DEAR MR. VAN COOK:

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 26, 2005
Sequence Number: 
35
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 13, 1981
Content Type: 
LETTER
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-1.pdf139.31 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 :CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-, CENTf~AL INTELLIGF'NCE AGENCY WASFiINC~TON. [7.C. ~f),~a0a i 1r ~ ~kr~:hur F. Van Cool; Diret:t.or crf Information Security Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of L~~fense for Policy Review De)aartment; of Defense Room 3C26Q Pontag~an ;;ra`~.(7..!_n~Tt(32~!, D. 20301 Lear ~'tT". ~~~aalS COOi~;: t It~e share tote concern, expressed :in your 1e~.ter of I9 October 198.). , for prc~ ~:ec c.zng certa~ rl, .::.reformation that does not meet the corr. ent criter~.a for class..-i ficcation tinder Executive Order 12065. ):rr past%cula_r, we beli.e~%e eerie. a~~-~~janced U. S. technology relating to national security systems should be ~:-ffelrc7ecl protection. The proposal to provide this protection by addi;~g y'KE~TRICTED" as a fourth Ievel of classification, however, raises several qucs~:ions that we feel should be resolved before we can fully support: this approao)r. .~~s you i~~.ocv, the 16 October 1981 Information Security Oversight ~.~~fi~.~ (ISOO~ draft replacement for Executive Order 12065 enhances the: ability of t}'e U.S. Government to protect technological information even without the acldytiun o:~ a rrew classification Level. Por example, Section 1-101 (c) no l.orlger t~rou:ld xequixe a showing of "identifiable" damage to the national security in Urder to classify information. Section 1=103 no longer would require that .i:x:~arniation not be classified if there is reasonable doubt as to rahether it s~iould b4. Section 1-3G2 would require explicitly that inf~~~natinn be classified if it is ari element of what has been referred to as the "aggregate" or "mosaic", llnd Section 1-~Ol no longer would require that a maximum duration of classification tae set when in~ormation is classified. .Given these changes to Executive Order 12065, ~~re believe that the proposal. to add a "FtESTRICTEI7" classification could in some cases result in information being provided less protection than it warrants. The new classificatien le~-el easily could become a "catchall" for information that in many cases should and cc~i~lcl be classified Confidential. tiVe believe, for example, that a loss of actra,itage to the U.S. resulting from the disclosure of technol--~~c::~: ~~~rormation relating to the national security would indeed damage t?~a ~.ati:.unal securit}", and therefore suer. information should be classified at least Confidential. Approved For Release 2005/08/02 :CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-1 i Approved. For Release 2005/08/02 :CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-1 C:Aassifying information "RESTRIC'!'Ell" rather than Confident~_al would. be of particular concern in light of the proposal that access to such infs:irmation would .require only need-to-lrno~v and would not require a security r,.earance. SVhi1e "RESTRICTED" information may be protected from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, dissemination controlled onl}* by Hoed-to-lrnow would be inadequate to prevent entry into the public ~'oz;iairi. 1'~it}i the positive approach to classification reflected in the ISOO draft replacement for Executive Order 120f5, we should be able to protect against loss of advantage to the U.S. through general ~uzderstanding and :increased utilization of classification in the aggregate. This would avoid. possibly 1~hrowing the entire national security classification system open to qu.~sti.on by the inclusion of information that does Hat require a determination of t:rc~.stw~~rt:hiness before granting access. 1~4'e ar?:- hopef_ul that the above questions Emig}it be resolved. t}-iroug}i a reformulat~.iorz of the "RES'iRICTE.i)" proposal that would include a requ~.rement for a determination of trustworthiness consistent with the existing three classification levels. Alternatively, we might support a.n. effor.t to establish a basis- for protecting tec}inological infornat~.on throug}~. J_egi_sl.ation or a sepa~?~,.t~; I:ixecutive ordex? addressing the need. to tvithholci c:.ertai.n unclassified: info~:~~~.ation from public disclosure. lye would be happy coo meet wit}i you and: of}ie,x' I.nterestecl par. ties to explore such . alternats.ve app~-riaches to avoiding ti:~; :I.[rs:y of advantage to the U.S. resulting' from p~-c.~naGtire disclosure; of sensitive information. Sincerely, Director of Information Services Directorate of Administration STAT DDA/OIS/R'~~?/RSB 1,-~v (13 November 1981) Distribution: Original-Addressee ?.~-OIS 1?-RSB Subject: Classification Mgt/EO 12065 Revision 1 ?-RSB Chrono STAT / -?- a ~r ~ - ~~ .~~.:., ~~ STAT ~-- ~r~,/:-r~~ r2 ,f~, ~~, Approved For Release 2005/08/02 :CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-1