NICARAGUA, AND THE CONTRAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00858R000200230014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 15, 1984
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/09: CIA-RDP87B00858R000200230014-4
SECRET
Talking Points for DCI Meeting with PFIAB on
Monday, 19 November 1984
SUBJECT: Nicaragua, and the Contras
KEY JUDGMENTS FROM SNIE 83.3-84
NICARAGUA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY BUILDUP
-Over the last five years, the Sandinista regime has
embarked on a major military buildup, primarily with substantial
Soviet Bloc and Cuban assistance. As a result, it has developed
the largest and best-equipped military force in Central
America. The ground and air defense forces are predominant,
while the air and naval forces are small and poorly equipped.
The overall buildup is primarily defense-oriented, but it
nevertheless has upset the regional military balance and
represents a growing potential threat to its immediate
neighbors. As in the case of Cuba, it also provides a shield
behind which the Sandinistas can continue to consolidate their
regime and support other regional revolutionaries.
-The arms buildup has accelerated during the last year. The
Soviet Union this month delivered a major weapons system--the
MI-24 helicopter gunship--directly to Nicaragua for the first
time. This action has important symbolic implications and
represents a Soviet decision to play a more direct role in
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ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET
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strengthening the Sandinista regime. During 1984, the inventory
of tanks and armored vehicles has doubled, and the basis has
been laid for a significantly improved air defense system.
-Although U.S. demarches appear to have so far deterred the
delivery of MIGs or other advanced jet aircraft, the Sandinistas
remain determined to acquire them. In the interim, the likely
acquisition of advanced surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems and
other air defense improvements will provide a protective
umbrella for future deliveries of additional weaponry,
potentially including combat aircraft as well.
-The some 3,000 Communist military and security personnel in
Nicaragua, predominately Cubans, play a key role in supporting
and maintaining the Sandinista armed forces. This role is
likely to increase in the future as Nicaragua obtains more
sophisticated weaponry, making Managua yet more dependent on
Moscow and Havana. Should Cuban pilots operate the
recently-acquired Soviet MI-24 helicopter gunships, as they do
in Angola, this would represent the first known direct combat
role for the Cubans in Nicaragua.
-We believe that the USSR seeks to use military assistance
to consolidate the regime in Managua and to establish a center
of Soviet influence on the Central American mainland. From the
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Sandinistas' perspective, Soviet and Cuban aid serves to raise
the costs to the U.S. of a major attack and enhances their
ability to defend against lesser threats. We believe that
Moscow will continue to probe the limits of U.S. tolerance for
delivery of additional weappns systems, including jet combat
aircraft, much as it has done in Cuba.
-The Nicaraguan military buildup serves other Soviet and
Cuban interests as well. It diverts U.S. attention and
resources from other critical areas and complicates U.S. force
planning. It ensures a key base for the support of other
regional insurgent and terrorist groups and intimidates
Nicaragua's neighbors. By assisting in the consolidation of a
Marxist-Leninist government, it encourages other leftist
movements in the region. Such consolidation, moreover, may
provide the Soviets the opportunity to establish secure
intelligence collection facilities, especially for SIGINT, as
well as access to Sandinista air and naval facilities.
-The Sandinistas have indicated they would be willing to
accept a Contadora Treaty which would limit the military buildup
and the number of foreign military advisers in the region. In
doing so, they seek the removal of U.S. military bases and
schools from Central America and an end to U.S. military
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Executive Regist 6 L., -7
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exercises. They clearly hope to use the Treaty to further
legitimize the regime and to end any foreign interference in
their domestic affairs that would hinder political
consolidation. Nevertheless, they are resisting the inclusion
of effective verification measures, and will continue to support
a clandestine Cuban military presence and provide materiel aid
to regional insurgents. Should the Treaty process fail, they
are likely to continue their military buildup unabated.
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3(-r-7i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/09: CIA-RDP87B00858R000200230014-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/09: CIA-RDP87B00858R000200230014-4
SUBJECT: Talking Points for DCI Meeting with PFIAB on Monday, 19 November 1984
Distribution:
Original - SA/DCI/IA (for DCI)
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - DDO
1 - A/DDI
1 - Comptroller
1. - D/OLL
1 - DD/OLL
1 - C/Liaison Div/OLL
1 - C/Leg. Div./OLL
1 - OLL Subject (84-4173)
DD/OLL:ELS:mlg (15 November 1984)
Executive Re ist ~~1 a
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