SIG/TT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000400520001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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J.X ('U`I'IVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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DDCI
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EXDIR
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D/ICS
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DDI
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DDA
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DDS&T
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----
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Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
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D/PAO
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VC/NIC
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N
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C/TTIC
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1 -A
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TE ecutive Secretory
Aug 85
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8523964 CJ
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
with SECRET Pt . t
Senior Interagency Group No. 23
TO: &Q'l;-k -
Commerce
Defense
Energy
FBI
Justice
NASA
NSA
OMB
OSTP
NSC
NSF
Mrs. Helen Robbins
COL David Brown
Mr. William Vitale
Mr. James Geer
Mr. Stephen Galebach
Mr. Kenneth Pedersen
Mr. Alton Keel
- Dr. George Keyworth
- Mr. William Martin
- Dr. Bodo Bartocha
SUBJECT: SIG/TT Executive Committee Meeting
Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the
Executive Committee meeting of the SIG on domestic
safeguards on supercomputers, held on August 12, 1985.
Nicholas PlUtt
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Summary of Conclusions.
2. List of Participants.
w; + h SCRET la.t+ _ -L_ +
STAT
STAT
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United States Department of State
Washington, U.C. 20520
August 13, 1985
SECRET
PARTICIPANTS:
DATE AND TIME:
See Attached List
Monday, August 12,
1985 at 3:00 p.m.
PLACE:
Room 1105, Department of State
SUBJECT:
Domestic Safeguards for
Supercomputers
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Under Secretary Schneider convened the Executive
Committee of the SIG to reach an agreed interagency
on U.S. policy regarding domestic safeguards for super-ition
computers. The Under Secretary opened the meeting by
underscoring the reasons for U.S. concern about uncontrolled
access to supercomputers. He reviewed for the group the
existing international regime that prohibits access for
COCOM proscribed nationals. Mr. Schneider noted that the
Japanese have been particularly vigorous in enforcing
domestic safeguards; they have already denied 3 dozen visa
applications on this basis. He added that if we are to
maintain the safeguard agreements contained in the existing
international regime, we must design and implement a US
regime that is the functional equivalent of the
international regime.
The following is a summary of issues discussed by the SIG
Executive Committee:
Issue I: Category I - USG Owned and Operated
Supercomputers: Should the U.S. Government apply "no access" rule to supercomputers owned and operated by
U.S. Government Agencies? y
All USG agencies with the exception of DOE and OSTP
agreed that USG owned and operated machines should have
a strict "no access"
nation. rule applied to COCOM proscribed
s OSTP and DOE indicated that they had not
been briefed on the national security threat of COCOM
proscribed national's use of the machine, and felt that
the facts for restricting access were not well
developed. However, it was stated that DOE was an
active participant in the conceptualization and
negotiation of the US-Japanese supercomputer agreement.
SECRET
DECLASS OADR
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NSA offered to provide a briefing for OSTP and DOE.
OSTP and DOE said that they were planning a trip to Los
Alamos at the end of next week, and would be briefed
there as well. OSTP and DOE asked the group to reserve
judgment on the issue until they returned from Los
Alamos. The Chairman agreed.
Issue II: Category II - Privately Owned & Operated
Supercomputers - The U.S. Government should restrict and/or
deny access to COCOM proscribed nationals to universities
and private sector supercomputers through:
Option It No access (accomplished through the visa
process as a first step);
Option 2: No access with some limited exceptions
(enforced by a combination of the visa process and a
procedure for the US Government to grant exceptions);
or
Option 3: Indirect access (through a monitoring
process enforced by the supercomputer managers.
The issue of treatment of PRC nationals as a COCOM
proscribed nation was raised by NSF. The group agreed
that the PRC question could be dealt with in a manner
consistent with COCOM guidelines.
After some discussion, the Under Secretary agreed that
this issue should be considered along with that of
Issue V -- consultations with the academic community.
It was agreed that a team, led by the State Department
and including all those involved in the international
negotiations (plus NSF), would visit several
universities to consult with the academic community on
this question. The baseline proposal presented to
thelacademic community would be the "no access" policy,
with a view towards entering into a dialogue with
them. He said that the SIG/TT would revisit this issue
in September after the team visits.
