AGENDA FOR 15 APRIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING: LONG-RANGE PLANNING (PHASE II)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-01146R000200060012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 8, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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EXCOM 82-7008
8 April 1932
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
SUBJECT: Agenda for 15 April Executive Committee Meeting: Long-Range
Planning (Phase 11)
REFERENCES: A. ER 81-8722 dated 12 November 1981
B. ER 82-4288 dated 1 February 1982
1. The Executive Committee will meet at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, 15 April, in the
DCI Conference Room for Phase!' of this year's long-range planning exercise- Your
Interdirectorate Planning Group representatives have been briefed so that they can assist
you in preparing for this session.
2. The attached papers on long-range intelligence needs, prepared by DDI-led
Agency-wide teams, will serve as the basis for discussion. I IDDI/CRES, will 25X1
highlight them, pointing out the implications for intelligence management. You will be
asked for your assessment of the papers and your views on the relative priorities the
Agency should place on addressing these intelligence needs. This will facilitate
developing the necessary guidance for our Phase III planning on required collection,
processing, and analytical capabilities.
Attachment:
Issue Papers
cc: Director of Personnel
Comptroller
Inspector General
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CIA LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR 1985-90/92
PHASE 2 -- TARGET OVERVIEWS AND PRIORITIZED INFORMATION NEEDS
Prepared by the DDI
April 1982
REPORT FOR THE EXECUTIVE comminhE
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INTRODUCTION
On 1 February 1982, the Executive Director established the CIA's
Long-Range Planning Schedule for 1982. The DDI was given the
responsibility for identifying important future information needs
consistent with an assessment of the 1985-90/92 environment for each
of 17 substantive intelligence targets (13 regional and 4 worldwide).
He assigned this task to the Chief of his Collection Requirements and
Evaluation Staff, who chaired both the Agency-wide team and an intra-
DDI working group. This report is the culmination of their overall
effort, being intended principally as an input to the Phase-3
exercise (Intelligence and Operational Capabilities). (C)
KEY FINDINGS
Review of the World Environment.
USSR-Military plans and programs will continue to challenge the
United States severely into the next decade. Particularly critical
will be intelligence on S&T advances. (S/NF)
USSR-Political. The Soviet Union will remain for the foresee-
able future the most formidable threat to the United States and to
American interests globally. (S/NF)
USSR-Economic. A successor leadership will have to cope almost
immediately with severe economic problems. Thus the potential for
sudden changes in policies requiring a US response will be high. (C)
Eastern Europe. Endemic instability will have substantial
implications for the United States - -for a shift in the balance of
power in Europe, for US-USSR relations, and for US relations with the
NATO Allies. (S)
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Middle East/North Africa will likely continue to be the
preeminent area of US policy interest in the Third World during the
second half of this decade. At the same time, the current interest
in Libya, which is tied exclusively to Qadhafi, will dwindle. (S)
Sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Africa will likely remain the
priority policy concern for this region. Our interest in the rest of
South Asia. The key issues will be the adjustment of India and
Pakistan to Soviet efforts to expand their power and influence in the
area, and competition--possibly nuclear--between the two major
regional powers. (S/NF)
China. The stability of China both internally and externally is
vital to US security interests throughout Asia, but it is by no means
certain. (S/NF)
North Korea. As its leadership changes over this decade, we
will remain preoccupied by the growing North Korean military power.
(S/NF)
South/Central America. Endemic social and economic problems
plaguing Central America will not be resolved in this time frame.
Cuba. Assuming the continuation of the Castro regime, enmity
will continue to characterize relations between Cuba and the United
States. (S)
International Terrorism. There will be even more states willing
to support international terrorist groups, hence more of them with
greater sophistication are likely to be active. (S)
Nuclear Proliferation. The acquisition and possible use of
nuclear weapons and material by Third-World states and the potential
use by sub-states will represent major national-security problems for
the United States. (S/NF)
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International Narcotics. The drug trade is so profitable that
it will persist despite efforts to break it up; it will directly
threaten US forces abroad and the US population at home at least as
much as it does now. (S)
Global Resources. The DDI has identified five topics that
demand special attention:
--Technology Transfer. It is likely that the United
States will experience serious export-control, counter-
intelligence, and industrial-security problems during the
period. (S/NF)
--Third-World Political Instability and Insurgency. The
spread of illicit arms and the increase in the number of
states willing to support opposition groups and insurgencies
in key countries friendly to the United States will make
political instability even more of a problem. (S)
--Energy and Resources. There is a virtual certainty
that late in this decade oil supplies will once again begin
to fall below desired levels. On the agricultural front, the
ability of the United States to offset harvest shortfalls in
other parts of the world without substantially raising prices
is likely to decline. (S)
Changes in Intelligence Needs and Priorities. The Report of the
Executive Committee Long-Range Planning Project, completed in
December 1980, noted, "We are increasingly diverging from our tradi-
tional near-single focus on intelligence concerning Communist
military strength toward a broader and more complicated range of
intelligence topics in a larger number of countries." That this
trend will continue is indisputable. At the same time we believe the
USSR will remain the must formidable threat to the United States.
