INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF PUBLIC RELEASE OF SELECTED SATELLITE IMAGERY OR INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000700060008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 5, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC
RELEASE OF SELECTED SATELLITE IMAGERY OR INFORMATION
5 January 1979
This memorandum was prepared by an interagency working group for the
DCI Task Force on the Declassification of Photoreconnaissance Imagery.
It has been informally coordinated at the working level within CIA,
State, ACDA, DOD, NASA, and AID.
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CONTENTS
Summary and Key Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Likely Foreign Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The PRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Major OECD Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Less Developed Countries . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Specific Implications . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Multilateral Issues Concerning the
Peaceful Use of Outer Space . . . . . . . . 17
International Satellite Verification
Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 20
Specific East-West Arms Control
Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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The reactions of foreign governments to a release of
imagery from US reconnaissance satellites will be determined
by a complex and variable mix of sometimes contradictory
national and international concerns. How these interests
and concerns are seen to be affected will depend in large
part both on the quality, quantity, timeliness, and coverage
of the imagery involved and on the diplomatic and administrative
mechanics (including the declared purpose) of its release.
So many variables and uncertainties are involved, however,
that many of the judgments advanced below are necessarily
speculative in nature. (C/NF)
-- The Soviet response to a US release of military
reconnaissance satellite imagery would. depend
on the purpose of release, the method of release,
the location of the targets, and to a somewhat
lesser extent on the type of target. The USSR
is. on record as opposing release of high or
medium resolution imagery without permission
of the imaged state and would be likely to view
such action by the US as a misuse of national
technical means of verification. The intensity
of Moscow's reaction would be heavily influenced
by whether it had been consulted in advance, or
in the absence of such consultation, whether any
imagery of Soviet territory that might be mili-
tarily useful to the Chinese was released. (S/NF)
-- The PRC would probably register mild criticism of
the US action, particularly if not consulted in
advance. However, Peking would be unlikely to
object strenuously to the public release of even
high quality imagery unless coverage of military
or nuclear-related Chinese installations or
production facilities were included. (C/NF)
Although most of the major Western industrialized
countries support unrestricted release of satellite
imagery in principle, they are likely to have
grave reservations about the release of imagery
from US reconnaissance satellites. Their principal
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concerns would center on possible compromise of
intelligence methods and military secrets and on
possible damage to East-West detente. The chances
are, however, that solicitation and accommodation
of their views in advance would substantially
reduce the risk of openly negative reactions.
(S/NF).
-- Because of France's unique interests and perspective,
Paris would be likely to subject any US initiative
that involved release of imagery of another country
without that country's prior permission to
explicit and possibly strong public criticism. In
addition, the French could be expected to attempt
to exploit both the fact and nature of any release
of US reconnaissance satellite imagery of other
countries to win support for their proposal for
an International Satellite Verification Agency.
(S/NF)
-- The reactions of less developed countries would
reflect the interaction of disparate concerns:
their interest in acquiring more satellite imagery
to support their efforts to promote economic growth
and their fear that such imagery might be exploited
to their disadvantage by foreign governments or
corporations. Most LDCs favor a prior consent
regime for the dissemination of satellite imagery
and would initially be leery if they felt the US
might release high or medium resolution photo-
graphs of their territory without their permission.
Should the US agree to such prior consent practice,
its present policy of open dissemination of satel-
lite imagery from its civil programs would probably
become less tenable. (C/NF)
Conclusions as to the longer term implications of foreign
reactions to a release of reconnaissance satellite imagery
for specific space-related issues and activities of U.S
policy concern are difficult to draw. A host of related and
unrelated considerations will influence the manner and
extent that the leaders of a given country translate their
basic opposition to, or support for, such an initiative into
practical action. (C/NF)
-- In the short term, current positions in UN nego-
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tiations on establishing principles for remote
sensing are unlikely to be greatly affected, al-
though over the longer term, support for a prior
consent regime would most likely increase. A
fairly widespread negative reaction to the imagery
release could also stir up some presently rather
quiescent issues (e.g., the right to sense and the
right to overfly). (C/NF)
The net impact of the imagery release on support
for the French proposal for an International
Satellite Verification Agency is difficult to
gauge. The force of some US arguments against such
an agency would be undermined and to the degree
that the details of the US initiative proved to be
widely controversial, concern about superpower
monopoly over high and medium resolution satellite
imagery might mount. On the other hand, if the
US action was not perceived as potentially threatening,
it could lead a number of nations to conclude that
an international agency of the sort proposed by
Paris was unnecessary. (C/NF)
The Soviets have strong incentives for attempting
to keep both SALT and MBFR on track and have
shown interest in extending the current East-West
arms control dialogue to include such additional
issues as theater nuclear forces. Hence, unless
Moscow were extremely unhappy with the specific
course of action with respect to imagery release
that was chosen by Washington (or unless other
considerations intervened), there would seem to
be a good chance that the practical impact of
Soviet distress on current and pending negotiations
in these three critical areas would be relatively
limited. The Soviets might even see the release
of reconnaissance satellite imagery of the US as
beneficial if they thought it would help ratifica-
tion of the SALT II agreement by increasing the
confidence of the American public in US capabili-
ties to monitor complicance. On balance, however,
they would probably prefer no release of imagery
at all. (S/NF)
-- In the event the Soviets viewed the course of
action chosen by the US as only mildly provocative,
its impact on the Anti-Satellite Talks would also
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probably be quite limited. However, the Soviets
did raise the problem of "unlawful" satellite
activities briefly during the first round of ASAT
as a genuine concern of theirs that would have to
be addressed. Hence, it seems likely that any
release of US satellite photography of Soviet
territory without Moscow's express consent would
prompt the Soviets to return to that issue with
considerable vigor. (S/NF)
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
PUBLIC RELEASE OF SELECTED SATELLITE
IMAGERY OR INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to assess the likely
foreign reactions to selective or more general public re-
lease of reconnaissance satellite imagery to support US
foreign policy objectives and for civil applications. The
paper does not assess the utility of such release in
furthering US policy objectives, except insofar as such an
assessment might affect judgments about likely foreign re-
actions per se. (C/NF)
A complex and variable mix of sometimes contradictory
national and international concerns will determine the reaction
of individual foreign governments to any public release by the
US of reconnaissance satellite imagery or information. In
all cases, pragmatic assessment of how such an initiative
might, in its specific context, impact directly on national
security and economic interests will be an important factor.
