SCC/CIWG TASKING , NATIONAL CLEARANCE/ INVESTIGATIVE POLICY FOR THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500030009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 8, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
8 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee
VIA: Executive Secretary, DCI Security Committee
Security Committee Staff
SUBJECT: SCC/CIWG Tasking, National Clearance/
Investigative Policy for the Entire Government
1. The Chairman of the Security Committee appeared
before the SCC/Counterintelligence Working Group on 5
February 1980, reporting on Differing Personnel Security
Clearance/Investigative Standards Within the Intelligence
Community. As a result of this report, the SCC/CIWG tasked
the Security Committee Staff as follows:
Action:
The Security. Committee Staff, acting for the
SCC/CIWG, will study the problem of differing
personnel security clearance/investigative
standards from a government-wide viewpoint,
not limited to the Intelligence Community.
It will make recommendations for a national
clearance/investigative standards policy for
the entire government. Target date for sub-
mission to the Chairman, SCC/CIWG: 15 June 1980.
2. Attached hereto is a draft of a study (Tab A) of the
differing clearance/investigative standards found throughout
the government and a recommendation for a standard policy for
the entire government. The recommendation would cover, (1)
access to all forms and levels of classified information;
and (2) a standard for civilian employment by the United
States Government.
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3. The first part of the recommendation would be
accomplished by addition of an Annex to E.O. 12065 (Tab B)
providing for criteria and investigative standards for all
classified information. The second part is an appropriately
revised version of the August 1977 Civil Service Commission's
draft of a replacement Executive Order for E.O. 10450 (Tab Q.
4. It is intended that the attached study and recom-
mendations would serve to fulfill the tasking of the SCC/CIWG.
Prior to submitting it to the SCC/CIWG, it would be well to
forward information copies to the members of the Working
Group, asking them for any comments they might wish to make.
This would allow for an advance reading of the stand each
organization would take towards this proposal.
S. The first step to be taken would be to send the
study and recommendations to the SA/DCI/CI for his review,
and to determine that it meets the tasking levied upon the
Security Committee Staff.
Distribution:
Orig - C/SECOM
1 - SECOM Subject
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TAB
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PROPOSED NATIONAL CLEARANCE/INVESTIGATIVE POLICY
Executive Order (EO) 10450 dated 27 April 1953 was established
and designed to be the standard against which (civilian) employ-
ment in the Federal Government would be measured and gauged. The
qualities required of the Federal employee are reliability, trust-
worthiness, good conduct and character, and unswerving loyalty to
the United States.
In order to measure these qualities, the EO established two
levels of investigation based upon the sensitivity of the position
to be occupied by the individual. If the position had the potential
for having a material adverse effect on national security, the
position was to be designated as being a sensitive position. Such
designation required that the candidate for employment be the
subject of a full field investigation. The alternate was a non-
sensitive position which required an investigation including national
agency checks and written inquiries to appropriate law enforcement
agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools
attended by the applicant for such position.
In the application of EO 10450, the first and foremost factor
in making the determination between a sensitive and non-sensitive
position was the degree of access to classified material. Access
to Top Secret material was considered to place the position in the
sensitive category but classification per se was not mentioned or
defined in EO 10450. Also, there was an accepted standard that
originated with EO 10450 for defining the full field investigation.
While the EO applied only to civilian employment, the standard full
field investigation extended even to the military when a Top Secret
clearance was required.
The standard then developed for the full field was an investi-
gation of the most recent 15 years of the individual's life or
investigation from age 18 whichever was the shorter period. The
selection of a 15-year period of coverage was based upon the
historical event of the German/Soviet nonaggression treaty of 1938
which caused the Communist Party of the United States to switch the
"party line" 180 degrees in its attitude towards the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany. This change in "party line" made a similarly
observable change in 1940 with the invasion of the Soviet Union
by the Germans. Since the period of the early 1950's was high-
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lighted by an aggressive effort to purge any and all communists
from federal employment, it was considered necessary for an
investigation to extend back in time,at least 1938,to determine
the political affiliations of the individual during that 1938-1940
period deemed to be critical. Since EO 10450 was promulgated
in 1953, coverage back to 1938 amounted to 15 years which then
became accepted as the standard for a full field investigation
by all of the investigative agencies.
The 15 year background investigation remained the standard
period of coverage until 1968. It was accepted as the required
investigative period of coverage for the first Director of Central
Intelligence Directive 1/14 which was formulated in 1966-67 as
the personnel security standard for access to compartmented infor-
mation. The erosion of this standard first occurred in 1968, when
the Civil Service Commission (since renamed the Office of Personnel
Management - OPM) changed the ground rules for EO 10450 full field
investigations from a 15-year period of coverage down to a 5-year
period of coverage. It was termed as an investigation covering
the individual's life with emphasis on his background and activities
during the most recent 15 years or since his 18th birthday, which-
ever is shorter. Particularly intensive coverage is obtained for
the last five year period. That meant that it was a basic 5-year
period of coverage with some record sources such as police and
military service extending back beyond the 5 year period. Such
coverage was expanded time wise when material derogatory matters
were developed which required investigation. The reasons for the
change were based on budgetary and resource constrictions. Also
at this time, sensitive positions were further defined as being
either critical or non-critical sensitive with only the critical
sensitive positions requiring the newly defined five year full
field investigation.