Issue III: Should NSF funded and controlled supercomputer
centers be treated as US Govenment owned and operated
computers (regime discussed in Issue I) or as private
computers (regime discussed in Issue II)?
Under Secretary Schneider said that the Supercomputer
Working Group recommended that these machines be placed
in the second category. NSF agreed, and the group
concurred.
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Issue IV: Voluntary Guidelines for Physical Security on
Supercomputer Facilities.
NSF said that they found all of the guidelines in the
options memo satisfactory with the exception of the
security measures on remote terminals. This was
impracticable given sheer numbers. NSF suggested that
better security should be put in front end computers.
The group accepted all other guidelines, and asked the
Supercomputer Working Group to re-think the remote
terminal issue.
Issue V: Consultations with the Academic Community
The group decided this issue in the context of Issue II.
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SIG TT - Supercomputers
Monday, August 12, 1985
3:00 p.m., Room 1105
William St?hnaidar Jr.
"CI.LLUL J, son
Stephen Bryen
George Menas
Al Trivelpiece
Carl Thorne
Don Ofte
Harry W. Porter
Roger Diehl
J. Michael Shepherd
Rick Cinquegrara
Douglas Norton
vaviC Wigg
Erich Bloch
Clifford Jacobs
John Moore
Arthur J. Kusinski
Dan Taft
Norine Noonan
John McTague
Ora Smith
Michael Marks
Pam Smith
Sherwood McGinnis
David Wilson
Robert Price
Dale Tahtinen
Jerry W. Leach
Ken Peoples
Ralph A. Hallenbeck
Dan Abbasi
Wang 74
Agency
State
CIA
CIA
DIA
DOC
DOD
DOD
DOE
DOE:DP
DOE:DP
FBI
FBI
Justice
Justice
NASA
NSA
NSA
NSC
NSF
NSF
NSF
NSF
OMB
OMB
OSTP
OSTP
State
State
State
State
State
State:EB/ITC
State:PM
State:PM
State:PM
State:PM/STA
377-5491
697-9347
694-4625
252-5430
252-2112
252-2179
324-4646
324-4646
633-4604
633-5604
453-8458
395-5607
357-7748
357-9695
357-9427
357-9445
395-3285
395-3534
395-3961
395-5052
632-8071
632-8724
632-0533
632-1421
632-0964
632-1625
632-5097
632-1236
632-0440
632-5097
25X1
25X1
25X1
orlyl
'25X1
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
x
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
x
16
NIO &
17
C/TTIC
x
18
19
20
21
22
Remarks
To 15: Per DDCI, Julian ill nd this
mtg as the principal with as the
"plus-one ES has calle n e names.,--,
rU7nve,)ecr-eTo--ry
Aug 85
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SECRET
Senior Interagency Group No. 23
United States Department tae
Washington, D.C. 20520 RC
'j ry %
August 7, 1985
Commerce -
Mrs. Helen Robbins
Defense - COL David Brown
Energy -
Mr.
William Vitale
FBI -
Mr.
James Geer
Justice -
Mr.
Stephen Galebach
NASA -
Mr.
Kenneth Pedersen
NSA -
OMB -
Mr.
Alton Keel
OSTP -
Dr.
George Keyworth
NSC -
Mr.
William Martin
NSF -
Dr.
Bodo Bartocha
SUBJECT: Announcement of a Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the SIG on Transfer of Strategic
Technology
207/2
The SIG/TT Executive Committee will meet on Monday, August
12, 1985, at 3:00 p.m. in Room 1105 at the State Department.
The issue for the meeting will be the question of domestic
safeguards on supercomputers. Attached you will find an
options paper which has been prepared by the Supercomputer
Working Group.
Attendance is principal plus one. We respectfully request
that only principals sit at the table. Please telephone the
names of your participants to Jerry Leach (6325097) or Kristen
Johnson (632-5104) by COB Friday, August 9.