But the broader international implications of the US action will
be weighed as well. (C/NF)
Steady improvement in remote sensing system capabilities,
their application to new uses, and the actual or projected
entry of new actors into the field have greatly increased the
salience and sensitivity of the acquisition and dissemination
of satellite imagery as international political issues over
the past few years. Subsequent discussion will explore the
extent and significance of their current linkage to such
questions of widespread concern as:
The limits of national sovereignty.
--- LDC aspirations for a new world order.
-- Peaceful use of outer space in general and related
US programs (e.g., Landsat) and policies in
particular.
-- East-West and Sino-Soviet tensions.
-- The outlook for a number of arms control and
disarmament initiatives of global import, including
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the French proposal for an International Satellite
Verification Agency and the SALT, ASAT, and MBFR
negotiations.
The picture is complicated, however, by the fact that the
importance (both absolute and relative) attached to these
general issue areas varies from country to country. So too
will assessments of the potential impact--positive or negative--
on each of a public release of US satellite imagery. (C/NF)
Although it is clear that the quality*, quantity,
timeliness, and coverage of the imagery involved will--
together with the diplomatic and administrative mechanics
(including the declared purpose) of its release--generally
be the key variables, the uncertainties alluded to above and
the gaps in our knowledge of the relevant attitudes, policies,
and concerns of many foreign governments make predictions
about the likely short and longer term political conse-
quences of alternative courses of action hazardous at best.
Hence it must be emphasized that much of the discussion
that follows is necessarily speculative in nature. (C/NF)
* A certain amount of confusion can arise from the fact that two
different measures of imagery quality are widely used at present.
The system most commonly employed in describing the capabilities
of multi-spectral scanners on US satellites is instantaneous field of
view (IFOV) which indicates the quality of the individual picture ele-
ments (pixels). The IFOV yardstick invariably yields more impressive
figures than the alternative approach--measurement of equivalent
photographic or spatial resolution--that seems to be favored by the
Soviets and that has been uniquely defined by them (in the absence of
any politaically agreed interpretation) as the smallest size of an
object that can still be seen in any given picture. For example,
the 40 meter IFOV achieved by the Return Beam Vidicon System on the
US Landsat C platform corresponds to a photographic resolution of
about 80-100 meters. (U)
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Finally, it bears note that there are a number of
potential problem areas that must be kept in mind when
assessing the impact that various release options might
have on other US policies and interests. In view of their
significance, it seems wise to draw attention to at least
two of them here. (U)
The first stems from the fact that in many cases the
risk of a strongly negative reaction apparently could be
eased by prior consultation (including, where applicable,
securing the permission of the country concerned for the
release of imagery of its territory). Such action might,
however, undermine or necessitate a revision of the current
US policy of practicing and promoting unrestricted release
of remotely sensed data of the earth's environment and
natural resources. (C/NF)
The second centers on image quality. Certain US
objections might require the release of high quality
imagery. At the same time, however, it is clear that under
some circumstances, at least, the higher the quality of
imagery released, the greater the risk of untoward conse-
quences--albeit some of the latter might be voided or atten-
uated by recognition of the increased benefits that could be
derived from such imagery. (C/NF)
LIKELY FOREIGN REACTIONS
The USSR
If the US were to begin releasing high or medium reso-
lution imagery, the Soviet Union's principal concern would
be to prevent the publication of photographs of its own
territory, particularly of its military installations.
Moscow does not object to the unrestricted dissemination
of low-resolution imagery produced by civilian space pro-
grams like the US Landsat, but it does not acknowledge the
dissemination of medium or high resolution imagery as le-
gitimate except with permission of the sensed state. It
would consider unilateral release of reconnaissance satel-
lite imagery without the target country's permission as
a form of espionage and betrayal of the trust established
in those agreements. (C)
In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union claimed that all
forms of satellite reconnaissance were illegal infringements
on sovereignty, and Soviet officials regularly denounced US
reconnaissance programs as space espionage. Their denunciations
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declined after the signing of the Outer Space Treaty in
1967, by which time their own satellite reconnaissance
program was underway. In 1972, Moscow implicitly recognized
the legitimacy of at least some satellite reconnaissance by
pledging in the SALT I agreements not to interfere with
"national technical means of verification" (NTM) operating
in a manner consistent with international law. Nevertheless,
the Soviets have never given a blanket endorsement to satellite
reconnaissance or officially acknowledged that their position
has changed. They assert that space activities must not
violate either national sovereignty or the principle of
noninterference in another state's internal affairs, and
their public commentaries still refer to US space reconnaissance
that is not related to strategic arms limitation verification
as espionage. (C)
The Soviet position on an international regime to
control dissemination of satellite imagery, or other data
gained through remote sensing, is consistent with this
posture. The Soviets distinguish global data (low-resolution
photography of broad areas) from local data (high-resolution
photography of small areas), and would prohibit dissemination
of local data without the permission of the target country.