In 1976, the State Department and the Department of Defense
reduced the basic period of coverage of their background investi-
gations. State Department's full field went from 15 years of
coverage down to a seven year period of coverage. Their investi-
gation serves as the basis for applicant screening under EO 10450
as well as the granting of a Top Secret clearance. The stated
reason for the reduction in the period of coverage was to reduce
the case processing time. DoD reduced the period of coverage from
15 years down to 5 years. For both Departments the last institution
of higher learning as well as military service records were checked
without regard to the abbreviated period of coverage. The DoD also
instituted at this time, an entirely new criteria for granting
the Top Secret clearances to military personnel. This consisted
of a favorably completed National Agency Check (NAC) plus 10 year
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continuous honorable active duty. This criteria remained in
effect until December 1979 when the (5 year) background investi-
gation was made the minimum requirement for a Top Secret clearance
in the DoD. The DoD investigative organization, the Defense
Investigative Service (DIS) also conducts a special background.
investigation (SBI) which meets DCID 1/14 requirements for access
to SCI as well as for certain other highly sensitive assignments
such as Presidential Support Activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has continuously held
to a background investigation of 15 years or investigation since
age 17, whichever is shorter. This investigative coverage is
augmented by a polygraph examination which serves the applicant
security screening process as well as the basis for granting a Top
Secret clearance and an SCI access approval when required. The
National Security Agency (NSA) has personnel security requirements
substantially the same as the CIA. The processing is different
in that the polygraph examination precedes the investigation which
is an SBI conducted by DIS.
The FBI background investigation for personnel security screening
has remained substantially unchanged over the years and basically
covers the "entire adult life" of the individual. The FBI does
not routinely employ the polygraph examination as part of its
applicant processing but does reserve its use for those instances
where other means of investigation have not produced the information
required. This "last resort" type use of the polygraph for applicant/
clearance cases has also been adopted by the Treasury Department
for use on cases related to the intelligence functions of the
Department.
Other Departments and Agencies of the Federal government
which conduct EO 10450 applicant investigations or investigations
for security clearances such as the Treasury Department or the
Postal Service have patterned their coverage after that of the
OPM 5 year background investigation.
Attached are graphs showing the scope of the investigations
conducted by the various agencies. As can be seen, the standard
15 year background investigation which originated in the early 1950's
with EO 10450 has been considerably changed. In addition to the
period of coverage, further change has been made in the various
requirements for coverage of places of residence, verification
of birth, numbers of references, etc. Legislative changes have
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also affected the investigation in the type and amount of data
available from NACs, particularly the FBI, as well as credit
and police checks, and have made it necessary to obtain release
forms in order to have access to personal information from
educational,employment and medical sources.
The effect of these changes over the years in the amount
of coverage in the full field or background investigation,if
measured solely in terms of EO 10450 eligibility for occupying
a sensitive position,would be acceptable since the individual
agency or department head determines that the scope of the
investigation is sufficient for his own sensitive positions.
The difficulty enters when inter-agency or inter-departmental
exchanges of data or material are considered. The degree of
access to the sensitive (classified) data or material which is
exchanged may be based on standards considerably different from
those of the agency that originated the data or material. The same
is true of certifications for visits between agencies or depart-
ments. This could mean that two persons from different organiza-
tions would have access to material classified Top Secret, the
first being cleared on the basis of a 15 year background investi-
gation plus polygraph, while the second received a clearance based
upon 10 years honorable service plus a NAC. The degree of security
assurance in such an extreme example does not appear to be equitable.
This situation becomes particularly acute in the dissemination
of national foreign intelligence as defined in EO 12036. The
Director of Central Intelligence is charged with the protection
of national foreign intelligence (NFI) and has addressed this
responsibility only partially by setting standardsfor only that
which is identified as Sensitive, Compartmented Information(SCI).
DCID 1/14 establishes positive minimum standards for access which
pertains to civilian and military alike. The only exceptions are
for "elected officials of the United States Government, federal
judges and those individuals for whom the DCI makes a specific
exception."
Other than SCI, national foreign intelligence at standard
levels of classification (NFI/SLC) receives protection only to
the personnel security standards of the organization which is the
recipient of the NFI/SLC. This situation came into focus in early
1979 when the NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation appointed a
panel to review the security standards for personnel clearances.
The NFIB Working Group was concerned over the vast amounts of
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formerly compartmented material which would be released as NFI/SLC
when the APEX Special Access Control System came into being. The
differences in personnel security standards in government were
recognized and it was considered necessary to make recommendations
to enhance those standards for access to NFI/SLC.
The panel concluded that the minimum acceptable personnel
security standard was a 5 year background investigation along the
lines of that conducted by OPM or DoD. It was found that such
requirement would have only marginal impact on organizations
receiving NFI/SLC other than the DoD. The other Departments and
Agencies acting under EO 10450 designated nearly, if not all,
positions which would receive NFI/SLC as being critical-sensitive
and thus would meet the minimum standard of a 5 year BI. With the
military personnel as well as the contractors' personnel associated
with DoD, neither of whom are included under EO 10450, the situation
is quite different for two reasons. First, due to their vast
numbers and the fact that they are cleared only to the level
necessary for access, the cost of conducting 5 year background
investigations for all having access to NFI/SLC at the Secret
level, was found to be prohibitive. Secondly, to keep NFI/SLC
separate from other classified material would require separate
facilities for receiving, handling, storing and transmitting it
which, in effect, would be the creation of still another compart-
mented system. The creation of another compartmented system was
not intended and this plus the high cost factor of the numerous
BI's,brought an end to the discussion of raising the personnel
security standards for NFI/SLC.
