INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000400060003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 26, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/02 : CIA-RDP87S01034R000400060003-6
esciThRtriDENTIAL ?
STAT
STAT
STAT
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Interagency Group/Countermeasures
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Ci ISSC/OS
DATE
2 6 MAY tf13
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
L C/PPC
,
4E70 Hqs.
2.
3.
.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
1 3.
14.
15.
FORM 61n USE PREVIOUS
V EDITIONS
1-79
tartFIDENTIAL
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved'Tor Rkele.aTevt2.01-13/12/02 :ICIA-RDP871301034R000400060003-6
IP
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief, Policy
26 MAY 1983
and Plans Group
STAT
ATTENTION:
STAT
FROM:
Informatibn
'Systems Security Group
STAT
SUBJECT:
Interagency
Group/Countermeasures
REFERENCE:
Memo for Members
and Invitees from IG/CM,
dated 10 May 83, ,sanie Subject, D/ICS-83-0676
1. The Navy candidate issue concerning "National Policy
on ADP Security" presents an excellent opportunity for the
Intelligence Community and the USG in :general to standardize
computer security, policy and countermeasures throughout the
STAT Government.
STAT
STAT
STAT
2. As you are aware, the ,Computer Security Subcommittee
under SECOM is now revising the DCID titled "Security of
Foreign Intelligence in Automated Systems and Networks." This
document will address both Sensitive Compartmented Information
and collateral intelligence information. It could well prove
to be adaptable, at least in part, to all areas of USG inter-
est. It should, at a minimum, be a good bar?E7 an overall
USG policy in the computer security field.
Jr..:1)1\tclefErIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/02 : CIA-RDP87601034R000400060003-6
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/02 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000400060003-6.
Teragency Gratip/bOunterineaSult
Washington, D.C. 20505
? MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees
STAT FROM:
D/ICS-83-0676
10 May 1983
STAT SUBJECT:
Executive Secretary.
Interageny Group/Counter
Administrative Actions
sures (IG/CM)
,
The-finalluirnites-Of the-fourth IG/CM meeting are enclosed as ?
Attachment 11; -Addressees-are re uested to examine the minutes and complete
STAT, asjgned.actions'eS required.
?
?2. The fifth meeting.of-the IG/CM will be held on Friday, 3 June 1983,
? at 1400 'hours. The meeting will convene in Rm. 6744, Department of Justice,
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Seating space in the DoJ
..secure conference room is limited; therefore, attendance at this particular
meeting should be-restricted to the minimum required to address agenda ? "
STAT iteMs. . ?
a.. The meeting agenda is enclosed as Attachment 2. Addressees have
already received materials pertinent to all issues listed in paragraph 2
of the agenda except for the draft industrial security policy memorandum,' .
which is enclosed as Attadliment 3. :It is anticipated that the status
reports reflected in par,ograph 3 of the agenda will be limited to 273 .
STAT' minutes each. 'STAT. ?
? b. Members and invitees are requested to call"
by COB 31 Ma with the names of individuals who will be STAT
STAT attend ng the meeting.
STAT
STAT
STAT
?
3: NSA has submitted a proposed new issue for IG/CM consideration, which
is enclosed as Attachment 4. Addressees are requested to prepare respective .
agency.cnninnntcfpositions on the proposal for discussion at the 3 June
meeting.
ir)
Attachment: .
a/s
C ONFIDENTIAL
OS REGISTRY '
LiSatp..
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/02: CIA-RDP87601034R000400060003-6 -
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SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING
.-.14 APRIL 1983
1. The fourth IG/CM meeting was convened at 1400 hours, 14 April 1983,
STAT by the Chairman' (DUSD-Policy), General Richar ilwell, USA (Ret.). A
listing of individuals attending is attached.
