RECOGNITION OF SENATOR NUNN
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Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 25, 1985
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S 8710
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'Y .,%
June 25, 1985
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE P
In other words, what have we
learned and what have we rectified
from the nightmare of 40 years past?
Mr. President, I ask, indeed, what
has become of those promises? The
Genocide Treaty seas one promise.
Ninety-six nations have ratified that
treaty and thereby have promised to
fight genocide in the future.
But sadly, Mr. President, the United
States has not made that promise. It
has not ratified the Genocide Treaty.
Our promise to future generations
must be the ratification of the Geno-
cide Treaty. The agony of the Holo-
caust victims and the Holocaust survi-
vors must not be forgotten as we move
toward a calm future.
The ratification of the Genocide
Treaty will not erase the scars of the
past.
It will, however, serve as an assur-
ance that the United States does not
and will not condone the inhumane
acts of genocide.
RECOGNITION OF SENATOR
NUNN
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. Nuxx] is recognized for
not to exceed 15 minutes.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
SECURITY CLEARANCE
INFORMATION ACT OF 1985
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to
offer a bill which is intended to close a
critical loophole in our Government's
current Security Clearance Program.
Senators WILLIAM ' V. ROTH, JR.,
LAWTON CHILES, ALBERT GORE, JR., and
TED STEvai s join me in introducing
the "Security Clearance Information
Act of 1985." The problem which the
bill addresses is the growing inability
of Department of Defense, Office of
Personnel Management [OPM], and
Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] in-
vestigators to obtain State and local
criminal justice records on individuals
being considered for access to classi-
fied information or sensitive national
security duties.
As ranking minority member of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations, I ordered an investigation of
our Government's Security Clearance
Program. This investigation culminat-,
ed in 4 days of hearings held this past
April. Senator ROTH, who as chairman
of our subcommittee, gave his full sup-
port and cooperation to those hear-
ings, joins me today in introducing leg-
islation drafted as a direct result of
the subcommittee's work.
Testimony at those hearings con-
firmed that one of the most meaning-
ful and productive sources of informa-
tion in personnel security investiga-
tions is local criminal justice records.
For many years, local jurisdictions
were quite forthcoming in making this
information available to Federal inves-
tigators from the Defense Investiga-
tive Service [DIS], the Office of Per-
sonnel Management, and the Central
Intelligence Agency [CIA].
However, our subcommittee learned
that in recent years a disturbing trend
has developed. Local and State juris-
dictions in increasing numbers are de-
nying DIS, OPM, and CIA agents
access to criminal history records or
permitting access to records of convic-
tions only-not records of arrest.
Other jurisdictions are severely limit-
ing the number of requests that can be
made or delaying the processing of
these requests for a considerable
period of time. The net result is that
this important source of information
is being seriously curtailed in many lo-
calities throughout the country.
Such a situation would be ludicrous
if it did not have such far reaching
and dangerous implications. Currently
the U.S. Government is unable to
obtain State and local criminal records
on applicants for some of the most
sensitive positions in the military and
other Government agencies that are
entrusted with our Nation's national
security. Our recent hearings showed
the serious nature of espionage as seen
in the Christopher Boyce case at
TRW, the William Holden Bell case at
Hughes and the James Harper case at
Systems Control Technology.
The potential target for Soviet espi-
onage efforts is, unfortunately, an in-
creasingly massive one. Today more
than 4 million Americans hold Gov-
ernment security clearances, including
more than 53 percent of Federal em-
ployees. More than 144 million indus-
try personnel are cleared. The latter
figure alone has increased by over 44
percent since 1979.
Cleared personnel have potential
access to an incredibly large amount of
classified material. In our subcommit-
tee hearings we heard testimony that
there are today over 17 million Gov-
ernment secrets whose height, if
stacked one on top of each, would
equal the height of eight Washington
Monuments.
Obviously, our proposal today will
not respond to the entire problem of
espionage. However, it will close a
loophole which the Department of De-
fense, the Office of Personnel Man-
agement, the Department of Energy
and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion specifically brought to our atten-
tion during our hearings.
