hu Dingyi
to the Embassy as Deputy Chief of Mission. Hu's
superior performance in dealing with West Coast
politicians and businessmen made him an attractive
choice as a role model for Embassy officials, who
rarely left their offices to meet with Americans and
were often ignorant of impending US decisions, ac-
cording to US officials in Washington. At the Embas-
sy Hu actively encouraged political officers to aban-
don their closeted workstyle, meet more regularly
with their US counterparts, and learn in advance
about changes in US policy.'
informed analysis of US policy.
In October 1983 Ambassador Zhang personally ar-
ranged the transfer of Zhang Zai, a longtime personal
and professional associate and then deputy director of
the Foreign Ministry's American and Oceanian Af-
fairs Department, to the Embassy's Political Affairs
Section. US diplomats in Beijing at that time said
that Zhang Zai, one of China's leading America
watchers, could be counted on to provide a more
In May 1985 Ambassador Zhang was replaced by
Han Xu, widely acknowledged as the Foreign Minis-
try's highest ranking specialist on US affairs and one
of the few Chinese Government officials to have dealt
with US officials since the 1940s.2 During World War
II Han drove ambulances for US pilots shot down
over China. After the Communists defeated the Na-
tionalists in the civil war, he delivered China's request
for recognition to the US Embassy in Beijing. In
February 1972 he played a major role in the visit of
President Nixon. The following year Han was as-
signed to Washington as Deputy Chief of the PRC
Liaison Office (now Embassy). He remained there
until 1979, when he returned to the Ministry as Vice
Foreign Minister in charge of American and Oceani-
an affairs.
Kingdom.
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Vice President Walter
Mondale, National Security
Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski,
and Ambassador Chai Zemin
toast the January 1979
normalization of Sino-US
President Ronald Reagan
receives newly appointed
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Han and Zhang: Cut From the Same Cloth
Han Xu and Zhang Wenjin have followed similar
career paths. They served simultaneously in the
Foreign Ministry (1950-64, 1970-73, 1980-83) and
abroad (1973-76). Both were purged during the early
years of the Cultural Revolution (1967) but, like
several leading Chinese diplomats at that time, were
probably protected by then Premier Zhou Enlai. The
only major difference in their careers came during
1973-76, when Han was deputy chief of the Liaison
Office in Washington and Zhang was Ambassador to
Canada (Beijing's premier America-watching post
from the 1950s until the opening of the Liaison Office
in 1972). Later, both men returned to Beijing to serve
in turn as vice foreign minister in charge of US affairs
(Zhang, 1978-83; Han, 1983-85), each immediately
prior to appointment as Ambassador to the United
States.
Since becoming Ambassador, Han has renewed rela-
tionships formed with US Government and industry
officials when he served at the Liaison Office. During
official and informal meetings with US officials he
has spoken knowledgeably-usually without notes or
other assistance-on topics ranging from purchasing
land for diplomatic housing to chemical weapons and
nuclear proliferation. Han, who in the past impressed
Western diplomats as being stern and sometimes
blunt, has surprised US officials in Washington with
his congenial manner and a diplomatic style that is
less pedantic than it was in Beijing. State Department
Secret
Age when appointed
60
Ambassador to United
States
First dealings with
1945 (World War
1945-49 (US
Americans
II)
Marshall
Mission)
Joined the Foreign
1949
Ministry
First senior MFA
1950-64 (direc-
1956-64 (direc-
position
tor, Protocol De-
tor, Asian Affairs
partment
Department)
First Overseas Post
1964-65 (second
1966-67 (Ambas-
secretary,
sador to
Moscow)
Pakistan)
Purged in the Cultural
1967
Revolution
First post after the Cul-
1971-73 (direc-
1971-73 (assis-
tural Revolution
tor, Protocol
tant foreign
Department)
minister)
First North American
1973-79 (deputy
1973-76 (Ambas-
assignment
chief, PRCLO)
sador to Canada)
Ambassador to the
1985-present
1983-85
United States
officials say that his February 1986 airing of Chinese
objections to US arms sales to Taiwan was considera-
bly less shrill and vehement than past performances.
This probably reflects his diplomatic skill and adapt-
ability as well as improvement in the broader US-
Chinese relationship.