? 2. General Stilwell advised the membership that on 11 March 1983 the
? SIG(I) had approved the IG/CM paper on Foreign Civil Overflights of the U.S.
and had forwarded it to the NSC for further action. He also advised that the '
? IP/CM-approved report on Unauthorized Disclosures had been signed by the
? President as' NSDD-84. ,The NSC is involved' in working groups which are ironing
out-implementation procedures." The Chairman reported he had provided the :
'-Senate Select.COmmittee on 'Intelligence (SSCI) with a status update on issues
the IG/CM .is currently,considering and that the SSCI seemed pleased with the
extent Of IG/CM-involvement. General Stilwell commented on the French
? Government expulsioU of 47 Soviets for reported involvement in intelligence
activities (technology transfer) and observed that the incident will hopefully
STAT have a beneficial effect in the-U.S.
STAT
STAT
? 3. The-Chairman invited attention to the agenda and called for status
reports on listed issues:
a. ' Foreign Civil Overflights. The Chairman recalled his-opening
remarks and suggested that Mr. deGraffenreid, NSC representative, keep
? the membership posted on the paper's status in the NSC.
? Action: Mr: deGraffenreid is to report on the overflight paper
? status at the next IG/CM meeting.
b. Unauthorized Disclosures. Mr. deGraffenreid reported on
progress of the task to develop implementing procedures for NOD-84.
Essentially, there are four segments being examined. Steve Garfinkle of
the ISO? is chairing a group examining the prepublication review aspect
and other forms. This group has identified a number of policy questions
and is seeking the appropriate channel for their resolution. A Media
Contacts Group led by Bob Simms is just starting its tasks. The two .
remaining groups are led by Doi. The Unauthorized Disclosure
?Investigative Procedures Group is examining the criteria the FBI will use
to initiate unauthorized disclosure investigations. It is also working
? with OPM on the polygraph issue. The fourth group is examining the
Federal Personnel Security Program. It is, therefore, doubtful that
implementing drafts will be ready by the 18 April deadline. Mr.
? CONFIDENTIAL
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III .
deGraffenreid noted that a number of new investigations are being called
. for under the thrust of NS00-84.
Action: The NSC representative will keep the IG/CM apprised of .
significant developments concerning the development of implementing
? procedures for NSDD-84. Another status report is requested at the next
IG/CM meeting.
c. .OPSEC. The OSD representative, Mr. Snider, distributed an
OPSEC policy paper which integrates all member comments received to
? date. State is to. take a final look at the paper and provide concurrence
. decision by not later than 18 April. All other members concurred with
the paper...
Action: ' The IG/CM Secretariat is to forward the OPSEC paper to
*he SIC(fl subseqUent to noon, 18 April, monitor its status, and report
STAT
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70s-neceSsary to the IG/CM membership.
. 7FoUrttileVel-of Classification. Mr. Snider advised he had .
"discussed the "Confidential Modified Handling Authorized" (CMHA)
: classification possibility.with 'SOO as promised. I500, while agreeing
that such a classifictiOn could be implemented with modification of the
ISOO Directive, opposed 'doing so. The principal objections were the
probable confusion which would result and the adverse impact it would
have on Defense contractors, Mr. Snider distributed a related study done
by Mr. Art Van Cook and advised that the !SOO Director has recommended
its conclusions as an alternative-to-the-CMHA approach. The study -
.suggests each agency protect sensitive information through implementation
of its own internal controls and offered a way in which DoD could
accomplish this. Mr. Snider indicated OSD would like to put the fourth .
classificatton issue on hold until DO evaluates the Van Cook approach
more thoroughly. He advised the Van Cook study reportedly takes the
legal (FOIA) aspect into consideration. The Army (Col. Press) and Air
Force (Mr. Paseur) representatives responded to the Chairman's request
:for comments. They indicated they still strongly support having a fourth
classification and have great concerns about industry/contractor
adherence to the "internal" controls concept, but will examine the Van
Cook study. Mr. Snider advised that on 21 April the Senate Judiciary
Committee will consider the legislative action the IG/CM recommended to
..exempt technical data from FOIA provisions.