To correct this problem, I propose
this bill which specifically authorizes
the Federal Government to obtain
access to local criminal justice records
when conducting eligibility investiga-
tions for, one, access to classified in-
formation: two, assignment to or re-
tention in sensitive national security
duties: or three, acceptance or reten-
tion in the armed services. Such a re-
quest is only permitted if the person
under investigation consents to it in
writing. Moreover, the criminal histo-
ry record information obtained pursu-
ant to this request would be afforded
the same protections as provided by
the Privacy Act.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I once
again must emphasize the importance
of this legislation. Since the Inception
of the Government's personnel securi-
ty investigation program, one of the
most meaningful resources of infonna-
tion has been the criminal justice
records of municipalities, counties and
States. These local criminal records
contain a wealth of information par-
ticularly pertinent to the trustworthi-
ness and reliability of persons who are
employed in sensitive positions or have
access to classified information. In
recent years, access to these vital files
has been seriously eroding.
This inability to review criminal
record histories is causing severe
delays in clearing employees for Fed-
eral work and contracts. In addition, it
is impairing the Government's ability
to evaluate the overall suitability of an
individual for a sensitive position and.
thus, decreasing the Government's
ability to meet its obligations for
maintaining and safeguarding classi-
fied information. Not suprisingly, hos-
tile intelligence services are not overly
intimidated by a Government persop-
nel security program like this where
the proverbial left hand of the Gov-
ernment does not know or is not al-
lowed to know what the right hand
does.
I recommend passage of this bill so
that we can put some credence into
our Security Clearance Program.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the text and the section-by-
section analysis of the bill be printed
in the REcoaD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
9.1347
Be it enacted by the Senate and House if
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled.
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the
"Security Clearance Information Act of
1985".
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND POLICIIS
SEc. 2. The Congress finds-
(1) that under the Constitution. Congress
has the responsibility and power to provide
for the common defense and security of our
Nation;
(2) that the interests of national secutlt}
require that the Department of Defense.
the Office of Personnel Management, or the
Central Intelligence Agency conduct investi-
sations of individuals for the purpose of de-
termining eligibility for access to classified
Information, assignment to or rotw*ion in
sensitive national security duties, or accept-
ance or retention in the armed services:
(3) that the interests of national Security
require that the Department of Defense.
the Office of Personnel Management, or the
Central Intelligence Agency have access to
Criminal history record Information when
conducting investigations of individuals for
the purpose of determining elWbility for
access to classified information, assignment
to or retention in sensitive national security
duties, or acceptance or retention in the
armed services: and
(4) that the interests of national security
have been adversely affected '-y the reluc
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 8711
investigation for the release of such Infor-
mation for one or more of the purposes set
forth in subsection (b).
"(d) Criminal history record information
received under this section shall not be dis-
closed except for the purposes set forth in
subsection (b) or as provided by section 552a
of Title 5, United States Code.".
Sec. 4. The amendments made by this Act
shall become effective with respect to any
inquiry which begins after the date of en-
actment of this Act conducted by the De-
partment of Defense. the Office of Person-
nel Management, or the Central Intelli-
gence Agency for any of the purposes speci-
fied in subsection (b) of section 520a of Title
10, United States Code, as added by this Act.
Sax. 5. The amendments made by this Act
are made pursuant to the powers vested in
Congress as found in Section 8 of Article I
of the United States Constitution.
Lance and refusal of many state and local
criminal Justice agencies to provide criminal
history record information to the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Office of Personnel
Management. or the Central Intelligence
Agency for use in investigations of individ-
uals for the purpose of determining eligibil-
ity for access to classified information, as-
signment to or retention in sensitive nation-
al security duties, or acceptance or retention
In the armed services.
Sac. 3. Chapter 31 of Title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking out sec-
tion 520a and substituting the following:
"SECTION 520.. CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD IN-
FORMATION FOR NATIONAL SE('t'RI-
?t'Y PURPOSES
"(a) As used in this chapter:
^(1) The term "criminal justice agency"
includes federal, state, and local agencies
and means: (A) courts or (B) government
agency or any subunit thereof which per-
forms the administration of criminal justice
pursuant to a statute or Executive Order,
and which allocates a substant k) part of its
annual budget to the administration of
criminal Justice.