There have been studies of the EO 10450 question having as an
objective modernizing, updating, and standardizing its application
to the Federal Government. To the present time such studies have
been without success in accomplishing their objective. Among such
studies was the Domestic Council Committee on the Right to Privacy,
Project 10 which went through draft after draft of proposed revisions
of EO 10450. The complexities of the Federal employment system gave
rise to a continual series of objections and proposals for modifications
to meet specific situations which in turn gave rise to still other
objections. The Project 10 final draft of the proposed revision
specified the positions of special trust which were defined as 1)
having access to Top Secret, 2) having access to SCI, 3) access
to information revealing intelligence sources and methods, and 4)
any classified information controlled by special access procedures
would be subject to a full field investigation emphasizing the most
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recent five year period. This draft was submitted to OMB and
caused the DCI to register a strong objection to infringement on
his charge to protect intelligence sources and methods as well
as limitations on his termination authorities both of which are
based upon statutory responsibilities. This resulted in still
another drafting of the proposed EO by the Civil Service Commission
which exempted the Intelligence Community. This draft was forwarded
to OMB in August 1977 and since has remained dormant.
Still other studies have been conducted on security clearance
or personnel security procedures either by or for Congressional
Committees. Among these are the series of GAO reports to the House
Committee on Government Operations in 1974, 1977 and 1979 which
emphasized the constraints new legislative and court decisions have
had on EO 10450 and the need for a single consolidated piece of
legislation which would be the authority for all personnel security
investigations and adjudications in government. A secondary
objective was the equitable treatment of applicants and employees
in the investigative and adjudicative process. The underlying
thrust which came to the forefront in the 1979 report titled. Costs
of Federal Personnel Security Investigations Could and Should Be
Cut, was the need for reducing the numbers, scope and costs involved
in investigations and security processing under EO 10450. This was
to be accomplished by more explicite definitions of the sensitivity
of each Federal position as judged by the agency heads and centralizing
and standardizing all phases of the personnel security processing
to achieve the most cost efficient operation.
The Oversight Subcommittees Staff Report to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in September 1979, studied
the security clearance procedures used by CIA, NSA, State and the
DoD intelligence related organizations, particularly as they pertain
to the screening of applicants for access to SCI. The report con-
cluded that the screening process cannot presently meet uniform
high standards and that the divergencies in their screening
techniques have become excessive. Factors contributing to the
conclusions are:
? "Although the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
is in theory (and in law) generally responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods, this function is in fact diffused
among a number of agencies.
. Clearance procedures and philosophies differ widely
among, and sometimes even within these agencies. There are,
for example, major variations in the use of and attitudes towards
the polygraph.
6
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? Cuts in manpower have placed pressure on investigative
procedure and standards, and put a premium on efficient procedure
and organization.
? Investigative branches report increasing difficulty in
compiling adequate data bases from the FBI and other sources.
A major problem appears to be inadequate access to criminal justice
records."
The HPSCI report found two areas where there was need for
improvement in the way security screening is carried out: the
need for greater uniformity in investigative procedures and
standards; and the need for improved access to pertinent infor-
mation. The recommendations of the HPSCI report are summarized as
follows:
1. Establish standards for access to TOP SECRET and SCI
which would be substantially the same, i.e., investigation
to DCID 1/14 standards.
2. Establish standards for searching out and reporting
of both positive and negative data in order to have an
effective screening process.
3. Recommended. conducting a study to validate the accuracy
of the polygraph as used in the security screening process.
4. Establish an Intelligence Community-wide criteria for
use of the polygraph.
5. Examination of the benefits and costs of establishing
a centralized office to conduct background investigations
for the entire Intelligence Community in order to assure
uniform procedures and quality control.
6. Promote legislation to assure access for the purpose
of background investigations to criminal justice records
as well as education, employment, credit and medical records.
7. Resolve the inconsistency between EO 10450, the Attorney
General's Domestic Security Investigations Guidelines and
the Privacy Act which preclude obtaining certain information
relevant to screening individuals nominated for access to
SCI.
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From the foregoing it is evident that the passage of time
has altered the original intent as well as the procedures which
flowed from EO 10450. Court decisions, legislation and public
attitudes toward protecting individuals rights to privacy and
access to due process procedures have modified and inhibited the
effectiveness of the EO.
The studies mentioned above have resulted in attempts to
further define the sensitivity of federal civilian positions and
the degree of investigative coverage needed to make determinations
on eligibility to occupy such positions. Results thus far have
been of little avail in moving toward a solution of these prob-
lems. Each succeeding effort toward a hoped for solution has
intensified the problem rather than making it more simple and
easier to administer.
The original scope of EO 10450 was limited to civilian
federal employees. The first step in determining the sensitivity
of the positions they were to occupy is their degree of access
to classified information and material. This brings forth two
questions: Why only civilian federal employees, and why not affix
the degree of investigative coverage directly to the degree of
access to classified information and material as defined in EO
12065. In a move toward simplification of the problems, it would
be well to take the same step as was taken by the DCI with the
promulgation of DCID 1/14. That is to create a criteria and
standard which would apply to all civilian federal employees,
the military, contractors employees and all others who are not
specifically exempted. Such criteria and standard would have to
address the degrees of sensitivity identified for each level of
classified material: Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential and
equate to each a minimum standard of investigation which would have
to be accomplished with favorable results in order to grant access.
The establishment of these criteria and. standards for access can
best be accomplished by publishing it as an annex to EO 12065
which specifically defines the levels of classification.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the task yet remains to
graduate the minimum standards of investigative coverage to each
level of classification. It is necessary to make the minimum
standards of investigation compatible insofar as possible with
budgets and personnel resources as well as with the definitions
of each level of classification. The definition of each level
of classification is that information the unauthorized disclosure
of which reasonably could be expected to:
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' TOP SECRET - Cause exceptionally grave damage
to the national security
SECRET - Cause serious damage to the national
security
CONFIDENTIAL - Identifiable damage to the national
security.