Action: Members are to examine the Van Cook study and prepare
to Comment on it as an alternative to the fourth classification
proposal. DO is to coordinate its position.
e. Damage Assessments. The SECOM representative, Mr. Paschal,
introduced a paper distributed to members via IG/CM Secretariat
memorandum dated 7 April 1983. After summarizing the various options for
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STAT
a lessons learned data base, he recommended one of the (*ions be chosen,
that it be limited to intelligence compromises only, and that a pilot
study be conducted to determine how well it meets the needs. General
discussion followed on the cost of a pilot program--estimated at $200,000
over a one-year period, what purposes a data base would/should serve, and
what ingredients should Make up the data base. The Justice
representative, Ms. Lawton, pointed out two problems: If the data base
contained 'names of individuals on dissemination lists, we would have a?
Privacy Act problem; if CIA holds the data base files on compromises .
which.are,the subject of ongoing criminal investigations, this could
raise a.qUestion of CIA involvement in domestic law enforcement. State
and Defense.lobjected to the inclusion of names in the, data base. DoD
fOrther:lobserved that:their attempt to construct a similar type data base ,
:.ayielder?piestionable-results. A.review was given of why the issue of '
TdaMage'asseSSment'Wds before the IG/CM, what the task has been to SECOM,
..t.an4 Where we now stand.
STAT
STAT
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Chairman asked members to examine Options (1) and
.:(2) Of the paper. Members are to identify, in writing for each '
'Opti-OnVWPat-400-iyidual.agency preferences are for: (1) the purposes of.
Hi.a:1-0'ssOnSTlearned_data base, e.g., what it is hoped the data base will
accomplish/permit; 2) what input, elements the data base should contain
toaccOmplishithe purposes; and (3) any specific input elements the
.agency would, hOt SUpport-in a damage assessment lessons learned data
base. These items Will be discussed at the IG/CM meeting and
.isubsequentlyt,provided,to SECOM for reconstruction.of a second strawman.?
f. Industrial Security. Mr. Snider reported the' reSUlts of his
' research into the best vehicle for national level promulgation of the
FOCI provision of the DoD Industrial Security Regulation. A National
Security Council Policy Memorandum was the vehicle recommended to and
,approved by the membership.
'Action: DoD will prepare a draft policy memorandum on
Industrial Security and arrange for its timely distribution so that
members can comment/concur at the next meeting.
-g. Personnel Security. The DoJ representative, Mr. Cinquegrana,
advised that the new NSOD-84 specifies that DoJ will chair the research
into implementation procedures for personnel security aspects of that
Directive. Since DoJ representatives had previously deliberated with the
IG/CM working group on personnel security, DoJ will look into
incorporating the conclusions of the IG/CM group into NSDD-84 actions.
DoJ is considering different approaches to the project, including the
option of two subgroups chaired by OPM and DoD respectively. A final
approach, however, will not be decided upon until initial consultations
are completed with DoD and OPM.
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IP ? - -
Action: DoJ will continue to work the personnel security issue
as chartered by NSDD-84, and DoD representatives, working with DoJ, will
push for incorporation of the IG/CM working group's conclusions into
. national policy documents.
?h. COMSEC Monitoring. The NSA representative, advised
that a draft of NACSI 4000 had been out for comment since February
1983. The civil sector had no comments but the Military Services, With -
Navy leading, had several. He opined that rewording of the draft, in ?
coordination.with DoJ, will resolve problems and that a final draft could
STAT be out by May.
' Action: NSA is to continue to push for earliest completion of
the final draft and advise the IG/CM of significant problems if they
STAT. occur.
?
STAT
STAT
STAT
Organilational Study. Mr. Jason Horn, Study Director, advised
e:final draft of the Organizational Study would be out to members by
10 May ?A minimum of two weeks will be required for field comment, and
? .subsequent-drafts are anticipated. As a result, it was determined that
- the SIG(I) Chairman be advised that it is unlikely the study will be
completed by 31 May,
ACtiOn:The--IG/CM Chairman Will advise the SIG(I) Chairman O.,'
thejlip in completion date. Mr. Horn will continue efforts to expedite;
completion-of:the:Study and advise of significant problems if. they 2 .
