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Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq STAT Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 S 2 _ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ?11an-h 3, ?9:.5 30 Cor.:.:Stt e on Small Business: Mr. Bump- SENATE RESOLUTION 90-RELAT- ber 1984 GAC Report to the President on ens. Mr.:'unn_ Mr. Sasser, Mr. Baucus, Mr. ING TO THE SOVIET ARMS Soviet Arms Control Violations stated 13 pit. Dixon. Mr. Boren. Mr. Harkin. CONTROL VIOLATIONS REPORT more conclusive Soviet arras control viola. and ?jr- Kerry. OF 1985 Uona, and it was reviewed and received gen- Corrmittee on Veterans' Affairs: Mr. eral agreement within the Administration Cranston. Mr. Matsunaga, Mr. DeConclnl, Mr. SYMMS (for himself and Mr. as a Presidential Report to Congress. This ).tr. Mitchell.. and Mr. Rockefeller. - . McCLv-Rz) submitted the following res- was the result of a h1cClure?Ma:tincl) -Cour- Select Committee on Ethics: -Mr. Beflin, olution; which was referred to the ter unanimous Amendment. The Frbruary. 1985 Presidentlal Report to Congress on Mr. Pryor, and Mr.la8leton. ? -- - i ?' Committee on Foreign Relations. 'Arms Control Violations (classified Secret) states 6 new Control Soviet arms control i d Select Committee on Indian Affairs:"Mr. S. R. 90.- Soviet ' Burdick Mr. Inouye, Mr. DeConcinL and Resolved.,it is the sense of the Senate that lations conclusively with unanimous inter- Melcher, Mr. Bur ?t.he people of the United States should be agency agreement. This Is the result of a Special Committee on Aging: Mr. Glenn: informed urgently and. consistent with the McClure amendment. Mr. Chiles. Mr. Melcher. Mr. Pryor, Mr. protection of intelligence sources and meth- There are thus a total of 24 Soviet arms control treaty violations for which the evi- Bradley, Mr. Burdick. Mr..Dodd. Mr. John- ds. to the fullest extent possible regarding ston. and Mr. Bingaman. Soviet noncompliance with the unratified Joint Economic Committee: Mr. Bentsen, SALT II Treaty or any arms control agree- Mr. Proxmire, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Sax- meat to which the Soviet Union is a Party. banes. - and, pursuant to this finding, requests the the Congress dated February 1, 1985. and as SENATE RESOLUTION 88- soon as possible after the adoption of this AMENDING THE STANDING resolution promptly to make public all ma- RULES OF. THE SENATE terial and information therein which can be w ....s.e ..en..lo f the TTnitrd States ------- ., Mr. DOLE submitted the following resolution; which was considered and consistent with the s-,aanaara s;pecureu herein. - agreed to: ' - Mr. SYMMS.Mr. President, I am of- If d Resolved. That paragraph 3(a) of Rule J~-V of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended for the 99th Congress as follows:- Strike "12" after "Rules and Administra- tion" and insert in lieu thereof "15". - Src. 2. Paragraph 3(c) of Rule XXV of the Standing Rules- of the Senate is amended for the 59th Congress as follows: Strike "T? after "Indian Affairs" and insert in lieu thereof "9". fering this resolution for myse an Senator MCCLVRE for a very important reason. Soviet arms control violations must be ended. But before they can be -ended, they must be revealed to the Soviets and to the American people. I want the distinguished American dele- gation to the Geneva arms control talks-the so-called umbrella talks- confirmed today to confront the Sovi- ets on March 12, 1985, with the full spectrum of all their arms control SENATE RESOLUTION 89= treaty violations. MAKING MAJORITY PARTY AP- - I believe that the most important POINTh ENTS TO SENATE COM- findings of President Reagan's Febru- MI.IZ.EES AND - ELECTING ary 1, 1985, report to Congress on CHAIRMEN AND SUCH COM- Soviet Non-Compliance with Arms MITTEES Control Treaties are in the classified annex. I believe fur her that these Mr. DOLE submitted the following findings must be made public so that resolution; which was considered and they can be understood by the Con- agreed to: - gress and by the American people. Revolved, That the following shall consti- cussed in the press repeatedly before, Lute the majority party's membership on and I believe that their confirmation those Senate committees listed below for by the executive branch would in no the 99th Congress, or until their successors way jeopardize intelligence sources are appointed: and methods. No intelligence data sup- Rules and Administration: Mr. Mathias, porting these findings need be di- (chair-man), Mr. Hatfield, Mr. McClure, Mr. vulged at this time, just the findings Helms, Mr. Warner, Mr. Dole. Mr. Stevens, themselves. and Mr. Gam. My resolution merely requests that Small Business: Mr. Weicker (chairman), the President release these findings, Mr. Boschwitz, I.ir. Gorton, Mr. Nickles. Mr. which are so necessary to our under- s 14 to I advantage in Int.ermedia.e Range Rudman, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Hasten Mr. Nuclear Force Warheads against NATO. and - standing of the Soviet threat to our The Soviets are also developing and deploy- t ld G wa o Pressler, Mr. er,Veterans' Affairs: Mr. Murkowski (chair- national security. . lag a nation-wide ABM defense, capable of man). Mr. Simpson. Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- on defending not only Moscow, but also Stafford, Mr. Specter, Mr. Denton. and Mr. sent that the President's unclassified ICBM fields, and the whole nation. Thus Boschwitz. February 1. 1985, report be printed in _ the Soviets are over a decade ahead of the Select Committee on Ethics: Mr. Rudman the RECORD, together with my analysis U.S. in both offensive and defensive caps- (chairman), Mr. Helms.. and Mrs. T< e- of this report. bilitles. - baurn There being no objection, the mate- The most sensible and cost effective U.S. Special Committee on Aging: Mr. Heinz- rial was ordered to be printed in the response to Soviet break-out from SALT I (chairman), Mr. Cohen, Mr. Pressler, Mr. and SALT II is to accelerate our Strategic Grawley. Mr. Wilson, Mr. Warner, Mr. RECORD, RS follows: Defense Initiative. But the only way that we Evans. Mr. Denton, Mr. Nickles, and Mrs. ANALYSIS Or FEBRUARY 1. 1985, VIOLATIONS are ever going to be able to deploy SDI in Hawkins. - REPORT the near term. or even in the long term. Select Committee on Indian Affairs: Mr.- The January 1984 Presidential Report to however. is to selectively abrogate the SALT Andrews (chairman). Mr. Goldwater, Mr. Congress on Soviet Arms Control Violations I ABM Treaty. And the only way. political- Gorton, Mr. Murkowski, and Mr. Abdnor. found S Soviet violations conclusively, with ly, that we can do that is to scrap the unra- Joint Economic Committee: Mr. Abdnor unanimous interagency agreement. This tified SALT II Treaty. Thus it is extremely (vice chairman), Mr. Roth, Mr. Symms, Mr. Report was the result of a McClure-Helms- important to SDI and to American national Mattingly. Mr. D'Amato. and Mr. Wilson. Symms unanimous amendment. The Octo- security to scrap SALT II. the entire Reagan Administration unani- mously agrees that these 24 are conclusive violations. There are nine more probable. likely, and possible violations reported by the President. with 31 more to go to report on the full 64 Soviet violations: It Is now fair to say that the Arms Control Process has suffered a "broken back" ad- ministered by the Soviets It is also most reasonable to conclude 'that the Soviets have torn up both SALT I and SALT II. Indeed, the Reagan Administration unani- mously agrees that the Soviets are conclu- sively violating the core provisions of both treaties. Soviet SYDV growth is certain to continue in 1985. with impending SS-24 ICBM de- ployment, impending SS-25 mobile ICBM - deployment and continued Bear H bomber production, together with SS-16 deploy- ment- The Soviets are directly challenging the essence of the U.S. democratic political system by their 24 conclusive and agreed arms control violations They are boldly gambling that American democratic leaders can not muster the leadership or collect the . bipartisan political consensus necessary to demonstrate the political will to compensate -for their violations. They believe. with some justification derived from their past obser- vation of American behavior, that American political leaders are paralyzed and demoral- ized and unable to galvanize public support to challenge them and counteract their. threats to our collective security. Of course, the Soviets are very self confi- dent. They have reason to be. The Soviets know full well that they now have an over- whelming 4 to 1 numerical advantage in ICBM warheads (counting DLA's reported best estimate of 14 warheads on each of 308 superheavy SS-18 ICBMs. reportedly giving the Soviets 8.500 ICBM warheads to only 2,100 for the U.S.). and their accuracy and megatonnage advantages give them over a 6 to 1 advantage in first strike. counterforce Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 S 2 3333 March 5, 1955 CONGRESSIONAL RECOKJ -.~t.~-~ 1 t equate and therefore a violation of the merits. The U.S. will continue to monitor de- test and deploy" just one new t; ,e of Soviet Unions political commitment under velopments closely. "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as ore the Helsinki Final Act The USSR's compli- 6. Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class Ba:ls:ic that differs from an existing type by more ante with its notification commitment was Missile Submarines than 5 percent In ler:g-h? largest dia re:er. reexamined for this report launch-weight and throw-weight or differs in Obligations' The SALT I Interim Agree- of stages or propellant type. In ad- Judged The U.S. Government previously went and its procedures require that subma- number ag-reed sngle entr re- y that the Soviet Union violated its po- rives limited by the Agreement be disman- nuton ition. It was ICBM of a n eatsno s type with a lltical commitment to observe the prior-no- tied or be reconfigured Into submarines vehicle tlfication prorslcns of Basket I of the Hel- without ballistic missile capabilities. Any post'boost vehicle would be flight-tested or si^.ki Final Act which requires notification Soviet actions inconsistent with this obiiga- deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is and other information concerning exercises tion are violations of a political commit- less than 50 percent of the throwweight of exceeding 25.000 ground troops. A major - ment. that ICBM. This latter provision was in- Warsaw Pact maneuver (Zapad-81). exceed- Issue. The U.S. examined whether the tended to prohibit the possibility that single ing the 25.000 troop limit, was conducted ire, .USSR's reconfiguration of a submarine to warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted 1981 at a time great pressure was being put _ increase its length. and for use as a platform to MIRVed systems. on Poland. and the Soviet Union did not for modern long-range cruise missiles is con- Issues: The Soviets declared the SS-X-24 provide the pre-notification or other infor- sistent with its political commitments under to be their allowed one new type ICBM. The mation required. The judgment that the the Interim Agreement and Its implement- January 1984 report examined the Issues: Soviet Union did not observe the prior not!- ing procedures. whether the Soviets have tested a second ficatlon provisions of the Helsinki Final Act Finding: The U.S. Government judges new type of ICBM (the SS-X-25) which is is confirmed, that the Soviet Union's conversion of a dis- prohibited: whether the reentry vehicle While the USSR and Warsaw Pact states mantled SSBN into a submarine longer (RV) on that missile, if It is not a new type, have generally taken an approach to the than the original, and carrying modern, .'is In compliance with the provision that for confidence-building measures of the Final long-range cruise missiles is not a violation existing types of single RV missiles, the Act which minimizes the Information they of its political commitment under the SALT weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 per- provide. Soviet compliance with the exer- I Interim Agreement, but constitutes a cent of total throwwe!ght: and whether en- cise-notification provisions was much im- threat to U.S. and Allied security similar to cryption of SS-X-25 flight test telemetry v-erilicatton. The U.S. reexan-incd proved in 1983. However, during 1984, the the original Yankee-C13v submarine. impedes [s.-ues for this report. USSR returned to a minimalist stance, pro- SALT If Treaty these ese e is5u viding only the bare minimum required Treaty status: SALT II was signed In June a. Second New Type: The U.S. Govern. under the Final Act 1979 and has not been ratified. In 1981 the ment judges that the SS-X-25 is a prohibit- Salt I Interim Agreement United States made clear to the Soviet ed second "new" type of_ICBM and that its Treaty Status The SALT I Interim Agree- Union Its intention not to ratify the SALT testing. in addition to the SS-X-24 that Its ment entered into force for the United II Treaty. Prior to this clarification of our thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dis- position in 1981, both nations were obligat- political commitment to- observe the "new" mantling procedures Implementing the In- ed under customary international law not to type prov'om ori- of the SALT IL Treat;. De- terim Agreement were concluded in 1974- take actions which would defeat the object spite U.S. requests, no corrective action has The Interim Agreement, by its own terms, and purpose of the signed, but unratified been taken. was of limited duration and expired as a le- Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 1981 -, b. taken. Throwweight Ratio: The U.S. gaily binding document in 1977. The appii- are violations of legal obligations. Since Government reaffirms the conclusion of the cabWty of the