(S/NF)
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Implications for Intelligence Management.
We follow on the heels of the Long-Range Planning Project
(December 1980) and the "1985 Intelligence Capabilities Study"
(October 1981). We endorse their findings. For example, we agree
that consumers will demand intelligence reporting on the complete
range of targets. At the same time, in most instances, the topics
subsumed under each target will continue to expand. (C)
In rather general terms we have strived to sketch the outlines
of the world as it will confront senior policymakers in the second
half of the decade. But we can go no further. We have no crystal
ball that will enable us to forecast the future. Angola, El Sal-
vador, Falkland Islands, etc. would not have been predicted years
before events catapulted them into the headlines. Accordingly, we
reiterate the need for flexibility in the management of all phases of
the intelligence cycle. (C)
Indications-and-warning intelligence, particularly strategic
I&W, remains a knotty subject. Given our construct, it was
inevitable that the first item listed among the USSR-Military
Priority-1 information needs would be "Reliable intelligence on
deployments of Soviet...forces, especially against US and Allied
Forces" (p. 29). At most, we can claim this to be a partially
"unmet" need. Because we can never be sure, it must be included.
The Phase-3 teams will have to weigh programmed capabilities
carefully against this topic. Being first does not necessarily mean
I&W should claim further resources. (S/NF)
ORGANIZATION, METHODOLOGY, and PRIORITIES
Organization. The report is divided into two sections. The
first (pp. 1-27) is a set of 17 target overviews--called "White
Papers" within the Directorate of Intelligence-- that describes the
nature of the US policymaking concern with respect to each topic for
the latter half of the decade. They therefore represent the DDI's
best judgments of what finished intelligence the Agency shall be
called on to provide. The second (pp. 28-69) represents the
prioritized, significant information needs that our analysts foresee
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for the 1985-90/92 time period; they are consistent with the world as
delineated in the White Papers. Except for several of these, which
are new future needs, they are current unmet (or less then fully
satisfied) needs that will continue into the next decade. (C)
Methodology. The 17 substantive intelligence targets are the
responsibility of seven different DDI Offices. The Deputy Director
of the appropriate Office drafted the White Papers within his/her
purview. They were then reviewed on an informal basis by three NI0s,
who made numerous useful comments and suggested emendations. These
were discussed by the team chairman with the DDI Office Deputy
Directors on a one-on-one basis. The papers were then redrafted,
typically vetted by the relevant DDI Office Director, and then
approved by the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence. During
their gestation they were also distributed - -as were the various
iterations of the "needs" statements--to the members of the Agency-
wide team, who represented the three other Directorates. (C)
The intelligence-information needs statement initially was based
on the DDI's listing of collection needs for FY 1984, which was
provided the Comptroller at the request of the Executive Director and
which was subsequently distributed in conjunction with the Program
Call. In Phase 2, the responsible Offices reviewed the listing,
applying two tests: would these needs continue to be unmet into the
next decade, considering their knowledge of the future collection
mix, and would they be "significant." Additionally, they defined a
small number of likely new future information needs. The DDI
chairman and the DDI member of the Agency-wide team together with two
DDI/CRES officers then devised a strawman set of rankings, generally
in agreement with the updated DCID 1/2 (see below), which was then
reviewed by the Office Director and/or Deputy Director concerned.
