COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NSDO WITH PD-24

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000700070004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REQ

Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8
CONFIDENTIAL
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NSDD WITH PD-24
NSDD
General
PD-24
General
2c, 6b 2c,d
CHANGE CONSEQUENCES
Expands scope to include all automated
systems including word processors.
Expands security miss ion to include
'information affecting privacy of U.S.
persons.
Adds provision for the Government to
formulate strategies and measures for
providing protection for "systems
which handle nongovernment informa-
tion the loss of which could adversely
affect the national interest or the
rights of U.S. persons...." Explicit
responsibilities and mechanisms to
implement this policy are not pro-
vided but must devolve on the DIRNSA.
Raises questions of feasibility of
managing consolidated effort.
Raises questions of Executive Agent's
and National Manager's suitability
to represent entire Government's
privacy interests.
The propriety of this goal, and its
pursuit by a military agency, are legal
issues which should-be explored by the
Attorney General.
Replaces PD-24-based National Commu- The breadth of issues covered raises
nications Security Committee with a questions of who should be represented
Steering Group and National Telecom- on these groups, and what other organi-
munications and Information Systems zations are affected.
Security Committee (NTISSC).
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED
NSA review completed
NSC review completed
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8
 Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8
CONFIDENTIAL
NSDD
3c
3d
4b (3)
PD-24
no ref.
4g
no ref .
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NSDD WITH PD-24
Page 2
CHANGE
Empowers Steering Group to approve
"consolidated resources program
and budget proposals" for national
telecommunications and information
systems security.
Centralizes review of systems'
security status by the Steering Group.
NTISSC to "administer matters per-
taining to the release of sensitive
security information, techniques and
materials to foreign governments or
international organizations (except
in intelligence operations managed
by the Director, Central Intelligence
Agency)."
Makes SecDef Executive Agent for Auto-
mated Systems Security as well as for
Telecommunications Security. Expands
his executive agent role to cover all
electronic information, not just
"national security" information as
before.
CONSEQUENCES
Restructures budget review process for
these areas, with significant impact
on DCI role for NFIP and on department
and agency head authorities to set
priorities.
Implies migration of accreditation
approval responsibilities from depart-
ments and agencies to the Steering Group,
which would be separated from the
environment to be accredited.
4c
CONFIDENTIAL
Supersedes the DCI's E.O. 12333 authori-
ties to prescribe policies for and
coordinate foreign intelligence relation-
ships (except for DDO operations).
Considering the rapid expansion of word
processing, makes SecDef Executive Agent
for all Government information
processing.
Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8
 NSDD
5f
5g
6a, e
PD-24
4d
no ref.
no ref.
no ref .
no ref.
Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NSDD WITH PD-24
Page 3
CHANGE r
Secretary of Commerce out as Execu-
tive Agent for unclassified, non-
national security information, and
for commercial and private sector
information.
Empowers SecDef to "procure for and
provide to government agencies, and
where appropriate, to private institu-
tions (including Government contractors)
and foreign governments, equipment and
other materials."
Empowers SecDef to develop and submit
a National Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Program
budget, "including funds for the pro-
curement and provision of equipment and
materials" Government (and contractor)
wide.
The DIRNSA would be responsible for
carrying out the foregoing responsi-
bilities of the Secretary of Defense
as Executive Agent.
Empowers DIRNSA to "empirically
examine Government telecommunications
and automated information systems and
evaluate their vulnerability to hostile
interceptions and exploitation."
CONSEQUENCES
Severely curtails Bureau of Standards
role and functions. Raises question
of legal propriety of military respon-
sibIlity for this area.
GSA, and department and agency heads
with delegated authority, would lose
the right to procure computers and word
processors. Centralized procurement
would make it very difficult to meet
schedule and individual agency require-
ments.
Seriously affects the budget cycle,
department and agency head administra-
tive prerogatives, and DCI role in NFIP.
Raises questions of feasibility of dis-
charging this responsibility.
All previously itemized SecDef respon-
sibilities may be delegated to DIRNSA.
Shifts security accreditation responsi-
bility for all Government and contractor
telecommunications and information
systems to DIRNSA.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8
 Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BOl034R000700070004-8
CONFIDENTIAL
6b, e
6b,10a
6b
6b
PD-24
no ref.
4g
no ref .
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NSDD WITH PD-24
Page 4
CHANGE
Empowers DIRNSA to develop and approve
"all standards, techniques, systems
and equipment" "related to cryptog-
raphy, communications security and
trusted computer and automated infor-
mation systems."
Empowers DIRNSA to perform all
Government-sponsored R&D for telecom-
munications and information systems
Removes PD-24 authority of heads of
Federal departments and agencies to
organize and conduct their commu-
nications security and emanations
security activities as they see fit,
and vests this responsibility with
the DIRNSA.
Empowers DIRNSA to conduct liaison
with foreign governments and inter-
national organizations.
CONSEQUENCES
Entire Government must use DIRNSA spe-
cified standards, techniques, systems
and equipment.
Eliminates such roles for CIA (ISSG and
ORD), DOE (LLL, etc.), Bureau of
Standards, GSA and others.
In CIA, for example, removes OC COMSEC
and OS ISSG missions.
Impacts formal and informal roles of DCI,
State Department and Commerce Department
in many relationships.
no ref .
Empowers DIRNSA to conduct all
security-related liaison with
private institutions.
Removes Bureau of Standards role with
American National Standards Institute,
Question of legal propriety arises
again.
Precludes any other agencies from working
or contracting in those areas. Could
impact private sector research into
security methods.
6c
Empowers DIRNSA to operate
no ref.
industrial facilities to provide
"cryptographic and other sensitive
security materials or services."
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8
CONFIDENTIAL
NSDD PD-24
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NSDD WITH PD-24
Page 5
CHANGE
6d no ref. Empowers DIRNSA to assess and dis-
seminate information on hostile
threats to telecommunications and
automated information systems.
6g,10b no ref. Requires department and agency heads
to provide DIRNSA all information "he
may need to discharge the responsi-
bilities assigned...."
7 no ref. Requires DCI to provide DIRNSA with
"unique handling requirements associ-
ated with the protection of sensitive
compartmented intelligence."
CONSEQUENCES
Removes analysis missions from CIA and
DIA, such as technology transfer and
Soviet technology.
DIRNSA specifies what he wants; others
have to provide.
DIRNSA free to accept, modify or reject
requirements. Does not accurately recog-
the DCI's statutory responsibilities and
authorities.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700070004-8