In a model convention that the USSR and seven of its Comecon
partners signed in May of this year, the division between
global and local data is placed at 50 meters.* During the
past two years, the USSR has announced several earth resources
missions of its own and has indicated its willingness to
take high or medium resolution photographs for this purpose,
but with the data to be provided only to the target country.
(U)
The Soviet Union's public posture reserves for it the
right to counter satellite reconnaissance over its territory
that is not required for verification of the SALT agreements.
The US and USSR have never jointly defined what is required
for verification or what systems are considered to be NTM.
Negotiations since 1972 have revealed that the Soviets favor
a narrow interpretation of verification, and hence of what
activities are subject to the noninterference pledge. They
have not specified how, or under what circumstances, they
The convention does not specify how resolution is to be defined,
but the Soviets have indicated that it is photographic resolution.
Such a limit, if adopted worldwide, would permit the continued re-
lease of imagery from present and approved Landsat satellites, but
not from higher resolution imaging systems. (C)
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would interfere with other reconnaissance activities,
although on another issue--the use of direct broadcast
satellites--Moscow has explicitly claimed a right to take
whatever active measures it deems necessary to counter
intrusions upon its sovereignty from space. (S)
The Soviet response to a US release of imagery would
depend on the purpose of release, the method of release
(e.g., whether it was a one-time act or a continuing program),
the location of the targets, and to a somewhat lesser extent
on the type of target. If the released imagery only covered
US territory, or the territory of third countries that had
given permission, the Soviets might be concerned that attention
would be drawn to their own reconnaissance programs, but
would probably make no immediate response if they felt assured
that photographs of their own territory would not be released
in the future. They might actually see such a US action as
beneficial if they thought it would help ratification of the
SALT II agreement by increasing the confidence of the
American public in US capabilities to monitor compliance.
On the other hand, unilateral release of high-quality imagery
would be an act of technological one-upsmanship the Soviets
would be reluctant to counter because of their stress on
secrecy, particularly where intelligence capabilities are
involved. Neither would they welcome the public reminder of
the difference in openness between our society and theirs.
On balance, the Soviets would probably prefer no release of
imagery. If consulted beforehand, they would probably
respond in a low-key fashion, either recommending that we do
not release (on the grounds that satellite reconnaissance is
suited to the private verification of arms control agreements,
not to public initiatives) or answering that as long as the
photography is of our own territory, it is up to us to
decide.* (C)
Release of high or medium resolution imagery of a
foreign country without that country's permission would be
an entirely different matter. Because this would be directly
contrary to the Soviets' public position, they would almost
certainly express concern and would probably increase
pressures to establish a prior consent regime to govern the
DoD believes that it is unlikely the Soviets would respond by saying
that it is up to us to decide, and that it is more likely they would
state an objection if imagery to be released is of high or medium reso-
lution. (C/NF)
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release of remote sensing data. Such a release might also
cause some unease in Moscow because it would establish a.
precedent that could later be extended (perhaps with the
international mood having shifted in favor of freer release
of imagery) to photographs of Soviet territory. Privately,
the Soviets would disapprove of release. They would lobby
LDCs to prevent the growth of international approval of such
release and, if such efforts failed, would probably maintain
their conservative position. (C)
By far the most severe Soviet reaction would come if
photographs of targets in the Soviet bloc, especially the
USSR itself, were released without Moscow's consent. The
reaction would be particularly sharp if Soviet targets alone
were singled out. Even if these targets were part of a
broader program of release, however, the Soviets would
feel strategically threatened, seriously embarrassed by the
dramatization of their apparent inability to prevent
"espionage" over their territory, and angered by what they
would consider a misuse of NTM. (S)
The Soviet Union is capable of responding with anything
from diplomatic initiatives to the unlikely extreme of
physical interception of some US satellites. Other possible
responses include increased concealment, cover, and deception
around sensitive targets; increased efforts to establish a
narrow definition of NTM; and interference with satellite
operations through electronic means. If the Soviet objective
were denial of data alone, deception and/or electronic
measures may suffice to achieve it, but Moscow would probably
feel that a more visible gesture was needed to make
the point that its sovereignty had been violated. (S)
In weighing its options, the Soviet Union would have to
consider several possible disadvantages of a response that
went beyond diplomatic actions, including the initiation
of a large US effort to improve the survivability of its
satellites, a large US antisatellite program, or an adverse
impact on SALT. Milder responses would probably not appear
to have these drawbacks, but they would diminish the prospects
for continued US-Soviet cooperation in space (e.g., the
projected Shuttle-Salyut cooperative program), which Moscow
seems to value highly. By stirring up opposition to US
space activities, the USSR would also risk increasing
sentiment against all space 'reconnaissance operations,
including its own. (C)
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Despite these reservations, the Soviets' pervasive
concern with secrecy and their overall attitude toward
satellite reconnaissance makes some sort of negative re-
action to release of imagery of its own territory a virtual
certainty. The chances of active Soviet countermeasures
would increase if the released imagery covered Soviet mili-
tary targets of potential use to a strategic rival other
than the US--i.e., China. Moscow would probably consider
virtually all military targets within its territory as
falling in this category, but it would be especially sensi-
tive about its installations and forces near the Chinese
border, above all if the imagery were released on a timely
and continuous basis. (C)
Consultation with Moscow prior to release might help to
alleviate some unwarranted Soviet concerns raised by a
limited program of dissemination, but is unlikely to cause
them to alter their public position on the release of imagery.