After the second iteration of this process, to allow the Office
Directors to comment on the overall package, the section was approved
by the A/DDI. (C)
Concept of Priorities. The DCI's foreword of June 1981 to the
National Intelligence Topics states, "The Topics of Continuing
Interest provide the Intelligence Community with more general
guidance on the issues that senior policymakers believe will be of
greatest importance to US interests over the longer term." Because
the priority definitions in the attachment to DCID 1/2 equate with
those of the NITs of Continuing Interest, it seemed fitting to use
the Community-accepted definitions in prioritizing the intelligence-
information needs. Once change was made, however. Priorities 5, 6,
and 7 have been combined as "All Other." The DCID 1/2 definitions of
priorities are
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1 -- Intelligence vital to US national survival;
2 -- Intelligence of critical importance to US political,
economic, and military interests;
3 -- Intelligence of major importance to US political,
economic, and military interests;
4 -- Intelligence of considerable importance to US political,
economic, and military interests.
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5 APRIL 1982
TARGET OVERVIEWS
(Phase 2)
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USSR-MILITARY
The USSR's military plans and programs will continue to
challenge the United States severely into the next decade.
Moscow's historical security concerns and improved United States
first-strike capabilities will lead the Soviets to take measures
to conceal the nature and status of their programs and forces.
Increased mobility of weapon systems, expansion of telemetry
encryption, more concealment of ship construction, completion of
naval tunnel's, and development of sophisticated systems for
defense and space warfare will combine to complicate US efforts
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programs and to provide accurate and reliable intelligence to
support policy formulation and implementation.
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Intelligence on deployments of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate
military forces will also be required as Moscow's sea and airlift
capabilities expand and offer the potential for large-scale, long-
distance movements beyond areas adjacent to the USSR.
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USSR-POLITICAL
The Soviet Union will remain for the foreseeble future the
most formidable threat to the United States and to American
interests globally. Soviet actions and intentions to influence
the Third World by exploiting regional tensions and instability
will cause the United States to cope with challenges to friendly
nations by elements receiving Soviet support. Moscow will
continue to exploit differences between the United States and its
Western allies, hoping to divide the alliance. The USSR's
interest in Western technology will remain high, but the Soviets
will also. play Western nations against each other to gain maximum
econcmic and political advantage. They will seek to manipulate
public opinion to offset fears of a Soviet threat, to prevent
deployment of new NATO weapons, and to decrease the level of West
European defense spending. Meanwhile, the endemic economic
problems and political dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe will.pose
long-term problems for the Soviets who will continually be
reassessing the nature of East European economic reforms and ties
to the West. It will-rernain essential to evaluate accurately
Soviet preceptions of developing situations in Eastern Europe, the
extent of Moscow's tolerance, and the nature of Soviet actions and
intentions.
The Soviets will also remain preoccupied with their China
problem, and it will become increasingly important to look for
evidence of debate within the leadership on this problem as well
as signs of Soviet willingness to become more conciliatory toward
the Chinese.
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CONFIDENTIAL .
USSR-ECONOMIC
During the decade ahead, the United States will face a
continuous challenge to detect and predict Changes in Soviet
economic performance and strategy. The economic strategies and
tactics of potential (or actual) successors to the present
leadership could lead to major changes in resource-allocation
priorities, management practices, and/or administrative
reorganizations. Because a successor leadership will have to cope
almost immediately with severe stringencies in labor, capital, and
natural resources at home as well as an increasing burden of
supporting its East European clients, the potential for sudden
changes in policies requiring a United States response will be
high, especially in the areas of East-West trade, arms control;
commercial relations with LDCs, and domestic military programs.
Reliable timely intelligence will be required on Soviet
initiatives in these areas as well as on Soviet relations with
CEMA countries and the LDCs, and on Soviet domestic plans and
programs for dealing with their internal problems.
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EASTERN EUROPE
In the next decade enderpic instability in Eastern Europe
will have substantial implications for the United States--for a
shift in the balance of power in Europe, for US-USSR relations,
and for US relations with the NATO Allies. The exacerbation of
the precarious financial situations in Eastern Europe brings into
question Eastern Europe's ability to retain its credit-
worthiness. Without access to Western credits to finance the
modernization of its industrial and agricultural sectors,
stagnation or worse will be its lot. The problem is compounded
by the failure to develop effective economic management systems,
which in turn provides an impulse for political change. This .
impulse has already produced a new variant of national Communism-
-military Communism--in Poland, and manifestations also can be
detected and are likely to increase in Romania, Albania, and
Yugoslavia. Another impulse for political change will come from
the inability of the East European regimes to live up to their-
commitment to raise living standards.
The changed role of the military in Eastern Europe includes
increasing political and economic involvement. How these changes
will affect the reliability of the military as instruments of
local or Soviet authorities for Warsaw Pact action or for control
of local disturbances will be a major question in the coming
years.
