RESOURCES FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY (U)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87B01034R000500150044-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 11, 2005
Sequence Number:
44
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 28, 1978
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 88.31 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150044-7
TAB
Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500150044-7
'87861034R000500150044-7
2 s Jr t
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Resources for Personnel Security (U)
1. (C) With the concurrence of the National Foreign.
Intelligence Board (NFIB), I have approved issuance af a
directive (DCID 1/16) providing policy and procedures on the
security of foreign intelligence in automated data processing,
(ADP) systems and networks. NFIB discussion of this matter
focused on personnel security considerations bearing an
system access. The Board.noted that we do nOt yet have fully
reliable security software for ADP systems to guard against
unauthorized access to volumes, of sensitive data or modifica-
tion of data bases. The consensus was that we can best guard
against these problems by ensuring that persons authorized
access to ADP systems holding sensitive data have had personnel
security investigations sufficient to verify their bona fides
and to provide reasonable assurances of their loyalty and
trustworthiness. The new DCID 1/16 requires persons acceess
ing a central computer facility or its terminals when the
system holds sensitive compartmented information to have a
TOP SECRET clearance based on prescribed background investi-
gation requirements set forth in DCID 1/14.
2. . (C) I am aware that DCID 1/16 will require Defense
(particularly for the Military Services) to conduct more back-
ground investigations than they do now. I recognize that this
carries resource implications,' but I am convinced that the
modest amount involved (roughly $2 million) is marginal when
contrasted to the direct cost benefits of sharing ADP systems
and to the value to national security of maintaining the security
integrity of sensitive intelligence. I therefore-seek your
assistance in ensuring that sufficient resources are made
available to conduct adequate background investigations on
military personnel and Defense employees who will. have access
to sensitive intelligence in ADP systems.
7e7 Stares-ri eld Thrner
STANSFIELD TURNER
25X1
Approved For'Release 200 24 : -R9 7B0103 f R000500150044-7