DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/ SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190048-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 48
• Content Type: DCID

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NSA review
completed
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/
SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING 'FRAV I!,L AND ASSIGNMENT OF
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE'. COMPARTMENTED
INFORMA'I':[O': i
(Effective
1 General
Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947,
Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence
Directives, minimum security policy applicable to assignment and
travel of US Government civilian and military personnel, government
consultants and employees of government contractors who have, or
who have had, access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
is hereby established.
2. Pur o s e
This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possible
compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation or
entrapment of personnel (stipulated in paragraph 1 above) by hostile
.or unfriendly nations or groups,
Existing directives, regulations (including pertinent provisions of
the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations), agreements
and such other references governing hazardous activities as deLined
herein shall be revised accordingly.
May be Downgraded to Unclassified
When Removed from Appendix-A,
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3. Definitions
a. Sensitive Comj?artmcnted lnforniation. The term Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) includes .a.Il information and materials
bearing special. community controls inch.cat:i.ug restricted handling
within present and future community inti.'.li.gericc collection programs
(and their end products) for which co nimnunity systems of compart-
mentation have been or will be formally established. The term does
not include Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended;
b. IlazardousActivities. Ilazardous activities include,
assignments or visits to, and travel through, nations listed in
Appendix, hereto. Ilazardous activities also include assignment
or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking
place, duties behind hostile lines and duties or travel in isolated or
exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected
against hostile action.
c. Defensive Securi.t Briefin s. Defensive security briefings
are formal advisories which alert personnel as to the potential for
harassment, provocation or entrapment by local agencies/officials
in designated areas of risk. These briefings are based on actual
experience whenever feasible, and include information on courses
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of action helpful in mitigating the adverse security and personal
consequences of such acts.
d. Risk of Capture Briefings. Risk of capture briefings are
formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected
in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified
information if captured or detained and a ggested courses of action
they should follow to avoid or limit such These advisories
include instructions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous,
alternative explanations of duties and background.
e. Senior Intelligence Officers. Within the meaning of this
policy directive, Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO) are those officials
representing their individual departments and agencies on the National
Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), including the Military Department
Intelligence Chiefs.
4. Policy
a. Unofficial Travel. l~i1e US-~i 4i fc ~:r ~ ~'e- 3et ~e-sti ie-ted-by-US
lvas-from-t~~vfii~g in -fog cgri-eour~t tes,- Persons granted authorization
for access to certain categories of extrenmcly sensitive information
on Foreign intelligence sources and methods of SCI incur a special
security obligation and are to be alerted by their SIO to risks
associated with unofficial visits to, or travel through, the
countries listed in Appendix. The SIO concerned should'.
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advise that travel in the listed countries may result in the withdrawal
of clearance for continued access to SCI for persons with specific
and extensive knowledge of the -following categories of extremely
sensitive information on foreign i.ntelligcnncr sources and methods:
- Ted i1nological structure, funct.ionand techniques of
sensitive intelligence colleti.ti~an :~~
c:.p .o Cation systems/
methods; or
Designated system,-,targets or sources; or
Method and purpose of target selection; or
- -Degree of success of collection. or exploitation
system/method: or
-- Collection or exploitation syste_n/method capabilities
and vulnerabdities.2
b. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel
to or through countries listed in Appendix must:
(1) Give advance notice of such planned travel.
(2) Obtain a defensive security briefing from a specified
official before traveling to such count-.ri.es.
2 NSA does not agree with 4a and proposes alternate language in
Attachment 1.
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(3)
Contact irrtnnediatcly the n,,,artist United States
consular, attache or Embassy official if they are detained
or subjected to significant harass''Tlent or provocation while
travel.ing.
(4) Report upon return from travel to their SIO any
incidents of potential security co v:urrl. 'A Ihicl7 befell them.
(5) Be reminded annually of the foregoing obligations
through security education programs.
c. Official Assignment/Travel.