STAT :occur:-
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J. TEMPEST Policy. The NSA representative adviSed that-the
Subcommittee on Compromising Emanations (SCOCE) has been working on
alternatives for TEMPEST policy. A draft revision of CONUS TEMPEST '
' Standards is to reflect considerable relaxation of current
requirements. Overseas requirements are to remain high. The Chairman,:
suggested deferral of discussion on this issue until completion of the.
Organizational S jdy since the study will also address TEMPEST.Y., --
, considerations.
?
ActiOn:'. IG/CM action on this issue will be held_in 'aheyanCe.
untiLcompletion of the Organizational Study. , ,.? ?
k. Security Enhancement of U.S. Embassies. The Chairman discussed
SIG(I) reaction to this subject when surfaced at its 11 March meeting.
The results of that meeting, as well as a DIA position paper distributed
to members at the instant IG/CM .meeting, caused the Chairman to suggest
the need for redefinition of the problem the IG/CM needs to consider. ,
The Chairman asked that State chair a working group composed of State,
DIA, CIA and NSA members, at a minimum, to accomplish a reexamination of
the problem. and to report findings to the membership.
4
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111,
m Action: State is to identify a chairperson and call a meeting of
appropriate representatives to reconsider what aspect(s) of the security
of U.S. embassy problem the IG/CM needs to address. The principal guide /
STAT ? in this review is to be pertinent portions of Chapter VII in the.study,..
? "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-1988."
4. The Chairman opened the floor to discussion of new issues for IG/CM,
consideration:
?.4. Both DoD and State suggested that knowledge of the background,
: methodology, and purpose of the recent French Government expulsion of '
Soviet diplomats would provide beneficial lessons learned data to
Intelligence Community members.
H'ActiO18/CMLSeeietariat is to coordinate with CIA an theHY .
HpossITFTTTi Of a ing on the subject and report to IG/CM members at
the- next meeting.
. .
?
- - .
:Jb..LtThe4avy-representative, Captain Hoskins, passed out a list
'containing five proposed issues (attached). The Chairman asked the :
membership to review the proposed issues and prepare their views on ,
acceptability for IG/CM consideration.
8. The meeting adjourned at 1550 hours.
STAT
STAT
STAT
5
C ONFP?HTIAL
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CANDIDATE ISSUES FOR THE .
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES
_
I; (U) National Policy on Use of the Polygraph. A number of individual initiatives have :
been launched in this area; the cumulative effect of these possibly disparate efforts
- needs to be examinedand a national policy developed.
2. (U) National Policy on Anticompromise EmeEgency Destruct (ACED). A new family
of equipment is being developed by the Navy which will permit the anticompromise
_ emergency deatritction of sensitive information and equipment. However, lack of a
national policy and a to ' fundincr May limit the effective development of the new
'LACED devi
-2-.Ae):NatiOnal;_POliCY 'On 'ADP Security. At present there appears to be considerable
differences in the. application of ADP security measures. This is of particular concern
since it appearsithat--ADW security vulnerabilities are targeted for exploitation by hostile
intelli ence services. ,t *".?
t -4. (C) National Micy oh Secure Telephones. The loss of sensitive information iti non-
secure telephone conversations is a major security problem which may be solved only by -
high-level supportfor greater availability and use of secure communications equipment.
5 (U) Definition of Unclassified National Security Information- Certain national policy
now requires that such information be protected; in order to protect this information, it
must first be defined and protective thresholds established. .
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S.
IIP
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
ATTENDEES
IG/CM Meeting, 14 April 1983
Room 6W02, Community Headquarters Building
NAME
Richard G. Stilwell Chairman
- L. Britt Snider
Edwin Yee ' ?