"(2) The term "Criminal history record in-
formation" means information collected by
criminal justice agencies on individuals con-
sisting of identifiable descriptions and nota-
tions of arrests, detentions, indictments, in-
formation, or other formal criminal charges,
and any disposition arising therefrom, sen-
tencing, correction supervision, and release.
The term does not include identification in-
formation such as fingerprint records to the
extent that such information does not indi-
cate involvement of the Individual in the
criminal justice system.
"(3) The term "classified information"
means information or material designated
pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive Order as requiring protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons
of national security.
"(4) The term "state" means any of the
several States, the District of Columbia. the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. the North-
ern Mariana Islands, Guam, the Virgin Is-
lands, American Samoa, the Trust Territory
'Of Pacific Islands, and any other territory or
possession of the United States.
"(5) The term "local" and "locality"
means any local government authority or
agency or component thereof within a
State having Jurisdiction over matters at a
county, municipal or other local govern-
ment level.
" (b)(1) Upon request by the Department
of Defense, the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment. or the Central Intelligence Agency
criminal justice agencies shall make avail-
able criminal history record Information re-
garding individuals under investigation by
the Department of Defense, the Office of
Personnel Management, or the Central In-
telligence Agency for the purpose of deter-
mining eligibility for (A) access to classified
information, (B) assignment to or retention
in sensitive national security duties, or (C)
acceptance or retention in the armed serv-
ices. Fees charged for providing criminal
history record information pursuant to this
subsection shall not exceed those charged to
other government agencies for such infor-
mation.
"(2) This subsection shall apply notwith-
standing any other provision of law or regu-
lation of any State or of any locality within
s State, or any other law of the United
States.
?"(c) The Department of Defense, the
Office of Personnel Management, or the
Central Intelligence Agency shall not obtain
criminal history record information pursu-
ant to this section unless it has received
written consent from the individual under
SECTION-BY-SLUrION ANALYSIS
Section 1. States the title of the bill.
Section 2. Four subsections specify the
Congressional findings Justifying federal
action in this area. Congress is entrusted
with the responsibility and power to provide
for our national security. These provisions
establish that the inability of the Depart-
ment of the Defense, the Office of Person-
nel Management, and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to obtain state and local
criminal justice records when conducting
background investigation negatively impacts
upon our nation's security.
Section 3. Amends Title 10. United States
Code. Section 520(a) by striking Its language
and substituting the proposed legislation.
The current language of Section 520(a) is in-
adequate. Its language requests, but does
not require, state and local governments to
provide criminal history information. It is
also inadequate since it is limited only to
the Department of Defense and only for
military recruitment purposes.
The new 520(a) language makes the lan-
guage mandatory and broadens Its scope
beyond military recruitment to include con-
tractor. civilian and military personnel with
access to sensitive national security infor-
mation or duties. '
Subsection (&X1-5) defines the appropri-
ate terms as used in the-statute. It utilizes
those definitions now commonly used in the
'law enforcement community.
Subsection (b)(1) specifically authorizes
the federal government, through the De-
partment of Defense, the Office of Person-
nel Management, or the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, to obtain access to local
criminal justice records. Such requests are
limited to those made in connection with in-
vestigations to determine eligibility for (A)
access to classified information; (B) assign-
ment to or retention in sensitive national se-
curity duties: or (C) acceptance or retention
in the armed services. Fees charged for such
records cannot exceed those normally
charged to other agencies.
Subsection (b)(2) reiterates the authority
under the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution for such legislation.
Subsection (c) protects the rights of the
individual under investigation since it re-
quires his written permission for the release
of such Information by the local or state
criminal Justice agencies.
Subsection (d) acts as a further protection
to the rights of the individual under investi-
gation. It affords the protections found
under the Privacy Act to the subsequent dis-
closure of any erhninal history record infor-
mation obtained pursuant to this Act.
Section 4. Provides for the effective date
of the Act. Only those inquiries beginning
after enactment of the Act would be able to
utilize its provisions.
Section 5. This section states that the
amendments made by this Act are made
pursuant to Article I. Section 8 of the
United States Constitution. This reinforces
the Congressional intention to pre-empt
this area of legislation as an issue of nation-
al security.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I reserve
the remainder of my time.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the Secu-
rity Clearance Information Act of
1985, introduced by Senator NUNN and
myself today, will constitute a major
tool for enduring that all pertinent in-
formation relating to applicants for se-
curity clearances will be available to
background investigators. It is incredi-
ble that such is not the case today.