An absence of consultation would surely augment Soviet re-
sentment about the release of NTM data. The Soviet Union
would resist being drawn into a detailed discussion of
imagery of other countries, however, lest they appear to
be associating themselves with a potentially unpopular move
by the US or, to be contradicting their public posture on
dissemination of remote sensing data. It is very unlikely
that the Soviets--who, although they have referred to
satellite reconnaissance, have not followed the US lead in
formally acknowledging it--would agree to any joint program
of release of high or medium resolution imagery. (S)
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The PRC
The PRC's public position on acquisition and dissemina-
tion of satellite imagery is ambiguous. Peking has derided
the US and the USSR for using satellites to steal each
others' military secrets and to advance their rival quests
for global hegemony. It has also suggested that existing
"peaceful use" satellites are designed primarily to serve
military purposes. At the same time, however, the PRC has
given little evidence of concern over legal technicalities
relating to violations of national sovereignty by military
or civilian remote sensing satellites or the release of in-
formation acquired by such satellites to third countries.
(It has, in fact, routinely avoided voting on all UN resolu-
tions concerning outer space questions). Moreover, the Chi-
nese have demonstrated a long-term awareness of the signifi-
cance of US and Soviet satellite reconnaissance efforts and
have objectively discussed many facets of remote sensing
technology in their scientific literature. (C)
The actions taken by Peking behind the scenes are, in
combination, considerably more revealing.
Given the nature of past Chinese commentary, Peking's
desire to appear as a champion of LDC interests, and the
PRC's jaundiced views of the SALT process, some relatively
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low key criticism of the US initiative would be likely--
particularly if the Chinese were not consulted about the
move in advance. But the chances seem strong that the PRC
would not object strenuously to the public release of even
high quality US satellite imagery unless it appeared that
photography of Chinese military or nuclear-related instal-
lations or production facilities might be included. (C/NF)
Major OECD Members
With the notable exception of France, whose unique
position is examined separately below, most of Washington's
OECD partners currently tend to support the arguments for
unrestricted acquisition and dissemination of remote sensing
data that the US has persistently pressed at the UN and in
other international forums. If not preceeded--and shaped--
by extensive consultations, however, any public release of
US reconnaissance satellite imagery of areas outside US
borders would almost certainly fragment this consensus.
(C/NF)
To the extent that the release of imagery was seen as
necessary to enhance the prospects for signature and ratifi-
cation of SALT II, the US' NATO and non-NATO partners within
OECD would probably be sympathetic. But, they would prob-
ably have grave reservations on national security grounds if
release of high quality photographs of their own territory
was planned--particularly so if they did not have a veto
over the release of any given item. (C/NF)
Failure to accommodate the above concerns could result
in serious strains in US relations with many of its major
OECD partners--especially with its principal NATO allies
and Japan. The impact of these strains on existing coopera-
tive agreements would, however, be likely to be mitigated
by the independent value attached to these arrangements by
the countries involved as well as by the interest of these
countries in avoiding actions that might jeopardize their
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participation in the Landsat program or the viability of
their own multilateral and unilateral remote sensing
programs.* (C/NF)
OECD-member reaction to the public release of US satel-
lite imagery would also be conditioned by a number of other
concerns. Perhaps foremost among these would be apprehension
over the potential impact of such an initiative on East-West
detente and such related matters of especial regional con-
cern as MBFR. Indeed, some West European officials expressed
initial uneasiness about how the Soviets would react to the
PRC's large purchases of Landsat photography of the USSR.
Clearly, most NATO members would find any prospect of public
release of higher quality imagery of Soviet territory much
more troubling. Unless they were convinced that the initia-
tive had been thoroughly cleared and orchestrated with Mos-
cow, they would be likely to view its potential impact on
verification arrangements for past and pending arms control
agreements with the Soviets--and on the toughness of Soviet
positions in other East-West negotiations--with considera-
ble alarm. (S/NF)
Most of Washington's NATO allies would probably also
be troubled by the implications of even highly selective
Recent surveys have identified about 170 experimental remote
sensing programs in the ten member states of the European Space Agency
(ESA: The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Swit-
zerland). In addition to sponsoring and coordinating such significant
space-related projects as the French Ariane launch vehicle that is
scheduled to place an experimental earth observation satellite in orbit
sometime in 1983 or 1984, the ESA has established Earthnet--a network
of European ground stations for the acquisition of various types of
remote sensing data (including that which will be provided by Spacelab
on its first flight in 1980). For their part, Canada and Japan are
also active participants in the Landsat program. Although Canada has
reserved its position on whether or not the dissemination of satellite
imagery should be subject to regulation, Ottawa already operates two
Landsat ground stations. The Japanese investment in Landsat has so
far been more modest, but Tokyo does have firm plans to build a simi-
lar ground station. Japan has also developed (with US assistance) a
successful space launch vehicle of its own, but is unlikely to use it
to launch a remote sensing platform until more pressing requirements
for communications satellites have been met. (U)
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declassification of satellite imagery with respect to Wash-
ington's determination and ability to protect intelligence
sources and methods--especially since the risk of compromise
of such information has been one of the arguments that the
US has employed against the French International Satellite
Verification Agency proposal.