Donald Macdonald::
-
Thomas 44cCay. -
ORGANIZATION
-Kenneth AeGraffenreid:
Donald Press
? Frank Aurelio
R. D. Hoskins
-
George W. Paseur
- John J. Guenther
' . Donald Paschal
Ed Cohen
? Mary C. Lawton
Cinquegrana
J. Robert McBrien -
Mike Cassetta
'Robert Wingfield
Douglas Miller
IC Staff Attendees
C 0 PIFIDENTIAL
OSD ?
OSD
FBI .-
CIA
? CIA -
? CIA
State
.State
NSA
NSA
NSC
DIA '
DIA
DIA
? Army
Army
Navy
Air Force
Marine Corps
SECOM- -
SECOM
Justice
Justice -
Treasury .
.Commerce
- Energy
? Energy - ?
CCIS/ICS
CCIS/ICS
CCIS/ICS
IG/CM Staff
IG/CM Staff
IG/CM Staff
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? AGENDA
Fifth IG/CM Meeting
3 June 1983
I. Chairman's Opening Remarks
2. Discussions:
a. eview'of:DoD-prepared industrial security policy memorandum.]
Member. concurrence decision:;
Review of agency inputs to damage assessment lessons learned
? , ? .,_
ata base istUei.r. -oUrse_of action decision. -
,
-t. RevtW?avy-proposed IG/CM issues Decision ow
7-iCCePiabili4sSSIOMent_of action as appropriate.
"?
1.1.RewieWto -NSA-proposed-IG/CM issue. Decision on,
aCCeptabilityAsSignment of action as -appropriate.;
3. Status Reports.
a Overflight policy paper.-- NSC representative
NSOD-84 NSC-and DoJiepresentatives
NACSI-4000 7- NSA representative
b.
rd:- Embassy security enhancement working groilpHL Statelr'
_
trepresentatiVe
e. Countermeasure organizational study -- CCIS representative(
-?
f. French expulsion briefing -- CCIS representative
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:
The IG/CM Chairman has accepted DO'S -offer to host the fifth IG/CM
meeting at the new ?DoJ secure conference facility. Attendees will find use of
the DoJ entrance at 10th and Pennsylvania AvenUe the most convenient for '
access to Room 6744. (Sixth floor; left off elevator to first corridor. For:
additional directions once in the DoJ building, if needed, call Barbara, ?
633-3738.)
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? OFFICE.OF THE UNCER t I A t-C I. LWL?L_.,
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111,? WASHINGTON. O.L. ho".
POLICY
9 MAY 1923
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, INTERAGENCY GROUP/
H COUNTERMEASURES
Draft NSC Memorandum Industrial Security
SUBJECT:
At the 14 April meeting of the IG/CM, it was agreed that-the
proposed national policy statement in the area of industrial
security -- dealing with theownership of U.S. firms by -
fOreign interests -- would be placed in the form of an NSC -
-memorandum, rather than as an amendment to E.O. 12356 or IS00--
DireCtive NO: I..
AccOrdingly, the proposed memorandum has been prepare/1,H'
incorporating what bad previously been agreed to by the'IG/CM
without objection: Request that copies be provided IG/CM
members in Advance Of the next meeting,-So that this memorandum
May be considered for transmittal to the SIG-I. ?
L. Britt Snider
Director for counterintelligence .
- and Security Policy
.0SD Member
tit zi\C-\\.?41* 3
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STAT
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NATIONAL SECURITY ACiENIF .
PORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755
Serial: N/0582
26 April 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, IG/CM
SUBJECT: Proposed New Agenda Item
/
? 1. HEnclosedlfor consideration as an IG/CM agenda item is
? an issue paper on cryptographic access requirements and an
associated proposed NSDD entitled "Safeguarding Cryptographic
H-Information and Material."
. -
2. The National. Security Agency believes a formal
._cryptographic access program is the key element in our efforts
to counter theAJUMINT threat to U.S. cryptography. Pursuing
?
the.linitiative:ibegUn7in NSDD-84, our proposed NSDD would establish
a- national access program based on several criteria,
. including a requirement for consent to aperiodic, limited polygraph
examinations--
. ,
. 3. I recommend .the enclosure be circulated to .the members
for disr-ssion at out next meeting. -
HAROLD E: DAVLS, JR.
