PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON EMPLOYMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1983
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/11/06 CIA-RDP87BO1034R000100020001-1
18 OCT 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR:
I
ministr.a ive Law Division
Office of General. Counsel
STAT
I
ie _, o .icy and Plans Group
Office of Security
SUBJECT: Proposed Executive Orders on Employment
in the Federal Government and Protection
of National Security Information (U)
STAT
1. Representatives of the Office of Security have reviewed
the two proposed Executive Orders which you provided to STAT
I f this Office on 4 October 1983. The following comm,n s STAT
are o fered. (C)
? We have no basic objection to the concept of
two Executive Orders - one for Federal employment
and one for employment in positions requiring
access to National Security Information (NSI). (U)
? In Section 2, line 2 of the Order for the
Protection of NSI, we are unclear on what
constitutes prudent "management risk" (sic) no
doubt it should be "prudent risk management." We
would prefer a simple statement (as it does almost
appear later in the same sentence) that "Executive
Branch security officials must carefully weigh all
factors which suggest that a person may not
properly safeguard...." (U)
? The Order on NSI appears somewhat heavy-handed
and seems to give exclusive and final authority to
security officials alone. Senior Agency officials
who are now included in the appeal process under
DCID 1/14 would-appear to be excluded in this
version. (U)
0 Section 3, lines 1-7 of the proposed NSI Order
do not seem to take into consideration a person's
past activities. (U)
? It is suggested that the characteristics cited
in Section 3 either be listed or placed in various
groupings rather than provided in narrative
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
STAT
OS 3 2528
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style. The latter approach appears to us a bit heavy-
handed. (U)
? The last two lines of Section 3 suggest that once an
individual has been turned down, he or she will never, again
be considered for access. (U)
0 Section 4, line 23 mentions Congressmen and Federal
judges as persons who can receive classified information
without formal clearance when needed. Should not Cabinet
officials and others confirmed by the Senate be included?
Furthermore, it would seem that the DCI should have
releasing authority for information relating to Foreign
Counterintelligence and the Director of the FBI for
information relating to domestic counterintelligence. Also,
should such dissemination to "uncleared" persons not be
subject to minimum sanitization of certain materials in
order to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and
methods information? (C)
S7
0 Section 5, lines 10-14 do not accurately portray the
situation. The Department of Energy does not conduct
background investigations when access to atomic energy
information (RD) is required. The Office of Personnel
Management does most of those investigations, with the FBI
(probably) still doing a few of them. (U)
? The last four lines of Section 5 must be re-cast.
(and other agencies) must be able to see all available
suitability information in order to reach a security
determination. We cannot let an official at some other
agency decide for us what is or is not pertinent to our
security interests. (U)
0 The restriction "only to the security offices" in line 5
of Section 6 suggests that the FBI would not be able to
share data, as it does now, with the Agency's Directorate
for Operations. (S)
0 It is not clear to us whether the wording in Section 6,
lines 15-20 means that information CIA receives from another
agency may be used only for lead purposes. Under this
wording, would CIA be allowed to make a security
determination on the basis of the information it received?
(C)
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? There is no mention of "other investigative measures."
A specific reference to use of the polygraph when
appropriate might be considered here. (U)
? The question also arises as to whether the NSI Executive
order should specify the level of Background Investigation
for a specific level of access or if this should be left to
the implementing regulations. As long as the original
standards are set sufficiently high, we might have more
uniformity if the NSI Executive order stated them
succinctly. (S)
? Again, and this time with respect to Section 2, lines
15-28, of the proposed Executive Order on Employment in the
Federal Government, we would note that Agency officials must
see all available information in order to make informed
decisions about an individual's suitability for Government
employment. (U)
2. If you have any questions concerning these comments,
please contact Policy and Plans Group, on black STAT
line
xtensio7 STAAT
F I
Distribution:
Ori Adse
l - OS Registry
1 - PPG Chrono
OS/PIM/PPG1c (170ct83)
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000100020001-1