UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 23, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
23 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Chairman
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (U)
REFERENCE: A. Memo to DCI dtd 10 Jul 85, Subj: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
B. C/SECOM memo dtd 18 Apr 85, Subj: Talking Points
for NSPG
1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum updates reference A
(attached) and forwards a printout from the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis
Center's leak register. (C)
2. Reference B (attached) provided talking points for NSPG discussion of
unauthorized disclosures along with several examples of specific leaks to show
the relationship between leaks and the damage or risk they caused. Amore
Tf1D CF~RFT
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23 July 1985
Prepared by: SECOM~
Distribution:
Copy 1 DCI, w/att
Copy DDCI, w/o att 3
Copy 3 - D/ICS, w/att
Copy 4 - DD/ICS, w/o att 3
Copy 5 - ER, w/o att 3
Copy 6 - ICS Registry, w/o att 3
Copy 7 - SECOM Chrono, w/o att 3
Copy 8 - SECOM Subject, w/att
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-190
10 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Chairman
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum responds to EA/DCI
requirement for information for OCI use in an NSPG on leaks.
2. Discussion: The 29 November 1984 memorandum from the DCI to the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Attachment A)
provides an appropriate basis for an NSPG discussion on leaks. It represents
the consensus of the SIG/I and is available to Mr. McFarlane and the NSC
Staff. The leak situation has not changed dramatically since the memorandum
was written. The climate of public opinion about actions detrimental to the
national security, however, may be more favorable to doing something about
leaks of classified information.
3. The following comments are keyed to paragraph numbers in the
29 Nov 84 memo to Mr. McFarlane.
Para. 3 - Presidential leadership remains essential. He must obtain
the wholehearted personal support of his senior officials in this effort.
Para. 4 - An "up front" statement of the problem and the need for a
solution would defuse possible media charges of an illegal plumber-type
operation.
Para. 5 - Although a commission takes time, it may be the best way to
publicize the problem and generate public support of solutions.
Para. 6 - A meeting with media officials is unlikely to change
anybody's mind-set. The only value of such a meeting would lie in
maintaining an above-board posture. Media coverage could be expected to
emphasize negative aspects of anti-leak efforts.
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SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
Para. 7 - Control of disclosures is the most difficult problem--how
to require officials to coordinate before discussing classified
information with the media. Judge Webster's 29 Nov 84 memorandum
(Attachment B) points out that no one has the authority to disclose
classified information unless he has the authority to declassify it. It
also would require positive action and reporting on leaks by senior
officials. Accountability must be established before anything can be
done about unauthorized disclosures.
Para. 8 - Those responsible for protecting classified information
must be held accountable and appropriate sanctions enforced. This is the
root cause of leaks--no acceptance of responsibility and no need for
concern about penalties for violating responsibilities.-
Para. 9 - Cleared officials must be required to make their
revelations to the media on official government business a matter of
record. The public has a right to know what its employees say to the
press--especially if they are revealing classified information.
Para. 10 - Those who violate a requirement to make press contacts a
matter of record would be in violation of Administration policy and
liable to penalty for that.
Para. 11 - There is no reason to give the press unrestricted access
to areas or buildings which are closed to the public. A press pass need
not be a license to intrude upon sensitive activities or information.
Para. 12 - Officials being interviewed by the press should benefit
from expert advice on what is or is not classified.
Para. 13 - Not only must investigations be initiated more promptly,
they must be directed at determining the source of the leak. Current
efforts all too often seem to be intended to show (a) that dissemination
of the leaked information was too broad to permit successful investi-
gation and (b) that there is no evidence to prove the leak occurred in
the agency conducting the investigation. The SSCI Staff claims to have a
list of leak investigations which were terminated when they appeared to
be on the verge of identifying the leaker. While authorities for
investigations appear adequate, resources devoted to investigations
generally are meager and investigative efforts often seem to be
perfunctory.
Para. 14 - Leaking is a consensual crime known only to the leaker and
the leakee, in most cases. Use of the polygraph offers the most
eff ective, and in some cases the only, way to identify the leaker.
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SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
4. The problem of unauthorized disclosures transcends departmental
boundaries. Yet we continue to use an approach to the detection of leakers
that is almost wholly dependent upon the initiative of individual departments
and agencies. If all agencies cannot act with reasonable uniformity and vigor
to counteract the loss of classified information, a centrally managed approach
may be required. A senior level interagency review group to study media
interface and investigative procedures in each department or agency might
provide recommendations on how to achieve a government-wide approach to
remedying leaks of classified information.
