LETTER TO RONALD REAGAN FROM JAMES A. MCCLURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00858R000200180003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 30, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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May 21, 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Uear Mr. President:
Executive Registry
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We strongly support your bold efforts to defend American national
security in the Caribbean and in Central America. Secretary of
Defense Weinberger has written the following statement to us
recently:
"k~ ether the stopovers on Cuba of [Soviet]
reconnaissance and ASW Bears constitute 'deployment' in
a legal or strategic sense and whether they or Soviet
military equipment furnished to Cuba are 'offensive
weapons' within the terms of the 1962 U.S. - USSR
agreements, as later amplified, are questions of
considerable importance and implications, which are
addressed at the highest levels of the U.S.
gorernment."
The 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement was supposed to "halt
further introduction of offensive weapons" [i.e. Soviet offensive
missiles, bombers, submarines, and other offensive weapons, which
Khrushchev even defined as including Soviet troops] into Cuba "as
firm undertakings" on the part of "both" the U.S. and the Soviet
governments.
You stated quite courageously at a press conference in May, 1982:
"You know,. there's been other things we think are
violations also of the 1962 agreement ..."
On September 14, 1983, you repeated your bold accusation, by
stating:
"As far as I'm concerned, that agreement has been
abrogated many times by the Soviet Union and Cuba in
the brining of what can only be considered offensive
weapons, not defensive, there."
STAT
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Tt~e President ?
April 30, 1984
Page 2
Two letter s. from the State Department on the 1962
Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement have recently been delivered to us,
and they have raised additional questions. In the first letter,
the State Department has stated:
"The basing of a-Y nuclear-armed submarine in Cuba
would contravene the U.S.?- USSR Understanding on Cuba.
The Soviets are aware of this." (Emphasis added.)
From this statement, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
publicly acknowledged Soviet basing of Golf and Echo class
nuclear armed missile submarines in Cuba in 1970, 1972, 1973, and
1974 should be regarded by the State Department as Soviet
contraventions of the Kennedy - Khrushchev Agreement.
There have been other authoritative official U.S. confirmations
of Soviet violations. CIA Director William Casey was asked in US
News and World Report of March 8, 1982: "Does what is happening
now in Cuba violate the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev' Agreement ending
the missile crisis?" CIA Director Casey answered:
"Oh sure it does, because the 1962 agreement said the
Soviets would send no offensive weapons, and it also
said there would be no export of revolution from Cuba.
The agreement has been violated for 20 years."
(Emphasis added.)
Alsa on March 8, 1982, Congressman Jack Kemp asked the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
"Is it not true that there is a de facto, if rot a
de jure violation by the Soviet Union of understandings
that this country had with them?"
The JCS Chairman answered:
"We interpret ... Soviet actions in Cuba as a violation
... in my judgement, they [the Soviets) have gone
beyond the 1962 accords." (Emphasis added.)
On March 11, 1982, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred
Ikle confirmed that the Soviets had bases in Cuba capable of
nuclear attack and he testified to Congress that the 1962
Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement "had been eroded away to nothing"
Soviet actions.
Ex~r.~tayE ~~~i;try
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Tnt~ President
April 30, 1984
Pa g ~~ 3
In the second letter, the State Department has also stated:
"The Department of State does agree with the President
and the other officials [i.e., the Chairman of the JCS,
the CIA Director, and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy] ... that the Soviet Union has on occasion
violated the spirit of the [Kennedy-Khrushchev]
Understanding." (Emphasis added.)
This statement is a State Department concession that the Soviet
Union has in fact also violated the spirit of the
Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement.
The first State Department .letter also states that "All Soviet
tactical aircraft in Eastern-Europe, including Floggers, are
rated as potential nuclear delivery systems."(Emphasis added.)
The CIA has told us that the Soviet MIG-21 Fishbed in Cuba has a
nuclear delivery capability, and the Defense Department has told
us that there are about 200 MIG 21s in Cuba. The April 1984
ed;;tion of Soviet Military Power, on Page 75, also gives Soviet
MIG-21 Fishbeds a nuclear delivery capability.
Several questions emerge from these State Department concessions
cor.cer:,ing the status of Soviet compliance with the 1962 Rennedy-
Khrushchev Agreement:
1. If the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement is neither a treaty
nor a legally binding international agreement, but is
instead a "political understanding," as the State
Department maintains, what are the precise terms of
this understanding?
2. Does the Soviet deployment of Golf and Echo class
nuclear armed submarines in Cuba in the early 1970s
constitute "basing" and therefore a contravention or
violation of the understanding?
3. What specific Soviet actions violate the "spirit" of
the understanding? Have these actions stopped? How
.dangerous are they to U.S. national security?
4. If Soviet MIG 23 and MIG 27 Flogger aircraft and Soviet
MIG-21 Fishbed aircraft are officially credited with a
nuclear delivery capability against NATO, why is it
that when Floggers and Fishbeds are based in Cuba,
their nuclear delivery capability somehow disappears?
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The President
April 30, 1984
Page 4
5, The State Department has promised to answer all of
Senator Helms' and Senator Symms' questions. When will
these answers be received?
Thank you for your prompt answer to our questions. We strongly
support your attempts to uphold the Monroe Doctrine in Central
America.
With warmest personal regards.
Sincerely,
G. m
Steve Symms
United States Senator
esse Helms
nited States Senator
CC: The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of State
The Director, CIA
The Director, ACDA
The Chairman, .7CS
The National Security Advisor
to the President
A. McClure
d States Senator
Executive R~gis!ry
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