RECOGNITION OF SENATOR NUNN

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CIA-RDP87B00858R000300360036-5
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December 22, 2016
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March 1, 2011
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36
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Publication Date: 
June 25, 1985
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MISC
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S 8710 Approved For Release 2011/03/02 : CIA-RDP87B00858R000300360036-5 'Y .,% June 25, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE P In other words, what have we learned and what have we rectified from the nightmare of 40 years past? Mr. President, I ask, indeed, what has become of those promises? The Genocide Treaty seas one promise. Ninety-six nations have ratified that treaty and thereby have promised to fight genocide in the future. But sadly, Mr. President, the United States has not made that promise. It has not ratified the Genocide Treaty. Our promise to future generations must be the ratification of the Geno- cide Treaty. The agony of the Holo- caust victims and the Holocaust survi- vors must not be forgotten as we move toward a calm future. The ratification of the Genocide Treaty will not erase the scars of the past. It will, however, serve as an assur- ance that the United States does not and will not condone the inhumane acts of genocide. RECOGNITION OF SENATOR NUNN The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nuxx] is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes. Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair. SECURITY CLEARANCE INFORMATION ACT OF 1985 Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to offer a bill which is intended to close a critical loophole in our Government's current Security Clearance Program. Senators WILLIAM ' V. ROTH, JR., LAWTON CHILES, ALBERT GORE, JR., and TED STEvai s join me in introducing the "Security Clearance Information Act of 1985." The problem which the bill addresses is the growing inability of Department of Defense, Office of Personnel Management [OPM], and Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] in- vestigators to obtain State and local criminal justice records on individuals being considered for access to classi- fied information or sensitive national security duties. As ranking minority member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investi- gations, I ordered an investigation of our Government's Security Clearance Program. This investigation culminat-, ed in 4 days of hearings held this past April. Senator ROTH, who as chairman of our subcommittee, gave his full sup- port and cooperation to those hear- ings, joins me today in introducing leg- islation drafted as a direct result of the subcommittee's work. Testimony at those hearings con- firmed that one of the most meaning- ful and productive sources of informa- tion in personnel security investiga- tions is local criminal justice records. For many years, local jurisdictions were quite forthcoming in making this information available to Federal inves- tigators from the Defense Investiga- tive Service [DIS], the Office of Per- sonnel Management, and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. However, our subcommittee learned that in recent years a disturbing trend has developed. Local and State juris- dictions in increasing numbers are de- nying DIS, OPM, and CIA agents access to criminal history records or permitting access to records of convic- tions only-not records of arrest. Other jurisdictions are severely limit- ing the number of requests that can be made or delaying the processing of these requests for a considerable period of time. The net result is that this important source of information is being seriously curtailed in many lo- calities throughout the country. Such a situation would be ludicrous if it did not have such far reaching and dangerous implications. Currently the U.S. Government is unable to obtain State and local criminal records on applicants for some of the most sensitive positions in the military and other Government agencies that are entrusted with our Nation's national security. Our recent hearings showed the serious nature of espionage as seen in the Christopher Boyce case at TRW, the William Holden Bell case at Hughes and the James Harper case at Systems Control Technology. The potential target for Soviet espi- onage efforts is, unfortunately, an in- creasingly massive one. Today more than 4 million Americans hold Gov- ernment security clearances, including more than 53 percent of Federal em- ployees. More than 144 million indus- try personnel are cleared. The latter figure alone has increased by over 44 percent since 1979. Cleared personnel have potential access to an incredibly large amount of classified material. In our subcommit- tee hearings we heard testimony that there are today over 17 million Gov- ernment secrets whose height, if stacked one on top of each, would equal the height of eight Washington Monuments. Obviously, our proposal today will not respond to the entire problem of espionage. However, it will close a loophole which the Department of De- fense, the Office of Personnel Man- agement, the Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion specifically brought to our atten- tion during our hearings. To correct this problem, I propose this