In the course of hearings before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations, which I chair, investigators
under the able direction of Senator
NUNN, PSI's ranking minority
member, revealed the shocking lack of
information this Government is able
to gather on persons who are to be
granted access to our most sensitive
national secrets. In many cases, only
information gained from Federal in-
dexes and a few neighbors is available
for use in determining a person's trust-
worthiness. The great store of infor-
mation regarding arrest history and
other matters of a criminal justice
nature at the State and local level has
been largely unavailable.
While certainly not determinative of
a person's current situation, such
arrest and conviction information is
absolutely necessary for a full adjudi-
cation of an application of a security
clearance.
Our PSI hearings demonstrated the
critical nature of both the initial and
reinvestigation of a candidate's back.
ground. That background check is our
first line of defense in safeguarding
important military secrets from our
enemies. If we are, by inaction, pre-
venting the most thorough screening
possible of the persons we entrust
with such infq oration, then we share
the blame for a security clearance
system that is ineffective and wasteful
of the taxpayers' dollars.
I urge my colleagues to join Senator
NUNN and myself to swiftly act on this
critical legislation.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I take
great pleasure in cosponsoring the Se-
curity Clearance Information Act of
1985, which my friend from Georgia,
Senator SAM NUxN, is introducing
today.
As the recent events surrounding
the Walker espionage case have made
all too clear, the threat of Soviet espi-
onage is all too real and pervasive. The
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies have a massive effort underway
in this country to steal our secrets and
our technology, in almost any manner
they can. Against the backdrop of this
threat, we have the sad and inexcus-
able state of affairs with respect to
our system of security clearances, a
system which is supposed to be one of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 25, 1985
our Nation's chief safeguards against
espionage.
Our system of clearances has arrived
at a state which resembles "fast food"
security clearance. The number of re-
quests for clearances has nearly dou-
bled since 1979, until now over 4 mil-
lion Americans hold clearances of
some kind. Over one-half of all Feder-
al employees hold a clearance, not to
mention 1.5 million defense contractor
employees. The weight of evidence
suggests that many of these clearances
are unnecessary. Thus, we are need-
lessly increasing the number of targets
for foreign agents.
This legislation is but a first step in
a series of legislative solutions that are
the result of hearings held by the Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions on this topic. These hearings
were presciently conceived by Senator
NUNN well before the events surround-
tng the Walker case came to light.
This legislation is an attempt to alle-
viate one of the more glaring problems
with our system of investigating appli-
cants for clearances. For many years.
State and local law enforcement au-
thorities have been more than cooper-
ative in sharing information with Fed-
eral agents. However, recently there
has been a disturbing trend toward
limiting the access to criminal records,
which has been seriously debilitating
to investigators from the Department
of Defense and the Office of Person-
nel Management. The Federal Govern-
ment has no guaranteed right to this
information under current law. This
bill would grant that access, thereby
closing one of the loopholes in our ex-
isting law.
The subcommittee will continue to
bring forth proposed solutions, and I
urge the support of my colleagues to
counter the real threat of espionage.
Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, recent
events have underscored our need to
close every possible loophole in our se-
curity clearance system. This legisla-
tion marks a continuation of congres-
sional effort to make sure that we give
Federal investigators every tool they
need in order to do their job effective-
ly. I am happy to bin Senator NUNN.
who initiated the subcommittee's
hearings and investigations.
When investigators are assigned to
look into a person's background for
the purpose of determining their fit-
ness for security clearances, they need
to be able to look at local criminal Jus-
tice records as part of their evaluation.
I, of course, recognize the natural
aversion that some State and local of-
ficials may have concerning Federal
bureaucrats from Washington, DC,
coming down looking through their
files and records. However, When you
consider the fact that the person
being investigated may hold an ex-
tremely sensitive position in the De-
fense Department or some other
agency, then the "inconvenience"
would be well worth it.
We need desperately to cut the
number of people who have clearances
and we need to do a better job of in-
vestigating the ones who are "cleared"
for access to classified materials.