Interim Agreement to the ac- 1981, the United States has observed a polit- January 1934 report regarding the SS-X-25 Lions of both parties has, however, been ex- foal commitment to refrain from actions RV-to-throwweight ratio. That is, if we were SS- tended by the parties by a series of mutual that undercut the SALT II Treaty so long to accept the Soviet argument that the were political commitments, including the Presi- as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Sovi- X-25 is note a prohibited new type of ICBM. dent's May 31, 1982 statement that the eta have told us they also would abide by it would be a violation of their political corn United States would refrain from actions these provisions. Soviet actions Inconsistent mitment to observe the SALT II pro. ision which would undercut existing strategic with this commitment are violations of their which prohibits the testing of such an exist- arms agreements so long as the Soviet political commitment with respect to the ing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle Union shows equal restraint. The Soviets SALT II Treaty. whose weight is less than 50 percent of the have told us they would abide by the SALT Three SALT H issues are included In this throwweiiht of the ICBM I Interim Agreement and SALT IL Any aic- unclassified report: encryption of telemetry, c. Eacrypilc of The U.S. Government reaf- January tions by the USSR Inconsistent with this SS-X-25 ICBM, and SS-16 ICBM deploy- firms Its judgment made Government commitment are violations of its political went 1984 report regarding telemetry enJanu on commitment with respect to the Interim 7. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry during tests of the S3-X-25. Encryption Agreement and its implementing proce- Obligation The provisions of Sr'-:.T 11 ban during tests of this missile is i lustrati:?e of dures. - deliberate concealment measures that the deliberate impeding of verification of Two Issucs were analyzed for this report: impede verification by national technical compliance in violation of a legal obligation Soviet activities at dismantled ICBM sites, means. The Treaty permits each party' to prior to 1981, and of the USSR's political and reconfiguration of a Yankee-Class bal- use various methods of transmitting tele- commitment subsequent to 1981. listic missile submarine. _ metric information during testing. Including 9_ S S-16 Deployment 5. Mobile Missile Base Construction at encryption, but bans deliberate denial of te- nion ag eed in not The Soviet Dismantled SS-7 ICBM Sites lemetry. such as through encryption, when- Obligation produce, Uniot a elo or parties Obligation The SALT I Interim Agee- evlssuechThe The January verification- cemp'-'-ance ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular. from and Its proities reremaining prohibit t at ai3msn- report examined whether the Soviet Union not to produce the SS-16 third stage or the from using facilities ICBM torage has engaged in encryption of missile test te- reentry vehicle of.that missile. Any or So%viet ac, - ' lemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verl- Issue The January 1984 report examined tied or destroyed ICBMs. sites for support, or launch o of f ICBMs. - tlcation This ,issue was reexamined for this the evidence regarding whether the Soviets tfo inconsistent this commitment are report have deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite of Violations of a political ical commitment with re- Finding: The II.S Government reaffirms the ban on its deployment. The D.S. reex- plect nt the Iocedur Agreement and its !m- the conclusion in the January 1984 report amined this issue for this report I sue: gerU.S. es. that Soviet encryption practices constitute a Finding: The U.S. Government rea:!irrs ISiLG The examined whether the violation of a legal obligation under $ALT the judgment made In the January 1984 USSR has used d former ICBM sites In a II prior to 1981 and a violation of their po- report. While the evidence is somewhat am- manner inconsistent with Its political cam- litical commitment since 1982. The nature biguous and we cannot reach a definitive its im le under the Interim Agreement and and extent of such encryption of telemetry conclusion, the available evidence indicates Its trading.' The g U.S. gove res on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. re- that the activities at Plesetsk are a probable Finding: The apparently government judges that quest for corrective action, continues to be violation of the USSR's legal obligation not Soviet a[ttvity ant at related to S3-S7 an example of deliberately impeding verifi- to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II 25 ICBM deployme at present a at two a the eee cation of compliance in violation of this prior to 1981 when the Treaty was pending bases does not at prduoiotat the agreed Soviet political commitment ratification, and a probable violation of a termm Agreement- procedures r. the SALT I Iris 8 The SS-X-^.5 ICBM political commitment subsequent to 1981. ermm However, ongoing activi- ties raise concerns about compliance for the Obligation' In an attempt to constrain the .