bill which specifically authorizes the Federal Government to obtain access to local criminal justice records when conducting eligibility investiga- tions for, one, access to classified in- formation: two, assignment to or re- tention in sensitive national security duties: or three, acceptance or reten- tion in the armed services. Such a re- quest is only permitted if the person under investigation consents to it in writing. Moreover, the criminal histo- ry record information obtained pursu- ant to this request would be afforded the same protections as provided by the Privacy Act. In conclusion, Mr. President, I once again must emphasize the importance of this legislation. Since the Inception of the Government's personnel securi- ty investigation program, one of the most meaningful resources of infonna- tion has been the criminal justice records of municipalities, counties and States. These local criminal records contain a wealth of information par- ticularly pertinent to the trustworthi- ness and reliability of persons who are employed in sensitive positions or have access to classified information. In recent years, access to these vital files has been seriously eroding. This inability to review criminal record histories is causing severe delays in clearing employees for Fed- eral work and contracts. In addition, it is impairing the Government's ability to evaluate the overall suitability of an individual for a sensitive position and. thus, decreasing the Government's ability to meet its obligations for maintaining and safeguarding classi- fied information. Not suprisingly, hos- tile intelligence services are not overly intimidated by a Government persop- nel security program like this where the proverbial left hand of the Gov- ernment does not know or is not al- lowed to know what the right hand does. I recommend passage of this bill so that we can put some credence into our Security Clearance Program. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the text and the section-by- section analysis of the bill be printed in the REcoaD. There being no objection, the mate- rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: 9.1347 Be it enacted by the Senate and House if Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. SHORT TITLE SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Security Clearance Information Act of 1985". CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND POLICIIS SEc. 2. The Congress finds- (1) that under the Constitution. Congress has the responsibility and power to provide for the common defense and security of our Nation; (2) that the interests of national secutlt} require that the Department of Defense. the Office of Personnel Management, or the Central Intelligence Agency conduct investi- sations of individuals for the purpose of de- termining eligibility for access to classified Information, assignment to or rotw*ion in sensitive national security duties, or accept- ance or retention in the armed services: (3) that the interests of national Security require that the Department of Defense. the Office of Personnel Management, or the Central Intelligence Agency have access to Criminal history record Information when conducting investigations of individuals for the purpose of determining elWbility for access to classified information, assignment to or retention in sensitive national security duties, or acceptance or retention in the armed services: and (4) that the interests of national security have been adversely affected '-y the reluc Approved For Release 2011/03/02 : CIA-RDP87B00858R000300360036-5 Approved For Release 2011/03/02 : CIA-RDP87B00858R000300360036-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 8711 investigation for the release of such Infor- mation for one or more of the purposes set forth in subsection (b). "(d) Criminal history record information received under this section shall not be dis- closed except for the purposes set forth in subsection (b) or as provided by section 552a of Title 5, United States Code.". Sec. 4. The amendments made by this Act shall become effective with respect to any inquiry which begins after the date of en- actment of this Act conducted by the De- partment of Defense. the Office of Person- nel Management, or the Central Intelli- gence Agency for any of the purposes speci- fied in subsection (b) of section 520a of Title 10, United States Code, as added by this Act. Sax. 5. The amendments made by this Act are made pursuant to the powers vested in Congress as found in Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution. Lance and refusal of many state and local criminal Justice agencies to provide criminal history record information to the Depart- ment of Defense, the Office of Personnel Management. or the Central Intelligence Agency for use in investigations of individ- uals for the purpose of determining eligibil- ity for access to classified information, as- signment to or retention in sensitive nation- al security duties, or acceptance or retention In the armed services. Sac. 3. Chapter 31 of Title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out sec- tion 520a and substituting the following: "SECTION 520.. CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD IN- FORMATION FOR NATIONAL SE('t'RI- ?t'Y PURPOSES "(a) As used in this chapter: ^(1) The term "criminal justice agency" includes federal, state, and local agencies and means: (A) courts or (B) government