Together with Canada, then, most of Washington's Euro-
pean OECD partners would probably see many more disadvan-
tages than advantages in the public release of reconnais-
sance satellite imagery. If their views were solicited--
and at least partially accommodated--in advance they would
be likely to exercise considerable restraint in voicing
official criticism of such a move. Their reactions in the
event that Washington,acted without or against 'their counsel
could be severe, but even in such a case there would seem
to be a strong chance that their behavior would be tempered
by a desire not to compound the damage already done. (S/NF)
The French, however, would view the public release of
US reconnaissance satellite imagery from a somewhat differ-
ent perspective--and they would be likely to act accordingly.
Paris is on record (most notably, in documents submitted
both unilaterally and jointly with the USSR to the Legal
Subcommittee of the UNGA Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space in 1974) as favoring a consensual regime for
publication or transfer to a third party of satellite im-
agery. Even though the French appear to have become more
flexible on this score in recent years, their sensitivity
to perceived superpower infringements of the sovereignty of
other nations remains as strong as ever. Hence they would
be likely to subject any US initiative that involved release
of high or medium resolution imagery of another country
without that country's prior permission to explicit and
possibly strong public criticism. Moreover, Paris could be
expected to attempt to exploit both the fact and nature of
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such a US initiative to win support for--and undermine US
arguments against--its proposal for an International Satel-
lite Verification Agency.* (S/NF)
For its part, Japan has yet to establish a well arti-
culated policy regarding legal space activity. Tokyo's few
pronouncements on this score suggest that the Japanese, who
collaborate closely with the US and various Western European
countries on space development, would in principle be in-
clined to support any peaceful space-related activity that
seemed to serve commonly-held international goals. In addi-
tion, the Japanese have demonstrated a keen interest in the
economic utility of satellite imagery and thus would be
likely to view the prospect of acquiring better imagery than
in the past as fundamentally attractive. Nonetheless, given
Toyko's direct security interests in the status of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, the Japanese would undoubtedly be very sen-
sitive to the potential impact of US release of reconnais-
sance satellite imagery on both Moscow and Peking. Hence,
failure of the US to consult the Japanese in advance of
taking such action could result in considerable alarm and
resentment--albeit even under these circumstances the im-
portance that the Japanese attach to their pervasive and
complex ties. to the US would make a strong public stand by
Tokyo fairly unlikely.
Less Developed Countries
The LDCs' attitude toward dissemination of satellite
imagery has two disparate elements: (1) a desire to in-
crease their own use of remote sensing data, particularly
in the management of their natural resources; and (2) a con-
cern that imagery of their territory might be used to their
disadvantage by foreign governments or corporations. Most
LDCs probably believe that the US routinely photographs
their territory already, but they realize they can do noth-
ing to prevent this, and it is convenient for them to ignore
it as long as the imagery is not published. Their fears of
being exploited would be engaged only if they thought that
the imagery were being provided to their military or eco-
nomic rivals. (C)
* See the concluding section of this paper for further discussion of
how the extent of international support for this French initiative
might be affected by US release of reconnaissance satellite imagery.
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Because the LDCs tend to be highly dependent on agri-
culture or the exploitation of mineral resources, many of
them have found the Landsat imagery to be useful in such
tasks as geological surveys and the monitoring of crops.
Iran and Brazil operate ground stations for receiving
Landsat transmissions directly from the satellite, with
Brazil becoming a source of both data and expertise for the
rest of Latin America. Argentina, Chile, India, Romania,
and Thailand are constructing stations or have plans for
one, and several other LDCs are actively studying the possi-
bility of following suit. Many more purchase Landsat data,
and the World Bank is proposing a major expansion of the
use of imagery in mineral surveys. India is building its
own earth resources satellite, which will be launched by a
Soviet booster, probably sometime in 1979. The demand among
LDCs for assistance in photo interpretation-and digital
processing of satellite data is being partially met through
regional remote sensing centers supported by the US, other
Western governments, and UN bodies. Such centers operate
in Nairobi and Ouagadougou, and two more are to be estab-
lished, one in Bangkok and the other somewhere in Latin
America. (S)
The LDCs' concern about foreign use of imagery is both
military and economic. Militarily, some states fear that a
hostile neighbor could glean valuable intelligence on instal-
lations or forces from photographs of its territory. Economi-
cally, the fear is that a multinational corporation or a
government of an industrialized state, either of which pre-
sumably would be better able to interpret the imagery, would
use the information to drive harder bargains or take effec-
tive control of resources away from the LDC.* On both
counts, dissemination of recent imagery (e.g., this week's
troop dispositions, this year's crop) would cause the most
unease, but even older data--which could provide insights
into mineral deposits or permanent military installations--
would raise the same concerns. (C)
;; In one respect, however, the dissemination of high or medium resolu-
tion imagery might lessen this fear; because it is easier to inter-
pret, it is more amenable than low-resolution imagery to processing by
a large number of interpreters having only minimal skills. Neverthe-
less, dissemination would still tend to raise concerns about neighbor-
ing LDCs using the information in?an adverse fashion.