US officials in Washington say that Han's encourage-
ment has made their Chinese counterparts more
willing to explore ideas that diverge from official CCP
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Organization of PRC Embassy, Washington
I
Political Affairs
(Created 1979)
Administrative Affairs
(Created 1979)
Counselor: Zhang Zai, MFA Counselor: Xu Qun, MFA
Staff: 13 members: Staff: 16 members:
Science and Technology Affairs Defense Attache Office
(Created 1979) (Created 1979)
Counselor: Lu Jingling, SSTC Attache: Zhang Wutang, PLA
Staff: 8 members:
4 SSTC
1 CAS
1 MOAI
1 MMB
1 unknown
Staff: 11 members:
All PLA
Education Affairs Press Affairs
(Created 1980) (Created 1983)
Counselor: Li Weitong, MOE Counselor: Zheng Wanzhen, MFA
Staff: 15 members: Staff: 1 member, MFA
All MOE
Commercial Affairs Economic Affairs
(Created 1979) (Created 1984)
Counselor: Chen Shibiao, MOFERT Counselor: Xu Ji, SEC
Ye Zhenghua, XDI
Staff: 14 members: Staff: 2 members:
5 MOFERT
1 SEC
2 MACHIMPEX
2 CNNC
1 CNPC
1 MCI
1 CCPIT
1 unknown
Consular Affairs Cultural Affairs
(Created 1979) (Created 1979)
Counselor: Lu Zhaoyin, MFA Counselor: Xu Jiaxian, MOC
Staff: 13 members: Staff: 7 members:
All MFA 4 MOC
2 CFCRFC
1 MPT
CCPIT: China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
CCNC: China National Chemical Construction Corporation
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation
CRCRFC: Commission for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries
MACHINPEX: China National Machinery Import/Export Corporation
MCI: Ministry of Chemical Industry
MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MMB: Ministry of Machine Building Industry
MOAI: Ministry of Astronautics Industry
MOC: Ministry of Culture
MOE: Ministry of Education
MOFERT: Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade
MPT: Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication
PLA: People's Liberation Army
SEC: State Economic Commission
SSTC: State Science and Technology Commission
XDI: XINSHIDAI (New Era) Company
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reaction from the administration.
policy than were former Chinese political officers,
who always adhered closely to the party line. State
Department officials say that Political Counselor
Wang Li, who frequently departs from official rheto-
ric to express what he labels his personal thoughts, is a
case in point. During a State Department briefing for
Chinese officials on the status of the 1985 US-Soviet
nuclear disarmament talks in Geneva, for example,
Wang departed from Beijing's public stance of nonin-
volvement by privately suggesting that a positive
response to Soviet proposals would probably embar-
rass Moscow, which was counting on a negative
that at least 12 have attended college, 17 speak some
English, and another six speak a second or third
We also know
Ambassadors Zhang and Han have relied increasingly
on the Embassy's two minister-counselors, 18 counsel-
ors, and defense attache to oversee daily operations.
The counselors supervise the staff, prepare reports to
Beijing, and serve as the Ambassador's point of
reference for specific bilateral issues.' (See chart.)
During the past three years they have gained greater
latitude in determining which issues are of interest to
Beijing and how they should be reported, according to
a variety of US officials. By virtue of their training
and familiarity with Sino-US affairs, the counselors
at the Embassy today are well qualified to manage
their increased responsibilities. Indeed, on the basis of
our conversations with US diplomats in Beijing and
with US Government officials in Wash-
ington, we believe many of them are the leading US
affairs experts in their home organizations. Of the 20
current counselors, 16 led or participated in Sino-US
negotiations before assignment to Washington, 13 had
previously traveled to the United States, and 10 have
been involved in Sino-US affairs for over a decade.
foreign language.
' Most Embassy sections are headed by counselors; Political Affairs
and Commercial Affairs, which have 10 and three counselors,
respectively, are headed by Minister-Counselors. The Chinese
diplomatic system is similar to the British Foreign Service in that
not all political counselors serve in the Political Affairs Section.
Counselor Xu Qun, for example, heads the Chancery and has only
Minister-Counselor Zhang Zai plays with a tiger
cub during a visit to the Columbus Zoo in Ohio.
