SOME HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE AIRLIE HOUSE DISCUSSION ON DISINFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 123
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 12, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DOCUMENTS CROSS-REFERENCED
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CUNF NTIAL
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DOT- C2~~I J ,T
12 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence V
Director of Soviet Analysis
Senior Analyst for National Issues
Office of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation
1. Action required: None. This memorandum presents for
your information some preliminary results on the structure of
Soviet propaganda and disinformation, as gleaned from the first
several hundred pages of transcripts from the Airlie House
conference. We estimate that the transcription of the entire
proceedings, when completed, will comprise about 800 pages. In
addition, the 13 formal papers total almost 500 pages. As I
believe you are aware, we intend to synopsize the conference
proceedings in a conference report that will include the formal
papers. The State Department will publish and disseminate the
final product.
Ideology and Language
2. It was clear from the conference discussion that
Marxist-Leninist theory determines the semantic structure of
Soviet propaganda and disinformation. The Soviet world view
relates all human activities to world revolution. In Soviet
thinking, everything that promotes this process is good, right,
and true, while everything that hampers it is bad, wrong, and
false. The dichotomy between Soviet "socialism" and Western
"capitalism" results in numerous stereotypes in Soviet discourse
and rules out certain others. For example, "Soviet imperialism"
is literally nonsense in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology,
inasmuch as the term "imperialism" is defined as a particular
stage of capitalism. Therefore, to the extent that these terms
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CONF~I-(NTIAL
SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation
of reference are accepted by an audience, actual Soviet imperial
behavior is unthinkable, a contradiction in terms.
3. Two major campaigns in recent years illustrate how the
Soviet ideology sets the terms of international discourse. The
first is the so-called peace program, and the second is foreign
"nonintervention." Soviet socialism is, by definition of the
ideology, opposed to war and in favor of peace; only Western
capitalists and imperialists are "warmongers." Thus, to be for
the peace program means to be in favor of disarming the
warmongering opposition. Similarly, as socialists the Soviets
would never admit that they "intervene" in another country's
affairs--they have no such "insidious designs."
"Nonintervention" is a prescription applied to Western
capitalists and means that Western countries should undertake no
political or military resistance to the extension of communist
revolution.
4. As the above examples show, Soviet propaganda and
disinformation tend toward a stylized stereotyping, complete with
required epithets. The Soviet government is never said to have
"designs," which connote an insidious character and are
attributed to the US and the Pentagon. The Soviet regime, on the
contrary, always has "plans" which are "creative." In general,
these stereotypes and epithets have evolved out of the ideology
to connote an indisputable positiveness about Soviet life and an
indisputable negativeness about Western life. Interestingly, the
negative stereotypes applied to the West often have, in Russian,
an archaic flavor--perhaps reflecting the Soviet propagandists'
attempt to portray the western world as obsolete and subject to
being superseded by the next stage of history.
Semantic Tactics
5. The Soviets have developed a number of conscious and
consistently applied tactics in the use of language to give
ideological meaning to all concepts and strategies. Because the
Soviets believe that language and morality are inseparable--as
moral values are dependent on language for realization--they
engage in constant repetition of communist terms and constructs
in order to condition people's thinking and create feelings of
helplessness in the face of (what Soviets perceive and portray
as) communist moral superiority.
6. A related tactic that Soviet propagandists use is to
alternate individually weak arguments in rapid succession in the
hope that they will be convincing cumulatively. One example of
this would be the seemingly contradictory arguments about the
impermissibility of nuclear war and the winnability of nuclear
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation
war. The overall effect is to suggest that the Soviets view
nuclear war as morally impermissible but physically winnable--
once again, putting themselves on the side of the angels.
7. Similarly, the Soviets try to occupy the high ground
through an offensive tactic of occupying a position of principled
extremeness (the adversary is placed at the opposite extreme).
Thus, as the Soviets see themselves occupying the extreme-
principled left, the political word "left" must be placed in
quotation marks if it refers to an adversary of the Soviet Union.
8. Soviet propagandists try also to anticipate an
opposition's objections by framing their own plans in a way to
preempt the objections. For example, if greater party control
over scientific research is desired but expected to lead to
objections from scientists that this will deaden scientific
creativity, then the propagandist will anticipate the objection
and state that "tighter party control over scientific research is
the way to enhance creativity."
9. Another tactic is to try to discredit an adversary in
the very characteristic for which he is esteemed. Thus, Soviet
propagandists attacked Alexander Ginsburg, the trustee of the
Solzhensitzen Fund in the USSR, as a self-dealer and a wastrel,
although he was noted for selfless devotion to his trust and a
frugal way of life. The history of regime attacks on prominent
dissidents in recent years for allegedly self-seeking behavior is
replete with examples of this tactic. In the same way, because
the US has a worldwide reputation as a rich, free, and peaceful
country, Soviet propagandists try to discredit it as not rich but
either poor with millions of unemployed or profligate and
wasteful, not free but enthralled to this or that oppressor in
its society, and not peaceful but bellicose in its international
behavior.