Attachment:
A. Memo to Mr. McFarlane fm DCI dtd 29 Nov 84
B. Memo to OCI fm Judge Webster dtd 29 Nov 84
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' NOFORN
fie Oirrctor of Central intclligcncc
2 9 NOV 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Proposals for Consideration re Dealing with the
Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information
1. Following upon the NSPG meeting of 16 November, and ~ meeting
with the PFIAB on 19 November, in which the subject of leaks was a ma,~or
topic of discussion, I convened a special Senior Interagency Group
(Intelligence) (SIG-I) meeting on 20 November to discuss what steps might
be taken to deal with the situation; one that has clearly gotten out of
control.
2. During the SIG-I meeting there was a wide ranging discussion of
potential actions that might be taken in order to maintain security and
protect sources and methods. The paragraphs that follow set forth the
views of the SIG-I on specific steps that could be taken under eight
broad categories. These are provided for your consideration at a future
NSC/NSP G meeting.
Presidential Initiative
3. Char a to Senior Officials. The SIG-I agreed with Judge
Webster's proposa at t e res~ ent should make clear to his top
officials the importance of protecting classified information, charge
them with the responsibil ity for taking effective action to prevent any
such unauthorized disclosure, and require periodic reports from them on
steps taken and problems encountered. First, the President could use a
Cabinet meeting to make his views and expectations known. Subsequently,
at a meeting of all Presidential appointees (which he has tended to hold
annually), he could make clear what he has asked the Cabinet to do and
what he expects of everyone serving in his Adminstration.
4. Public Statement. A Presidential statement, in an appropriate
forum, sou a so a considered. Such a statement would focus on the
serious problems caused by the disclosure of classi~~fied information, the
actions directed by the President, and emphasize the fact that these
steps were taken, not with any intention to stifle the news media or
freedom of speech, but to ensure that those with a responsibility to
protect the nation's secrets and its sources and methods do so.
5. Presidential Commission. This, too, was discussed by the SIG-I
as a posse a way to ramat~ze further both the extent o f the problem and
the intention to deal with it. It could be achieved by appointing a
bipartisan blue ribbon panel to investigate the nature and effect of the
disclo w re of classified information, and report its findings to the
President.
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6. Conference with News Media Official s. Such a meeting, involving
the P rest ent an senior me ~a executives to solicit their cooperation in
protecting classified information, was discussed. The SIG-1 felt such a
step was risky, could back fire and lead to charges of Administration
attempts to sti fl a freedom o f the press; nevertheless, it i s an option.
Control o f D i scl osures
7. In spite of considerable discussion on the inherent difficulties
in dealing with the utterances of publ is officials, the SIG-I was in
agreement that some mandatory procedures are needed for. the coordination
of aRy public statement that might be based on, or contain, classified
information. General Stilwell advised that there is a procedure used by
Do0 in vetting proposed statements by OSD officials with the Intelligence
Community. At present, however, this procedure is neither well known nor
mandatory; nevertheless, it, or something like it, can provide the basis
for a P residential policy that the President can implement 8nd announce
to the Cabinet, making it both government-wide and mandatory.
8. It was also agreed that, concomitant with the establishment of
such a procedure, there must clearly stated, and well understood,
sanctions for noncompl fiance.
Media Relations
9. While acknowledging the need for government officials to talk to
the press, the SIG-I agreed that regulation of contacts between
government employees and the media is needed to help control unauthorized
disclosures. Since current regulatory requirements are extremely uneven
among departments and agencies, there was agreement with Judge Webster
that a common policy of recording media contacts and topics discussed
should be adopted. In doing so, however, it must be clear that such a
policy is directed at government employees, not the media.
10. Centralized Control of Press Contacts. Government-wide
regulations s ou a esta ~s a tat require personnel cleared for
classified intelligence to centrally record with their agencies all press
contacts, including dates and the identities of media representatives.
11. Press Access. The SIG-I, while recognizing that press access
varies among epartments and agencies, noted there is no reason for such
access to be greater than that afforded the general public.
12. Media Interviews. Another option considered by the SIG-I was to
have government emp oyees who are cleared for access to sensitive
intelligence obtain approval for media interviews in advance. When it is
anticipated that such interviews might involve or derive from classified
information, consideration should be given to having a knowledgable
public a ffairs or security officer present, and a record of the interview
maintained.