The Model Counselor
Minister-Counselor Zhang Zai exemplifies the new
breed of counselor. He frequently ran the Embassy in
Ambassador Zhang's absence and is now both the
Embassy's second in command and head of the
Political Affairs Section! He speaks fluent English
and has been active in Sino-US relations since 1971,
when then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger secret-
ly visited China. Zhang has told US diplomats in
Beijing that he returned to the Foreign Ministry in
1971 because discussions during Kissinger's visit
clearly revealed a lack of officials with either an
understanding of US affairs or a command of the
English language (he had joined the Ministry in 1949
after attending Beijing University but had been criti-
cized by the radical Red Guards at the height of the
Cultural Revolution and sent to a farm).
Unlike his predecessors, Zhang holds regular discus-
sions with a variety of US officials, including mem-
bers of the National Security Council, the State
Department, and Congress. People who have dealt
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with him say that in formal meetings he is quietly
assertive and prepared to discuss any number of
current issues, but that his remarks generally do not
contradict the Beijing line. They have observed, how-
ever, that during informal discussions Zhang will
criticize his superiors' decisions if he believes they are
wrong.
We believe Zhang Zai has begun to staff the Political
Affairs Section with seasoned America watchers who
are also apparently his political allies. He was respon-
sible for having Wang Li, a longtime friend, assigned
to Washington as a political counselor in February
1985, according to US diplomats. Wang, who has
dealt with Americans since the 1950s-when he was a
translator for the Neutral Nations Armistice Com-
mittee in Panmunjom-had spent his entire Foreign
Ministry career in the American and Oceanian Af-
fairs Department. In 1980 he earned an M.A. degree
in international relations from the Johns Hopkins
University School for Advanced International Stud-
ies.
The Technical Specialists
Beijing has strengthened the Embassy's ability to
oversee activities in other areas by assigning as coun-
selors non-Foreign Ministry officials who are familiar
with Sino-US affairs, speak English, and are techni-
cally qualified. These new counselors have managed
their duties more successfully than did their predeces-
sors, who lacked such abilities, according to a variety
of Washington officials. Counselors Chen Shibiao
(commercial) and Lu Jingting (science and technology)
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade (MOFERT) from 1983 until 1985, he negotiat-
ed the 1984 Sino-US Industrial and Technological
Agreement, arranged for the visit of the US Presiden-
tial Trade Mission during the summer of 1984, and
participated in the 1984 sessions of the Joint Econom-
ic Commission and of the Bilateral Investment Treaty
Talks. As a member of Premier Zhao Ziyang's and
President Li Xiannian's delegations to the United
States during 1984 and 1985, respectively, Chen
chaired the commerce-related discussions.
A career State Science and Technology Commission
(SSTC) scientist, Counselor Lu Jingting has been
involved in Sino-US scientific cooperation for over a
decade; his predecessor had only three years' experi-
ence in handling bilateral scientific issues before
coming to the Embassy. Since arriving in Washington
in October 1985, Lu has familiarized himself with key
Washington organizations and their personnel who
handle Sino-US scientific relations, according to offi-
cials of the Departments of Commerce and State.
Before coming to Washington, he had served since
1984 as deputy director of the SSTC's Exchange
Center, where he was responsible for monitoring
exchange programs involving Chinese and foreign
students, scientists, and businessmen. That same year
he was appointed to the UN Advisory Board on
Science and Technology Development. As deputy
director of the SSTC's Foreign Affairs Bureau from
1974 until 1979, Lu met with numerous visiting US
scientists, including a delegation from the American
Aeronautical and Astronautical Society in 1978.
are two examples.
Commercial Counselor Chen Shibiao speaks English
and is skilled in dealing with Americans
Since coming to Wash-
ington in August 1985, Chen has participated in Sino-
US talks on such issues as textiles, steel quotas, and
COCOM restrictions. In contrast to his predecessor,
who had handled Sino-European trade affairs before
coming to Washington, Chen had previously focused
almost exclusively on US affairs. As director of the
US and Canada Division of the Third Department of
Beijing's post-1983 effort to appoint well-qualified,
well-educated officials extends below the counselor
level. On the basis of conversations with US officials
in Beijing and Washington, we believe the Embassy's
33 first secretaries are representative of recent staff
assignments.