Disinformation Ploys
10. A standard tactic in disinformation campaigns involves
the language of prejudice or self-deception. As an example of
prejudice, if an Asian or African politician becomes too pro-
Western, the Soviets will label him as a CIA agent. Although the
politician may protest the falsity of the label, a residue of
suspicion may remain (so the Soviets hope). In trying to taKe
advantage of self-deception, Soviet active measures play upon the
audience's political and cultural biases, sending messages it
wants to hear. An example of this might be a campaign to
convince the Indians that the CIA was trying to overthrow their
government. The campaign might be successful in India, although
a similar ploy could not succeed in, say, Canada, because the
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CONF I DENT IAL
SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation
historical experience of Canadians would tell them, "Nonsense,
the Americans would not do this."
11. Most propagandistic disinformation is an act of
opportunity intended to promote the long-term interests of the
Soviet Union. For example, the Soviets probably were not
concerned that their crude forgery of a Ku Klux Klan letter on
the Olympics was exposed, because it was not designed for US
audiences; rather, it would be likely to have Third World
audiences in mind, and a long-term psychological aim may have
been achieved.
12. Because active measures serve long-term Soviet
purposes, they must be carefully considered and prepared,
requiring considerable time in planning. Soviet propagandists
and disinformation specialists, however, can and do avail
themselves of arguments and debates that are openly aired inside
an adversary's society, replaying critical views in an effort to
justify Soviet positions to foreign and domestic audiences.
During the first few months after they shot down the Korean
airliner in 1983, for example, the Soviets collected stories from
the Western press that supported their claim that the plane was
on a spy mission. Then, for a few months before the first
anniversary of the shootdown, anticipating that it would be the
subject of renewed Western interest and attacks on the Soviet
Union, the regime started a disinformation campaign to claim that
the plane was destroyed by a bomb placed on the plane by the CIA
in order to destroy evidence of spying and cover tracks. This
follows a principle of Soviet rhetoric that parallels the Big Lie
and might be called the Bigger and Bigger Lie--trying to show
that what is good is growing better faster, and what is bad is
growing worse faster. This has been described as the "constant
crescendo."
13. The above highlights of the Airlie House conference,
which far from exhaust its findings, reveal the organic link
between Soviet ideological goals and their consistent, conscious
pursuit of a complexly structured, purposeful program of
propaganda and disinformation. Despite, however, the verbal
attachment to Marxism-Leninism and the use of what may be
perceived in the West as ludicrous stereotypes, Soviet
propagandists are capable of making rather crude adjustments to
the philosophy and argumentation in order to explain
discrepancies between theory and practice. In fact, all
participants agreed that a hallmark of Soviet propaganda and
disinformation is flexibility. This, of course, complicates even
more the task of analyzing an already complicated problem.
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation
Further work on this moving target is needed, involving more case
studies.
14. Attached are two raw transcripts from the conference
that deal thoughtfully with these issues in some depth and that
you may find particularly interesting. Both are based on formal
case studies. The first, at Attachment A, is a discussion of how
the Soviets have used disinformation in the arms control arena in
an attempt to gain advantages in negotiations with the West. The
second, at Attachment B, is an examination of the theme of war
danger, which has been used for decades--the danger being played
up or played down--both to cloud actual Soviet military
intentions and capabilities and, in some cases, to intimidate the
West.
Attachments:
A. Transcript concerning Soviet use of disinformation in
the arms control arena
B. Transcript concerning examination of the theme of war
danger
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Some Highlights From the Airlie House
Discussion on Disinformation
DDI/SOVA/NIG,
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (w/Attach)
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - D/SOVA
1 - NIG Chrono
(9 August 85)
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington.D.C.20505 I Executive Registry
85- 3123
5 August 1985
Dear Aaron,
It is remarkable how after over forty years you and I find our minds
running on the same track so frequently. I have been thinking about follow-
up on the disinformation conference. Leo was down here last week and talked
to me about his idea that we need today the modern counterpart of the old
Institute for Propaganda Analysis. We talked about how best to develop it.
We both agreed that you could make a major contribution. I said I would get
in touch with you to get your ideas. Then over the weekend reading a
follow-up report on the disinformation conference I found appended to it
your letter of 14 February to in which you suggest that the
purpose of the conference should be to lay the groundwork for a permanent
Center for Propaganda Research, paralleling the Institute for Propaganda
Analysis of the 1930s.
So, we are all on the same wavelength. Leo has already talked, I
believe, to Freedom House about it. He tells me that Leonard Sussman was
involved in the Institute for Propaganda Analysis back in the 1930s.
I'd like you to think about and perhaps talk to Leo about how we can
proceed from here. I have already talked to Bob Gates about how we can
contribute and he has some ideas. Sometime soon we should all get together
and figure out what needs to be done.
It is too bad you were not able to make the conference at Airlie House.
Your presence there was missed. We taped the proceedings and are working to
prepare a conference report that includes synopses of the numerous oral
presentations and discussions, as well as papers presented. We expect this
to be given broad dissemination by the State Department.