~r~r Nicholas Pl41tt
executive Secretary
Attachments:
- Policy Options Paper on Domestic
Safeguards for Supercomputers
SECRET
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United States Department of State
Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science and Technology
Washington, D.C. 20520
August 6, 1985
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
TO: SIG Members Represented Qn the Supercomputer
Working Group
FROM: William Schneider, Jr.
SUBJECT: SIG Executive Committee Meeting on Domestic
Supercomputer Policy
Monday. August 12, 1985
Room 1105 - 3:00 p.m.
Over the last few months, the Supercomputer Working
Group (SWG) has been meeting to discuss options for a
domestic supercomputers safeguards policy that achieves
"functional equivalency" with the international regime that
is in place with Japan and the FRG.* Based on the work of
the SWG, it is now necessary to make several policy
decisions so that the we can proceed with a domestic
safeguards program. For this reason, I am calling a SIG
meeting for Monday, August 12, to focus on some of the
available options that have been identified by the SWG.
I. National Security Concerns About Supercomputers
Supercomputers, though general purpose in nature, can
be used for highly sensitive national security applications,
e.g.; nuclear weapons design and testing, anti-submarine
warfare, and will be critical to the development of the
Strategic Defense Initiative, including directed-energy
weapons. Consequently, the United States Government has
placed special restrictions on the sale of supercomputers
overseas under the authority of the Export Administration
Act, prohibiting these very sophisticated machines from
being sent to any COCOM proscribed country. These
restrictions had the following goals:
1. To assure a supercomputer is not acquired by any COCOM
proscribed country.
2. To assure that COCOM proscribed nationals will not
have access to supercomputer production technology.
*The existance of this regime is not generally known, and
should be treated as classified information.
SECRET
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3. To assure that COCOM proscribed nationals cannot
access to or use of Western supercomputers in order to
gain insight on supercomputer technology or to perform
military or intelligence related work that could not
be performed on a lesser machine.
There seems to be agreement that illigitimate use of
U.S. supercomputers for production work on direct military
or intelligence applications will be unlikely if COCOM
proscribed nationals have reason to believe that work they
might do will be monitored. Without some form of
monitoring, however, they might risk supercomputer access
where they were unable to do certain things of great
military importance without a supercomputer, and the risk of
detection was low. Due to the lack of any policy to the
contrary, COCOM proscribed nation scientists in the past
have been allowed hundreds of hours on U.S. supercomputers
-- more than enough time, some contend, for significant work
on things of immediate military or intelligence importance
to have been done.
There are 109 U.S. origin supercomputers in the world
(excluding the supercomputers at the Department of Defense),
sixty-five of which are located in the United States. Of
these sixty-five, six are located at U.S. universities and
twenty-nine are located at U.S. Government installations.
The remaining thirty are owned and operated by the private
sector. Most of the private sector machines are used
exclusively by the owner, but two of the private sector
machines are time-leased to any customer. In addition to
the installed supercomputers, the National Science
Foundation will fund four new supercomputer centers at
Princeton, University of Illinois (Urbana Champaign),
University of California (San Diego) and Cornell.
II. Policy Background
In a SIG meeting on March 16, 1984, it was decided that
we would seek an agreement with the Japanese (the only other
manufacturer of supercomputers) to prevent the utilization
and acquisition of or access to supercomputer technology by
COCOM proscribed nationals. It seemed to be futile to
restrict access to supercomputers if COCOM proscribed
nationals could gain substantial knowledge about
supercomputers, or perhaps even run programs with military
applications, through the use of supercomputers located
outside their borders.
We were successful in our discussions with the
Japanese. They agreed with us to condition foreign sales
with a "no access for COCOM proscribed nationals" clause.
It should be noted that under this agreed regime all exports
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of supercomputers are conditioned with controls on access by
all COCOM proscribed nationals. This includes PRC
nationals. Nevertheless, because of the continuing
liberalization in our relations with China, the SWG expects
to revisit this issue for the purpose of whether to make any
further recommendations to the SIG.
When asked about the lack of any domestic "no access"
policy, U.S. negotiators responded that we had this matter
under review, and planned to take some action in the near
future. Furthermore, we told them that it was our intent to
construct a national security package to deal with this
problem, including both domestic and international elements.
