RESOURCES FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY (U)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP87B01034R000500150044-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 11, 2005
Sequence Number: 
44
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 28, 1978
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP87B01034R000500150044-7.pdf88.31 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150044-7 TAB Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150044-7 '87861034R000500150044-7 2 s Jr t MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Harold Brown Secretary of Defense SUBJECT: Resources for Personnel Security (U) 1. (C) With the concurrence of the National Foreign. Intelligence Board (NFIB), I have approved issuance af a directive (DCID 1/16) providing policy and procedures on the security of foreign intelligence in automated data processing, (ADP) systems and networks. NFIB discussion of this matter focused on personnel security considerations bearing an system access. The Board.noted that we do nOt yet have fully reliable security software for ADP systems to guard against unauthorized access to volumes, of sensitive data or modifica- tion of data bases. The consensus was that we can best guard against these problems by ensuring that persons authorized access to ADP systems holding sensitive data have had personnel security investigations sufficient to verify their bona fides and to provide reasonable assurances of their loyalty and trustworthiness. The new DCID 1/16 requires persons acceess ing a central computer facility or its terminals when the system holds sensitive compartmented information to have a TOP SECRET clearance based on prescribed background investi- gation requirements set forth in DCID 1/14. 2. . (C) I am aware that DCID 1/16 will require Defense (particularly for the Military Services) to conduct more back- ground investigations than they do now. I recognize that this carries resource implications,' but I am convinced that the modest amount involved (roughly $2 million) is marginal when contrasted to the direct cost benefits of sharing ADP systems and to the value to national security of maintaining the security integrity of sensitive intelligence. I therefore-seek your assistance in ensuring that sufficient resources are made available to conduct adequate background investigations on military personnel and Defense employees who will. have access to sensitive intelligence in ADP systems. 7e7 Stares-ri eld Thrner STANSFIELD TURNER 25X1 Approved For'Release 200 24 : -R9 7B0103 f R000500150044-7