Wflliam J. Casey
1 -
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The Director of Central Intelligence
5 August 1985
Dear Colonel Sleeper,
Thank you for sending a copy of your book and for
your very interesting letter about the conference you
attended and the subject it addressed.
I think we need to have established somewhere in
the Free World an institute which would focus entirely
on the tactics and semantics of disinformation and
dissemination of analyses and conclusions. There was
an organization in New York in the late 30s called
The Institute for Propaganda Analysis that did this for
what we then called propaganda coming out of Nazi Germany.
I was interested in the book you are developing
on Soviet deception with General Schreiver. I attach
information, prospectus and outline of a book on a
conference on that subject which just crossed my desk.
I wish you well in both endeavors.
Attachments , ER 85-2814
Orig w/Atch - Addressee
1 w/o - DCI
1 w/o - ER File
,9-300
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY. CALIFORNIA 93943.5100
Honorable William Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. ~ 0.~0
The Honors -N Tiam Casey:
814
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NC4/56Pr
24 July 1985
Since 1979, I have headed an extensive research effort into
the theoretical and historical military dimensions of deception
and perceptions management at the Naval Postgraduate School.
An early product of that effort was a we] l received book edi ted
by Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, Strategic Military
Deception, published in 1982.
Since that time the research area has focused more
explicitly on problems of Soviet strategic deception and
perceptions management both in times of peace and war, thus
encompassing aspects of military as well as non-military
deception. The thrust of this research has been to go beyond the
theoretical exploration of deception to involve the policy-
relevant questions of Soviet deception efforts in all areas of
East-West interaction. The products of this effort will be
published later this Fall in a book entitled Soviet Strategic
Deception, edited by myself and Professor Brian Dailey. '
A conference or workshop will be held at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California on September 26-28,
1985. This conference will provide an opportunity for the
contributors to this book to present their research and findings,
and to promote discussion of- the implications of these findings
with other important and knowledgeable individuals inside and
outside of government. The conference is being jointly sponsored
by the Naval Postgraduate School and the Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution, and Peace.
We wou l d l i k e t o e x t e n d a c o r d i a l i nv i tat i on to you to
attend this important conference. We feel your participation
will be important to our success in this effort, and will
enhance the relevance and quality of the final product.
Hotel accommodations at the Monterey Sheraton, meals, and
air travel will be provided. We would appreciate it if you
could please notify the conference coordinator by 10 August
regarding your ability to attend.
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Leaderslu, p !Fattndation
PRESIDENT
MARTHA ROUNTREE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OLIVER M. PRESBREY
VICE PRESIDENTS
MRS. WILLIAM ARANGO
DAWN AURELL
MRS. LESTER L. WOFFORD. SR.
VICE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION
COL. RAYMOND S. SLEEPER, U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
NANCY KESHISHIAN
Fret wive Set retart
ROBERT ALT MANN
Treasurer
HUGO A. SEII.ER
Cummunirationt Director
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
MARTHA ROUNTREE
MRS. WILLIAM ARANGO
DAWN AURELI.
THE HON. HELEN D. BENTLEY
MRS CHARLES B. CLANCY
MRS REGINA H. MEREDITH
MRS. LESTER L. WOFFORD. SR.
ADVISORY BOARD
MR THEODORE H. AMSHOFF-. JR.
PROF. PEI R BECKMANN
THE HON LARRY BRADY
ADM. ARLEIGH A. BURKE, U.SN_ (Ret.)
CAP I. WINAFORD Q. COLLINS, U.S.N. (Ret.)
MRS. JOHN E. DURKOVIC
Fr. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM, U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
BRIG. GEN. CHARLES E. JONES, III
GEN. GEORGE KEEGAN. U.S. AT. (Ret.l
DR. WILLIAM KINTER
GEN. CURTIS E. LeMAY. U.S.AF. (Ret
THE HON. & MRS. JOHN D. LODGE
DR DAVID MARTIN
DR JAMES McCLELLAND
THE HON. ROBERT MORRIS
REAR ADM. WILLIAM C. MOTT, U.S.N. (Rel.)
THE HON. GEORGIA PETERSON
ADM. JAMES S. RUSSELL. U.S.N. (Ret.)
GEN. BERNARD SCHRIEVER. U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
DR FRED SINGER
MAJ GEN JOHN K. SINGLAUB. U.S.A (Rel.)
DR_ KURT STEHI.ING
THE HON. NORMAN B. TUBE
MAJ. GEN HAROLD E WATSON. U.S.A.F. (Rct.)
July 11, 1985
Mr. William Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
I want to thank you for the privilege
of attending the conference at Airlie House the
last week of June on Soviet disinformation,
propaganda, and active measures.
I commanded the United States Air Force
Foreign Technology Division and was Chief of
the Air Force Systems Command Foreign Technology
office (technical intelligence), from 1960 to
1967. I saw the tremendous rise of Soviet invest-
ment in missiles, space, air craft and all military
weapons systems. I also saw the beginning rise of
Soviet worldwide active measures operations.
