DOD SUGGESTED CHANGES TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12065

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000200060021-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REQ

Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP87BO1034R000200060021-5
DoD Suggested Changes to Executive Order 12065
The following proposals serve to strengthen the basis for classifying
information in the interests of national security.
Proposal to Modify Section 1-101: Modify this section to require that,
when there is reasonable doubt concerning classification, information
shall be classified at a level deemed appropriate until such time as the
reasonable doubt is resolved.
PRO: This change should allay foreign apprehensions about the ability
and intent of the United States to protect adequately information provided
to the United States.
CON: The change may be perceived by the public as retrogressive.
Proposal to Modify Section 1-104: Modify this section to eliminate the
word "identifiable."
PRO: This change will provide a broader basis for classification at the
Confidential level and may not be as vulnerable to challenge in Freedom
of Information Act litigation.
CON: The change may be perceived by the public as retrogressive.
Proposal to Modify Section 1-301: This section should be expanded to
include cryptologic activities, sources, methods, and materials as a
specific category of classifiable information.
PRO: Addition of the recommended category protects information concerning
communications security which is presently not clearly identified in the
Order.
CON: None perceived.
Proposal to Modify Section 1-303: Alter this section to include intelligence
sources and methods.
PRO: This change will clearly establish that unauthorized disclosure of
intelligence sources and methods information can be expected to cause
damage to the national security. It will also help to allay foreign
apprehensions concerning U.S. ability to protect such information.
CON: In the absence of a clear definition of intelligence sources and
methods this change could lead to unnecessary classification in the
intelligence community.
No Referral - On file OSD release instructions apply.
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Proposal to Delete Section 3-303: The "balancing test" should be deleted
from the Order.
PRO: Deletion of this section will serve to eliminate difficulties that
have been encountered in Freedom of Information Act litigation. Further,
some foreign governments have expressed concern regarding the "balancing
test" and have been reluctant to share some information with the United
States. Deletion of the section will help to restore foreign confidence
in the U.S. classification system.
CON: This change will certainly meet with strong opposition by certain
sectors of the public.
The following proposals address the systematic declassification review
requirement.
Proposal to Delete Section 3-4: The concept of systematic declassification
review should be deleted from the Order, restricted to that material
which has been accessioned by the National Archives and Records Service,
or be conducted at 30 years for all information.
PRO: The initial financial and personnel savings to be derived from
complete elimination of systematic declassification review are consider-
able. It has been estimated that $88 million will be expended on system-
atic declassification review by the principal agencies involved during
1981 through 1988. The alternative to complete elimination of systematic
review, i.e., conduct it at the National Archives and Records Service,
would still result in significant but undetermined savings in the agencies
involved. The last alternative, i.e., review at 30 years, would also
result in a significant but undetermined savings principally as a result
of the elimination of subsequent review, i.e., experience shows an
Office of the Secretary of Defense initial declassification rate at the
25/30 year mark of approximately 97% as opposed to a rate of just over
85% at the 20 year mark.
CON: The cost avoidance resulting from complete elimination of the
systematic declassification review requirement is actually only a deferral
of part of the current estimated cost. For example, there is no reason
to believe that British efforts to continue declassification programs.
will cease, therefore, cost for necessary concurrent U.S. effort will
remain. If declassification action is not accomplished in the principal
agencies now involved, then the National Archives and Records Service
will have the responsibility. This would probably involve increased
expenditures by the National Archives and Records Service and possibly
follow-on expenditures by the agencies in their necessary support of the
National Archives and Records Service declassification efforts. The
sensitivity of some of the information involved would make the agencies
reluctant to delegate complete responsibility for declassification.
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Proposal to Modify Section 3-403: Change this section so as to add a
provision that the Director of Central Intelligence may establish special
procedures for systematic review and declassification of other intelli-
gence sources and methods information.
PRO: This change, if systematic declassification review is not eliminated,
will help to alleviate foreign apprehensions with respect to declassifi-
cation of certain intelligence information. It can also be expected
that it would lead to more efficient utilization of systematic review
resources.
CON: None perceived.
Proposal to Modify Section 3-404: Modify this section to exempt infor-
mation that pertains to intelligence sources and methods from automatic
declassification and 20-year systematic declassification review.
PRO: This change will help allay foreign apprehensions about the ability
and intent of the United States to protect intelligence information.
CON: This change may be perceived as retrogressive.
The following proposals would be affected by the direction chosen with
regard to the systematic declassification review requirement. These
proposals should be considered as independent alternatives, but in
relation to systematic declassification review.
Proposal to Modify Section 1-402: Modify this section to eliminate the
present limitation on duration of classification and eliminate the
concept of setting dates for declassification review.