Like the
counselors, the first secretaries are well acquainted
with Sino-US affairs-55 percent (18) were involved
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in Sino-US affairs before being assigned to Washing-
ton, and 30 percent (10) have served previously in the
United States. The current group of first secretaries is
also well educated-45 percent (15) are known univer-
sity graduates, 85 percent (28) speak some English,
and 18 percent (6) have been trained in at least one
additional foreign language.
Staff quality appears to have been improved by the
assignment of highly trained specialists from Chinese
corporations, institutes, and commissions with a stake
in specialized negotiations and reporting. Fifty-five
percent (18 of the 33 current first secretaries) were
sent by non-Foreign Ministry organizations, and 39
percent (13) have specialized technical skills in such
areas as heavy machinery, antisubmarine weaponry,
and space systems. These officials use their expertise
to handle negotiations on issues of interest to their
home organizations and, according to US officials in
Washington, provide good reporting on those issues.
One example is Commercial First Secretary Chang
Liangcai of the China National Machinery Import
and Export Corporation (MACHIMPEX), China's
leading trader of industrial equipment. Appointed to
the Embassy in September 1983, he oversees talks
regarding trade in heavy machinery and reports on
US actions affecting his corporation. He maintains
close ties to officials of MACHIMPEX, according to
Commerce Department officials. As a company offi-
cial from 1979 to 1982, Chang helped attract and
coordinate heavy machinery exports to China. Imme-
diately before coming to Washington he served for a
year as a deputy division chief in MOFERT's Loan
Project Office, where he was exposed to the intrica-
cies of arranging trade agreements.
The staff also has a stake in fostering good Sino-US
relations. Unlike their predecessors, who rose through
the ranks during the Soviet alliance and the Korean
and Vietnam wars, when Beijing advocated an anti-
US foreign policy, this generation of professionals has
established careers during a time of improving bilater-
al relations. Of the first secretaries, for example, 42
percent (14) began after the early 1970s. Subsequent
years have seen the creation of numerous US-related
jobs in Washington and Beijing and the expansion of
a cadre of US affairs experts who see strong relations
as important to their careers. Because of their person-
al interest, they seem more eager than their predeces-
sors to work out differences with their US counter-
parts, according to US officials. This eagerness, how-
ever, probably stops far short of willingness to concede
on important points.
Political First Secretary Lian Zhengbao, Cultural
First Secretary Su Guang, and Science and Technol-
ogy Second Secretary Jing Zhaoqian
epresent this younger group. Lian Zhengbao,
now 45, was appointed first secretary in 1985. He
meets regularly with his US counterparts and has
discussed a variety of subjects, including China's
objections to the US Government's use of the term
"Republic of China" in its publications and Beijing's
concern that Taiwan officials would obstruct inquiries
into the 1985 murder of Chinese-American Henry
Liu. Lian, who joined the Foreign Ministry in 1965,
after graduating from the Ministry's Institute of
International Relations, has been active in Sino-US
relations since joining the US Affairs Division in
1970. He served as a notetaker during Henry Kissin-
ger's secret visit to Beijing in 1971 and has told US
diplomats that he helped draft the first communi-
que-which China ultimately tabled-on normaliza-
tion of relations.
Su Guang, 42, is the youngest first secretary in the
Cultural Affairs Section. Appointed in March 1985,
he had served with the Chinese People's Association
for Friendship With Foreign Countries since the mid-
1970s. He was the official interpreter for Chen
Xitong, the mayor of Beijing, during Chen's 1984 US
visit. A language major in college, Su was accepted by
the Monterey Language Institute in California in
1979 but was unable to attend.