Upon retirement in 1967 I started working
on the problem of translation of Marxist-Leninist
terminology into truthful English. The result
finally was a publication of "A Lexicon Of Marxist-
Leninist Semantics" which is a lexicon of Marxist-
Leninist concepts. These concepts as you well know,
have specific meaning to the Nomenklatura whereas
they have a very different, usually diametrically
opposite, meaning in the United States and in the
West, in general. I am convinced that we must
teach our intelligence officers, our diplomats,
our foreign service officers, our Voice of America
personnel, and even the average American what
these concepts are and what they mean.
Stalin wrote a little book called "The Word".
In this book he said that "the most important weapon
in my arsenal is the dictionary". Marxist-Leninist
leaders worldwide, are indoctrinated in these concepts
7945 Altac -lrthur Blvd., Cabin clohn, ibid. 20818
(301) 229 -8400
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r;:iitvo Regi2t
1659/1
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and use them to deceive their enemies. This Semantic deception penetrates
our education, penetrates our press and penetrates all of our media. The
"People's Democratic Republic. of Kampuchea" is a clear example. The Com-
munists killed some two million people in the name of democracy in Cambodia.
How preposterous!
Most people in the West still do not know the difference between
the "Republic of China" and "The People's Democratic Republic of China".
This type of confusion is perpetuated worldwide by our media.
Professor Libor Brom suggested at your conference that a transla-
tion facility be established to translate Marxist-Leninist terms into
simple English. This is a crucial suggestion. Such a service could
easily be established as an adjunct to the FIBIS or the JPRS activities.
Such a service could start at a fairly low level of activity with
a few people to translate basic Soviet publications such as Gobachev
speeches, lead stories in Pravda, lead stories in Moscow News, etc. These
translations should be made available to the leadership echelons in our
government but they should also be made available to the media, the
universities and the public at large. Properly marketed the service should
pay for itself.
There are a dozen or more "dictionaries", "lexicons", and similar
publications on interpreting Communeese language. It would be useful to
obtain the advice of a group of truly top level semanticists in establish-
ing this service. I'm thinking of men like Professor L.A. Richards of
Harvard, (probably deceased by now), Hayakaya--men or women of that stature
in the field of semantics.
Someone asked Solzenitsyn how to defeat communism and he replied
"tell the truth, tell the truth, tell the truth". When the U.S. Secretary
of State is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for engineering a "just peace",
(a Communist term for a peace favoring the growth of Communism), there is
a burning need for truth.
Your conference was well planned and well run. I sincerely hope
you will publish the minutes of the meeting.
But you dare not stop with the publication of the minutes. A follow-on
conference is needed to discuss "what can be done" about Soviet disinformation,
propaganda, and active measures.
Meanwhile, I am running a study developing a complete book on "Soviet
deception". General Bernard A. Schreiver is chairing the study. We would
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like to discuss this study with you or such persons as you may designate
if you find it of interest.
I have enclosed a copy of my book on Marxist-Leninist Semantics for
your personal library.
Congratulations again on giving this vital subject--Soviet decep-
tion methods--priority status in your busy schedule.
RSS/jeb
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I TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE. 25 Jul 1985
ROOM NO.
4E65 I BUILDING
Hq
im 241 w,$ YSEUSED.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Col. Raymond S. Sleeper, USAF (Ret.)
Vice President. Leadershin Foundation
Dear Col. Sleeper:
Thank you for your letter of July 11 with its positive
evaluation of the Airlie House conference on Soviet propa-
ganda and disinformation. Special thanks also for your
lexicon on Marxist-Leninist semantics. As you know from my
opening remarks at the conference, this subject has been a
particular concern of mine for some time, and the more
people who are made aware of the problem through efforts
like yours, the better for the health of our nation and the
West.
You have made several useful suggestions regarding what
can be done about Communist disinformation and deception.
You can rest assured that we are actively working on this
problem. One part of this effort is educational, so we are
indeed planning to issue a report on the conference and are
considering also a follow-on conference such as you
proposed.
As for the study that you and General Schreiver are
undertaking on Soviet deception--broadly conceived, I
assume--I can only applaud the effort. I would be pleased
if you were to contact my National Intelligence Officer for
Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities, Fred Hutchinson,
and discuss it with him. He can be reached on 351-6606.
Sincerely,
7`fl4n J. Casey
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
DDI-
"t 1 JUL 1985
STAT
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Letter to Col. Raymond S. Sleeper, Leadership Foundation
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - DDI Registry
1 - NI0/FDIA
1 - E0/SOVA
2 - D/SOVA
1 - SOVA/NIG Chrono
DDI/SOVA/NIG/
(25 Jul 85)
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Mr. William Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
PRESIDENT
MARTHA ROLNTREE
1659/1
Leadw5k1~0 ~FOttt2 A.t'WY(
July 11, 1985
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OLDER M PRESBREI
VICE PRESIDENTS
MRS WILLIAM ARAAGO
DAWN Al RELL
MRS (ESTER I WOFFORD. SR
VICE PRESIDENT.