agency or any subunit thereof which per- forms the administration of criminal justice pursuant to a statute or Executive Order, and which allocates a substant k) part of its annual budget to the administration of criminal Justice. "(2) The term "Criminal history record in- formation" means information collected by criminal justice agencies on individuals con- sisting of identifiable descriptions and nota- tions of arrests, detentions, indictments, in- formation, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, sen- tencing, correction supervision, and release. The term does not include identification in- formation such as fingerprint records to the extent that such information does not indi- cate involvement of the Individual in the criminal justice system. "(3) The term "classified information" means information or material designated pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive Order as requiring protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security. "(4) The term "state" means any of the several States, the District of Columbia. the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. the North- ern Mariana Islands, Guam, the Virgin Is- lands, American Samoa, the Trust Territory 'Of Pacific Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States. "(5) The term "local" and "locality" means any local government authority or agency or component thereof within a State having Jurisdiction over matters at a county, municipal or other local govern- ment level. " (b)(1) Upon request by the Department of Defense, the Office of Personnel Manage- ment. or the Central Intelligence Agency criminal justice agencies shall make avail- able criminal history record Information re- garding individuals under investigation by the Department of Defense, the Office of Personnel Management, or the Central In- telligence Agency for the purpose of deter- mining eligibility for (A) access to classified information, (B) assignment to or retention in sensitive national security duties, or (C) acceptance or retention in the armed serv- ices. Fees charged for providing criminal history record information pursuant to this subsection shall not exceed those charged to other government agencies for such infor- mation. "(2) This subsection shall apply notwith- standing any other provision of law or regu- lation of any State or of any locality within s State, or any other law of the United States. ?"(c) The Department of Defense, the Office of Personnel Management, or the Central Intelligence Agency shall not obtain criminal history record information pursu- ant to this section unless it has received written consent from the individual under SECTION-BY-SLUrION ANALYSIS Section 1. States the title of the bill. Section 2. Four subsections specify the Congressional findings Justifying federal action in this area. Congress is entrusted with the responsibility and power to provide for our national security. These provisions establish that the inability of the Depart- ment of the Defense, the Office of Person- nel Management, and the Central Intelli- gence Agency to obtain state and local criminal justice records when conducting background investigation negatively impacts upon our nation's security. Section 3. Amends Title 10. United States Code. Section 520(a) by striking Its language and substituting the proposed legislation. The current language of Section 520(a) is in- adequate. Its language requests, but does not require, state and local governments to provide criminal history information. It is also inadequate since it is limited only to the Department of Defense and only for military recruitment purposes. The new 520(a) language makes the lan- guage mandatory and broadens Its scope beyond military recruitment to include con- tractor. civilian and military personnel with access to sensitive national security infor- mation or duties. ' Subsection (&X1-5) defines the appropri- ate terms as used in the-statute. It utilizes those definitions now commonly used in the 'law enforcement community. Subsection (b)(1) specifically authorizes the federal government, through the De- partment of Defense, the Office of Person- nel Management, or the Central Intelli- gence Agency, to obtain access to local criminal justice records. Such requests are limited to those made in connection with in- vestigations to determine eligibility for (A) access to classified information; (B) assign- ment to or retention in sensitive national se- curity duties: or (C) acceptance or retention in the armed services. Fees charged for such records cannot exceed those normally charged to other agencies. Subsection (b)(2) reiterates the authority under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution for such legislation. Subsection (c) protects the rights of the individual under investigation since it re- quires his written permission for the release of such Information by the local or state criminal Justice agencies. Subsection (d) acts as a further protection to the rights of the individual under investi- gation. It affords the protections found under the Privacy Act to the subsequent dis- closure of any erhninal history record infor- mation obtained pursuant to this Act. Section 4. Provides for the effective date of the Act. Only those inquiries beginning after enactment of the Act would be able to utilize its provisions. Section 5. This section states that the amendments made by this Act are made pursuant to Article I. Section 8 of the United States Constitution. This reinforces the Congressional intention to pre-empt this area of legislation as an issue of nation- al security. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the Secu- rity Clearance Information Act of 1985, introduced by Senator NUNN and myself today, will constitute a major tool for enduring that all pertinent in- formation relating to applicants for se- curity clearances will be available to background investigators. It is incredi- ble that such is not the case today. In the course of hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investi- gations, which I chair, investigators under the able direction of Senator NUNN, PSI's ranking minority member, revealed the shocking lack of information this Government is able to gather on persons who are to be granted access to our most sensitive national secrets. In many cases, only information gained from Federal in- dexes and a few neighbors is available for use in determining a person's trust- worthiness. The great store of infor- mation regarding arrest history and other matters of a criminal justice nature at the State and local level has been largely unavailable. While certainly not determinative of a person's current situation, such arrest and conviction information is absolutely necessary for a full adjudi- cation of an application of a security clearance. Our PSI hearings demonstrated the critical nature of both the initial and reinvestigation of a candidate's back. ground. That background check is our first line of defense in safeguarding important military secrets from our enemies. If we are, by inaction, pre- venting the most thorough screening possible of the persons we entrust with such infq oration, then we share the blame for a security clearance system that is ineffective and wasteful of the taxpayers' dollars. I urge my colleagues to join Senator NUNN and myself to swiftly act on this critical legislation. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I take great pleasure in cosponsoring the Se- curity Clearance Information Act of 1985, which my friend from Georgia, Senator SAM NUxN, is introducing today. As the recent events surrounding the Walker espionage case have made all too clear, the threat of Soviet espi- onage is all too real and pervasive. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have a massive effort underway in this country to steal our secrets and our technology, in almost any manner they can. Against the backdrop of this threat, we have the sad and inexcus- able state of affairs with respect to our system of security clearances, a system which is supposed to be one of Approved For Release 2011/03/02 : CIA-RDP87B00858R000300360036-5 88712 Approved For Release 2011/03/02 : CIA-RDP87B00858R000300360036-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 25, 1985 our Nation's chief safeguards against espionage. Our system of clearances has arrived at a state which resembles "fast food" security clearance. The number of re- quests for clearances has nearly dou- bled since 1979, until now over 4 mil- lion Americans hold clearances of some kind. Over one-half of all Feder- al employees hold a clearance, not to mention 1.5 million defense contractor employees. The weight of evidence suggests that many of these clearances are unnecessary. Thus, we are need- lessly increasing the number of targets for foreign agents. This legislation is but a first step in a series of legislative solutions that are the result of hearings held by the Per- manent Subcommittee on Investiga- tions on this topic. These hearings were presciently conceived by Senator NUNN well before the events surround- tng the Walker case came to light. This legislation is an attempt to alle- viate one of the more glaring problems with our system of investigating appli- cants for clearances. For many years. State and local law enforcement au- thorities have been more than cooper- ative in sharing information with Fed- eral agents. However, recently there has been a disturbing trend toward limiting the access to criminal records, which has been seriously debilitating to investigators from the Department of Defense and the Office of Person- nel Management. The Federal Govern- ment has no guaranteed right to this information under current law. This bill would grant that access, thereby closing one of the loopholes in our ex- isting law. The subcommittee will continue to bring forth proposed solutions, and I urge the support of my colleagues to counter the real threat of espionage. Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, recent events have underscored our need to close every possible loophole in our se- curity clearance system. This legisla- tion marks a continuation of congres- sional effort to make sure that we give Federal investigators every tool they need in order to do their job effective- ly. I am happy to bin Senator NUNN. who initiated the subcommittee's hearings and investigations. When investigators are assigned to look into a person's background for the purpose of determining their fit- ness for security clearances, they need to be able to look at local criminal Jus- tice records as part of their evaluation. I, of course, recognize the natural aversion that some State and local of- ficials may have concerning Federal bureaucrats from Washington, DC, coming down looking through their files and records. However, When you consider