PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REGULATION

Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
By virtue of the authority and discretion vested in me
under the Constitution to protect the national security and
conduct the foreign relations of the United States, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. This Order cover ns certain
practices and procedures relating to the protec-
tion of national security information and estab-
lishes minimum security standards for granting
United States Government employees and contrac-
tors, and other appropriate persons, access to
such information. Additional security standards
relating to the protection of national security
information may be established by individual
agencies to the extent deemed appropriate by such
agencies. National security information is
information classified pursuant to Executive
Order 12356, or any prior or subsequent Orders.
This Order does not govern federal employment
suitability, and the fact that a person is
security disapproved pursuant to this order does
not bar that person from federal employment in a
position for which that person is otherwise
qualified and for which access to classified
information or to sensitive facilities is not
required.
Section 2. To protect the security of
classified information, the prudent management of
risk is essential. Fisk management requires a
careful weighing and balancing by Executive
Eranch security officials of all factors which
suggest that a person may not properly safeguard
classified information, and a person may be
security disapproved as a result of a security
judgment based upon one or a combination of these
factors. No person has an entitlement or right
of access to classified information or to sensi-
tive facilities and the granting, denial, or
withdrawal of such access is committed to the
sound discretion of Executive Branch security
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
officials. In view of the low degree of risk to
the national security which can be accepted, a
critical element in granting access to classified
information or to sensitive facilities is whether
there exists the requisite confidence in a
person's ability to protect this nation's secrets
of state. In all security evaluations, the
protection of the national interest shall be
paramount and any doubts concerning a person
having access to classified information or to
sensitive facilities shall be resolved in favor
of the national security and against the person
having such access.
Section 3. The factors to be considered in
assessing the risk of granting or continuing
access to classified information or to sensitive
facilities in any given case relate to whether or
not the person under consideration may have
vulnerabilities or may engacte in any exploitable
personal conduct or indiscreet behavior. R t a
minimum, it shall be a prerequisite for any
person having access to classified information or
to sensitive facilities to be trustworthy,
reliable, and to have excellent character, judg-
ment, and discretion. Another prerequisite is
that a person should not have a background
reflecting criminal or dishonest activity, abuse
of controlled substances and other drugs, alcohol
abuse, exploitable sexual conduct, financial
irregularities, or mental, emotional, or finan-
cial instability. A further prerequisite is that
a person should be of unquestioned loyalty to the
United States and not susceptible to undue
influence, coercion, or duress. In this regard,
doubts concerning suitability for access to
classified information or to sensitive facilities
need not stem from evidence of disloyalty itself;
questions concerning the security suitability of
a person may arise from any of the factors which
indicate that a person could pose a security risk
to the protection of classified information.
During the course of any security investigation
conducted to determine whether or not a person
should have access to classified information or
to sensitive facilities, Executive Branch
security officials may take into account the
activities of any individuals with whom the
person is bound by ties of affection, or with
whom the person is in close and continuing
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
contact, and the activities of any individuals in
the person's immediate family. Also to be taken
into account is whether or not any such indivi-
duals are foreign nationals or reside in a
foreign country. The nature and scope of any
foreign travel performed by the person being
considered for initial or continued access shall
be another pertinent factor. Access to classi-
fied information or to sensitive facilities can
be denied or withdrawn by an Executive Branch
agency when it is determined that a person does
not meet the security standards of that parti-
cular agency, taking into account all of the
factors discussed above, or when it is determined
that sufficient information cannot be developed
to evaluate the person under that agency's
security standards. This determination shall be
final and unreviewable.
Section 4. When it is determined that a
person meets the security standards of an
Executive Branch agency, that person may be
granted a security clearance or a limited
security approval. A person shall not be hired
for or placed in a position requiring a security
clearance or approval until such clearance or
approval has been granted. Classified informa-
tion may be disseminated by authorized Executive
Branch officials to persons without security
clearances or approvals if such persons are
Members of Congress, Federal judges, officials of
foreign governments who have appropriate levels
of clearance under their own classification
system, or with the permission of the Director of
Central Intelligence when necessary in the course
of intelligence or counterintelligence opera-
tions, or with the permission of the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) when
necessary in the course of law enforcement
operations.