In addition to the three levels of classification, EO 12065
also defines special access programs. Among these are SCI
programs for which the minimum personnel security standards
for access eligibility to SCI are set forth by the Director
of Central Intelligence in DCID 1/14. These minimum standards
and procedures would be included in the LO 12065 Annex. It would
further appear appropriate to accept the first HPSCI recommendation
and make the standards for access to Top Secret the same as the
minimum standards for access to SCI.
The worth of the DCID 1/14 investigative requirements is
supported by the SECOM Personnel Security Survey which is an
examination and analysis of the investigative and adjudicative
procedures followed by ten departments and agencies in the
Intelligence Community. It is a study of over 5,000 cases
investigated by six different investigative units and adjudicated
by the ten participating organizations. In addition to the
more standard investigative sources, it also included analysis
of utilization of polygraph examinations and personnel interviews
with the subject of the investigation.
The examination included an analysis of the period of
coverage required to capture significant adverse information
and adverse information which resulted in adjudications resolved
against the person being considered for access. Briefly shown
the period of coverage analysis provided the following information:
WOULD RISK LOSING:
A PERIOD OF COVERAGE
RESOLVED AGAINST
OF
SIGNIFICANT DATA
DATA
5 YEARS
28%
22%
7 YEARS
17%
11%
10 YEARS
9%
3%
15 YEARS
4%
0%
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The above indicates that target periods of coverage of 5, 7
or 10 years risk losing significant adverse data, including data
resolved against the individual. This survey identified six
cases in which a 15-year period of coverage acquired data serious
enough to resolve against the individual. Put another way, data
resolved against the individuals in those six cases would not
have been identified with less than a 15-year period of coverage.
In the study a productivity scale was used to rank the
sources that contributed to the identification of adverse infor-
mation, both that which was resolved in the individual's favor as well as
that which was resolved against the individual. With only a few
minor variations when considered as a unique source versus a
shared source the rank order for productivity was as follows:
Source
Productivity Index
(Resolved against data)
1.
Polygraph examination
23.48
2.
Developed Sources
2.92
3.
Subject Interview
2.62
4.
Employment Personal Interviews
1.71
5.
Police Records
1.35
6.
Employment Records
.74
7.
Credit Sources
.67
8.
Listed References
S2
9.
Educational Personal Interviews
.40
10.
Residence Checks
.39
11.
Educational Records
.02
From the above it is apparent that the minimum standards set
forth in DCID 1/14 are needed to protect SCI as well as Top Secret
if the definition "exceptionally grave damage to the national
security" really means what it says. It is quite apparent that
with the exception of CIA and NSA the very highest rated source of
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adverse information, the polygraph examination, is not required
to be used as an investigative tool by the other Departments and
Agencies of the federal government.
In order to approach investigative standards for access to
material classified at'the Secret level it must be kept in mind
that this involves very large numbers of contractors employees
and military personnel. Current Secret level clearances, for
other than civilian Federal employees, are usually granted on
the basis of National Agency checks (NAC) only. Realizing that
such a simple error as a misspelling of a name can result in no
record returns from an NAC, which would result in the granting of
Secret level access, it becomes evident that more is needed in the
way of positive information on which to base access. It is
necessary, therefore, to strike a balance between the large numbers
of secret clearances and the need for positive information developed
from investigative sources.
It appears essential that investigative requirements for
Secret level clearances cover at a minimum the most recent three
to five Years of the individuals life and include a NAC (with FBI
fingerprint check), review of employment records and interviews
at the current or most recent significant place of employment,
interviews with at least two persons knowledgeable of the individuals
reputation, character and loyalty as well as a check of police
records at locations of residence within the period of coverage.
In the event that adverse information is developed in the course
of such investigation the coverage would be expanded to develop
sufficient data on which to base a sound and reasonable adjudication.
Access to classified information at the Confidential level
would require a NAC (with FBI fingerprint check) and a check of
police records at the current or most significant location of
residence within the past five years. These inquiries would be
expanded if it was necessary to resolve adverse data.
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DCID 1/14
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
- College
- Interviews
Employment Records
- Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth Citizenship
Listed. References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
It - College
- Interviews
Employment Records
It - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth ~ Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
AGE 5 10 15
18 Years Years Years
Me-quire~ d
Judgment
Minimum 3
Optional
Optional
Yes
AGE 5 7 10 15
18 Years Years Years Years
--TLeiuired
2-3
By Inve st i gators
Not Used
Yes
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Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
College
" Interviews
Employment Records
" - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth ~ Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
It - College
- Interviews
Employment Records
It - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth ~ Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interviews
Polygraph
NAC
AGE S 10
18 Years Years
Required
All (3)
Judgment
Extensively Twice
Used as "last resort"
Yes
AGE 5 10
17 Years Ycars
Required
Judg ,yen t
Minimum S
Optional
Required
Yes
Entire
Adult
Li le
15
Years
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Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
- College
It - Interviews
Employment Records
" - Interviews
Police
Credit
Birth Citizenship
Residence
Listed References
Developed. Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
DIS - SBI (DCID 1/14)
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
It c 11
-
o ege
Interviews
AGE 5
18 Years
10
Years
15
Years.
Required
Not Required
Not Required
Minimum 3
Yes
Not used
Yes
AGE 5
18 Years
10
Years
15
Years
Employment Records
It - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
NAC
Begin
Judgment
Minimum 3
Yes
Not used
Yes
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Basic Period,of Coverage
Education - High School
- College
It - Interviews
Employment Records
" - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth ~ Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph -
NAC
TREASURY
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
- College
it - Interviews
Employment Records
" - Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth P1 Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interviews
Polygraph
NAC
AGE 5 1.0
18 Years , Years Years
Checked if considered necessary
Judgment
Judgment
For clarificati-oii of allegations
Not applicable
Yes
AGE 5 10
18 Years Years Years
Cecked _if consi_dered necessary
3
2-3
For Investigative Personnel.