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These fears lie behind the widespread support among
LDCs, particularly the Latin American states, for restric-
ting the dissemination of remotely sensed data. The extreme
position, embodied in a draft treaty proposed by Argentina
and Brazil in 1974, is to prohibit remote sensing without
the consent of the target state. This proposal has little
support at present, but virtually all LDCs favor prohibiting
the dissemination of at least some kinds of remote sensing
data and information derived therefrom without the permis-
sion of the sensed state. (U)
Given these various motivations, it is difficult to
estimate the response of most LDCs to the release of higher
resolution imagery. On one hand, they may welcome the
willingness of the United States to make some of its best
imagery available for civil use in developed countries. If
the release were selective, such a positive response might
even lead to a demand for release of still more imagery,
either of higher resolution or of more targets. On the
other hand, fears about sensitive military or economic
targets could stimulate some states to harden their line on
issues involving the peaceful use of outer space. Those
issues are discussed in the concluding section of this
paper. (C)
Two recent episodes suggest that the LDCs' tolerance
for unrestricted dissemination of imagery is greater than
their rhetoric at the UN would indicate, and that, given
assurances about sensitive targets within their territories,
most of them would welcome the dissemination of more satel-
lite imagery than is available through existing civil pro-
grams (even though they would probably continue to press
for a prior consent regime). One was the release, albeit
on a one-time basis, of all imagery from the US Skylab mis-
sions. This included photographs with resolution of 10-20
meters--much better than what is available from Landsat.
Even though the consent of target states was not obtained,
the release provoked no protests. To the contrary: many
LDCs expressed their interest in receiving imagery of com-
parable or better resolution on a regular basis. (S)
The other episode is Brazil's differences with NASA
regarding the terms of its participation in the Landsat
program. Brazil clearly demonstrates the split.mind with
which most LDCs approach the issue of dissemination of
imagery, because it has been one of the strongest advocates
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in the UN Outer Space Committee of restrictions upon the
dissemination of imagery but also the most important LDC
participant in the Landsat program, which operates on the
principle of unrestricted dissemination. Brazil at first
failed to adhere to this principle after its Landsat termi-
nal went into operation in 1973, and when its agreement with
NASA came up for renewal in 1975, it was forded to choose
between accepting NASA's policy or dropping out of the pro-
gram. Brasilia chose the former, and is now reviewing its
international policy on remote sensing. Like other Landsat
participants, Brazil has preserved its future options by
distinguishing the present "experimental" phase of the
program from any permanent arrangements that may later be
agreed upon, thus retaining its freedom. to insist upon a
.strict consent regime in the future. (C)
US civilian agencies have found distinct uses for the
high and medium resolution, intermittently acquired imagery
from reconnaissance satellites, which complements low-reso-
lution imagery in many applications. However, most LDCs
have no experience in using this higher resolution photog-
raphy, and many of them may be slow to appreciate its use-
fulness. Their reaction to release would depend in large
part on whether the increase in their appreciation outpaced
any heightening of their suspicions. An initial release of
photographs of targets in the US--an action carrying no par-
ticular drawbacks from the LDCs' viewpoint--might convince
them of the value of high and medium resolution imagery,
particularly if it demonstrated its application to a spe-
cific mission like disaster relief. (S)
Prior consultation would be important in shaping LDCs'
reactions if the targets concerned were in their own terri-
tories. A release of high or medium resolution imagery of
even nonmilitary targets without the target state's consent
would probably provoke complaints and talk of the dangers
of revealing more sensitive targets, although the long-term
response may be more positive if fears failed to be real-
ized and new applications became apparent. Release only
with permission of the target state would be wholly consis-
tent with the LDCs' posture on remote sensing, should gen-
erate no significant negative reactions, and would probably
also serve to increase interest in civil applications of
imagery from reconnaissance satellites. (S)
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Sensitivity regarding military targets would probably
keep most LDCs from ever agreeing to dissemination of all
imagery from reconnaissance satellites. Their economic con-
cerns might lessen over time as they became more confident
in their own ability to exploit the imagery. These concerns
may be sustained, however, if the LDCs suspected that US
corporations or US allies were receiving preferential treat-
ment in the dissemination of market-sensitive information.
This suspicion might be enhanced if release were highly
selective, or appeared to be less than complete because of
exaggerated notions of the coverage of US reconnaissance
satellites. (S)
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SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS
The longer term implications of a public release of
reconnaissance satellite imagery for specific space-related
issues and activities of US policy concern are more difficult
to gauge than the immediate reactions of key foreign governments.