While Albania and Yugoslavia have slipped from Soviet
control and Romania has achieved some independence, instability
in the coming years in these areas would be viewed by the Soviets
as an opportunity to regain control. This would have serious
impact on the Eastern Mediterranean and weaken our influence in
the Balkans.
Questions on succession will loom large in the coming years,
particularly in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania.
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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA
The Middle East-North Africa area will likely continue to be
the preeminent area of US policy interest in the Third World
during the second half of this decade. US interest in the area
will continue to be dominated by three key concerns:
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?
MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA (continued)
rine
evolution of Iran's revolution and its relations with all of its
neighbors will be a major factor in the military security and
political stability of the Gulf region and will thus be of as
great significance during the 1985-90 as it is today.
The Israeli/Arab relationship now almost dominates our policy
and intelligence interests; it is nevertheless impossible to
forecast any decrease in interest or requirement for intelligence
Support. Requirements are likely to increase. Israel's ability
to survive not just foreign pressure but internal pressures for
change will be a major question throughout the decade. Egypt's
key role in the Israeli/Arab equation, and Cairo's major place-in---
the Arab world, will mean a continued commitment for in-depth
intelligence collection and analysis. The very real economic and
demographic pressures facing Egypt will be the focus of increased
US attention.
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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA (continued)
The longer-term impact of such problems as overpopulation or
urban crowding, water and food scarcity, and potential for
industrialization or other economic development will begin to be
felt in one or more of all countries in the region during this
period.
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Southern Africa will likely remain the priority policy
concern for this region in 1985-90. Increasing polarization and
instability as well as escalating military activity are probable
in the area. Black states will continue to be dependent upon
econcrnic?links with South Africa while at the same time opposing
white rule there. Prospects are high for continued intervention
frcm outside the region, which will increase the cc:mplexity of the
problem and pose additional concerns for the United States.
Moreover, nuclear developments in South Africa warrant a high
priority.
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SOUTH ASIA
In South Asia the two key issues affecting US interests in
the region in the 1985-90 time frame will be the reaction of India
and Pakistan to Soviet behavior toward the region and the
political, military, and possible nuclear competition between
these two regional powers.
The key issue will be the adjustment of the major regional
powers, Pakistan and India, to Soviet efforts to expand their
power and influence in the area. If, in the post-Brezhnev era,
the Soviets become even more expansionist in this region, the
requirement for US intelligence support to policymakers on this
area will increase markedly.. India will reemerge as an issue of
primary concern to the United States as the Indian leadership
comes to grips with the question of whether to go along with or to
oppose an increased Soviet role in the area: To the extent that
the Soviet effort is hurried or overly _forceful India would be
likely to oppose Moscow; Delhi's reacton to a continued protracted
seduction would be more ambivalent and difficult to guage. As
long as the Soviets are engaged in Afghanistan, which is likely
.through the mid-1980s, Pakistan's reactions to real or perceived
Soviet pressure will be a major US concern.
Even if the Soviets do not up the ante in South Asia,
however, there will be an increased need for intelligence
collection and analysis on the area. The key question here will
be to assess whether (and how) India will succeed in increasing
its political influence on the world scene to match its economic
and military potential. Implicit in this is an improved
capability to examine and understand India's economic growth,
military development, and the inherent potential for political
instability in the areas of food and population growth, especially
in the urban areas. A similar increased capability against
Pakistan will also be important, not only because of the Pakistani
role as India's principal protagonist, but also because of the
likely continued increase in Pakistan's relations with Arab
countries of the Gulf region and beyond. The nuclear-weapons
capability of both these states will continue as major
intelligence and policy concerns.
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As China takes a more active role in the world community
during the latter part of this decade, the United States will be
concerned about changes -in its political, military, and economic
policies that might lead to friction in bilateral relationships.
. The stability of China both internally and externally is
vital to stability and US security interests throughout Asia, but
it is by no means certain. China has had a volatile political
history, and the transition in Chinese leadership that has begun
and will continue during this decade will determine whether the
successor leadership will prevail and be able to modernize China's
economic, military, and political structure.
Because of China's importance in countering the Soviets, the
United States will be concerned about changes in China's military
doctrine, strategy, and war-fighting capabilities, especially as
they impact on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Taiwan military balances.
During this decade and the next, China's most pressing
concern will continue to be .feeding and clothing its population
and attempting to modernize its economy. Potentially major
problems will be the magnitude of China's needs for US grain and
other agricultural exports and the general US role in the -
modernizaton process. In particular, the United States will be
preoccupied with China's attempt to acquire and integrate advanced
technology and modernize its agriculture, industry, and military.