As the representative to the United States from the
Ministry of Astronautics Industry, Jing Zhaoqian, 44,
has been the principal contact for US Government
and industry officials during negotiations to purchase
a direct-broadcast satellite. Trained as an engineer-
probably in missile or satellite tracking-he served
with the Institute for Space System Engineering for
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Life at the Embassy
The assignment to Washington of Chinese diplomats
who are younger and more familiar with US affairs
has led to increased curiosity about American culture
and society. With better English-language capabili-
ties than their predecessors, Embassy personnel-
particularly those at the second-secretary level and
above-routinely attend cultural and academic
events, serve as keynote speakers at international
conferences and seminars, and no longer shun the
media. The first staff members (other than the Em-
bassy's regular chauffeurs) obtained their drivers'
licenses in 1985 and can now operate the Embassy's
fleet of tourbuses and minivans to take frequent trips
to areas of historic or scenic interest. The staff has
visited such sites as Colonial Williamsburg, Niagara
Falls, and Disney World/EPCOT Center.
The Embassy is a close-knit group of families who
live, work, and play together. All members-except
the Ambassador and a few of his personal staff-live
at the Embassy. (According to the State Department,
an agreement concluded in 1984 allowed the Chinese
to purchase two separate properties for Cultural
Affairs Section offices and housing, but officials have
not yet moved into these facilities.) In late 1984 the
Washington Post reported that, within the Embassy,
daily routines varied but most staff members began
their day at dawn with morning exercises. After the
news and breakfast, workers went to their offices
from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. Following dinner, most
participated in evening exercises and then watched
television or a Chinese or American movie. Sports are
frequent diversions, and many members jog around
the Embassy in the morning and swim and play
tennis at the Ambassador's residence in the after-
noon.
Ambassador Zhang (in white
tennis togs) and staff doing
Embassy officials enjoy a
swim in the Ambassador's pool.
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several years before joining the Chinese Academy of
Space Technology in 1979. He visited the United
States twice with space delegations before being
assigned to the Science and Technology Section at the
Embassy in Washington in 1983.
technical knowledge, relaxed style, and command of
English.
The assignment of trained specialists familiar with
such complex issues as textile quotas, technology
transfer, and military weapons procurement has en-
abled the Embassy's four major sections- Political
Affairs, Commercial Affairs, Science and Technology
Affairs, and the Defense Attache's Office-to man-
age their specialized tasks independently. Because of
the sections' new autonomy, the Political Affairs
Section is no longer able to dominate nonpolitical
areas, as it did before 1983. US commercial officials
once had to discuss all significant issues with Embassy
political officers because commercial or S&T and
technology personnel were incapable of holding mean-
ingful talks. US military and government officials in
Washington say that, since the 1983 appointment of
Defense Attache Zhang Wutang, Chinese military
attaches have asserted greater control over military
issues, discussing them not only with US Department
of Defense officers but also with officials in the State
Department and the National Security Council. F_
Although the assignment of better trained, more
specialized personnel has made non-Foreign Ministry
sections more independent, it has also created coordi-
nation and communications problems that did not
exist when the political section oversaw all major
issues. Commercial Counselor Chen and Science and
Technology Counselor Lu, in particular, are often
bypassed by subordinates who come from different
organizations and report directly to their superiors in
Beijing, according to their US counterparts. US offi-
cials in Washington say Embassy officers in the
Commercial and Science and Technology Sections
frequently fail-often deliberately-to inform their
superiors of specific projects, leading to delays in
routine business and ignorance of current events.
Science and Technology Counselor Lu Jingting's sur-
prise at learning of the well-publicized October 1985
resignation of Health and Human Services Secretary
Margaret Heckler epitomizes this problem. State
Department officials say that, despite the section's
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Beijing later that year, Lu's staff failed to inform him,
his
leaving him unaware of the resignation several weeks
after it occurred.
Political Affairs: The Vanguard of Improvement
Since 1983 the Political Affairs Section has improved
its ability to deal with US officials; we believe that its
reporting has also improved markedly. The close
association of the Foreign Ministry's best America
watchers, including Ambassadors Zhang and Han, as
well as other senior US Affairs Division personnel
assigned to Washington, has enabled the section to
understand and work with Americans more success-
fully than it did under Ambassador Chai. Current
political officers, in contrast to their predecessors,
make more of an effort to bounce ideas off their US
counterparts and are not as inclined to base their
analysis strictly on US media reports. Working break-
fasts and luncheons are no longer a rarity-the 1985
nuclear cooperation agreement was formulated entire-
ly through a series of working lunches with State
Department officials in Washington, for example-
and demarches are delivered on a diplomatic level
without the nationalistic rhetoric that accompanied
them in the past.
