TERMS OF REFERENCE, NSSD 2-82 COUNTERMEASURES ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000300060003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 19, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Office of Security
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Terms of Reference, NSSD-2/82 Countermeasure Organizational
Study
_
FROM: ~ Z ~4
/
EXTENSION
NO.
Group
Policy and Plans
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, ord
ildin
)
b
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
g
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INITIALS
fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1.
C/Policy Branch/PPG
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The Director of Security asked
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FORM ~~ O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
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~~~ 1~
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Po icy and Plans Group
Terms of Reference, NSSD 2-82
Countermeasures Organizational Study
IG/CM I~~lemorandum of 11 January 83, same subj
1. The study is related to NSSD 2 tasking which called for
assessment of_ the organizational and managerial framework to
determine "the most effective application of budgetary and
personnel resources" to combating/negating "espionage and other
threats and activities by foreign intelligence services against
the United States." The entire NSSD ?_ exercise was directed
toward a perception that determined and extensive activities on
the part of hostile services, combined with an eroded U. S. capa-
bility to counter these activities, presented an "increasingly
significant" threat to the national security.
?. The preface to "Capabilities .Against the Hostile
Intellience Threat, 1983 - 1988," reflects agreement (with the
NSC) that the above-mentioned tasking, along with related con-
sideration concerning a possible central, all-source database and
analysis capability, be deferred for study at a later date. The
cited publication noted that these separable subjects would be
afforded a good basis for later review through its (the publica-
tions's) findings. Reference does not specify that a central,
all-source database will be studied; however, the concept is
included in the overall NSSD 2 approach to an organizational
study.
3. The study will he submitted to the SIG-I and forwarded
to the President through the NSC. It is most unlikely that any
organizational change in the NSC will be addressed and a poor
bet that the SIG-I will be studied in terms of disestablishment
or major organizational/functional change. The structure of the
IG/CM and IG/CI probably will be reviewed with a view to
responsibilities, membership, subcommittees and input to a
discrete budget exercise dedicated to resources needed for
classical .counterintelligence and protective security.
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT
ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET
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JtLKt ~
4. The thrust of the study expressed in reference involves
"fine tuning" (of) existing countermeasures structures and
relationships." The attached "Outline for National Security
Study Directive 2/82 Study" illustrates shared responsibility
of agencies and, in some instances, specifies the CIA directorate
concerned. The outline indicates that the study will feature
comprehensive analysis of the internal organizational structure
and responsibilities of the separate agencies and a compilation
of the overall capability of the major topics mentioned in
Section V of the TOR. The study director. can establish working
groups composed of knowledgeable specialists in each category of
paragraphs B, C and D of Section V. The individual you will
appoint as the principal representative/focal point will not
necessarily participate in the selection of working groups
rTiernbers but should be prepared to do so. This will involve
complete familiarity with the organizational makeup of the
Agency and of key personnel qualified to represent the various
disciplines.
5. It is suggested that the "principal representative/focal
point" be selected from the senior managers of the Office and,
for representational purposes, at as a high a level as possible.
He should be well-grounded in PTAS functions and conversant with
personnel security. Also, the appointee should have that knowl-
edge of .Agency operations anc] activities to which the senior
Office managers are privy.
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27 April 1982
Chief, Office of Security, Policy & Plans, P&M
SUBJECT: National Security Study Di_r_ective 2/82
1. Attached for your information are an "Outline for
National Security Study Directive 2/82 Study" and "Definitions
for Terms of Reference and Qutline for NSSD 2/82 Study".
2. Additional information on ^ISSD 2/82 will be forwarded
to you in th An questions re ardin the Study may
Attachments:
As Stated
p Fig.::'"';
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Attachment A
DEFIfJITIOtiS FOR 7ERt?1S OF REFEREfdCE AfdD
OUTLIfJE FOP, fVSSD 2/82 STUDY
Threat or Intelligence Threat: The combination of capability and intent
on the part of a foreign country to engage in an intelligence activity inimical
to the United States. ~ .
Multidisciplinar Threat: The aggregate, irrespective of collection .
method or technique, of all the intelligence threats posed by a given country
or country group.
Vulnerability: The potential for. information to be acquired through
intelligence activity. Vulnerability is independent of the threat, i.e., a
vulnerability may exist even though no capability or intent exists to exploit
it.
Security: Establishment and maintenance of protective measures Vrhich are
intended to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences_
Security requirements typical]y establish a required level of protection based
on vulnerability rather-than threat.
Communications Security: The application of security to deny un-
authorized persons information which might be derived from telecommunica-
tions or to ensure the authenticity of telecommunications.
Personnel Security: The application of security to assure that
persons granted access' to information are loyal and trusttirorthy.
~sical Security: The use of guards, barriers, containers, alarms
and other physical means to protect material, facilities or documents from
damage, theft or unauthorized access.
Document Security: The protection of documents through the use of
classification designators and their associated access controls.
Computer Securit,Zr (.also Automatic Data Processing Security); The
protection of computers and data processing equipment and the in~orm~tion
they contain through a combination of physical, personnel and co~~,runica-
tior~s security, as well as hardware, software and management controls.
Operations Security: The protection of an operation, project or program
from hostile intelligence activities. Operations security establishes pro-
tective requirements based upon a comparison of vulnerabilities and the multi-
disciplinary threat. Operations security differs from other security programs
in that it focuses on the threat.
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Counterintelli eg nce: "--:information gathered and activities conducted to
protect against espionage,.other intelligence activities, sabotage or assas-
sinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign po~?rers, organizations or persons,
or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical,
document or communications security programs." (E.O. 12333) Counterintelli-
gence differs from. security in that it is normally directed against a specific
known or postulated threat.
,_
Intelligence Countermeasures: The aggregate of all measures taken to
provide protection from the intelligence activities, irrespective of method or~
technique, of foreign countries. Intelligence countermeasures include counter-
intelligence, operations security, and security. (Also called multidisciplinary
counterintelligence). ..~
_Active t~{ea.sures: A Soviet term for activities beyond traditional diplomacy
which are used to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives. Active measures -
are most frequently carried out by the intelligence services and are intended
to influence the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between
other nations, undermine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions or
discredit opponents. ?
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SECRET
Interagency Group/Countermeasures
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees
Interagency Group/Countermeasures
FROM: General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Chairman
SUBJECT: Terms of Reference, NSSD-2/82 Countermeasure
Organizational Study
1. The OCI, in his capacity as Chairman, NSC/SIG-I, has directed me to
conduct a study of the organizational and structural impediments to achieving
required capabilities for? detecting, analyzing and countering the non-HUMINT
foreign intelligence threat to the United States. This study is to be
submitted to the SIG-I which, after appropriate consideration, will forward it
to the NSC and the President.
?_. I have named) of the Intelligence Community Staff's
Community Counterintelligence Staff as Study Director, to be assisted by
representatives to be designated by recipient addressees. It is expected that
agency representatives will vary depending on the particular study topic being
addressed, but each agency should initially identify a principal
representative/focal point by 18 January 1983.
3. Draft terms of reference and study outline are attached. Your
representatives should be prepared to discuss these at an initial.meetina of
the overall Study Group which will be scheduled later in January 1983.
i a , . i we 1
Attachment:
a/s
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