At the last SIG meeting on May 8, we floated a draft
national policy on use of or access to domestic
supercomputers (Tab 1). Our view was that it made sense to
restrict access to U.S. government owned machines first, and
then to consider how to control COCOM proscribed access to
other machines located in the U.S. It was pointed out that
this was not as simple as it might appear, in that the
National Science Foundation was funding new supercomputer
centers at U.S. universities.
The SWG has discussed options for restricting access.
The SWG believes that formal consultations with academia and
the private sector will be helpful in formulating a USG
policy, but feels that it needs further guidance of the SIG
before it can speak with one voice in discussion options
with these groups. The SWG has requested the SIG to decide
what options should be selected for presentation during
these consultations as the draft USG policy.
ISSUES FOR DECISION
Issue I:
Category I - - USG Owned & Operated Supercomputers
Should the U.S. Government apply a strict "no access"
rule to supercomputers owned and operated by U.S.
Government agencies?
Pros -- This would be a necessary step in conforming
the international regime in place to the U.S.
context and would be the minimum necessary to
demonstrate our intent to deny access to COCOM
proscribed nationals.
-- Without this minimum step, it will be difficult
at best to maintain our partnership with Japan
SECRET
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and Germany concerning this issue and to
continue to ensure that uniform safeguards are
attached to all internal sales of
supercomputers.
Cons -- There might be the desire on the part of U.S.
Government Agencies to permit access to COCOM
proscribed nationals for the release of
unclassified information, in keeping with the
intent of existing bilateral agreements.
-- When the academic community learns of a USG
decision to uniquivically deny access to USG
owned and operated supercomputers, they may
regard this a prejudicial to the outcome ofthe
regime that might apply to other
supercomputers, including theirs.
Category II -- Privately Owned & Operated Supercomuters
The U.S. Government should restrict and/or deny access
to COCOM proscribed nationals to universities and
private sector supercomputers through:
Option 1 -- Strict "no access" by uses of the visa
process through straight denials or amendments to the
visa.
Pros -- This would conform with actions taken by the
Japanese as a result of the international
regime and would be totally consistent with
conditions being placed on all international
sales.
-- It would demonstrate our serious intent not to
allow loopholes in our domestic safeguard
system for supercomputers and serve as a role
model for importing governments to follow.
-- This approach is consistent with the goals of
our policy under the Export Administration Act.
-- This approach would provide the greatest screen
of protection against COCOM proscribed access
to U.S. supercomputers.
-- This approach would be enforced by the U.S.
Government rather than the academic and
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business communities and would not encumber
them with the bureaucratic difficulties of a
"indirect access" system (Option 3).
-- We expect that the approximate number of
affected individuals would be small.
Cons -- It may stimulate new, tougher restrictions on
U.S. scientists working in COCOM proscribed
countries.
-- While it will certainly make access for COCOM
proscribed operatives much more difficult, it
may not be 100% effective.
-- A move to restrict access would effectively cut
off a portion of our S&T cooperation with the
COCOM proscribed nations. The policy would
prevent their scientists from running programs
on benign scientific projects.
-- Some in the academic community will regard this
policy as a restriction on scientific and
academic freedoms.
-- This approach will involve a greater effort by
the INS and FBI to monitor the limited core
group that might attempt to access
supercomputers, especially through time sharing
service center operations where the customer is
less well known compared with situations
existing in the university center.
Option 2 -- Option 1 (no access) with some exceptions,
as determined by the USG, on a case-by-case basis.
Pros -- This would provide a general policy of "no
access", while allowing some exceptions
desirable to the academic community and agreed
to by the U.S. Government.
Cons -- While presumably providing less access than in
Option 3 below, this approach would have the
same drawbacks as with Option 3 concerning its
affect on the international regime.
-- The USG would become involved in reviewing of
cases for approval, which could create
bureaucratic strains for the USG as well as
unhappiness in the academic and business
communities.
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-- Supercomputer centers would be encumbered with
many of the same bureaucratic and enforcement
requirements as in option 3.