New and Improved Reporting. Since the appointment
of Ambassador Zhang, the Embassy has sought to
improve its political analysis and boost the influence
of its reporting in Beijing. Reporting from Washing-
ton-like that from other missions-has traditionally
carried little weight with foreign policy makers
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Number of Washington Lobbying Agents
Employed by Four Asian Nations, 1980-85
Country
1980
CHINA
10 14
JAPAN
82 87
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
32 35
TAIWAN
29 24
Source: US Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Unit,
January 1980-June 1986
Key Washington Lobbying Agents Used by China
Company
Akin, Gump, (Strauss), Hauer and Feld
Anderson & Pendleton, Chartered Attorneys
Daniels, Houlihan, and Palmeter
Garvey, Schubert, Adams, and Barer
Haight, Gardner, Poor, & Havens
International Business and Economic Research Corporation
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
Millbank and Tweed
Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander
Pierson, Semmes, and Finley
Surrey & Morse
Trade, Foreign Policy Advice
Civil Aviation
Textile Negotiations
Legal Representation Before the US Maritime Commission
Civil Aviation
Textile Statistics and Negotiations
Diplomatic Public Relations
Trade Legislation
Textile Negotiations
Trade Legislation
Legal Services, Congressional Lobbying on Foreign Investment and
Family Planning Legislation
Asian Development Bank Membership
Foreign Ministry's assignment to the Political Affairs
Section of knowledgable officers such as Zhang Zai
and Wang Li was in large part a response to com-
plaints from senior leaders about the quality of Em-
bassy analysis. The assignment of better officers-
and their increased interaction with US officials-has
resulted in more informed, complete, and unbiased
interpretations of US policies and views. For example,
State Department officials say that, during the 1985
negotiations to include China on the list of countries
eligible to receive US foreign aid, a Chinese political
officer read to his US counterpart the text of a
telegram before it was sent to Beijing in order to
ensure that US views were accurately represented.
The message, containing the Embassy's analysis of
the issue, used exact quotes from and the names of US
officials to support its comments. US diplomats in
Beijing report that ensuing discussions with their
Foreign Ministry counterparts were more successful
than they had anticipated.
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the Embassy's lobby- 25X1
We believe Ambassadors Han and Zhang have used
their influence to get the Embassy's analysis to top
leaders. Unlike Chai, both were chosen by Deng
Xiaoping, and Han has stated publicly that he reports
directly to Deng. Neither Han nor Zhang hesitated to
return to Beijing to participate in foreign policy
discussions affecting Sino-US relations, according to
US diplomats in Beijing. This personal involvement is
important because Chinese foreign policy making
remains highly centralized; we know
that Deng, with the assistance of
Premier Zhao Ziyang and CCP Secretary Hu Yao-
bang, is the ultimate arbiter in major foreign policy
decisions.
The New Lobbyists on Capitol Hill. The Political
Affairs Section's highly successful efforts to interact
with officials in the executive branch of the US
Government have not yet been matched on Capitol
Hill. In the past, Embassy political officers did not
understand how Congress operated, tended to remain
"behind the curve" on issues of concern to them, and
frequently missed opportunities to expand their influ-
ence
Although Beijing's lobbying effort on the Hill is still
in its infancy, during the last three years the section
has improved its technique and added new programs.
Zhang Zai and Wang Li-the most active lobbyists-
have a better understanding of how US Government
policy is made and are more tolerant of political
posturing than were their predecessors
Capitol Hill regularly,
Zhang and Wang work
ing during the 1985 Congressional debate over provid-
ing AID family planning assistance funds to China
illustrated its maturing finesse. During this debate,
several US Congressmen raised the issue of whether
China, which advocates forced abortions, should re-
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unable to curtail Congressional discussion of family
planning and medical practices,
the predictable approach would have been to declare
it an issue of national sovereignty, harangue the
United States for bullying, and angrily issue political
demarches and public pronouncements condemning
Congress. In this instance, however, the Chinese
pursued their interests in a low-key manner, sending
formal letters and holding constructive one-on-one
talks with key US Congressmen and Senators.