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NORTH KOREA
During the remainder of this decade and beyond, the US
interest in the Korean Peninsula and maintaining stability there.
will not diminish. The United States will remain preoccupied by
the growing military power of North Korea and concerned that it
might use this capability in an attempt to reunify the country by
military action.
As North Korea's leadership changes over this decade, the
United States will be especially interested in the intentions and
plans of the new leaders toward South Korea and the risks they may
be willing to take to achieve reunification. By spending far more
for defense than it can afford, the North might gain a decisive
edge in the military balance. Because of the warning problem, the
United States will continue to be concerned about the North's
military capabilities, deployments, and planning for
hostilities. With the heavy defense burden, the North Korean
economy has suffered. US policymakers will be interested in
determining whether the country will maintain this focus into the
next decade or make adjustments to address its economic problems.
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SOUTH/CENTRAL AMERICA
In the 1985-90 time frame, South/Central America will remain
a key policy/intelligence problem. Central America will continue
to be the first priority within the region because the endemic
social and economic problems plaguing the area will not be
resolved in this time frame. Revolutionary ferment will intensify
and probably spread. Scant prospects exist of establishing an
environment in which private-sector resources can flow to the
region and within the region to support greater political and
social stability. Given the willingness of the Soviets, Cubans,
and other leftists in the region to intervene, reconstruction will
be slow and tedious, if at all. Migration, trade, investment, and
regional politics in Central America will be key issues.
Other than Cuba, the Caribbean mini-states are not by
themselves substantial US antagonists or partners; yet their
proximity to this country requires their consideration.
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SOUTH/CENTRAL AMERICA (continued)
Deteriorating economies, weakening colonial ties, and prospects
for instability will present intermittent problems, and key among
these will be migration. The nature of the intelligence problem
for the remainder of Latin America, i.e., states of little
intrinsic importance to the United States, will be a discontinuous
one and a relatively low priority--focused on such issues as
narcotics trafficking, finance, and political instability.
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CUBA
Assuming the continuation of the Castro regime during 1985-
90, enmity will continue to characterize relations between the
United States and Cuba, although the level of hostility may
vary. Castro sees himself as a revolutionary pathfinder for the
Third World and the United States as the principal threat to the
fulfillment of this role. Cuba will continue to strengthen
militarily and will, therefore, have a heightened capability and
requirement to project itself in the Third World.
Economic decline is also likely, which could lead to
increased social turmoil and a new wave of refugees similar to the
Mariel exodus. Concurrently, however, pressures to interact
constructively with the West will build as constraints on the
Soviets to provide bilateral assistance grow. The Cuban political
system will remain closed, and policy shifts will likely be more
rapid and difficult to predict. The problem will remain a high
priority and become more complex as intelligence is called upon to
provide the policymaker the timely analysis that can be used to
exploit Cuban vulnerabilities--economic, political, and military.
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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Terrorism feeds on its own success; terrorists seek publicity
and publicity generates more terrorism as groups imitate each
other. By 1990, there will be even more states willing to support
international terrorists groups, directly or indirectly, to
further their own interests, hence more groups with greater
sophistication are likely to be active. US persons and property
abroad will be at least as vulnerable as they are now, and
probably more so. Terrorists are likely to capitalize on the
widespread fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants to
threaten, or perhaps even to try to seize, a weapon or an
installation. Even if government counter-measures keep pace with
the growth in numbers and capabilities of international terrorists
(a tall order), the ability of terrorists continually to search
out unguarded targets means that the threat to United States and
its allies is unlikely'to diminish. We also face the conktant
danger that the scale and bloodiness of terrorist incidents will
increase when and if terrorists decide that the public has became
inured to the publicity smaller attacks attract.
The Intelligence Community will be required to support
counter-terrorism measures, assess prospects for terrorist
incidents and campaigns, and provide close support during major
terrorist incidents.
