A POLITICAL INPUT ON THE US-SOVIET JCC MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000400480004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400480004-9
CONTROL 140.
PRIOR PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT: NO
PRIOR CORRES SENT TO:
CROSS REF:
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhingon, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #02176-85
25 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: A Political Input on the US-Soviet JCC Meeting
1. The following observations are offered in addition to Dave Low's
contribution, on which I have no specific comments.
2. US decisions on the JCC meeting and the meeting itself seem likely
to take place in an atmosphere of deteriorating US-Soviet relations:
The Gorbachev leadership is facing the US at the moment from a
fairly pugnacious posture. The reasons are several:
An internal political need for Gorbachev to look tough.
A belief that after several years of ineffectual Soviet
policies, during which the Reagan Administration pursued
hard-line policies toward the USSR, Moscow now seems to
believe it has to teach Washington some "respect."
A possible belief in Moscow that Reagan's foreign policy
troubles (Bitburg, Contras, MLM) and the US deficit (as
Gorbachev suggested to O'Neal) give the Soviets a new chance
to put the Administration on the defensive.
The US will take action on the Nicholson killing; the Soviets will
do something in return.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DCI
EXEC
SECRET)
REG 25X1
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3. There is a fair chance, it seems to me, that by the end of May the
atmosphere will be such that holding the JCC meeting will look out of joint
with the rest of US policy. Policymakers will want to consider early the
possible conditions under which they may want or have to cancel it. I'm not
making the case for cancellation, but rather for some political contingency
planning so that a decision to cancel doesn't look like a knee-jerk reaction
or forced by external events on an indecisive government, or a decision to
proceed appear inconsistent or-irresolute.
4. As to the fundamental matter of US-Soviet trade prospects, the
mid-term outlook is not very promising in any event except for a few select
firms.
For political and economic reasons, the Soviets are going to be
very careful to hedge against heavy reliance on US suppliers of
both capital or agricultural goods, even if they increase imports
substantially.
The areas where they are most eager to come to us will be the high
technologies we are most reluctant to sell.
5. The Soviets want for political reasons to encourage the view among
business lobbyists that there is a big market for the US in the Soviet
Union. There really is unlikely to be one unless some very unlikely
political conditions are met:
A broad and lasting atmosphere of detente.
A wholesale loosening of US policies on technology transfer.
6. Meeting these conditions will require either a fundamental shift of
Administration policy toward accommodation to the USSR, or a fundamental
shift of Soviet policy in that direction toward the US. As long as the
relationship is frosty or oscillating around the mi a of the spectrum, the
Soviets will tend to take their business elsew re. %
Fri W. Ermarth
cc: DCI
C/NIC
VC/NIC
NIO/ECON
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400480004-9