Used as "last resort" in DC[D 1/14 Cases
Yes - Conducted by OP1
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TAB
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MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND
INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY
FOR ACCESS TO NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Pursuant to Executive Order 12065, the following minimum
personnel security standards and investigative procedures are
hereby established for all United States Government civilian and
military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of con-
tractors and other individuals who require access to National
Security Information (NSI) classified in accordance with section
1-1 and 4-2 of this Order. The standards and procedures established
herein are minimum and the departments and agencies may establish
such additional security steps as may be deemed necessary and
appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained.
PURPOSE
1. The purpose of this Annex is to enhance the security
protection of NSI through the application of minimum security
standards and investigative procedures.
APPLICABILITY
2. The provisions of this annex shall apply to all persons
(other than elected officials of the United States Government,
federal judges and those individuals specifically excepted by
appropriate authority) without regard to civilian or military
status, form of employment, official rank or position or length of
service.
GENERAL
3. The granting of access to NSI shall be controlled under
the strictest application of the "need-to-know" principle and in
accordance with the personnel security standards and investigative
requirements set forth in this Annex. All persons given access to
NSI, as a condition of obtaining that access, shall sign an agree-
ment that they will not disclose that information to persons not
authorized to receive it.
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CRITERIA FOR ACCESS TO SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS
4. Criteria and requirements for security approval of a
person for access to NSI controlled under Special Access Pro-
grams as defined in section 4-2 of this Order shall comply
with the provisions of the Director of Central Intelligence
Directive No. 1/14.
CRITERIA FOR ACCESS TO TOP SECRET NSI
5. Criteria and investigative requirements for security
approval of a person for access to Top Secret NSI are as follows:
a. The individual shall be stable, trustworthy,
of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned
loyalty to the United States.
b. Except where there is a compelling need and a
determination has been made by competent authority as
described in paragraph 7 below that every reasonable
assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances
the security risk is negligible:
(1) Both the individual and the members
of his or her immediate family shall be U.S. citizens.
For these purposes "immediate family" is defined as
including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers,
sisters and children.
(2) The members of the individual's immediate
family and persons to whom he is bound by affection or
obligation should neither be subject to physical,
mental or other forms of duress by a foreign power,
nor advocate the use of force or violence to over-
throw the Government of the United States or the
alteration of the form of Government of the United
States by unconstitutional means.
6. In exceptional cases the head of a department or agency,
or his designee, may determine that it is necessary or advisable
in the National interest to authorize access to Top Secret NSI
prior to completion of the fully prescribed investigation. In
this situation such investigative checks as are immediately
possible shall be made at once, and. should include a personal
interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel.
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Access in such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the
fully prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be
completed at the earliest practicable moment.
7. The exceptions to paragraph 5.b(l)(2) above may be
granted only by the head of a department or agency or his
designee, unless such authority has been specifically delegated
to the head of an office or organization as set forth in inter-
departmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be common
sense determinations based on all available information, and
shall be recorded by the agency making the exception. In those
cases in which the individual has lived outside of the United
States for a substantial period of his life, a thorough assessment
of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of
the information therein must be made before an exception is con-
sidered.
INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO TOP SECRET NSI
8. The investigation conducted on an individual under
consideration for access to Top Secret NSI will be thorough and
shall be designed to develop information as to whether the
individual clearly meets the above criteria.
9. The investigation shall be accomplished through record
checks and personal interviews of various sources by trained
investigative personnel in order to establish affirmatively to
the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include
birth, residences, education, employments and military service.
Where the circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation
shall exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that
those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility have in
their possession all the relevant facts available.
10. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history
statement, fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and a signed release, as necessary,
authorizing custodians of police, credit, education and medical
records, to provide record information to the investigative
agency. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained
where additional corroboration of identity is required.
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11. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:
a. Verification of date and place of birth and
citizenship.
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission
of fingerprint charts, and such other National agencies
as are appropriate to the individual's background. An
additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service
records shall be conducted on those members of the individual's
immediate family who are United States citizens other than
by birth or who are resident aliens.
c. A check of appropriate police records covering
all areas where the individual has resided in the U.S.
throughout the most recent fifteen (15) years or since
age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period.
d. Verification of the individual's financial
status and credit habits through checks of appropriate
credit institutions and interviews with knowledgeable
sources covering the most recent five (5) years.
e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of
all the individual's residences in excess of six (6)
months throughout the most recent five (5) year period.
This coverage shall be expanded where the investigation
suggests the existence of some questionable behavioral
pattern.
f. Confirmation of all employment during the past
fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, whichever is
the shorter period but in any event the most recent two
years. Personal interviews with supervisors and co-workers
at places of employment covering the past ten (10) years
shall be accomplished.
g. Verification of attendance at institutes of higher
learning in all instances and at the last secondary school
attended within the past fifteen (15) years. Attendance
at secondary schools may be verified through qualified
collateral sources. If attendance at educational institutions
occurred within the most recent five (5) years, personal
interviews with faculty members or other persons who were
acquainted with the individual during his attendance shall
be accomplished.