PRO: This change would accompany elimination of the costly systematic
declassification review program (an earlier proposal). Elimination of
the systematic declassification review program would necessitate providing
for indefinite classification. Documents could bear a marking such as
"Declassify upon notification of the originator."
CON: Some will see this change as being retrogressive.
Alternate Proposal to Modify Section 1-402: Include intelligence sources
and methods in the exception to the 20-year duration limitation that is
presently provided for foreign government information.
PRO: This change will allow original Top Secret classification authori-
ties to set a 30-year classification duration for intelligence sources
and methods information that is not also foreign government information.
There is ample evidence that the original classification period of 20
years for such information is not adequate. The change will also convey
to foreign intelligence services the U.S. intention to provide better
and longer protection for such information.
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CON: To the extent that this change may be viewed as allowing longer
periods of classification, it will be viewed as retrogressive.
Proposal to Add Section 1-403: Add a new section to the Order which
would exclude foreign intelligence information revealing intelligence
sources and methods and cryptologic information from the periods of
classification duration presently set by the Order. Such a section
should require that the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary
of Defense issue classification guidelines dealing with such information
that would prescribe classification duration only as long as may be
necessary.
PRO: This addition to the Order would allay foreign apprehensions with
respect to the intent and ability of the United States to protect such
information.
CON: Some will perceive this addition as being retrogressive.
The following proposals are designed to simplify the implementation of
the Order.
Proposal to Delete Section 1-501(a): Delete from the Order the require-
ment to provide separate and distinctive identification of the classifier.
PRO: This change would eliminate the redundant requirement to identify
separately the classifier of the information. The person who signs or
approves a document is responsible for informational content and its
classification. That person is the one to whom any question concerning
the classification should be directed. The deletion of this requirement
will simplify the implemention of the Order and can be expected to
result in some cost avoidance.
CON: Some will see this change as weakening the accountability of
classifiers.
Proposal to Delete Section 1-502: This section of the Order should be
deleted in its entirety. Its elimination accompanies the first proposal
to modify section 1-402 and the proposal to delete section 1-501(a).
PRO: Elimination of this section will simplify the implementation of
the Order and some cost avoidance should be realized.
CON: Some will see this change as weakening the accountability of
classifiers.
Proposal to Delete Section 1-506: This section of the Order should be
deleted in its entirety.
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PRO: Deletion of the section will simplify the Order to some extent by
eliminating a provision that says little. It could be included in a
revised Information Security Oversight Office directive.
CON: None perceived.
Proposal to Modify Section 2-201: This section should be altered to
delineate clearly the principal requirements for security classification
guides, i.e., specific idnetification of information to be protected,
level of classification to be applied, and the duration of such classifi-
cation. The "how to" language should be deleted.
PRO: This change will eliminate the present ambiguity of the section
and promote better classification guides.
CON: None perceived.
Proposal to Modify Section 2-202: Change this section to provide for
approval of classification guides by any appropriate original classifi-
cation authority.
PRO: This change will permit more efficient information classification
management of classified programs when Top Secret information is not
involved and when classification durations do not exceed six years.
CON: None perceived.
Proposal to Delete Section 4-4: This section of the Order should be
deleted and placed in the Information Security Oversight Office directive
that implements the Order.
PRO: Relocation of this section to the directive will serve to eliminate
this non-Presidential policy information from the Executive Order.
CON: None perceived.
Proposal Concerning Agency Head Authorities: The Order presently reserves
to agency heads a number of authorities such as the authority to designate
officials to exercise Top Secret classification authority. The Order
should be amended to provide that the "senior agency official" designated
pursuant to section 5-404(a) may be delegated these authorities.
PRO: These changes will relieve agency heads such as the Secretary of
Defense of the need to deal with purely administrative security matters.
CON: These changes may be perceived as retrogressive.
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The following observat:_ons also may warrant consideration.
It may be appropriate in any revision of the Order to address the persist-
ent problem of "leaks." Concern has been expressed that it is presently
impossible to determine whether or not a public disclosure of sensitive
information was officially authorized, and pre-disclosure measures taken
to assess the full effects of such disclosure. Adding a section that
would require consultation with the agency that originated the information
prior to the disclosure of the information may assist in dealing with
this problem.
Section 4-101 requires a determination of trustworthiness prior to
granting access to classified information. State and local criminal
justice authorities frequently refuse to provide information needed to
make this determination because of the lack of statutory or Presidential
authority. Consideration could be given to including Presidential
authority in the Executive Order thereby allowing Government investi-
gators greater access to criminal justice records to determine the
trustworthiness of individuals having access to classified information.
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