A host of related and unrelated considerations will influence
the manner and extent that the leaders of a given country
translate their basic opposition to, or support for, such a
US initiative into practical action. Nonetheless, some
general observations and conclusions can be offered with
respect to the problem areas discussed below. (C/NF)
Multilateral Issues Concerning the Peaceful Use of
Outer Space
Remote sensing from space has been a priority topic for
discussion at the UN, particularly in the Outer Space
Committee and its subcommittees, since 1974. This attention
has resulted mainly from the LDCs' concern with maintaining
control over their natural resources, an objective which
many of them believe requires limiting access to information
on those resources. The principal issue, and the one that
would be raised directly by a unilateral release of imagery
of other countries without permission, is whether dis-
semination of remote sensing data should require the consent
of the sensed state. (U)
Such a release of imagery would surely increase interest
in this issue, but whether the tone of the debates shifted
in favor of, or against, greater restrictions on dissemination
would depend on all of the considerations facing individual
states that were discussed above. Those favoring a consent
regime would continue to do so, although in some cases with
more vigor. The West Europeans might waver in their
support of unrestricted dissemination, although initially
they would probably express any second thoughts about
Washington's position through channels other than a UN
committee. In the short term, then, positions are unlikely
to change markedly. In the longer term, however, the US
may find that support for its position had eroded. (C)
It is possible, but unlikely, that a release of high
or medium resolution imagery would appreciably increase the
sentiment in favor of restricting low-resolution imagery
from Landsat or other civil programs. Selective release
of imagery from reconnaissance satellites would lower the
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credibility of the US argument that completely open dis-
semination of data is the best safeguard against its misuse
by foreign organizations. Landsat already has a large
constituency, however, which would be reluctant to risk
losing the benefits of the program. About forty states
participate directly, with private users in many more
countries also purchasing imagery. Several countries have
made sizable investments in ground stations, technical
training, and domestic programs that are dependent on a
continuing flow of data. (C)
If this support for Landsat were accompanied by opposi-
tion to dissemination of higher resolution imagery, sentiment
may develop in favor of establishing a distinction between
global and local data, as found in the Comecon convention.
The Soviets have thus far not garnered a great deal of support
for a 50 meter photographic resolution limit, perhaps because
the Skylab photography, which falls below that limit, has
already been released and widely accepted as not causing
economic or military harm. Some countries, however, might
campaign for a limit near the best resolution of the Skylab
photographs (e.g., 10 meters photographic). Nevertheless,
anyone attempting to restrict dissemination of data de-
classified by the US would tend to be deterred by the fact
that the US Freedom of Information Act provides for dis-
closure of unclassified data on request. Consequently,
foreign governments or private organizations could obtain
such data anyway. (S)
The release of imagery from US reconnaissance satellites
could also influence the debates on several related issues
concerning the peaceful use of outer space. On one hand,
foreign governments that were upset by release might take
a more anti-US line on those other issues, either to challenge
the legitimacy of US satellite programs or simply to retaliate
for a perceived infringement of sovereignty. On the other
hand, positive reactions to release would tend to make
debates on the related issues more benign. These other
issues, beginning with those most closely related to the
dissemination of remote sensing data, are the following: (S)
a. Dissemination of Information Based on Ima er .
The Comecon convention on remote sensing, besides
establishing the 50-meter limit for freely disseminated
imagery, also requires prior consent to disclose "infor-
mation" on another country's natural resources or eco-
nomic potential that is derived from remote sensing data.
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"Information" is broadly defined as the "end-:product of
the analytical process" of exploiting this data in com-
bination with data from other sources. This would seem
to include any book or article that makes even slight
use of satellite imagery. Most LDCs have supported
this sort of sweeping restriction in UN debates on re-
mote sensing principles. If their concerns about dis-
semination of imagery were stimulated by the specifics
of a US initiative, this support would be likely to
intensify--at least over the short term. The longer
term consequences would depend on their perceptions of
the net gains or losses to them of Washington's course
of action. (C)
b. Right to Sense. The issue of prior consent for
remote sensing has recently been quiescent. The 1974
Argentine-Brazilian draft agreement requiring prior
consent is still on the table, however, and the countries
most sensitive about release of imagery could make it a
live issue once again. As far as civil systems are
concerned, this would be a gesture of protest with little
practical effect intended: few countries would want to
lose completely the benefits of the Landsat program and
most agree that it would be neither practical nor advan-
tageous to attempt to turn the imaging equipment on and
off as it crosses political boundaries. Some may attempt
to restrict sensing by reconnaissance satellites alone,
probably on the grounds that this is a violation of
sovereignty. (C)
c. Right to Overfly. There is general acceptance
of the right to overfly another state's territory by
satellite, with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty
prohibiting any national appropriation of outer space
by claims of sovereignty. The lack of an agreed
definition of outer space means, however, that the door
is still open to national claims. The nations currently
most inclined to make them are those on the equator,
i.e., those that because of their location are most
intrigued by the "scarce resource" attributes of the
limited (because of radiointerference problems) space
in the 22,000 mile-high geosynchronous orbit. Most of
the equatorial countries have claimed some sort of
preferential rights for use of this orbit. At a 1976
meeting in Bogota, eight of them declared their in-
tention to pursue the question of claiming the part of
the geosynchronous orbit above their countries as
national territory. Any ill will generated by release
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of imagery could stimulate them to move further on this
issue, but they would have only limited support from
other LDCs, and none at all from the USSR. Another
possible initiative, however, would be to push for a
general definition of outer space that placed its
lower limit above the orbits of many remote sensing
satellites (e.g., 200 miles). This would have more
widespread LDC support, although the USSR would still
oppose it. (C)
d. Direct Broadcast Satellites. Like remote
sensing, this issue arouses concerns about control over
information. It is another area for possible agitation
by governments displeased by release of imagery, but
most non-Western states already take an anti-US line on
the issue anyway by insisting on the prior consent of
the receiving state. (C)
e. Liability. It is possible, but extremely
unlikely, that some states may endeavor to intercept
the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by?Space Objects as applying to economic
or military losses resulting from release of imagery of
their territories. (U)
International Satellite Verification Agency
Earlier this year, France proposed the creation of an
international agency that would use satellite technology to
monitor and verify disarmament agreements and other measures
designed to reduce the chance of armed attack. The UN
General Assembly recently adopted, over US objections,
a resolution calling for an experts' study on the subject,
to be completed before the Assembly reconvenes in September
1979. A unilateral release of imagery by the US could
affect the degree of support for the French proposal by
influencing perceptions of: (1) the need for such an agency;
(2) its practicability; and (3) the chances that the US
might reverse its opposition to it. The net effect on this
support is difficult to gauge, however, and would depend on
how governments with no prior access to the imagery came to
appreciate the process of interpreting it. This, in turn,
would largely depend on which imagery was chosen for release.