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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
The acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons and
material by Third World states and the potential use by sub-states
will represent major national-security problems for the United
States in the latter half of this decade and beyond. Several
countries that currently are near-term proliferation threats
Nuclear technology, facilities, and material will be much
more widely available and far more difficult to control and to
monitor, leading to a greater threat of terrorist acquisition or
attack. Senior US Government officials will be faced with a broad
range of nuclear-proliferation issues in order to establish and
implement realistic policies and initiate sound responses to
threatening or crisis situations. Accurate intelligence will be
needed on the intentions and prospects for weapon developments in
a large number of countries; on clandestine, black-market,.or
terrorist acquisition of nuclear material or technology, and on
the ability of safeguards to prevent such illicit acquisitions;
and on the nature of actual weapons programs--weapon designs,
testing, stockpiling, reliability, safety, control, and military
doctrine.
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
The drug trade is so profitable that it will persist despite
efforts to break it up. It will directly threaten US forces
stationed abroad and the US population at home at least as much in
1990 as it does now. Trafficking in heroin and to an increasing
extent in cocaine and marijuana will contribute heavily to growing
corruption in key producing states--probably so much so that it
will impede US efforts to influence their policies on a broad
range of issues. Narco-dollars, flowing through various
international laundries, also attract organized crime and will
serve to finance at least some international-terrorist
endeavors. If production or trafficking are slowed or disrupted
in one area--by bad weather or an honest government effort--the
trade will shift quickly to another one.
The Intelligence Community will be called upon for
information on levels of production of the major drugs, the main
trafficking routes, financial flows, and the impact on producing
and trafficking nations of this illicit trade.
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GLOBAL RESOURCES: Technology Transfer
The .combination of past Soviet acquisitions of Western
technology through legal and illegal means and the continued
expansion of Soviet weapons systems through the 1980s indicate
that the United States and its Western allies will experience
serious export-control, counter-intelligence, and industrial-
security problems during the 1985-1990 time frame. Senior US
Government officials dealing with these problems will be concerned
with Western technology losses to Soviet and East European
intelligence operations in West Europe and Japan, trade diversions
abroad of US and and Western technology, Western technology losses
through Communist-owned locally-chartered companies, and losses
from both S&T exchange agreements and student exchanges.
Information on advanced Free World cutting-edge technologies with
important military applications will be critical as will those
technologies in which the United States no longer may hold the
technological lead. Advanced production technologies, compUters,
micro-electronics, telecommunications, aerospace, and civil
aircraft will be of particular importance in the late 1980s.
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GLOBAL RESOURCES: Third-World Political Instability And Insurgency
As the United States beccmes more dependent on the Third
World for key resources, base facilities, and markets, political
instability in important Third-World countries will affect our
interests even more than it does today. Discontent in these areas
stems from the increasing clash between traditional and modern
ways, from worsening economic conditions in many countries, and
from ethnic and other kinds of social stresses. By 1990, the
spread of illicit arms and the increase in the number of states
that are willing to support opposition groups and insurgencies in
key countries friendly to the United States will make political
instability even more of a problem. Malcontents and dissidents
will be quicker to take to violent means, while an ever-growing
number of experienced guerrillas will be available to teach their
skills to such groups. The USSR and its surrogates will also have
had that much more practice in aiding insurgencies and
manipulating discontents.
The Intelligence Community will be tasked with assessing the
level and trend of instability, in key countries as well as
indicating when growing instability could lead to insurgency or
political violence. It will also be called on for .estimatesof
the prospects for existing insurgencies.
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GLOBAL RESOURCES: Energy And Resources
The problem of energy and resource availability will be a
major policy concern in the second half of this decade and well
into the 1990s. At the heart of the energy problem is the virtual
certainty that late in this decade oil supplies will once again
begin to fall below desired levels except on the most optimistic
assumptions about gross additions to reserves. Even during the
interim period of surplus productive capacity and falling real oil
prices, the United States and its allies in Western Europe and
Japan .will remain dependent on imported oil and vulnerable to oil-
supply disruption. Indeed, lower real oil prices are likely to
cause economic hardship in key producing countries, which could
lead to political instability, and subsequent disruption of oil
output.
On the agricultural front, the ability of the United States
to use its surplus-food productive capacity to offset harvest
shortfalls in other parts of the world without substantially
raising prices is likely to decline. Nhile food production may
rise, costs could double because of more intensive methods of
cultivation. The United States as the world's largest food
exporter will be under intense pressure to solve food shortages
and to finance food sales.
The growing demand for limited world resources will increase
the interdependence of producers and consumers of key
commodities. As the volume of trade expands, US policymakers must
be able to anticipate developments that would focus import
dependence of the United States or its Allies on particular blocks
of LDCs, or on potential adversaries.
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S APRIL 1982
PRIORITIZED INFORMATION NEEDS
(Phase 2)
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