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION
(Ol RA151O\DS Si EE PER. I S AF (Re:
\A\C5 KESHISHIA\
f-uuI.' Sn'nan
ROBERT ALTMANN
T rc,ucr.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
MARTHA ROl \T Rif
SIRS N IL 11AM ARA\GO
DA"% Al RELL
7HE HON HELEN D BENTLEY
MRS CHARLES B CLANCI
MRS REGI\A H MEREDITH
MRS (ESTER L NOFFORD. SR
ADVISORY BOARD
MR THEODORE H AA!'HOFF. JR
PROF PETR BECKM ANN
THE HO\ L ARR) RR A:?
ADM ARI SIGH A Bt RKF I S \ IRc!
C APT %I\AFORD 0 COLLI\S. L S IRc:
MRS IOH\ E DI RKO'?,C
! T GE\ DANIEL C:RAH AM. L S A F IRc:
BRIG GE\ CHAR'. F> E )O\ES. III
C E\ GEORGE Kit A? S A F RS:
DR MII LIAM KI\TER
E\ (I RTIS E LrS1 A~ i S A F Rc!
'HE HON 3 MRS JOHN D LODGE
:1K DA 1ID 161 AR7IN
DR JAMES McCLEi LAND
,HE HO\ ROBERT MORRIS
RF AR ADM V. ILLIAM C MOTT. I S \ (Re:
THE NO, GEORGIA PETERSON
ADM JAMES S RI SSE L1 I S \ RctI
(,E\ BERN ARE) SCHRIE\ ER. I'. S A F IRc:
DR FRED SI\GFR
MAJ GE\ JOH\ K SI\GI ALB. I S A (Re:
DR KIRT STEHLI\(,
THE HO\ \ORMA\ B TIRE
MAJ GE\ HAROID E NATSO\.C SAF IRc
Dear Mr. Casey:
I want to thank you for the privilege
of attending the conference at Airlie House the
last week of June on Soviet disinformation,
propaganda, and active measures.
I commanded the United States Air Force
Foreign Technology Division and was Chief of
the Air Force Systems Command Foreign Technology
office (technical intelligence), from 1960 to
1967. I saw the tremendous rise of Soviet invest-
ment in missiles, space, air craft and all military
weapons systems. I also saw the beginning rise of
Soviet worldwide active measures operations.
Upon retirement in 1967 I started working
on the problem of translation of Marxist-Leninist
terminology into truthful English. The result
finally was a publication of "A Lexicon Of Marxist-
Leninist Semantics" which is a lexicon of Marxist-
Leninist concepts. These concepts as you well know,
have specific meaning to the Nonenklatura whereas
they have a very different, usually diametrically
opposite, meaning in the United States and in the
West, in general. I am convinced that we must
teach our intelligence officers, our diplomats,
our foreign service officers, our Voice of America
personnel, and even the average American what
these concepts are and what they mean.
Exc:utive Registry
Stalin wrote a little book called "The Word".
In this book he said that "the most important weapon
in my arsenal is the dictionary". Marxist-Leninist
leaders worldwide, are indoctrinated in these concepts
7J45. .lac -' mrhur Blvd., Cabin c1ohn, JKd. 20818
[phone]
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and use them to deceive their enemies. This Semantic deception penetrates
our education, penetrates our press and penetrates all of our media. The
"People's Democratic Republic of Kampuchea" is a clear example. The Com-
munists killed some two million people in the name of democracy in Cambodia.
How preposterous!
Most people in the West still do not know the difference between
the "Republic of China" and "The People's Democratic Republic of China".
This type of confusion is perpetuated worldwide by our media.
Professor Libor Brom suggested at your conference that a transla-
tion facility be established to translate Marxist-Leninist terms into
simple English. This is a crucial suggestion. Such a service could
easily be established as an adjunct to the FIBIS or the JPRS activities.
Such a service could start at a fairly low level of activity with
a few people to translate basic Soviet publications such as Gobachev
speeches, lead stories in Pravda, lead stories in Moscow News, etc. These
translations should be made available to the leadership echelons in our
government but they should also be made available to the media, the
universities and the public at large. Properly marketed the service should
pay for itself.
There are a dozen or more "dictionaries", "lexicons", and similar
publications on interpreting Comnuneese language. It would be useful to
obtain the advice of a group of truly top level semanticists in establish-
ing this service. I'm thinking of men like Professor I.A. Richards of
Harvard, (probably deceased by now), Hayakaya--men or women of that stature
in the field of semantics.
Someone asked Solzenitsyn how to defeat communism and he replied
"tell the truth, tell the truth, tell the truth". When the U.S. Secretary
of State is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for engineering a "just peace",
(a Communist term for a peace favoring the growth of Communism), there is
a burning need for truth.
Your conference was well planned and well run. I sincerely hope
you will publish the minutes of the meeting.
