PERSONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR SCI ACCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500010009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 5, 1983
• Content Type: MF

Approved For ReleaseAO&661 7C:IClI -E~87f1'Q34R000500010009-1
Director -
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington. D.C. 20505
APR 7983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access
1 Action Requested: That you provide guidance on resolving a difference
of opinion in the Community on the number of years that should be covered by
investigations required by DCI personnel security policy governing access to
SCI.
2. Background: The only uniform personnel security standards applicable
throughout the Government are those promulgated in DCID 1/14, which specifies
investigative and adjudicative requirements. governing access to SCI. Since its
original issuance in the mid-1960's, DCID 1/14, with full Community concur-
rence, has required investigations to cover the last 15 years of candidates'
lives, or to their 18th birthday, whichever is less, but in any event not less
than the most recent two years.
3. In 1980, the Security Committee (SECOM) completed a study of 5,204
DCID 1/14 investigations adjudicated for SCI access by 10 Community agencies.'
The study evaluated the productivity of various investigative sources and
periods of investigative coverage. It concluded that a 15-year period of
coverage.would capture all adverse data determined by adjudicators to warrant
denial of SCI access, but that a 10-year period would risk losing 9,o of
.significant adverse data which was the basis for 3/1, of the access denials.
Police checks in the 10- to 15-year period were shown to be useful sources.
4. This study was the basis for a thorough review of DCID 1/14.
Recommendations for its revision were approved by a majority (10 to 3) of
SECOM members in December 1981, and forwarded to the Director, IC Staff, for
guidance. The dissenting position was prepared by the OSD member of SECOM.
He argued for ranking SCI into first class (and,doing a full 15-year inves-
tigation) and second class (doing a reduced scope investigation). .General
Stilwell asked that the proposed revision be'pended' until Defense's senior-
level panel concluded its review of DoD personnel`security. The review
recommended substantia-1;.upgrading of DoD personnel security practices -- e.g.,
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raising investigative criteria for Top Secret clearances to DCID 1/14 levels
and considering use of the polygraph to screen persons for SCI access. Con-
currently, the Defense Investigative Service received a substantial increase
in resources to improve the quality of investigations and reduce its backlog.
by the present (1976) version of DCID 1/14. Defense stopped doing them in
1981 when the Defense Investigative Service got seriously behind in its
caseload. Implementation of a periodic reinvestigation program is merely
resumption of what they agreed was needed in 1976 and still agree is needed
5. With the new Defense findings, SECOM resumed work on DCID 1114
revision. The OSD member tabled a recommendation that the scope of all
investigations for SCI access be limited to 10 years (he provided the attached
copy of his memo on that to General Stilwell. (Tab W. That did not gain
majority support. The revision effort then focused on use of the polygraph.
The OSD member agreed to one mention of the polygraph in paragraph 11.m of the
attached draft (Tab B) completed at the 23 February 1983 meeting of SECOM..
The revision makes minor changes to investigative standards, includes the
single reference to the polygraph, adds language to strengthen the Govern-
ment's position in denying accesses for cause, and updates definitions and
references. A summary of the changes is at Tab C. All changes except the
issue of 10 versus 15-year scope were agreed to unanimously. The committee
voted 7 to 6 in favor of retaining the 15-year scope. All votes to reduce the
scope were from DoD agencies. The OSD dissent on the scope issue is attached
(Tab D).
6. Staff Position: The OSD dissent focuses on allocation of resources.
OSD proposes to raise investigative standards for Top Secret, non-SCI clear-
ances to DCID 1/14 levels, add a subject interview to every investigation, and
implement a periodic reinvestigation program for persons with SCI access. The
first item, while commendable from the standpoint of overall security, is
unrelated to SCI access. Routine subject interviews for all candidates for
SCI access exceed the unanimously supported criteria in the draft revision of
DCID 1/14. Periodic reinvestigations for persons with SCI access is required
now.
7. At the 23 February SECOM.meeting, the OSD member stated that Defense
increases do not materialize due to budget cuts or other reasons.
to raise Top Secret clearance standards..- Possible' savings should be consid-
ered-in the light of statements by OSD repxesentative'sthat-relatively few
cases require investigation beyond 10 years because of the age distribution
among, candidates for SCI access. The attached OSD dissent says "savings"
will be applied to periodic reinvestigations and administration of subject
interviews. A risk involved in this approach is that the actuality of a.
present cut in security standards may not be '.'balanced off" if the promised
needed the "savings? from reduction of investigative scope to free resources
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8. All non-Defense SECOM members support
continuation of 15-year scope investigations. Energy wants it because of
.concerns about the sensitivity of nuclear weapons data. FBI wants it because
they feel it has proved its worth in the past. CIA Office of General Counsel
wants it as a good means of maintaining a distinction between SCI access
criteria and Top Secret clearance standards in litigation on access denials.
9. The availability of investigative resources is a valid concern for
Defense. The Defense Investigative Service took a Congressionally mandated
budget cut this fiscal year. The difficulty of rebuilding the Defense
investigative program to a high level of quality in all areas is apparent.
A basic issue seems to be whether Community personnel security SCI access
standards should be reduced to satisfy Defense plans for al.location'of its
security resources. Another is whether DCI standards should be pegged to the
current Defense view of Top Secret standards.
10. Options include:
a. Adopt the majority position in favor of maintaining 15-year
scope. Defense could adapt to this by utilizing a period of cover-
age for Top Secret clearance investigations of something less than
the period required by DCID 1/14.
b. Adopt the OSD minority position (reducing scope to 10
years). The 10-year minimum investigative period predictably would
become a maximum for resource-strapped agencies.
c. Discuss the issue at the NFIC to determine Defense's degree
of flexibility on this matter as a basis for subsequent decision.
11. Recommendation: That you schedule this issue for NFIC discussion and
push there for maintaining the 15-year scope of investigation.
25X1
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SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access
CONCUR:
Deputy Director o entry me -igence
APPROVED:`'
Director of Central Inte ligence
Orig Return to D/ICS w/atts
:1 - DCI w/atts
1 - DDCI w/atts
:1 - ExDi,r Watts
2 - ER w/a.tts
1 - ICS Registry w/atts
1 C/SECOM w/atts
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