Section 5. In order to properly evaluate a
person under consideration for being granted
access to classified information or to sensitive
facilities, that person must undergo an appro-
priate background investigation. Such background
investigations shall be conducted by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) when access to CIA
information or facilities is involved., by the
Defense Investigative Service when access to
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
Department of Defense information or facilities
is involved, by the FBI in the case of certain
Presidential appointees or when access to
Department of Justice information or facilities
is involved and by the Office of Personnel
Management in all other cases. An agency which
would otherwise be required by this order to
conduct a background investigation may avail
itself of the investigative services of any other
agency and may accept as valid any background
investigation conducted by another agency and any
security clearance or approval granted by another
agency regarding any particular person. When a
person undergoes a background investigation, the
investigation shall include a National Agency
Security Check (NASC). A NASC shall consist of a
records check by appropriate agencies of the
Executive Branch for all records concerning the
person under investigation. The purpose of a
NASC is to enable the investigating agency to
determine if any information exists which would
cast doubt on whether the person should have
access to classified information or to sensitive
facilities. Any person who has been granted
access to classified information or to sensitive
facilities is subject to reinvestigation at any
time.
Section 6. Any information of security
significance concerning any person developed by
an agency during the course of a background
investigation, or otherwise, may be disseminated
only to appropriate security and intelligence
officers of other Executive Branch agencies, and
to the FBI if a violation of law may have
occurred, under tight controls and on a strict
need-to-know basis. Such information may be
disseminated without a confrontation of the
source or sources of that information when the
confidentiality of the source or sources has been
assured by the agency collecting the informa-
tion or when confrontation would disclose a
method of security processing or intelligence
gathering. Any agency, other than the FBI, that
receives such information from another agency
shall only use that information as a basis for
conducting a de novo security investigation and
evaluation of any issues raised by that informa-
tion.
Section 7. Failure to meet an agency's
security standards or to comply with an agency's
security regulations, such as the mishandling of
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
Department of Defense information or facilities
is involved, by the FBI in the case of certain
Presidential appointees or when access to
Department of Justice information or facilities
is involved and by the office of Personnel.
Management in all other cases. An agency which
conduct a background investigation mace tlas
valid any background investigation conducted by 04
another agency and any security clearance or
approval granted by another agency regarding any
particular person. When a person undergoes a
background investigation, the investigation shall
include a National Agency Security Check (NASC).
A N1SC shall consist of a records check by appro-
priate agencies of the Executive Branch for all
records concerning the person under investi-
gation. The purpose of a NASC is to enable the
investigating agency to determine if any informa-
tion exists which would cast doubt on whether the
person should have access to classified infor-
mation or to sensitive facilities. Any person
who has been granted access to classified
information or to sensitive facilities is subject
to reinvestigation at any time.
Section 6. Any information of security
significance concerning any person developed by
an agency during the course of a background
investigation, or otherwise, may be disseminated
only to appropriate security and intelligence
officers of other Executive Branch agencies, and
to the FBI if a violation of law may have
occurred, under tight controls and on a strict
need-to-know basis. Such information may be
disseminated without a confrontation of the
source or sources of that information when the
confidentiality of the source or sources has been
assured by the agency collecting the informa-
tion or when confrontation would disclose a
method of security processing or intelligence
gathering. Any agency, other than the FBI, that
receives such information from another agency
shall only use that information as a basis for
conducting a de novo security investigation and
evaluation of any issues raised by that informa-
tion.
Section 7. Failure to meet an agency's
security standards or to comply with an agency's
security regulations, such as the mishandling of
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
 Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9
classified information by unauthorized disclosure
or otherwise, is sufficient cause for withdrawing
a security clearance or approval, and for taking
other administrative action, including but not
limited to suspension and termination of employ-
ment under 5 U.S.C. ? 7531, et seq., or any other
provisions of law deemed appropriate by the
agency concerned.
Section 8. The head of each agency shall
have final authority for all security matters
within their purview and shall promulgate
appropriate regulations to implement this Order.
This Order supplements the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 and Public Law 88-290. Executive order
10865 shall be modified as necessary to be made
consistent with this Order. Executive Order
10450 is hereby rescinded.
Ronald Reagan
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP87B01034R000100020003-9