But you dare not stop with the publication of the minutes. A follow-on
conference is needed to discuss "what can be done" about Soviet disinformation,
propaganda, and active measures.
Meanwhile, I am running a study developing a complete book on "Soviet
deception". General Bernard A. Schreiver is chairing the study. We would
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-3-
like to discuss this study with you or such persons as you may designate
if you find it of interest.
I have enclosed a copy of my book on Marxist-Leninist Semantics for
your personal library.
Congratulations again on giving this vital subject--Soviet decep-
tion methods--priority status in your busy schedule.
RSS/jeb
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I
P':IOR Pt E C: THIS SUBJECT: i' 0
PRIOR CC "S ``--ENT 1r
OTHER C0F".".E1;TS:
EXECUTIVE ?'ZE:=ISTRY FILE "!0:
[/ ~?"' -
i;f:CSS REF
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24 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Soviet Analysis
Senior Analyst for National Issues
Office of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference
1. Action required: None. This memorandum, which reports on the
outcome of the 25-27 June Conference on Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and
Disinformation (CSPD), is for information only.
Conference Results
2. In practical terms, the conference produced much new evidence on the
problem of disinformation, although not as much as hoped for, perhaps, on the
semantic dimension per se. Thirteen formal papers were prepared, and
approximately 21 hours of discussion exist on tape. Overall, the quality of
the papers, oral presentations, and general discussions is quite high--
probably the result of the participants' having been informed that some sort
of conference proceedings would be published. (How this will be accomplished
is discussed below.)
3. As you know, one of the primary purposes of the conference was to
highlight the problem that we face in recognizing disinformation's various
guises. In this regard, the conference was very successful. The academic
papers, especially the case studies, focused attention on specific
manifestations of the problem. This forced the audience, as well as the
authors, to identify and recognize various forms of disinformation. Perhaps
even more useful, however, was the testimony--sometimes written, but more
often off-the-cuff--of participating Soviet and East European defectors and
emigres, whose accounts of their "hands-on" experience helped considerably to
bring home the reality of disinformation's forms and techniques. In fact, the
conference was unique in bringing together such a large number of these ex-
Soviets with academics and government specialists. This compositional mix
produced a good exchange of views and experiences.
ADMINISTRATIVE-;,L USE ONLY
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SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference
4. At the same time, the conference produced no consensus on the need
for Western scholars to deal directly with the issue of disinformation in
their work. Indeed, the conference's final session reflected some marked
differences of view among academics on this score. Some argued the need not
only to examine closely the "ambiguity and contradictoriness" of Soviet
policy, but to take a "moral" position in doing so. Others, while recognizing
that disinformation is a significant factor in creating this "ambiguity and
contradictoriness," were clearly resistant to this notion, appearing to equate
a "moral" position with a "political" one.
5. These differences apparently reflected differing philosophical views
as outlined by Norman Podhoretz in his keynote address. on the causes of
Western vulnerability to semantic manipulation. Despite this, the
participants appeared to agree fully on the need for the government to
neutralize and counter Soviet disinformation--primarily through greater
efforts at consciousness-raising among the media and the public.
Follow-up Steps
6. In organizing the conference, we made clear that some sort of
publication would result, and without exception all the conference
participants strongly supported this intention. We have considered publishing
a simple compilation of the formal papers but decided that too much valuable
information and analysis--especially that provided by the defectors--would be
lost. We therefore are having the taped proceedings transcribed as quickly as
possible in order to prepare a conference report that includes synopses of the
numerous oral presentations and discussions. The report will be given broad
dissemination by the State Department.
7. A number of the conferees suggested that a list of participants would
be useful to keep each other informed and to involve each other in related
work as time passes. Some saw this as a first step in helping to create a
network of specialists interested in disinformation issues. Accordingly, we
have sent such a list (excluding the names of CIA staffers except me) to the
conference participants.
8. Another suggestion that many conferees made at the conference and in
subsequent correspondence was to have a follow-up conference examine possible
countermeasures. A small sample of this correspondence is attached (including
an earlier letter from Aaron Levenstein proposing the creation of a privately
funded Center for Propaganda Research).
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SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference
9. We have discussed the idea of a follow-on Conference with the
expressed some dou t that academics would have much to contribute to a serious
discussion of disinformation countermeasures. If an academic conference were
to be held, however, SOVA believes that it should be conducted under the
auspices of the State Department, as it would be likely to deal explicitly
with issues touching on domestic sensitivities.
Attachment:
As stated
3
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STAT
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SUBJECT: Follow-up to Disinformation Conference
DDI/SOVA/NIG (24 July 85)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - DDI Registry
1 - D/SOVA
1 - NIG Chrono
4
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
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Central Intelligence Agency
April 22, 1985
Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick
American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C 20036
7c6cutlvfl Registry
I'd like to take you up on the offer you made last year to
contribute to a conference on the semantics of Soviet
disinformation. We are in the final stages of organizing the
conference, making arrangements with academic specialists on
specific aspects of the problem, and expect to have a firm agenda
in a couple of weeks. But we can now say definitely that the
conference will be held June 25-27 at Airlie House.
