SECURITY POLICY MANU. . FOR SCI CONTROL SYSTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500150014-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REGULATION

ECU R I TY #(?Eid R fj Relealt?00,018/plktDFWRJg4R000500150014-0
CONFIDENTIAL
prescribed in NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47, "U.S. Intelligence Community Physical Security Stan-
dards for SC! Facilities," effective 23 April 1981, or successor policy statements.
13. Accreditation ofSCIFs. The DCi shall accredit all SCriFs except where that authority has
been specifically delega or otherwise provided for. The CIA Office of Security shall
accredit SCIFs for Execute a Branch departments and agencies outside the Intelligence
Community and for the Legis ative and Judicial Branches. The accreditation shall state the
category(ies) of SCI authorized to be stored/ processed in the SCIF. Accrediting officials
shall maintain a physical security profile on each of their SCIFs to include data on any waiv-
ers of standards.
.14. Emergency Plans. Each accredited SCIF shall establish and maintain an approved
emergency plan. This may be part of an overall department, agency, or installation plan, so
long as it satisfactorily addresses the considerations stated below. Emergency planning shall
also take account of fire, natural disasters, entrance of emergency personnel (e.g., host
country police and firemen) into a SCIF. and the physical protection of those working in such
SCIFs. Planning should address the adequacy of protection and firefighting. equipment, of
evacuation plans for persons and SCI. and of life-support equipment (e.g., oxygen and masks)
that might be required for personnel trapped in vault-type SCIFs.
a. In areas %here political instability. host country attitude. or criminal activity suggests
the possibility that a SCIF might be overrun by outsiders. emergency plans must provide for
the secure destruction/removal of SCI under adverse circumstances, to include such
eventualities as loss of electrical power, nonavailability of open spaces for burning or
chemical decomposition of material, and immediate action to be taken if faced with mob at-
tack. Where the risk of overrun is significant. holdings of SCI must be reduced to, and kept
at. an absolute minimum needed for current working purposes, with reference or background
material to be obtained, when needed. from other activities and to be returned or destroyed
when it has served its purpose.
b. Emergency plans shall be reviewed annually and updated as necessary. All personnel
shall be familiar with the plans. In areas where political or criminal activity suggests the pos-
sibility that the SCIF might be overrun by outsiders, drills shall be conducted as local
circumstances warrant but no less frequently than annually to ensure testing and adequacy of
plans.
15. Two-Person Rule. N FiB/N FIC-9.1 /47 establishes policy on this subject, which is quoted
below for ready reference:
"As a matter of policy. SCI Control Facilities (SCIFs) should be
staffed with sufficient people to deter unauthorized copying or illegal
removal of SCI. SCIF designated communication centers, document
control centers (registriesi. and like facilities that handle or store quanti-
ties of SCI must be manned Ahile in operation by at least two appropriate-
ly indoctrinated persons in such proximity to one another as to provide
mutual support in maintaining the integrity of the facility and the
material stored therein. The granting by an SOIC of exceptions to this
policy will be made a matter of record and should involve consideration of
the proven reliability and maturity of the persons involved; the volume,
variety, and sensitivity of the holdings in the facility; and whether or not
the persons involved are subject to periodic polygraph examinations as a
condition of access. Exceptions for communications centers, document
control centers, and the like should be granted in only extraordinar
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CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150014-0