SECURITY CONTROLS ON THE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500260090-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 90
• Content Type: REPORT

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DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION'
(Effective
1983)
Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence Directive (DCID) on the Security Committee (SECOM), the
following controls on the dissemination and use of intelligence
information and related materials (hereafter referred to as intel-
ligence)2 are hereby established.
1. Purpose
These provisions establish certain common controls and proce-
dures for the dissemination and use of intelligence to ensure that,
while facilitating its interchange for intelligence purposes, it
will be adequately protected. These provisions amplify applicable
portions of the 23 June 1982 Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) Directive #1 which implements Executive Order (EO) 12356.
They also prescribe additional controls on the dissemination of
intelligence to foreign governments and to foreign nationals and
immigrant aliens, including those employed by the US Government.
Policy on release of intelligence to contractors and consultants
is set forth in the Appendix.
a. Applicability. The controls and procedures set forth in
these provisions shall be uniformly applied in the dissemination
and use of intelligence originated by all Intelligence Community
organizations as defined by EO 12333.
These provisions supersede DCID No. 1/7, effective 4 May 1981.
2 For purposes of these provisions the terms "intelligence informa-
tion and related materials" (or "intelligence") mean:
(1) "Foreign intelligence and counterintelligence," as these
terms are defined in EO 12333, and
(2) Information describing US foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities, sources and methods, equipment,
and methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or exploita-
tion of such intelligence, foreign military hardware obtained for
exploitation, and photography or recordings resulting from such US
intelligence collection efforts.
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b. Implementation. The substance of these provisions shall
be published in appropriate regulatory or notice media of each
Intelligence Community organization, together with appropriate
procedures permitting rapid interagency consultation concerning
the dissemination and use of intelligence. For this purpose, each
Intelligence Community organization will designate a primary refer-
ent. Originators of intelligence bearing control markings or other
restrictions required by this directive shall ensure that requests
concerning them are answered promptly.
c. "Need-To-Know" Principle. "Need-to-know" is a determina--
tion by an authorized holder of classified information that access
to specific classified material in his or her possession is required
by one or more other persons to perform a specific and officially
authorized function essential to accomplish a national security task
or as required by Federal Statute, Executive Order, or directly ap-
plicable regulation. In addition to an established "need-to know,"
a person must possess an appropriate security clearance and access
approvals, as required; prior to being provided classified informa-
tion.
3. Use and Dissemination Among US Intelligence Community Organiza-
tions
a. "Third Agency" Rule. EO 12356 states that classified in-
formation originating in one US agency shall not be disseminated
outside any other agency to which it has been made available with-
out the consent of the originating agency. This is commonly
described as the "third agency" rule.
b. Advance Authorization. To facilitate the dissemination and
different uses made of classified intelligence within and among
Intelligence Community organizations and to assure the timely
provision of intelligence to consumers, it is necessary to provide
controlled relief to the "third agency rule" within the Intelli-
gence Community in addition to that provided by the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 [50 USC 403 (d)]. Accordingly, Intelligence Com-
munity organizations are hereby authorized to use each other's
classified intelligence in their respective intelligence documents,
publications or other information media, and to disseminate their
products to other Intelligence Community organizations except as
specifically restricted by control markings prescribed in para-
graph. 6. Classified intelligence documents, even though they bear
no control markings will not be released in their original form to
third agencies without permission of the originator.
4. Use and Dissemination To Other US Organizations
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Classified intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive
control marking, will not be released in its original form to US
organizations outside of the Intelligence Community without permis-
sion of the originator. Any organization disseminating intelli-
gence beyond the organizations of the Intelligence Community shall
be responsible for ensuring that recipient organizations understand
and agree to observe the restrictions prescribed by these provi-
sions and maintain adequate safeguards.
5. Foreign Dissemination of intelligence
a. Dissemination to Immigrant Aliens, Foreign Contractors,
and Other Foreign Nationals.
(1) Classified intelligence, even though it bears no con-
trol markings, will not be released to foreign nationals and immi-
grant aliens (including US Government employed, utilized or inte-
grated foreign nationals and immigrant aliens) without permission
of the originator.