No person with access to SCI
will be assigned to or directed to participate in hazardous activities
until he has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk
of capture briefing as applicable. 3
d. Individuals with PreviousAccess. Persons whose access
to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of the risks
associated with hazardous activities as defined herein and of their
obligation to ensure continued protection of SCI.
3 Due consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by
US officials having diplomatic status.
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5. Responsibilities
a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the
SlOs a list of countries identified as posi.ur ri security risk bearing on
this policy (Appendix). The Security Conimittee will coordinate
required support including source ,nat-crial concerning these risks.
b. SIOs will issue implementing directives concerning travel
and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such
directives will be consistent with the overall policy, definitions and
criteria set forth herein and will provide for:
(1) Preparation and provision of defensive security
briefings and/or risk of capture briefings to appropriate personnel
of their departments/agencies as/when applicable.
(Z) Institution of positive programs for the collection of
information in reports obtained under the provisions of paragraph
4b(4) above and other means as feasible.
(3)
Insuring that new information obtained by their
departments or agencies on harassmenl?s or provocations, or on
risk of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other interested
NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes to
Appendix will be made, Recommendations with supporting justification
may be made for either addition or deletion of countries. )
(DRAFT)
Director of Central Intelligence
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/_
APPENDIX
COUNTIRTS N WIIICI-I VISITS, TRAW'I., .AND ASSIGNMENT ARE
CONSIDERED TO BE A IIAZAI) )DOUS ACTIVITY
25X1
Date Im po s sible to Determine
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ATT.ACIIMENT 1
The NSA recommended version of paragraph 4a is as follows:
4. Policy
a. Unofficial. Travel. Unofficia t visits to, or travel through,
the countries 'Listed in Anne'T A, may -on -!-il:tnte an. unnecessary security
risk. Per sons indoctrinated for access I.c, .ili.d possessing know-
ledge of current value may be prohibited from engaging in such visits
or travel. The SIO concerned may grant exemptions for such visits
or travel, however, he'. is responsible for ensuring, in each case, that
the degree of the individual's knowledge of SCI would not be unnecessarily
risked by granting the exception.
Knowledge of current value is detailed knowledge of the US
intelligence capability and its degree of success with regard to one or
more sources or disciplines gained as a regular recipient and/or user
of intelligence product affecting a specific target or geographic area,
or extensive knowledge of the US intelligence effort, including degree
of success of. collection systems or methods, technical material,
processing techniques, magnitude of effort, sensitive security pro-
cedures, end product that would reveal source or methods, collection
plans, and intelligence liaison and cooperation relationships.
Recipients of intelligence product, not revealing any of the foregoing
and indoctrinated persons whose duties are confined to administrative
support, do not necessarily fall into this category.
DIRSA.._..
eclassify on Notification by
r 'Originator
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TRA'
TO:
ROOM NO
REMARKS
FROM:
ROOM NO.
N
FORM
I FEB 55 24 1
REPLACES FORM 36--8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 F! UNCLASSIFIL Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190048-9 SECRET
IJ U!l~t WILT u u
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel
With Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Alternate CIA Member
ATE
DCI Security Committee
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
General Counsel
Attached is a copy of the
7D07
latest draft of the proposed
2?
DS&T
DCID concerning travel
restrictions for individuals
6E-5
with compartmented access.
At this point it is being
DD
ded for consideration
f
7E-44
orwar
by NFIB. As noted in the
4
attachment, NSA continues
. C/Operations Staff,
DO
to feel that unofficial
2D48
travel restrictions in
5.
almost all cases should be
imposed on anyone with
compartmented access. The
6.
Security Committee in
consensus has rejected such
an approach based on a lack
7.
of evidence that individuals
with compartmented access
have been any more the
8.
target of harrassment and
provocation than individuals
without such access. CIA
9.
practice in this area is
consistent with the
proposed version of the
10.
DCID,
May we have your concurrent
11.
or comments so that an
Agency position at the
NFIB can be developed.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM USE PREVIOUS INTERNAL
3-62 610 EDITION' F-1 CFrRFT 1 l rnNFInFNTIAI I-1 F-1 UN(IASSIFIED
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