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Investigations
13. Initiation. The SIG-I agreed with Judge Webster that promptness
in initiat ng nvestigations of unauthorized disclosures is critical in
order to allow for immediate and vigorous investigation, whether it
results in prosecution or administrative action. Referral of cases to
the FBI oust be expedited. The delays engendered by internal
investigations by departments and agencies and by responding to Justice
Department inquiries on individual cases frequently allows months to
elapse. J udge Webster stressed that, in order to be effective, the FBI
investigation must be initiated approximately one week after the leak
occurs. An investigation should be conducted only when classified
information is identifiable in a news story. Existing authorities for
unauthorized disclowre investigations appear to be adequate.
14. P~oIY~aPh~. The SIG-I views the polygraph as a useful
investigativ oT in unauthorized disclowre cases. The use of the
polygraph, however, requires both firm policy guidelines and strict
operational procedures and oversight of examiner personnel. Further, it
should be used only in cases involving the most serious unauthorized
disclosures of classified information and/or intelligence sources and
methods, and its use should be confined to contacts and circumstances
relevant to that investigation. The purpose o fusing the poly graph is to
~~~de the investigation and to suggest areas for inquiry; it is not to be
t~ e~eterminant of guilt or innocence. Decisions regarding culpability
reside with appropriate officials who must consider all pertinent,
available information.
15. Anal tic Center. I have ordered the establishment of an
Unauthoriz sc owres Analysis Center in the DCI Security Committee.
Procurement of data processing equipment and establishment of reporting
channels has already begun. There was SIG-I agreement that the creation
of such a center to compile and analyze data on unauthorized disclosures
involving classified information would be o f great help to individual
departments and agencies in leak investigations. This facility will
compile up-to-date information on unauthorized disclosures, provide data
for use in conducting investigations and for raising awareness of the
scope and seriousness of the unauthorized disclowre problem, and assist
in early referral of investigations to appropriate departments and
agencies.
Legal
16. PFIAB Initiative. The SIG-I considered, and generally approved,
a PFIAB proposa tat, ~n selected cases involving the most serious risk
to our national security, diplomacy or sources and methods, a newsman who
publishes unauthorized disclosures of classified information should be
brought before a federal grand jury, given immunity and ordered to
identify the source of the classified information. The reporter and his
publisher would be fined daily until the source's identity is revealed.
The PFIAB proposal emphasizes that the target of the grand jury inquiry
is not the reporter or the media, but the cleared individual who has
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violated his written contract not to reveal classified information, q
novel feature o f the PFIAB proposal is that, rather than make a martyr of
the reporter by sending him to jail for contempt, it would impose a fine
on him and on the corporation employing him. Edward Bennett Williams and
Leo Cherne will brief the Attorney General on this proposal on
30 November.
Dissemination
17. Recent initiatives for administrative controls were endorsed by
the SIG-I for broader application. These include: ongoing review and
reduction of the dissemination of classified material; greater use of
"read and return" procedures;
sensitive AoCUrtIPntS_ ttrictar fnl l nv-un nn rnntrnl l pA material e? ~nA the
18. Need-to-know. The SIG-I recognized that adherence to the
need-to-know pr ncip a has apparently eroded; this could be revitalized
in the President's charge to his Cabinet and other appointees. An
intensive effort throughout the government is needed to enwre
understanding of the President's desire that the need-to-know principle
be enforced. The SIG-I also feels that there should be a specific
prohibition on the retention of classified material by former officials
who have le ft the government.
Education
19. The SIG-I agreed that a program o f intensified security
education is needed at all levels, emphasizing individual responsibility
and the potential damage rewlting from unauthorized disclosures. Every
medium available should be utilized, including live briefings,
videotapes. posters, etc. The effort to change the prevailing attitude
that leaks are a way of life must be strong, unrelenting and carefully
cra fled to emphasize the responsibility o f cleared people to keep the
secrets they have agreed to protect. The allocation o f significant
resources to this task is essential. The enthusiastic cooperation of all
departments and agencies in the program will be indispensable.
Legislation
20. The SIG-I agreed that, regardless of whether their purpose is to
aid a foreign power, individuals who publicly reveal classified
information should be subject to a law that makes their breach of trust a
criminal act. Congressional initiatives to develop such legislation
should be encouraged and supported.
Nil l iam J. Casey
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U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
November 29, 1984
Executive Registry
84 - 9822
Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.
Dear Bill:
Enclosed as you requested is suggested draft language
for inclusion in a list of proposals for controlling leaks as
developed at the SIG-I November 20, 1984, meeting. The con-
sensus was clear from the meeting that under the category of
Presidential initiatives, a speech without action would produce
very little except concerns and criticisc*_i from the press; that a
commission would take too long; that a meeting with the media
would likely be unproductive and misconstrued; and that the most
significant Presidential initiative would be for the President
to call in his own people and place specific responsibility on
them to take internal steps to deal with the problem. In that
vein, you asked me to prepare some suggested language, which you
will find enclosed.