Would you do me the honor of delivering the keynote address
on the evening of the 25th? It would follow an opening reception
at 5:30 and dinner at 6:30, with no other activity scheduled for
the evening, so you could speak at whatever length you felt
appropriate. I invite you also to join a panel of experts who
will evaluate the findings of the conference on the afternoon of
the 27th. Please let me know whether your schedule permits, and
if this proposal suits you I will put the conference coordinator
in touch with more specific details.
6-0
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12 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
.VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Soviet Analysis
Office of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Keynote Address at the Conference on
Semantics of Disinformation
1. Action requested: This memo asks for your approval of
the choice of Jeane Kirkpatrick as the keynote speaker at the
forthcoming disinformation conference. It is suggested that the
draft letter at
letter of invitation come from you (see
Attachment A) and that you introduce her at the conference.
2. Other persons who have been considered as the keynote
speaker include jean-Francois Revel, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and
William Bennett. The overriding considerations in putingance of
Kirkpatrick at the top of the list were, first, a good
intelligence, personal experience, and knowledge of the isssuys,
and second, her attraction in terms of media attention.
will recall, she expressed strong interest in contributing to
such a conference when she corresponded with you last year.
Under the circumstances it seems appropriate that you introduce
her as the keynote speaker at the conference, your
permitting.
3. For your information, the conference organization is
first-rate
proceeding well,
eak with
committed to speak
ENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Keynote Address at the Conference on
Semantics of Disinformation
indicating names of those who have already agreed to speak). We
hope to have firm commitments from all speakers within a couple
of weeks. At that time, we will provide you with the fullF--]
t the conference.
b
ou
program and other relevant details a
Attachments:
A. Draft letter of invitation
B. Revised agenda
CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: Keynote Address at the Conference on
Semantics of Disinformation
Director of Soviet Analysis Date
Deputy DMI rector foo , In Bence
JAL Wiliiuin J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
SOVA/NIG/SA (12 April 1985)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee and return to originator w/att.
1 - DCI, w/att.
1 - DDCI, w/att.
1 - EXDIR, w/att.
1 - ExReg., w/att.
1 - DDI, w/att
1 - D/SOVA, w/att.
1 - C/NIG, w/att.
1 - NIG/DPD, w/att. (for chrono)
CONFIDENTIAL
z a APR 1985
19 APR 1985
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A T T A C H M E N T A
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D R A F T
Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick
.American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C 20036
Dear Jeane:
I'd like to take you up on the offer you made last year to
contribute to a conference on the semantics of Soviet
disinformation. We are in the final stages of organizing the
conference, making arrangements with academic specialists on
specific aspects of the problem, and expect to have a firm agenda
in a couple of weeks. But we can now say definitely that the
conference will be held June 25-27 at Airlie House. Would you do
me the honor of delivering the keynote address on the evening of
the 25th? It would follow an opening reception at 5:30 and
dinner at 6:30, with no other activity scheduled for the evening,
so you could speak at whatever length you felt appropriate. I
invite you also to join a panel of experts who will evaluate the
findings of the conference on the afternoon of the 27th. Please
let me know whether your schedule permits, and if this proposal
suits you I will put the conference coordinator in touch with
more specific details.
William J. Casey
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A T T A C H M E N T B
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CONFERENCE
ON
'CONTEMPORARY SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION"
June 25, 1985
3:00 P.M.
5:30 P.M.
6:30 P.M.
7:30 P.M.
June 26, 1985
(8:00 A.M. -
12:00 Noon)
8:00 A.M.
9:00 A.M.
10:00 A.M.
--Agenda (Revised)--
Registration
Reception
Dinner
Keynote Address
Session I. The Semantics of Soviet Propaganda and
Disinformation: Themes and Goals
Roundtable: "The Lexicon of Soviet Propaganda:
Its Connotative Content"
--Moderator: James P. Scanlan,
Ohio State University
Panel: "The 0 erational Code the Politburo
Revisited: Soviet Ideology Today"
--paper: George Breslauer,
University of California, Berkeley
Panel: "The Soviet Approach to Discourse in
International Relations"
--paper, "Setting the General Terms of Reference":
Herbert J. Ellison, The Kennan Institute for
Advanced Russian Studies
--paper, "Dealing With Friendly Forces"
--paper, "Dealing with Adversarial Forces"
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June 26, 1985 (cont.)
(1:00 - Session II. Case Studies in Soviet Use of
5:15 P.M.) Propaganda and Disinformation
1:00 P.M. Colloquium: "Lessons From Soviet Historiography:
The Treatment of World War II"
--paper:
2:00 P.M. Colloquium: "The Soviet Defense Burden and the
Specter of War"
--paper: Myron Rush, Cornell University
(3:00 - Break
3:15 P.M.)
