DEAR MR. VAN COOK:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 13, 1981
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2005/08/02 :CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050035-,
CENTf~AL INTELLIGF'NCE AGENCY
WASFiINC~TON. [7.C. ~f),~a0a
i 1r ~ ~kr~:hur F. Van Cool;
Diret:t.or crf Information Security
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
L~~fense for Policy Review
De)aartment; of Defense
Room 3C26Q
Pontag~an
;;ra`~.(7..!_n~Tt(32~!, D. 20301
Lear ~'tT". ~~~aalS COOi~;:
t It~e share tote concern, expressed :in your 1e~.ter of I9 October 198.). , for
prc~ ~:ec c.zng certa~ rl, .::.reformation that does not meet the corr. ent criter~.a for
class..-i ficcation tinder Executive Order 12065. ):rr past%cula_r, we beli.e~%e eerie.
a~~-~~janced U. S. technology relating to national security systems should be
~:-ffelrc7ecl protection. The proposal to provide this protection by addi;~g
y'KE~TRICTED" as a fourth Ievel of classification, however, raises several
qucs~:ions that we feel should be resolved before we can fully support: this
approao)r.
.~~s you i~~.ocv, the 16 October 1981 Information Security Oversight
~.~~fi~.~ (ISOO~ draft replacement for Executive Order 12065 enhances the: ability
of t}'e U.S. Government to protect technological information even without the
acldytiun o:~ a rrew classification Level. Por example, Section 1-101 (c) no
l.orlger t~rou:ld xequixe a showing of "identifiable" damage to the national security
in Urder to classify information. Section 1=103 no longer would require that
.i:x:~arniation not be classified if there is reasonable doubt as to rahether it
s~iould b4. Section 1-3G2 would require explicitly that inf~~~natinn be
classified if it is ari element of what has been referred to as the "aggregate"
or "mosaic", llnd Section 1-~Ol no longer would require that a maximum duration
of classification tae set when in~ormation is classified.
.Given these changes to Executive Order 12065, ~~re believe that the proposal.
to add a "FtESTRICTEI7" classification could in some cases result in information
being provided less protection than it warrants. The new classificatien le~-el
easily could become a "catchall" for information that in many cases should and
cc~i~lcl be classified Confidential. tiVe believe, for example, that a loss of
actra,itage to the U.S. resulting from the disclosure of technol--~~c::~: ~~~rormation
relating to the national security would indeed damage t?~a ~.ati:.unal securit}",
and therefore suer. information should be classified at least Confidential.
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C:Aassifying information "RESTRIC'!'Ell" rather than Confident~_al would.
be of particular concern in light of the proposal that access to such
infs:irmation would .require only need-to-lrno~v and would not require a security
r,.earance. SVhi1e "RESTRICTED" information may be protected from public
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, dissemination controlled
onl}* by Hoed-to-lrnow would be inadequate to prevent entry into the public
~'oz;iairi. 1'~it}i the positive approach to classification reflected in the ISOO
draft replacement for Executive Order 120f5, we should be able to protect
against loss of advantage to the U.S. through general ~uzderstanding and
:increased utilization of classification in the aggregate. This would avoid.
possibly 1~hrowing the entire national security classification system open to
qu.~sti.on by the inclusion of information that does Hat require a determination
of t:rc~.stw~~rt:hiness before granting access.
1~4'e ar?:- hopef_ul that the above questions Emig}it be resolved. t}-iroug}i a
reformulat~.iorz of the "RES'iRICTE.i)" proposal that would include a requ~.rement
for a determination of trustworthiness consistent with the existing three
classification levels. Alternatively, we might support a.n. effor.t to establish
a basis- for protecting tec}inological infornat~.on throug}~. J_egi_sl.ation or a
sepa~?~,.t~; I:ixecutive ordex? addressing the need. to tvithholci c:.ertai.n unclassified:
info~:~~~.ation from public disclosure. lye would be happy coo meet wit}i you and:
of}ie,x' I.nterestecl par. ties to explore such . alternats.ve app~-riaches to avoiding
ti:~; :I.[rs:y of advantage to the U.S. resulting' from p~-c.~naGtire disclosure; of
sensitive information.
Sincerely,
Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
STAT
DDA/OIS/R'~~?/RSB 1,-~v (13 November 1981)
Distribution:
Original-Addressee
?.~-OIS
1?-RSB Subject: Classification Mgt/EO 12065 Revision
1 ?-RSB Chrono
STAT / -?- a ~r ~ - ~~ .~~.:., ~~
STAT ~-- ~r~,/:-r~~ r2 ,f~, ~~,
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