NSA Representative, IG/CM
End:
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Issue Paper
Cryptographic Access Requirements
1. Prior to August 1973, a formal cryptographic access program
was a national requirement. In addition to restricting access to
Classified cryptographic information to U.S. citizens with appropri-
ate clearance and the need-to-know, the program required: (a) formal
indoctrination stressing the unique.pture of cryptographic infor,-
mation, its criticality, the special security regulations governing
its handling and protection, and the penalties prescribed for its
willful disclosure; and .(b) formal records of all individuals granted
cryptographic access.
August 1973, the requirements for the formal indoctrination
and recOrdkeeping Were discontinued, effectively ending the formal
cryptographicftcdeas:prograM. This was done Primarily to eliminate
the administrative bUrden_for military users of codes and secure voice
equipments in:Vietnati..7In the succeeding decade, there has been a
steady 'increase in: insecurities involving cryptographic information
and materials.: The increased incidence of insecurities is damaging
to the national security. Although it is attributable in some measure
to the proliferation of cryptographic information and materials, the
nature of the insecurities indicates a more serious cause, a lack of.
appreciation for protecting cryptography. This, in turn, is linked
to .the lack of a formal indoctrination requirement. Furthermore, the
1ack of formal records hampers the conduct of studies and investigations
of insecurities and unauthorized disclosures. Additionally, the lack of
signed access itatementS weakens prosecution in espionage cases.
_
3. While the foregoing are serious concerns, the greatest concern.
which the proposed cryptographic access program is directed toward is
?the HUMINT threat from cognizant agents. The key element of this program
? is the aperiodic, limited polygraph examination. We believe it is the
most effective measure for detecting properly cleared individuals who
have given or sold classified cryptographic information to unauthorized
individuals. -There are sufficient cases on record to give cause
for grave concern. An equally important aspect of the aperiodic,
limited polygraph examinations is their value in deterring individuals
who have access and who might otherwise be inclined to give or sell
classified cryptographic information to unauthorized individuals.
4. There is ample justification for reinstituting the proposed
cryptographic access program with the added requirement for consent'
to aperiodic, limited polygraph examinations. The proposed NSDD
(attached) is considered an appropriate means of accomplishing this,
particularly in view of the recently issued NSDD-84, "Safeguarding
National Security Information," which also'addresses the use of the
polygraph to safeguard classified national security information.
End:
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Proposed National Security Decision Directive
Safeguarding Cryptographic Information and Material
Cryptography is especially sensitive because it is used to protect
. highly classified and critical information on almost every conceivable
subject related to the operations and plans of the U.S. Government.
For this reason, cryptographic information and materials are highly
prized targets of hostile intelligence activities and must be, strictly
safeguarded. Access to cryptography, therefore, must be restricted to
the greatest extent practicable and be consistent with national security
needs. Accordingly, I direct that a cryptographic access program, be
established within' eachFederal department and agency which holds or ?
-uses cryptographic information or materials, consistent with the
_ .
0.-Accesstorinformation which reveals the design of a classi-
fied cryptographic logic, its theory of operation, or access to
classified cryptographiC *eying variables -designated "CRYPTO" may be
granted only when:.,
? . .
. (1) The heed for such access is established as.necessary
to perform official duties-by, for, or on behalf of the U.S. Government.
(2) The individual recuiring_such access is a U.S. citizen,
? a non-O.S- citizen member of the' U.S. military services or a non-U.S. .
:citizen employee of the U.S. Government.
- (3) The U.S.-Government has granted the individual a
final security clearance.
' (4) 'The individual has completed an indoctrination covering:
1) the sensitivity of cryptographic information and materials; 2) the
-rules for safeguarding such information and materials; 3) the 'rules
pertaining to foreign contacts, visits, and travel; 4) the rules and
procedures for reporting insecurities of COMSEC materials.; and 5) the
laws pertaining to espionage.
(5) The individual has executed a security agreement.