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h. Review of appropriate military records.
i. Interviews with a sufficient number of
knowledgeable acquaintances (a minimum of three developed
during the course of the investigation) as necessary to
provide a continuity to the extent practicable, of the
individual's activities and behavioral patterns over
the past fifteen years with particular emphasis on the
most recent five years.
j. When employment, education or residence has
occurred overseas (except for periods of less than five
f5) years for personnel on U.S. Government assignment
and less than ninety days for other purposes) during the
past fifteen years or since age eighteen, a check of the
records will be made at the Department of State and other
appropriate agencies. Efforts shall he made to develop
sources, generally in the United States, who knew the
individual overseas in order to cover significant employ-
ment, education or residence and to attempt to determine
if any lasting foreign contacts or connections were
established during this period. However, in all cases
where an individual has worked or lived outside of the
U.S. continuously for over five years, the investigation
will be expanded to cover fully this period in his life
through the use of such investigative assets and checks
of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Govern-
ment in the foreign country(ies) in which the individual
resided.
k. In those instances in which the individual has
immediate family members or other persons with whom he
is bonded by affection or obligation in any of the situations
described in subparagraph 5.b.(2), above, the investigation
will include an interview of the individual by trained
security, investigative or counterintelligence personnel
to ascertain the facts as they may relate to the individual's
access eligibility.
1. In all cases, the individual's spouse shall, at
a minimum, be checked through the subversive files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other National agencies
as appropriate. When conditions indicate, additional
investigation shall be conducted on the spouse of the
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individual and members of the immediate family to the
extent necessary to permit a determination by the
adjudicating agency that the provisions of paragraph
5, Personnel Security Standards, above, are met.
M. A personal interview of the individual will
be conducted by trained security, investigative or counter-
intelligence personnel when necessary to resolve any
significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies
developed during the investigation.
12. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within
the past five years which substantially meets the above minimum
standards, it may serve as a basis for granting access approval
provided a review of the personnel and security files does not
reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility.
If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum
standards or if it is more than five years old, a current investi-
gation shall be required but may be limited to that necessary to
bring the individual's file up-to-date in accordance with the
investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 11 above.
Should new information be developed during the current investi-
gation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's activities
covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall
be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this new
information.
13. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic
reinvestigation of personnel provided access to Top Secret NSI.
These reinvestigations will be conducted on a five year recurrent
basis, but on a more frequent basis where the individual has shown
some questionable behavioral pattern, his activities are other-
wise suspect.
14. The scope of reinvestigations shall include as a
minimum, appropriate National agency checks, local agency
(including overseas checks where appropriate), credit checks
and a personal discussion with the individual by trained investi-
gative, security or counterintelligence personnel when necessary
to resolve significant adverse information or inconsistencies.
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15. The evaluation of the information developed by investi-
gation on an individual's loyalty and'suitability shall be
accomplished under the cognizance of the head of the department
or agency (or a designee) concerned by analysts of broad
knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in personnel
security and/or counterintelligence. When all other information
developed on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative
requirement which has not been met should not preclude favorable
adjudication. In all evaluations the protection of Top Secret
NSI shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The
ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is
clearly consistent with the interests of national security shall
be an overall common sense determination based on all available
information.
CRITERIA FOR ACCESS TO SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL NSI
16. The criteria, and provisions for exceptions to that
criteria, for access to Secret and Confidential NSI shall be
the same as expressed in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above.
17. The investigation conducted on an individual being
considered for access to Secret NSI shall meet the following
minimum requirements:
a. Verification of date and place of birth if
there is reason to question information provided by the
individual being investigated, or of the individual's
citizenship through Immigration and Naturalization records
if that individual was foreign born.
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of
fingerprint charts, and such other National agencies as are
appropriate to the individual's background. An additional
check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall
be conducted on those members of the individual's immediate
family who are United States citizens other than by birth
or who are resident aliens.
c. A check of appropriate police records covering
all areas where the individual has resided in the United
States during the most recent 5 year period.
7
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d. Confirmation of the current or most significant
employment (or education in the event that the individual
has been a student) during the most recent 3 to 5 year
period to include personal interviews with supervisors or
co-workers (or in the case of a student, teachers or
fellow students).
e. Interviews with a minimum of two knowledgeable
acquaintances to provide to the extent practicable infor-
mation concerning the individual's activities and behavioral
patterns with particular emphasis on the most recent five
years.
f. Review of appropriate military records.
g. A personal interview of the individual will be
conducted by trained security, investigative or counter-
intelligence personnel when necessary to resolve any significant
adverse information and/or inconsistencies developed during
the investigation.
18. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history
statement, fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and a signed release, as necessary,
authorizing custodians of police, credit, education and medical
records, to provide record information to the investigative
agency. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained
where additional corroboration of identity is required.
INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL NSI
19. The investigation conducted on an individual being
considered for access to Confidential NSI shall meet the following
minimum requirements:
a. Check of the subversive and criminal files of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission
of fingerprint charts, and such other National agencies
as are appropriate to the individual's background. An
additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service
records shall be conducted on those members of the individual's
immediate family who are United States citizens other than
by birth or who are resident aliens.
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b. A review of appropriate military records.
c. A check of police records covering the current
or most significant areas where the individual has resided
in the United States during the most recent five (5) year
period.
20. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history
statement, fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and a signed release, as necessary,
authorizing custodians of police, credit, education and medical
records to provide record information to the investigative agency.
Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional
corroboration of identity is required.
9
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TAB
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Executive Order to Replace E.O. 10450
WHEREAS the national interests require that all persons
privileged to be employed in the Federal Government shall be
trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and
unswerving loyalty to the United States; and
WHEREAS the American tradition that all persons should
receive fair, impartial and equitable treatment at the hands
of the Government requires that all persons seeking the privilege
of employment or privileged to be employed in the Federal Govern-
ment be adjudged by consistent and uniform standards which comport
with the individual's right of privacy;
Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by
the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including
sections 1101 et seg., 1304, 3301, 3333, 7301, 7311, and 7501
et seq. of Title 5 U.S.C., the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), and as President of the United.