- ABM Treaty future. since use of "remaining facilities" to modernization and the proliferation of new, Treaty Status: The 1972 ABM Treaty and support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites more capable types of ICBMs. the provi- Its Protocol ban deployment of ABM svs- would be in violation of Soviet commit- slons of SALT II permit each side to "flight terns except that each party Is permitted to Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 The ed -_ J S 2534 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 5, IS 5 _ uu deploy one ABM system around the nation- a] capital area or. alternatively, at a Aingle Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM ICEM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is and ABM system components in contraven- in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet Lion of this legal obligation. - actions not In accord with the ABM Treaty Finding: The U.S. Government judges are, therefore. violations of a legal obliga- - that evidence of Soviet actions 'with respect tion. to concurrent operations is Insufficient to Flour ABM issues are included In this tin- assess frilly compliance kith Soviet obliga- clessified report the Krasnoyarsk radar, bons under the ABM Treaty, although the mobile land-based ABM systems or compo Soviet Union has conducted tests that have c , concurrent testing territorial ABM defeendnse. SAM Involved air defense radars In ABM-related compmponnentts, , and and ABM e' e~s4 aeAa The n?mber of incidents of con. 10. The Krasnoyarsk Radar Obfipaiion' In an effort to preclude cre- ation of a base for territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty limits the deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, in- cluding large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the periph- ery of the national territory of each party and requires that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of track- ing objects in outer space or for use as na- tional technical means of verification-of compliance with arms control agreements. Issue The January 1984 report examined the evidence regarding the construction of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia- It was concluded that this radar was almost certainly a violators of the current operation of SAM AND ABM com- ponents Indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. 13. ABM Territorial Defense Obligation: The Treaty allows each party a single operational 'site, explicitly permits modernization and replacement of ABM sys- tems or their components, and explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM' test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the ABM Treaty. The US..reexamined this parties and prohibits the parties from pro- the basis of evidence which continued to be .available through 1984. that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Misile Treaty of 1972 in that in Its associated siting, orientation, and capability. It is pro- hibited by this Treaty. Continuing construc- tion. and the absence of credible alternative .explanations, have reinforced otir. assess- ment of its purpose- Despite U.S. requests. no corrective action has been taken. . ' 11. Mobility of New ABM System - Oblip:tior>: The -ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or compo- nests. - hsue The U.S. examined Whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land- based ABM system, or components for such a system. in violation of its legal obligation under the ARM Treaty. Finding: The' US. Government judges that Soviet-actions with respect to ABM component mobility are ambiguous, but the USSR's development of components of a new ABM system, which apparently are de- signed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation. represent a potential violation of Its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ARM-related Soviet actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. - . . 