the fact that the person being investigated may hold an ex- tremely sensitive position in the De- fense Department or some other agency, then the "inconvenience" would be well worth it. We need desperately to cut the number of people who have clearances and we need to do a better job of in- vestigating the ones who are "cleared" for access to classified materials. There are nearly 4'h million persons who have security clearances. We probably don't know how many of those persons have local criminal records. Some States and localities co- operate, others don't. None are legally required to do so. This bill will authorize access to local criminal justice records under three conditions. They are: When Federal Government investi- gators are conducting a background check for access to classified informa- tion. During an investigation to determine a person's eligibility to be assigned or retained in a sensitive national securi- ty post. During an investigation to determine acceptance or retention in the armed services. I strongly agree with the safeguards written into the bill, and I want to em- phasize that these safeguards are the same as those provided for by the Pri- vacy Act. I want to compliment the senior Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN] for his leadership in this area that is of tremendous concern to and for all Americans. I participated in the hear- ings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation and heard some of the testimony which spotlighted the need for this legislation. Mr. President, I am hopeful that this bill will be quickly considered by the Senate because it is clear that we need to do everything we can to plug as many holes as we can in our securi- ty system. ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TRIBLE). Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning busi- ness for not to extend beyond 11:30 a.m., with statements therein limited to 5 minutes each. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE PROGRAM Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, it is a pleasure to report clear and substan- tial progress in an innovative program to enhance understanding among friendly nations and to enrich the training of our diplomatic corps abroad. Three years ago, to celebrate the bi- centennial of diplomatic relations be- tween the United States and the Neth- erlands, our two governments agreed to exchange young diplomats for a year. I am pleased to announce that the first half of the first full ex- change-in what I hope can become a model for future exchanges with other countries-has been taken. Tomorrow, in ceremonies at the State Depart- ment, Peter Le Poole of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, will be inducted as an honorary member of the U.S. Por- eign Service. Mr. Le Poole has earned this rare distinction. In a year, Mr. Le Poole has immersed himself in the American ex- perience in a vigorous and searching manner which should stand him in good stead as he moves on to his coun- try's embassy here as an economic of- ficer. He has worked in my office; he has spent time with Representative BARNES of Maryland and other Mem- bers of Congress; he has participated in the activities of Senate and House committees; he has traveled from one end of the country to the other to ob- serve the 1984 election; he has attend- ed the annual conference of the Na- tional League of Cities; he has taken part in seminars at universities from Charlottesville to Chicago. Shortly, Mark Wiznitzer. an able member of our own Foreign Service, will travel to The Hague to complete the exchange. I am confident that a similar year of orientation for Mr. Wiznitzer, who learned his Dutch on the island of Curacao where his fa- ther's business is located, will prove equally valuable before he takes over the post of political /economic officer in our embassy in Holland. Mr. Le Poole and Mr. Wiznitzer are making history. We have had frequent and continuing exchanges of officers between NATO navies, armies and air forces. But this is the first direct swap of diplomatic officers to my knowl- edge. Thanks to the Government of the Netherlands, to the U.S. Informa- tion Agency which paid for our ex- penses on this end and thanks to the Foreign Service Institute and Foreign Commercial Service which helped ar- range programs for these two diplo- mats. we have initiated an experiment which breaks new ground in strength- ening the strong bonds of friendship and respect between two old and trust- ing allies. This kind of program also holds great potential for lowering any barriers that might separate people with common aspirations and princi- ples. I salute Peter Le Poole for pioneer- ing this program. I commend Mark Wiznitzer for carrying it on. I look for- ward to the day when many more Peter Le Pooles and Mark Wiznrtzers cross the Atlantic-and Pacific-to ad- vance the cause of deeper and more comprehensive international under- standing. BILL FREDERICK-A FRIEND PASSES AWAY Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I speak for many Kansans in mourning the death of Bill Frederick. Bill was a quadriplegic as a result of an injury suffered when thrown from a horse 20 years ago. He never allowed adversity to get in the way. Bill loved politics and became a dedicated campaign workerLor me and the Kansas Repub- lican Party. Bat., he was far more than Approved For Release 2011/03/02 : CIA-RDP87B00858R000300360036-5