(2) Release of classified intelligence to a foreign con-
tractor/company under contract to the US Government will be made
according to paragraph 5b through the government under which the
contractor/company operates. Direct US-to-foreign contractor/com-
pany release is prohibited.
b. Dissemination to Foreign Governments.
Classified intelligence, even though it bears no control mark-
ings authorized by these provisions, will not be released in its
original form to foreign governments without permission of the
originator. Information contained in classified intelligence of
another Intelligence Community organization, and which bears no
restricti- control markings, may be used by the recipient Intelli-
gence Community organization in reports disseminated to foreign
governments3 provided:
(1) No reference is made to the source documents upon
which the released product is based.
f
(2) The information is extracted or paraphrased to insure
that the source or manner of acquisition of the intelligence cannot
be deduced or revealed in any manner.
(3) Foreign release is made through established foreign
disclosure channels and procedures, such as prescribed pursuant to
the DCIDs on the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX) and the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Committee.
3 Excepting RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, which is
prohibited from foreign dissemination under Sections 123 and 144
of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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6- Authorized Control Markings
a. "WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED"
(WNINTEL)
(1) This marking is used, with a security classification,
to identify information whose sensitivity requires constraints on
its further dissemination and use. This marking may be used only
on intelligence which identifies or would reasonably permit identi-
fication of an intelligence source or method which is susceptible
to countermeasures that could nullify or reduce its effectiveness..
(2) Classified intelligence so marked shall not be dis-
seminated in any manner outside authorized channels4 without the
permission of the originating agency and an assessment by the
Senior Official of the Intelligence Coimmunity (SOIC) in the dis-
seminating agency as to the potential risks to the national secu-
rity and to the intelligence source and methods involved. In
making such assessment, consideration should be given to reducing
the risk to the intelligence sources or methods which provided the
intelligence by sanitizing or paraphrasing the information so as
to permit its wider dissemination. To avoid confusion as to the
extent of dissemination and use restrictions governing the infor-
mation involved, the marking may not be used in conjunction with
special access or Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) con-
trols. This marking may be abbreviated as "WNINTEL" or as "WN."
b. "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR" (ORLON)
(1) This marking is used, with a security classification,
to enable a continuing knowledge and supervision by the originator
of the use made of the information involved. This marking may be
used only on intelligence which clearly identifies or would reason-
ably permit ready identification of an intelligence source or
method which is particularly susceptible to countermeasures that
would nullify or measurably reduce its effectiveness. This marking
may not be used when an item of information will reasonably be
protected by use of any other markings specified herein, or by the
application of the "need-to-know" principle and the safeguarding
procedures of the security classification system.
4 Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence in consultation with the National Foreign Intelligence Board
(NFIB) or as agreed to between originating and recipient agencies,
authorized channels are the Intelligence Community, as defined in
EO 12333, and Intelligence Community contractors and consultants
and officials of agencies represented on the NFIB as determined on
a "need-to-know" basis by recipient Senior Officials of the Intel-
ligence Community (SOIC).
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(2) Information bearing this marking may not be dissemi-
nated beyond the headquarters elements5 of the recipient organiz-
ations and may not be incorporated in all or in part into other
reports or briefings without the advance permission of and under
conditions specified by the originator. As this is the most
restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures to
ensure that it is only applied to particularly. sensitive intelli-
gence and that timely procedures are established to review requests
for further dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking.
This marking may be abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC."
C. "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS" (NOCONTRACT)
This marking is used, with a security classification, to pro-
hibit the dissemination of information to contractors or con-
sultants (hereinafter contractors) without the permission of the
originating agency. This marking may be used only on intelligence
which, if disclosed to a contractor, would actually or potentially
give him a competitive advantage which could reasonably be expected
to cause a conflict of interest with his obligation to maintain
the security of the information; or which was provided by a source
on the express or implied condition that it not be made available
to contractors. The restrictions applicable to this marking do
not apply to consultants hired under office of Personnel Management
procedures, or comparable procedures derived from authorities
vested in heads of organizations by law, and who are normally con-
sidered to be extensions of the office by which they are employed.
