DRAFT REVISION OF DCID 1/16

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500150023-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 22, 1983
• Content Type: MF

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150023-0
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Draft Revision of DCID 1/16
2 2 FEB 1983
This is in response to your memorandum SECOM-D-386 of February 3, 1983,
subject as above, which provided the draft revision of DCID 1/16 for
review and comment. Also noted in this regard is your memorandum SECOM-
D-035 of February 7, 1983, subject as above, which indicated required
format changes for the subject DCID.
Our specific recommended changes are appended, provided on separate pages
in a "line-out/line-in" format as requested. Also attached are our
thoughts on classification of the DCID.
The majority of these changes, however, are directly related to a
significant issue which we wish to highlight. This is the broad issue
of the DCID's applicability and the concurrent intersection of the DCID
provisions with Federal Department/Agency implementations of the provisions
of Executive Order 12356. With a multitude of DoD field automated information
systems concurrently processing both collateral intelligence and collateral
non-intelligence, the possible policy confusion, conflict and unwarranted
duplication of effort that could result from separate and different
policies governing each type of classified information is a matter of
significant concern to us. We fail to see a need for parallel and differing
policies for collateral classified intelligence as such. It is our view
that such intelligence is adequately covered by existing implementations
of ED 12356 and the special handling requirements additionally promulgated
by DCID 1/7. Accordingly, we recommend that the applicability of DCID
1/16, in a fashion similar to DCID 1/19, be limited to those types of
SCI, and other specific categories of intelligence for which formal systems
of compartmentation are established that require security measures
beyond those normally provided for collateral classified information
pursuant to EO 12356.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150023-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150023-0
A second problem area for Defense results partially from the foregoing and in-
volves the definitions of "Dedicated" and "System High" modes. In contrast to
the "Compartmented" and "Expanded Compartmented" modes which are defined in
terms of SCI processing, these two modes in DCID 1/16 do not necessarily relate
to SCI and thereby create a direct intersection with Department/Agency computer
security policies for collateral classified information. Moreover, the conceptual
basis for these modes differs from ours and NATO's. DOD and NATO policies
distinguish these two modes on the basis of need-to-know as a required security
function--This function is implemented in the Dedicated made external to
the system, prior to system access being granted, and a System High system
implements the requirement internally by hardware/software mechanism. An added
benefit of this basis for distinction is that it can be rather clearly correlated
with the proposed technical criteria being developed by the DOD Computer Security
Evaluation Center at NSA. By contrast, the DCI Regulation defines Dedicated
in terms of "one particular type of intelligence information," with the System
High mode not having this limitation. We would like to see DoD and DCI policies
similar on this, particularly in view of the applicability issue cited above.
Toward that end, we would like to better understand the intent and purpose of
the proposed Dedicated and System High modes, since it appears to us that the
.DOD/NATO definitions are more clearly delineated and more easily related to the
the emerging technical security evaluation criteria.
C.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150023-0