Under the category of investigations, you included the
use of polygraphs. If that area is developed, I adopt Mary
Lawton's suggestion that rather than use the term "suspects"
we refer to "persons who are or who have become a logical focus"
for investigation.
Best regards,
Enclosure
Sincerely,
William H. Webster
Director
CT,eSS. ~ FYT. EY G__j -
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The President has promulgated NSDD-19 and NSDD-84 and
has personally conveyed his concerns to his Cabinet officers and
agency heads. To date this has not produced any serious internal
effort to control the unauthorized dissemination of classified
information.
To produce this needed specific effort, it is recommended
that the President personally place responsibility on his departmental
heads and key White House officials and direct each of them to
report to him in writing within a stated time period on what specific
measures have been implemented within the respective departments to
control the unauthorized outflow of classified information.
The personal responsibility of the department heads should be
underscored. It should be made clear that no one in the Administration
has authority to disclose classified information unless that person
also has the authority to declassify such information and makes an
appropriate record of his action. When violations occur, department
heads must insist upon immediate and full cooperation with the
Department of Justice.
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SECOM-D-190 (Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information)
Prepared by: SECOM 0 July 85
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee, w/atts
1 - DDCI, w/atts
1 - D/ICS via DD/ICS, w/atts
1 - ER, w/atts
1 - ICS Registry, w/atts
1 - SECOM Chrono, w/atts
1 - SECOM Subject, w/atts
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
18 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Talking Points for NSPG
Attached are proposed remarks for use by the DCI at the forthcoming
NSPG. There probably are more examples than are needed, to permit selection
of cases the DCI considers best.
Attachment: a/s
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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DCI REMARKS FOR NSPG
THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE NEWS MEDIA
IS A PROBLEM WHICH HAS PLAGUED THE LAST EIGHT ADMINISTRATIONS. THE SITUATION
SHOWS NO SIGNS OF IMPROVING, AND ACTUALLY GIVES EVERY INDICATION OF
DETERIORATING.
IF THE PROBLEM WERE EASY TO SOLVE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SOLVED LONG AGO.
IT IS, IN FACT, EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT, WITH IMPLICATIONS TO FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS AND THE GOVERNMENT'S BASIC FUNCTION OF PROVIDING FOR T`HE COMMON
DEFENSE. ANY EFFORT TO ENHANCE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WILL BE
ATTACKED IN THE PRESS AND POSES A SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL RISK.
NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACT NOW TO CORRECT A
SITUATION WHICH THREATENS THE VERY VIABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF
THE UNITED STATES. AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WHICH CANNOT MAINTAIN SECRECY
ABOUT ITS ACTIVITIES AND THE INFORMATION IT GATHERS FAILS TO MEET THE MOST
BASIC REQUISITE OF AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. I BELIEVE THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES ARE ABLE TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT, BUT THE BROAD DISSEMINATION OF
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS AND WIDE KNOWLEDGE OF OPERATIONS CREATE SECURITY
VULNERABILITIES THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED. OUR MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SECRETS
ARE EQUALLY VULNERABLE. WE ARE BEING DAMAGED BY GROSS AND WILLFUL
TRANSGRESSIONS OF A SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH IS VIOLATED WITH IMPUNITY.
WHY SHOULD ANYONE BE PENALIZED FOR LEAKING TO THE PRESS? IT'S A TIME
HONORED CUSTOM AND EVERYONE KNOWS THAT A FEW CLASSIFIED ITEMS CAST TO THE
MEDIA CAN RETURN GREAT BENEFITS TO THE CASTER. I'LL TELL YOU WHY--BECAUSE IT
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TELLS OUR ADVERSARIES WHAT WE KNOW AND HOW WE KNOW IT, PROVIDES THEM WITH WAYS
TO KEEP US FROM KNOWING MORE, AND PLACES THEM IN A POSITION TO DECEIVE US IN
OUR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EFFORTS. ALTHOUGH THE DIRECT CAUSE AND EFFECT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEAKS AND DAMAGE OR RISK OF DAMAGE IS RARELY OBVIOUS,
ONLY A HOPELESSLY NAIVE PERSON WOULD DENY IT EXISTS.
LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT SOME CASES WHERE THE LINK IS FAIRLY APPARENT.