This marking may be abbreviated as "NOCONTRACT" or as "NC."
d. "CAUTION--PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN)
This marking may be used, with or without a security classifi-
cation, to identify information provided by a commercial firm or
private source under an express or implied understanding that the
information will be protected as a trade secret or proprietary
data believed to have actual or potential value. Information
bearing this marking shall not be disseminated in any form to an
individual, organization, or foreign government which has any
interests, actual or potential, in competition with the source of
the information without permission of the originator. This marking
may be used in conjunction with the "NOCONTRACT" marking to pre-
clude dissemination to any contractor. This marking may be abbre-
viated as "PROPIN" or as "PR."
5 At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters
elements may include specified subordinate intelligence-producing
components.
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e. "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)
This marking is used with a security classification to identify
intelligence that may not be released in any form to foreign gov-
ernments, foreign nationals, or non-US citizens without permission
of the originator. This marking may be used on intelligence which
if released to a foreign government, foreign national, or non-US
citizen could jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, or when
it would not be in the best interests of the US to release the in-
formation from a policy standpoint upon specific determination by
a Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC). SOICs are
responsible for developing, publishing and maintaining guidelines
consistent with the policy guidance herein for use in determining
the foreign releasability of intelligence they collect or produce.
These guidelines shall be used in assigning NOFORN control mark-
ings, and by primary referents (paragraph 2b above applies) in
.responding to inquiries from other organizations on application of
this control. This marking may be abbreviated "NOFORN" or as "NF."
f. "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO (name of country(ies)/interna-
tional organization)" (REL
This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that
an originator has predetermined to be releasable or has released,
through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to
the foreign country(ies)/organization indicated. No other foreign
dissemination of the material is authorized (in any form) without
the prior approval of the originator. This marking may be abbre-
viated "REL (abbreviated name of country(ies)/international organi-
zation)." In the case of intelligence and related material con-
trolled under DCID 6/2, authorized distribution indicators, pub-
lished separately, may be used instead of the "REL" control marking.
7. Procedures Governing Use of Control markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use intelligence in a manner con-
trary to the restrictions established by the control markings set
forth above shall obtain the advance permission of the originating
agency. Such permission applies only to the specific purpose
agreed to by the originator and does not automatically apply to
all recipients. Originators should insure that prompt considera-
tion is given to recipients' requests in these regards, with par-
ticular attention to reviewing, and editing if necessary, sanitized
or paraphrased versions to derive a text suitable for release sub-
ject to lesser or no control markings.
b. The control markings authorized above shall be shown on
the title page, front cover, and other applicable pages of docu-
ments, incorporated in the text of electrical communications,
shown on graphics, and associated (in full or abbreviated form)
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with data stored or processed in automatic data processing systems.
The control markings also shall be indicated by parenthetical use
of the marking abbreviations at the beginning or end of the appro-
priate portions. If the control markings apply to several or all
portions, the document may be marked with a statement to this
effect rather than marking.each portion individually.
c. The control markings in paragraph 6 shall be individually
assigned at the time of preparation of intelligence products and
used in conjunction with security classifications and other mark-
ings specified by EO 12356 and its implementing ISOO Directive.
The markings shall be carried forward to any new format in which
the same information is incorporated, including oral and visual
presentations.
8. Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings
that result in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intel-
ligence of another shall be reported to the Director of Central
Intelligence through the DCI Security Committee.
9. Obsolete Restrictions and Markings
The following markings are obsolete and will not be used sub-
sequent to the date of this directive: WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES
ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM
ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, NO FOREIGN DISSEM, USIB ONLY, and
NFIB ONLY. Questions with respect to the current application
of control markings authorized by earlier directives on the dis-
semination and control of intelligence and used on documents issued
prior to the date of this directive should be referred to the'
originating agency or department.
Appendix
DCI Policy on Release of Intelligence Information
to Contractors and Consultants
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