States, and deeming such action necessary in the national interest
and in order to protect the rights of citizens seeking employ-
ment or employed by the United States, it is hereby ordered as
follows:
Section 1. Revocation of E.O. 10450. This order shall
become effective 180 days after the date hereof; Executive Order
10450 of April 27, 1953, as amended, is then revoked, except that
determinations made under E.O. 10450 will not have to be re-
adjudicated.
Section 2. Purpose of the Order. The purpose of this Order
is to:: establish uniform stan.aressffor classifying positions as
to their sensitivity; define the types of investigation conducted
for making hiring, retention or access determinations under this
Order; delineate the authority and responsibilities of the depart-
ments and agencies in the implementation of this Order; and estab-
lish effective oversight to assure that department and agency
implementation of the policies set forth herein is consistent
with the interests of the nation and the constitutional and civil
rights of the individuals concerned.
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To insure consistent application of the standards and pro-
cedures contained herein, there shall be established a uniform
Federal Personnel Security Program operating under the policies
and procedures developed by the Office of Personnel Management
and the Department of Justice.
Section 3. Applicability. In addition to the departments
and agencies specified in the Act of August 26, 1950, Executive
Order 10237 of April 26, 1951, the provisions of that act shall
apply to all other departments and agencies of the Government.
The provisions of this Order shall apply to all executive branch
agencies including any executive department, agency, or indepen-
dent establishment of the United States or any corporation wholly
owned by the United States, the United States Postal Service,
Postal Rate Commission, and competitive service positions in the
legislative branch. All other legislative and judicial branch
organizations may, upon request, utilize the investigative services
provided by this Order.
This Order shall not apply to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence or the organizations constituting the Intelligence Community
as defined by Executive Order 12036, except the Director of Central
Intelligence shall prescribe standards for access to sensitive
compartmented information.
Section 4. Standard for Personnel Security. The appointment
or retention of each civilian officer or employee in any depart-
ment or agency is contingent upon the meeting of the following
standard:
The personnel security standard shall be whether or not
the employment or retention of the individual is in the interest
of the United States.
In applying this standard a balanced judgment shall be reached
after giving due weight to all the evidence, both favorable and
unfavorable, the nature of the position, the mission of the agency,
and the value of the individual to the public service.
Section 5. Sensitivity of Positions. Each department or
agency shall classify eac position as either sensitive or non-
sensitive.
(a) The criteria to be applied by the heads of the
departments or agencies in designating a position as sensitive are:
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(1) Access to information classified as Secret
or Top Secret under Executive Order 12065.
affairs;
(2) Duties involved in the conduct of foreign
(3) Development or approval of plans, policies or
programs which affect the overall operations of a department,
agency or organizational component; that is policy-making or policy-
determining positions;
(4) Investigative duties, the issuance of personnel
security clearances, or the making of personnel security determina-
tions;
(5) Duties involved in approving the collection, grant,
loan, payment or other use of property or funds of high value, or
other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust and
confidence;
(6) Duties involved in the enforcement of laws, or
responsibilities for the protection of individuals or property;
(7) Duties, whether performed by Federal employees or
contractors, involved in the design, operation or maintenance of
Federal computer systems, or access to data contained in manual or
automated files and records or Federal computer systems, when such
data relates to national security, personal, proprietary or
economically valuable information, or when the duties or data
relate to distribution of funds, requisition of supplies or similar
functions; or
(8) Duties involved in or access to areas which have
a critical impact on the national security, economic well-being
of the nation, or public health or safety.
(b) All other positions shall be designated as nonsensitive.
Section 6. Personnel Security Investigations.
(a) General - The appointment of each civilian officer or
employee in any department or agency shall be made subject to an
investigation conducted for the purpose of developing information
relevant to determining whether such appointment is in conformance
with the standard specified in Section 4 of this Order. The infor-
mation to be obtained shall relate to the character, reputation,
and loyalty of the individual under investigation.
3
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The scope of the investigation shall be determined in the
first instance according to the sensitivity of the position,
but in no event shall the investigation include less than a
National Agency Check, as defined by the Office of Personnel
Management except that, upon the request of the head of the
department or agency concerned, the Office of Personnel
Management may, in its discretion, authorize a lesser investi-
gation with respect to per diem, intermittent, temporary
or seasonal employees, or aliens employed outside the United
States.
(1) Sensitive Positions. The investigation to
be conducted for persons who are to occupy sensitive positions
shall be conducted prior to appointment, or before the individual
assumes the duties of the position. The scope of the investigation
shall be determined, first, if access to classified information
is involved (Section 5.(a).(1)) by the scope prescribed in
the Annex to E.O. 12065; and secondly, in all other instances
defines in Section 5.(a), the scope of the investigation shall
consist of no less than a full field investigation, as defined
by the Office of Personnel Management.
(1) In case of an emergency, a sensitive
position may be filled by a person whose required investigation
has not been completed if the head of the department, agency,
or major organizational component involved, or a designee
who is directly responsible to such authority, finds that
such an assignment is not contrary to the national interest.
(2) Nonsensitive Positions. The investigation
to be conducted for persons who occupy nonsensitive positions
shall consist of no less than a National Agency Check.
(i) If the duties of the position require
access to information classified as Confidential under
Executive Order 12065, the investigation shall consist
of a National Agency Check and written inquiries to local
law enforcement agencies, educational institutions, former
employers, supervisors and references. The investigation
may be conducted after appointment, but before access clearance
is granted.
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(4) Investigative Responsibility. The investigation of
persons entering or employed in the Federal service, including
experts and consultants however employed, shall be the responsi-
bility of the Office of Personnel Management, except in cases
in which the head of a department or agency assumes that
responsibility pursuant to law, or by agreement with the Office
of Personnel Management.
(b) Referral of Cases to the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. Whenever, during the conduct of the investigation, in or-
mation is developed which indicates that an individual may have
acted or been coerced, influenced or pressured to act in a manner
contrary to the national interests, the case shall be referred
promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation under guidelines
promulgated by the Attorney General.