(C)
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A fairly comprehensive release of imagery from US
reconnaissance satellites might make the proposed agency
appear superfluous by demonstrating that, even without it,
the US would provide its best reconnaissance products to the
international community. Any US release would not, however,
necessarily preclude other countries from continuing to urge
establishment of an international agency that operated under
a prior consent regime. Furthermore, if targets for US
satellites continue to be chosen according to US intelligence
requirements, many states would no doubt argue that such
selection was one-sided and no substitute for targeting
decisions reached by an international body. The argument
would be made even more forcefully if the US acknowledged
that it was withholding some of its imagery. Release might
also demonstrate to many governments that photo interpretation
is difficult, leading them to conclude that an international
agency with skilled, "impartial" photo interpreters would still
be necessary to avoid reliance on the US for interpretation. (C)
Although release may leave many states convinced that
an international verification agency was laudable in principle,
it might also persuade them that it would be unworkable in
practice. Controversies would probably arise over the
meaning of particular pieces of imagery, and this would
support the US contention that photo interpretation is not
only difficult but also fraught with political implications
and highly dependent on collateral information. There may
then be little confidence that any photo interpreter could
be "impartial." (S)
Unilateral release of imagery would probably raise
hopes, not least of all among the French, that the US was
backing down from its opposition to the proposal. At a
minimum, it would seriously undermine some of the arguments
that the US has lodged against it, suggesting that we were
not really as concerned as we had professed to be about the
security of our intelligence capabilities or the hazards of
letting the public look at raw data. US absence from the UN
experts' group would, however, keep these hopes from in-
creasing very much. (C)
Specific East-West Arms Control Negotiations
The extent to which the level of Soviet concern about
public release of US military reconnaissance satellite
imagery might be affected by various aspects of a. specific
US initiative along those lines (e.g., the nature of the
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imagery released and whether or not Moscow was consulted
beforehand) has already been explored. But it must be
emphasized that the degree of Soviet unhappiness would also
be likely to be either reinforced or attenuated by other
concurrent trends and developments affecting the overall
state of US-Soviet relations. Similarly, the venue and
nature of any Soviet response would depend upon a host
of concrete and nebulous variables. Hence while broad
generalizations about the likely impact of the release of
US military reconnaissance satellite imagery on specific
East-West arms control negotiations are possible, in the
absence of detailed scenarios, more precise predictions
about probable thresholds of Soviet tolerance or about US
moves that might trigger particular Soviet responses are not.
(C/NF)
The MBFR negotiations are no less vulnerable to disrup-
tion than SALT should satellite imagery released by the US
provide Moscow with grounds for charging that Washington was
using NTM for espionage missions in addition to their legiti-
mate treaty monitoring role. At the same time, however, the
Soviets have strong incentives for keeping both SALT and MBFR
on track, and have shown interest in extending the current
East-West arms control dialogue to include such additional
issues as theater nuclear forces. Hence there would seem to
be a good chance that unless Moscow were extremely unhappy
with the specific course of action chosen by Washington (or
unless other considerations intervened), the practical
impact of Soviet distress on current and pending negotiations
in these three critical areas would be rather limited. The
Soviets have other ways of signalling their displeasure.
Thus they might lecture and otherwise complicate the talks
for awhile, but on balance it seems unlikely that they would
risk taking any action that might seriously jeopardize the
negotiating process. (S/NF)
Similarly, the impact on the Anti-Satellite Talks of
a US course of action with respect to release of satellite
imagery that the Soviets considered only mildly provocative
would probably be quite limited. For political reasons, the
Soviets would almost certainly consider SALT--especially the
SCC discussions--to be the most suitable arms control nego-
tiating forum for registering severe irritation over any
perceived US "misuse" of NTM, and they would probably be
inclined to air lesser grievances there first as well.
Nonetheless, the Soviets did raise the general problem of
"unlawful" satellite activities during the opening round of
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ASAT. They subsequently indicated that while none of their
concerns on this score were offered as justification for
having an antisatellite system, these concerns were real and
would have to be addressed. Hence it seems likely that any
release of US reconnaissance satellite imagery of Soviet
territory without Moscow's express consent would prompt the
Soviets to return to the issue of illegal satellites with
considerable vigor within the ASAT context and, in addition,
to use this agitation at ASAT to strengthen their position
on the remote sensing issues under negotiation at the UN.
In fact, under some circumstances (including those involving
no more than mid-level Soviet concern), Moscow might be
particularly attracted by the fact that ASAT is a less
politically visible forum than SALT and thus could be used
to express protest with less risk to overall Soviet-US
relations. (S/NF)
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