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THIS LITANY OF LEAKS SHOULD BE ENOUGH TO CONVINCE MOST PEOPLE THAT
LEAKS CAUSE DEMAGE. WE APPEAR TO BE APPROACHING ANARCHY IN THE
WIDESPREAD DISREGARD OF SECURITY BY CLEARED PEOPLE. FORMER DCI JAMES
SCHLESINGER SAYS A BREAKDOWN OF DISCIPLINE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND IN OUR
SOCIETY AT LARGE UNDERLIES THE PROLIFERATION OF LEAKS. THERE ARE
INDICATIONS THE BREAKDOI~IN IS ACCELERATING.
IN WHAT MAY BE THE ONLY EFFORT TO DATE TO ESTABLISH THE NATURE AND
SCOPE OF THE LEAK PROBLEM, MY SECURITY COMMITTEE IDENTIFIED 285
PUBLICATIONS OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN 1978 AND 1983. THE
ANNUAL NUMBER OF DISCLOSURES ROSE FROM 43 TO 85 DURING THE FIVE YEAR
PERIOD AND THE NUMBER OF PUBLISHERS AND BROADCASTERS ENGAGED IN PRINTING
LEAKS ALSO INCREASED. THE ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN PUBLICATION OF A
CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND ITS PUBLICATION SHOWED A DECREASE.
SINCE OCTOBER 1983, MORE THAN 140 REPORTS OF INTELLIGENCE LEAKS HAVE
BEEN RECEIVED. THE PROBLEM IS NOT GOING AWAY.
THIS IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY AN INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH DAMAGE TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH LEAKS IS PROBABLY MORE SEVERE. THERE IS
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AN URGENT NEED TO RESCUE OUR SECURITY FROM THIS-CHAOTIC STATE AND
RESTORE RESPECT FOR OUR SYSTEM OF PROTECTING SECRETS.
THIS PROBLEM NEEDS A TOP-DOWN SOLUTION. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT
ISSUING NSDD'S AND PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS TO ALL FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HAVE NO
MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION. THE MOST COMMON BELIEF ABOUT LEAKS
IS, AS ADMIRAL INMAN RECENTLY TOLD THE PRESS, THAT LEAKS CAN BE DEALT
WITH "BY FIRING A FEW VERY SENIOR PEOPLE AT THE TOP OF GOVERNMENT, WHICH
IS WHERE THE BULK OF THE DAMAGING LEAKS OCCUR IN ANY CASE." ,
THE SIG/I RECOMMENDED IN NOVEMBER 1984 THAT THE PRESIDENT ADVISE
HIS CABINET AND OTHER TOP OFFICIALS THEY WILL BE HELD PERSONALLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR CLASSIFIED LEAKS TO THE PRESS AND REQUIRE REPORTS ON
THEIR POSITIVE EFFORTS TO COMBAT LEAKS. THE REASON WHY THE LEAK PROBLEM
HAS BECOME SO ACUTE IS THAT NOBODY FEELS OBLIGED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT
EXCEPT DECRY MEDIA IRRESPONSIBILITY. IF WE MEET OUR SECURITY RESPONSI-
BILITIES, WE WON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THE MEDIA.
FOR ADDITIONAL ACTION PROPOSALS ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES, I
REFER YOU TO THE SIG/I MEMORANDUM SENT TO THE NSC ON 29 NOVEMBER 1984.
A KEY FACTOR, IN MY OPINION, WOULD BE PASSAGE BY THE CONGRESS OF A
LAW CRIMINALIZING UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
USE OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT TO PROSECUTE LEAKERS IS LEGALLY FEASIBLE, BUT
IS UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATED. ENACTMENT OF A LAW PENALIZING CLEARED
INDIVIDUALS WHO FAIL TO MEET THEIR SECURITY OBLIGATIONS WOULD DRAMATIZE
THE WILL OF THE CONGRESS IN ADDITION TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S
25X1
rno c~rocT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8
DETERMINATION TO HALT THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF REVEALING VITAL SECRETS
FOR PERSONAL SATISFACTION.
IT IS CLEAR THAT A UNIFIED POSITION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES IS
NEEDED. UNLESS WE CAN DISPLAY THE WILL TO ACT DECISIVELY ON THIS ISSUE,
IT WILL CONTINUE TO POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8
18 April 1985
Pref~ared by: SECOM
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI, w/att
Copy 2 - DDCI, w/att
Copy 3 - D/ICS via DD/ICS, w/att
Copy 4 - ER, w/att
Copy 5 - ICS Registry, w/att
---Copy 6 - SECOM Chrono, w/att
Copy 1 - SECOM Subject, w/att
18 Apr 85 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400550007-8