In addition to improving its style, the Embassy has
during the last three years added to its lobbying
resources:
? It has increased its use of established US lobbying
groups. In 1985 China ranked fourth among Asian
nations in the number of lobbying firms retained; it
employed 24 such firms.
? It created a formal organization in 1984 to coordi-
nate trips to China for Congressmen during the
January and August recesses. US officials say the
Chinese organization, modeled after Taiwan's long-
standing program, has become more popular and
effective than Taipei's efforts because of a willing-
ness to grant access to senior leaders.
Ambassador Han has told State Department officials
that because of the number and complexity of issues
affecting China, two new officers will expand the
Embassy's network for knowing how, when, and why
Congress will act.
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Commercial Affairs: Slowly Making Needed Changes
Appointments to the Commercial Affairs Section
since 1983 have infused the group with experienced,
well-educated, and young officers who are more active
in meeting their US counterparts than were their
predecessors
Of the 11 first and second secretaries, 10
have a commercial background; 16 of the section's 20
members speak some English. All of the members
below the first-secretary level are in their thirties or
forties.
Unlike their counterparts in the Political Affairs
Section, however, the commercial officers lack initia-
tive and teamwork, according to US Commerce De-
partment officers, who add that the commercial offi-
cers tend to view their jobs as routine desk work and
are frequently ignorant of recent developments. Coop-
eration is further hampered because members come
from two ministries, four corporations, and one com-
mission and because each organization tasks its own
employees and requires them to report directly to it."
Within the ranks of the counselors and first and second secretar-
ies, the section includes five members from MOFERT; three from
the SEC; two each from MACHIMPEX and the China National
Chemical Construction Corporation; and at least one each from the
Xinshidai (New Era) Company, the China National Petroleum
Corporation, the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade, and the Ministry of Chemical Industry.0
Beijing's emphasis on diplomatic professionalism has
caused Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence
and activities at the Embassy to ebb. US officials who
meet with Embassy officers say that, under Ambas-
sadors Han and Zhang, diplomats have been able to
miss party meetings to attend business functions-
unlike their predecessors, who were required to at-
tend all political study sessions. Embassy personnel
who miss these meetings are usually briefed by the
party secretary at a later date.
Like all Chinese institutions, the Embassy maintains
an internal CCP committee, created and staffed by
the party to relay directives and to monitor the
loyalty of its members.
Within the past year Beijing has moved to strengthen
the section by posting three new counselors to oversee
key functions:
? In August 1985 Chen Shibiao was assigned to
handle trade negotiations.
? In September 1985 Ye Zhenhua was assigned to
oversee military procurement, an area of growing
importance and one with which Commercial Coun-
selor Chen was unfamiliar.
? In June 1986 Xu Ji was assigned as economic
counselor to attract US investors.
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The new counselors are all highly qualified
Huang Wenjun, who arrived in June
1986-has the talent, experience, and energy needed
to invigorate the section. he has a reputa-
tion as a technocrat who is well versed in bilateral
commercial issues, pleasant to deal with at the negoti-
ating table, and well connected in commercial organi-
zations throughout the United States, according to
former US diplomatic and commercial officials. Ac-
tive in Sino-US commercial relations since the early
1970s, Huang has served at the UN in New York
(1972-73) and with the PRC Liaison Office in Wash-
ington (1973-76). While in Washington he frequently
acted as head of the commercial section, impressing
with his
Newly assigned Economic Counselor Xu Ji arrived in
Washington with a mandate to boost US investment
in China, an area which received little attention under
his predecessor.' The former director of the Foreign
Affairs Bureau of the State Economic Commission
and one of China's leading experts on international
finance, Xu has dealt with US financial and banking
officials since 1979 and appears well qualified for his
current post. he is knowledgeable
on international economic and financial issues and has
supported closer ties with the United States in these
areas. he favors
forcing Chinese companies and enterprises to obtain
backing from foreign investors because these creditors
would want a return on their investment and therefore
would ensure that their Chinese partners ran their
operations efficiently and profitably.