Option 3 -- Indirect Access for COCOM proscribed
nationals for certain well defined cases. (A draft
plan for such a regime is attached at Tab 2).
Pros -- Permits access for COCOM proscribed nationals
working on basic scientific projects, with
subject matter that presents no national
security threat, and therefore permits the
continuation of certain joint S&T work.
-- Through screening of COCOM proscribed
nationals' programs, the academic/business
community (and hopefully the USG) would have
greater knowledge of program content.
-- Some sectors of the U.S. academic community may
find this flexible policy more acceptable.
Cons -- Creates a very complicated bureaucratic
structure through which access would be
granted.
-- There would be a greater possibility of
diversion for malicious use than with a "no
access" policy.
-- Almost certainly would place the burden of
access decisions and enforcement on the
shoulders of the supercomputer center managers,
which we assume would make them uncomfortable.
-- Supercomputer centers would have to deal with
remote access to the supercomputer, which would
make enforcement even more difficult.
-- If indirect access was readily available to
COCOM proscibed nationals in the U.S., it would
be impossible to continue to impose full
restrictions on U.S. international sales.
Option 1: No access
Option 2: No access with some limited exceptions
Option 3: Indirect access
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Issue III
Should NSF funded and controlled supercomputer centers
be treated as US Government owned and operated
computers (regime discussed in issue 1) or as private
computers (regime discussed in issue 2).
The SWG recommends, in order to prevent dual systems of
control for University Supercomputers Centers, that NSF
affiliated machines be included within Category II, under
whatever option is agreed to.
Category I Category II
Regardless of what options are chosen, the SWG
recommends certain immediately available minimal safeguards
be applied by non-Government Agency owned Supercomputer
Centers on a voluntary basis. This step is consistent with
the international regime in place, and helps to bring us one
step closer to a functional equivilant of the international
regime. This would be accomplished through periodic USG
briefings for all supercomputer owners and managers. The
proposed measures include:
a. physical security of the computer, peripheral
equipment, software, and on-site terminals;
b. physical security of all remote terminals; and
c. control of usage by means of passwords for all
users, compartmented access categories and other
procedures.
Yes No
The SWG recommends that based on SIG guidance a small
team led by State begin discussions with the academic
community as soon as possible in order to come to an agreed
domestic safeguard program.
Yes No
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NATIONAL POLICY
['OR PROH1131TING ACCESS
13Y NON-RESIDENT ALIENS OF PROSCRIBED COUNTRIES
'"O U.S. GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED SUPERCOMPUTERS
SECTION I - SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
1. This policy prohibits the acquisition, access or use
of U.S. Government owned or controlled supercomputers by
non-resident aliens of COCOM-proscribed and other proscribed
matins;,. Supercomputers are extremely valuable tools in
nuclear weapons design and testing, advanced aerodynamic and
h:ydro'3yr.amic research, the development of directed-energy
we.ipor:s, and other militarily critical technologies. Such
c:rputers are known to be targeted by the Soviet military
research and development community and by the Soviet
Intelligence services.
SECTION II - POLICY
2. It is the policy of the Government of the United
States that non-resident aliens of COCOM-proscribed and other
proscribed nations be prohibited from acquiring, accessing or
using U.S. Government owned or controlled supercomputers. To
effect this policy, the following security measures should be
implemented:
a. Computer center security against theft or unauthorized
use of hardware and software;
b. Appropriate checks to ensure that access to the
computer center will'be limited to authorized persons;
c. Password or ID protocols for access by any users
d. No passwords or IDs issued to any non-resident aliens
of COCOM-proscribed or other proscribed nations;
e. No conscious or direct ties to the networks of
COCOM-proscribed or other proscri=o:cribednations,
or otter proscribed
whose subscribers include COCOM-p
nationst and
f. Appropriate monitoring of computer usage.
DRAFT
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;:, ~..~?Ic~N i II - krSL'ONSIPII.ITIF:S
4. 1f14! ht-ads Of Federrl departments, agencies and
ions :,re responsible for prohibiting the acquisition.
;,ccons or use by non-resident aliens of COCOM-proscribed and
othor proscribed nations of supercomputers owned or controlled
by :