There are nearly 4'h million persons
who have security clearances. We
probably don't know how many of
those persons have local criminal
records. Some States and localities co-
operate, others don't. None are legally
required to do so.
This bill will authorize access to
local criminal justice records under
three conditions. They are:
When Federal Government investi-
gators are conducting a background
check for access to classified informa-
tion.
During an investigation to determine
a person's eligibility to be assigned or
retained in a sensitive national securi-
ty post.
During an investigation to determine
acceptance or retention in the armed
services.
I strongly agree with the safeguards
written into the bill, and I want to em-
phasize that these safeguards are the
same as those provided for by the Pri-
vacy Act.
I want to compliment the senior
Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN] for
his leadership in this area that is of
tremendous concern to and for all
Americans. I participated in the hear-
ings of the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigation and heard some of
the testimony which spotlighted the
need for this legislation.
Mr. President, I am hopeful that
this bill will be quickly considered by
the Senate because it is clear that we
need to do everything we can to plug
as many holes as we can in our securi-
ty system.
ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
TRIBLE). Under the previous order,
there will now be a period for the
transaction of routine morning busi-
ness for not to extend beyond 11:30
a.m., with statements therein limited
to 5 minutes each.
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE
PROGRAM
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, it is a
pleasure to report clear and substan-
tial progress in an innovative program
to enhance understanding among
friendly nations and to enrich the
training of our diplomatic corps
abroad.
Three years ago, to celebrate the bi-
centennial of diplomatic relations be-
tween the United States and the Neth-
erlands, our two governments agreed
to exchange young diplomats for a
year. I am pleased to announce that
the first half of the first full ex-
change-in what I hope can become a
model for future exchanges with other
countries-has been taken. Tomorrow,
in ceremonies at the State Depart-
ment, Peter Le Poole of the Dutch
Foreign Ministry, will be inducted as
an honorary member of the U.S. Por-
eign Service.
Mr. Le Poole has earned this rare
distinction. In a year, Mr. Le Poole has
immersed himself in the American ex-
perience in a vigorous and searching
manner which should stand him in
good stead as he moves on to his coun-
try's embassy here as an economic of-
ficer. He has worked in my office; he
has spent time with Representative
BARNES of Maryland and other Mem-
bers of Congress; he has participated
in the activities of Senate and House
committees; he has traveled from one
end of the country to the other to ob-
serve the 1984 election; he has attend-
ed the annual conference of the Na-
tional League of Cities; he has taken
part in seminars at universities from
Charlottesville to Chicago.
Shortly, Mark Wiznitzer. an able
member of our own Foreign Service,
will travel to The Hague to complete
the exchange. I am confident that a
similar year of orientation for Mr.
Wiznitzer, who learned his Dutch on
the island of Curacao where his fa-
ther's business is located, will prove
equally valuable before he takes over
the post of political /economic officer
in our embassy in Holland.
Mr. Le Poole and Mr. Wiznitzer are
making history. We have had frequent
and continuing exchanges of officers
between NATO navies, armies and air
forces. But this is the first direct swap
of diplomatic officers to my knowl-
edge. Thanks to the Government of
the Netherlands, to the U.S. Informa-
tion Agency which paid for our ex-
penses on this end and thanks to the
Foreign Service Institute and Foreign
Commercial Service which helped ar-
range programs for these two diplo-
mats. we have initiated an experiment
which breaks new ground in strength-
ening the strong bonds of friendship
and respect between two old and trust-
ing allies. This kind of program also
holds great potential for lowering any
barriers that might separate people
with common aspirations and princi-
ples.
I salute Peter Le Poole for pioneer-
ing this program. I commend Mark
Wiznitzer for carrying it on. I look for-
ward to the day when many more
Peter Le Pooles and Mark Wiznrtzers
cross the Atlantic-and Pacific-to ad-
vance the cause of deeper and more
comprehensive international under-
standing.
BILL FREDERICK-A FRIEND
PASSES AWAY
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I speak
for many Kansans in mourning the
death of Bill Frederick. Bill was a
quadriplegic as a result of an injury
suffered when thrown from a horse 20
years ago. He never allowed adversity
to get in the way. Bill loved politics
and became a dedicated campaign
workerLor me and the Kansas Repub-
lican Party. Bat., he was far more than
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