' In December 1984 Beijing created an economic counselor position
at the Embassy to get economic analysis from a post that was not
reporting and to boost the level of US investment in China. Liu
Guangpu, an experienced SEC official who filled the post when it
was created, encouraged his staff to develop contacts with several
US economic think tanks; the section, however, continued to base
its analysis on US media reports. For example, US diplomats in
Beijing say that senior Chinese financial officials were unprepared
for the 1986 reintroduction of protectionist legislation, having
believed Embassy economic reporting-which was based on US
press reports-that the US protectionist tide was ebbing. F
efficiency and ability to remain calm during heated
discussions
Science and Technology Affairs:
Active Technology Collectors
Despite a 1983 US decision to relax export restric-
tions, Beijing's efforts to obtain US technology have
increased,
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? Since 1983 the section has increased its efforts to
identify and recruit Overseas Chinese scientists
willing to teach or lecture in China, according to the
FBI. In 1984 the section helped develop a program
that regularly sends such scientists to China, where
their expenses are paid by the individual ministries,
institutes, and universities that benefit from their
expertise.
The section's ability to obtain the information Beijing
wants has been bolstered by the assignment of nine
highly specialized scientists and engineers-including,
for example, a satellite engineer from the Ministry of
Astronautics Industry, a physicist from the State
Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), and a
health sciences specialist from the Chinese Academy
of Sciences-to replace the seven generalists who
made up the staff before 1983. The new personnel
have pursued their contacts more vigorously than did
their predecessors, according to the FBI, and because
of their advanced scientific training can elicit more
useful information in technical dialogues.
As the Embassy's technical experts, they also help
manage technology-related programs that cross bu-
reaucratic lines. For example, US Government and
military officers say that science and technology
officers work closely with their counterparts in the
Defense Attache's Office and Commercial Affairs
Section to oversee issues relating to technology trans-
fer or COCOM-controlled equipment. Other US offi-
cials note that the staff cooperates with members of
the Education Affairs Section to monitor the activities
of PRC students in the United States and guide their
studies at US universities. Science and technology
officers also manage the Embassy's annual pur-
chase -of an estimated
80,000 US Government publications, including those
issued by the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration, the Defense Technical Center, the Na-
tional Technical Information Service, and the Depart-
ment of Energy.
Defense Attache's Office:
Growing Awareness of International Affairs
The 12-member Defense Attache's Office gives Bei-
jing a highly effective means of monitoring worldwide
military affairs, say Department of Defense officials.
A Growing Covert Collection F4,6`ort
The FBI reports that the
largest number of officials engaged in covert opera-
tions now serves in the Science and Technology
Affairs Section and the Defense Attache's Office,
although a significant number of consular and cultur-
al officials are engaged in covert recruitment of
Chinese-Americans and Taiwanese living in Washing-
ton.
Rivaling the Embassy's political officers in their
willingness to meet with their US counterparts,,Chi-
nese military officers frequently visit the Pentagon to
discuss issues ranging from current events in Afghani-
stan, Central America, and the Middle East to the
evolving Sino-US military relationship. The attaches
attend briefings, seminars, and social functions to
collect and report information on US military strategy
and equipment, as well as US information on Soviet
and Taiwanese military forces.
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We believe the DAO's effectiveness can be attributed
to Defense Attache Zhang Wutang's vigor and intelli-
gence and the unit's cohesiveness and relative freedom
of action. Zhang has been highly successful in setting
an example for his staff in interaction with Ameri-
cans, according to US military officers. Assigned in
August 1983, he has impressed US Government and
military officials with his knowledge of world affairs,
weapons technology, and military strategy and histo-
ry. They say that he is open and willing to express
opinions on most subjects-although he generally
does not deviate from the official line-and that he
stands in sharp contrast to his predecessor, Xu Yimin,
The DAO functions as a well-disciplined military unit
with a single chain of command. Unlike the Commer-
cial and Science and Technology Sections, with their
variegated membership, the DAO operates under
orders from PLA headquarters in Beijing and is thus
highly responsive to its consumers' needs.'
Zhang keeps Ambassador Han abreast of the office's
activities, US military officers say it is often only as a
matter of record. They add, however, that Zhang's
ability to interact with his colleagues has kept the
Embassy's civilian officials from extensive infighting
over the DAO's independence.
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