All such agreements shall, at a minimum, provide for:
(a) ',Prepublication review to ensure deletion of
classified cryptographic and any other classified information from
information or materials to be disclosed.
(b) The individual's consent to participate in
aperiodic, limited polygraph examinations consisting solely of questions
related to disloyal activities and espionage when so required.
(c) The individual's acknowledgment of the sensitivity
of, and obligation to protect, cryptographic information and materials.
Enclosure
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. (d) The individual's acknowlInment of his/her ?
obligations to comply with applicable regulations governing
unofficial foreign travel and contact with representatives of
foreign governments.
All such agreements shall be in a form determined by the Department
of Justice to be enforceable in a civil action brought by the United
States and consistent with the standards developed by the Director,
Information Security Oversight Office ?(IS00), to satisfy these
requirements.
. -
? r.-
.. b. In support of the cryptographic access program, the
heads of Federal departments and agencies are:responsible for:
Cl)-Restricting access to Classified cryptographio
Amformation-and classified cryptographic keying variables designated' ?
"CRYPTO"-ionlyto'thoSe persons who have been formally granted
crypto4raphicHaCces0,?6r-the .conduct of official business.
(2) Formally granting cryptographic access only
when ?-rtheTcriteria set forth herein are met and maintaining
records of indiVidUals.granted-cryptographic access.
,
(3) 'Developing programs for the aperiodic, limited?
polygraph examination of personnel granted access;.administering
the polygraph programs; arid evaluating the results of polygraph
examinations._ Departments :and agencies with substantial polygraPhing?
kesources:.are endouraged to extendthese resources to other departmenta:
and agencies whose-. limited requirements do not justify the acquisition.
of. separate polygraphing..,reSources.'.
(4) Establishing a quality control review over their
respective polygraph programs to ensure the propriety of polygraph
? examinations, consistent with paragraph a.(5), above, and to protect
individuals' rights,
.(5).Reporting:to the FBI and Other apprOpriate-imiest7
igative agencies:information which indicates possible espionage or:-1.,
other unlawful activities involving classified cryptographic infor-
mation or materials. Promptly advising the Director, NSA, of such
incidents; the Director, NSA, will provide technical assistance as .?
needed in the investigational such.incidents.
(6) Incorporating into contracts, where necessary, and
ensuring compliance with the special security requirements associated -
with access to cryptographic logic, cryptographic design information,
theory of operation, or cryptographic keying variables designated
"CRYPTO."
(7) Recognizing the cryptographic access authorizations
granted to individuals by other departments and agencies.
rnD (*lcFriA .1 Kr nmi v
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C. The Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for'
Communications Security, is directed to promulgate or revise
national communications security policies and directives, as '
necessary, to implement the cryptographic access program described
herein. These policies and directives will be promulgated through
.
the national communications security issuance system.
. . ,
3
rem* i FCC. nmi
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CANDIDATE ISSUES FOR THE
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES
1. (U) National Policy on Use of the Polygraph. A number of individual initiatives have '
been launched in this area; the cumulative effect of these possibly disparate efforts
needs to be-examined and a national policy developed.
2. (U) National Policy on Anticompromise Emergency Destruct (ACED). A new family
-a equipment is being developed by the Navy which will permit the anticompromise
emergency destruction of sensitive information and equipment. However, lack of a
. 'national policy and appropriate funding may limit the effective development of the new
?
3.-(0-14ational Oolicy on ADP Security. At present there appears to be considerable
differences in the application of ADP security measures. This is of particular concern
since it appears-that-ADP security vulnerabilities are targeted for exploitation by hostile
intelligence services. ,
, (C) National POlicy on Secure Telephones. The loss of sensitive information in non- '
secure telephone conversations is a major security problem which may be solved only by
high-level support for greater availability and use of secure communications equipment. ?
5. (U) Definition of Unclassified National Security Information. Certain national policy
now requires that such information be protected; in order to protect this information, it
must first be defined and protective thresholds established.
Classified by: Multiple Sources
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