Section 7. Due Process. No person may be denied eligibility
for appointment, denied appointment in the Federal service, denied
a clearance, or suspended or removed from a position in the Federal
service by any department or agency for failure to meet the
standard set forth in Section 4 of this Order without being
advised of the reasons therefore and given opportunity to respond;
any such action, either proposed or approved, shall be taken in
accord with applicable law and regulation.
Section 8. Determinations Related to National Security.
The reinstatement, restoration to duty or re-employment of an
individual suspended or terminated under the authority granted to
heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the Act
of August 26, 1950 (5 U.S.C. 7531 et seq.), or pursuant to Executive
Order 9835, Executive Order 10450, or any other security or loyalty
program relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall
be in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.
Section 9. Review of Unfavorable or Questionable Information
Arising Subsequent to Favorable Determination. Whenever there is
developed or received by any department or agency information
indicating that the retention of any civilian officer or employee
in the Federal service may not be in the best interests of the
Government, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the
department or agency concerned, or to a designee, who, after such
investigation as may be appropriate, shall review or cause to be
reviewed the unfavorable or questionable information, and determine
whether the retention of the person concerned is consistent with
the standard set forth in Section 4 of this Order.
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Section 10. Program Implementation and Management.
(a) General Policy Oversight. The National Security
Council shall exercise oversight over the Office of Personnel
Management and the Department of Justice in the operation of the
Federal Personnel Security Program.
(b) Office of Personnel Management. The Office of
Personnel Management shall:
(1) issue, within 90 days of the date of this
Order, a program directive which will prescribe:
(i) criteria to be used in making a
determination under the standard set forth in Section 4 of this
Order;
under this Order;
(ii) the scope of investigations conducted
(iii) instructions related to the protection
of the individual's rights;
of investigation;
(iv) guidelines with respect to the updating
(v) minimum standards for the selection and
training of program personnel; and
(vi) instructions dealing with the use, control,
release, maintenance and disposal of investigative reports.
(2) furnish investigative support, upon request, to
the legislative and judicial branches of the Government, and to all
other Federal Government entities electing to be subject to the
provisions of this Order;
(3) establish and maintain a security-investigation
index, covering all persons as to whom personnel security investi-
gations have been conducted under this Order, whether by the
Office of Personnel Management or any department or agency of the
Executive Branch. The index shall contain the name of each person
investigated, adequate identifying data concerning such person,
identification of the department or agency which has conducted
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an investigation concerning the person, or has suspended or
terminated the employment of such person under the authority
granted to the heads of departments and agencies by or in
accordance with the Act of August 26, 1950. The Security-
Investigations Index established and maintained by the Office
of Personnel Management under Executive Order 10450 of April
27, 1953, shall be made a part of this Index;
(4) develop and prescribe standard forms to be
used to implement the program;
(5) establish a clearing house for program
management information;
(6) develop and prescribe statistical reporting
procedures designed to facilitate analysis of the effectiveness
of the Order; and
(7) evaluate the manner in which the Order is being
implemented throughout the Federal Government, prescribe corrective
action or modification to the heads of departments or agencies con-
cerning deficiencies noted, and submit to the National Security
Council an annual report detailing the Office of Personnel
Management's appraisal findings and the extent of department
and agency compliance.
(c) Department of Justice. The Department of Justice
shall:
(1) Issue, within 90 days of the date of this
Order, a program directive which will prescribe:
(i) guidelines for the referral of cases
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as provided for in Section
6(b) of this Order, and establish the criteria for the use of the
information developed by these investigations in the adjudication
of such cases:
(ii) guidelines with respect to the use of
the polygraph, voice analyzer, or other similar technical equip-
ment for employment screening and in the conduct of personnel investi-
gations;
(2) provide assistance and advice to the heads of
departments and agencies regarding the implementation of this Order
with respect to actions taken for reasons of national security
against applicants and employees.
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(d) Departments and Agencies. The departments and agencies,
or the heads thereof, shall:
(1) issue, within 90 days of the date of the directives
cited in subsection (b) (1) and subsection (c) (1) of this Section,
appropriate regulations implementing the policies and procedures
of this Order;
(2) implement the program directives, policies and
procedures prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management and
the Department of Justice;
(3) establish a central personnel security office,
responsible for adjudicating cases, granting access clearance and
maintaining program records as prescribed by the Office of Personnel
Management;
(4) furnish to the Office of Personnel Management
information appropriate for the maintenance of the security-
investigations index; and
(5) implement any corrective action or modification
prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management with respect to
the program appraisal responsibility.
Approved For Release 2005/08/02 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500030009-9
 a
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SU
BJECT: (Optional) SCC/CIWG Tasking, National ClearanceI}i.v stigative
Policy for the Entire Government
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
SECOM-D-?03
SECOM Staff
3E05 Has
II
DATE
8 May 1980
TO:
ildi
b
(Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
t
)
h
f
u
ng)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
.
commen
ter eac
to whom. Draw a line across column a
1?
Exec Sec/SECOM
3D39 Has
2.
3.
C/SECOM
4E60 Has
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
"Miznnn'lon 00 - - - --
JINCLASSIFIE. INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET
STAT
 pprove
or
e
ease
- -
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Personnel Security Study
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
DD/PM
4E-60 Has.
5861
DATE 18 June 1980
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
ildi
b
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
t
)
h
f
ng)
u
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
.
commen
ter eac
to whom. Draw a line across column a
Chief, PPG
4E-70 Has.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 61 O USE PREV O S
1-79 EDITIONS
A
d F
R
l
2005/08/02 CIA