12. Concurrent Testing of ABM and SAM Components Obligation- The ARM Treaty and Its Pro- tocol limit the parties to one ABM deploy- ment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one 'deployment area the parties may have ABM systems and components for development and Lest- ing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohib- its giving components, other than ABM system components. . the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the parties from testing them in "an ABM mode" The parties agreed that the concur- rent testing of SAM and ABM system com- por tints is prohibited. Issue The U.S. examined whether Soviet ABM and related activities provide a base for a territorial defense- . Finding: The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ARM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR -may be preparing an ABM de- ierse of its national territory. SENATE RESOLUTION 91-DI- RECTING REPRESENTATION BY THE SENATE .LEGAL COUN- SEL' - Mr. SIILMSON '(for Mr. DoLx, Nor himself, and Mr. Bran) submitted the fol1oring resolution; Which was.con- sidered and agreed to: COMYr: fns ON 7HE BUDGET Mr. DOMENIC2. Mr. President. the Senate Committee on the Budget will meet on the first concurrent budget resolution for fiscal year 1986. Tues- day. March 5, 1985. through Friday. March 8, 1985. The markup will be held each day at 10 a m. and 2 p.m. For further information, contact Susan Yurko at .the Senate Budget Committee at 224-0536. SVBCOMMI:Tr2 ON GOVERN-YEKTAL D71CIEJ$CT Mr. -MATHIAS. Mr. President, .1 would like to announce that the Sub- committee on Governmental Efficien- cy and the District of Columbia of the Governmental Affairs Committee will bold a joint hearing with the Commit- tee on Environment and Public Works on the subject of "Government Global Forecasting'CapabIlity." The hearing will be held on Tuesday. March 26. 1985, at 9:30 a.m in room .SD-342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. For further information, contact Marion Morris of the subcommittee staff at 224-4161. - - AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO I.'IEET SELECT COA7CITTFS ON INTELi.IGLNCE Mrs. HAWKINS. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be author- ized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday. March 5, 1985, to conduct a closed hearing on the fiscal year 1986 budget. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. COMMITTEE ON POP.IIGN RELATIONS Mrs, AAWiTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations be au- thorized to meet on Tuesday. March 5, 1985, to conduct a hearing on the Genocide Treaty. - The PRESIDING -OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. SvsCOMIt:ITrl OV Sg.APOwER AA'D FORCE Faoir oil Mrs. HAWKINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Sub- committee on Seapower and Force Projection, of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Tuesday, March 5. 1985. to conduct a open hearing to be followed by a closed hearing on the Navy Shipbuild- ing Program. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, It is so ordered. S. RES. 91 Whereas in the case of Lear Siegler, Inc, etc. v. John Lehman. etc_ el Si, .filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the constitutionality of the procurement protest system estab- lished by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Public Law 98-369, 98 Stat 1175,1199-1203. has been plLced in issue; . Whereas the Department of Justice has notified the Senate that the Department will assert in this case and in other cases under the Competition in Contracting Act that the powers granted by that Act of Con- gress to the Comptroller General violate the constitutionally prescribed separation of powers - Whereas pursuant to sections 703(c), 706(a). and 713(a) of the Ethics in Govern- ment Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. 11 288b(c). - stnicoa ma= ox sraATCGIC AND THLATsst 288e(a), and 2881(a) (1982), the Senate may - 3mc+r.v TORCES direct Its Counsel to intervene in the name Mrs. HAWKS.. Mr. President, I of the Senate in any legal action In which ask unanimous consent that the Sub the and underothe Constirtution are placed in issuue:: committee on Stragetic and Theater Now, therefore, be it - - Nuclear Forces of the Committee on Resolved. That the Senate -Legal Counsel Armed Services be authorized to meet is directed to Intervene In the name of the during the session of the Senate on Senate in the case of Lear Siegler. Inc., etc. -Tuesday. March 5. to hold an open v. John Lehm= etc.. et al - ? _ hearing followed by a closed session on Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 _ Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3 STAT Q Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2009/09/04: CIA-RDP87M0022OR000400460032-3