3:15 P.M. Colloquium: "The Peace Movement in Europe:
Manipulation of Popular Perceptions"
--paper: Gerhard Wettig, Federal Institute for
Eastern and International Studies (Koln, FRG)
4:15 P.M. Colloquium: "The Arms Control Arena: Target on
Policy Initiatives"
--paper: David Yost, Naval Post-Graduate School,
Monterey
6:30 P.M. Dinner
(8:00 - Workshop: Soviet Propaganda Mechanisms
10:00 P.M.)
8:00 P.M. Seminar A: "The Media"
Seminar B: "Diplomacy"
Seminar C: "Unofficial Relationships"
9:00 P.M. Plenary Session: Seminar Reports
June 27, 1985
(8:00 - Session II. Case Studies... (cont.)
9:00 A.M.)
8:00 A.M. Colloquium: "National Liberation Movements"
--paper: Roger Kane t, University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign
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June 27, 1985
(9:00 A.M. -
12:00 Noon)
9:00 A.M.
(1:00 -
3:15 P.M.)
1:00 P.M.
1:45 P.M.
2:30 P.M.
(3:30 -
5:00 P.M.)
3:30 P.M.
5:00 P.M.
(cont. )
Session III. Im act and Effectiveness of Soviet
Propaganda and Disinformation
Panel: "Coping With the Contradictions"
--paper, "Dissidence":
--paper, "Economic and Social Strains":
--paper, "Afghanistan":
Luncheon
Session III. Impact... (cont.)
Roundtable: "Moscow's View of Western
Vulnerability to Semantic Manipulation"
Roundtable: "Moscow's Assessment of Its Own
Performance"
Roundtable: "Vulnerabilities and Costs to the
Soviet System and People"
Session IV. Conference Findings
Panel: "Strengths and Weaknesses of Soviet Use of
Propaganda and Disinformation Against Western
National Security Interests"
Conference closes.
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4 February 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Acting Director of Soviet Analysis
Senior Analyst, Office of Soviet Analysis,
Policy Analysis Division
SUBJECT: Results of 24 January Consultation on
the Semantics of Disinformation
1. Action required: Attachment A to this information
memorandum presents for your approval a tentative agenda for our
planned conference on disinformation. At Attachment B is a
similar agenda, containing a first cut at identifying possible
speakers, for your comment.
2. Our consultation with outside scholars and State
Department officials helped to clarify the important substantive
issues for the proposed conference. The attached agenda
represents what the CIA members of the consultative group
distilled from the ideas raised at the meeting. We are sending
this draft agenda to our consultants for their comments and
suggestions on speakers for specific topics. (The group's
members are listed in Attachment C.)
3. It was clear from the outset that the notions variously
described as "semantic pollution," "disinformation," and
"propaganda rhetoric" added up to something everyone around the
table generally understood and agreed was important, but not to a
single concept the group could easily define. The group decided
to broaden the focus beyond "disinformation," because it failed
to encompass a whole range of important and related issues: how
messages impact on different target audiences and why Western
audiences are so susceptible to images introduced from the
outside and so inarticulate and slack in response; the linkage
between language and culture (how rhetoric reflects cultural
attitudes and modes of thinking); the historical dimension (how
values and meanings attached to words evolve); the international
relations context of propaganda; how the nature of modern
communications'affects the ways in which verbal warfare is waged
and perceptions are created and cultivated; and the important
underlying role of ideology. By the close of the meeting there
was general agreement that the proposed conference should span
25X1
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SUBJECT: Results of 24 January Consultation on the
Semantics of Disinformation
both the rhetoric of political discourse and the techniques of
disinformation. We also agreed that to be manageable and
coherent, it should focus on the Soviet Union--the main source of
the rhetoric and disinformation with which we are primarily
concerned.
4. Dr. Levenstein expressed the view that if the conference
is to have tangible impact it should result in policy guidelines
for effective counter-efforts. The consensus of the group,
however, was that a prescription for counteraction should be
reserved for follow-on deliberation and that the proposed
conference should pursue the first-step goals of heightening
awareness of the problem and elucidating its dimensions. That is
a tall order in itself.
5. The group settled tentatively on a title like
"Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation" and decided
that two days would be a reasonable length for the conference.
As Attachment A indicates, we envisage an introductory overview,
a discussion of the ideological framework, and a series of case
studies that would elucidate various aspects--the historical
dimension, the cultural and political contexts, the nature of the
Soviet propaganda apparatus, and the rhetorical techniques that
are brought into play--as well as a concluding assessment. The
case-study approach seems the best way to attack a problem so
resistant to precise definition. It was felt that speakers
should include Soviet emigres as well as Western scholars.
6. The audience probably should represent a range of
disciplines and professions, including journalists, former
negotiators, psychologists, semanticists, political scientists,
public opinion and marketing people, Kremlinologists, and
propaganda analysts. We recognize that more needs to be done in
introducing more specialized skills (semanticists, psychologists,
etc.) into the list of participants at Attachment B, and are
working on this.
7. We will soon be negotiating the administrative aspects
of co-sponsorship with the State Department. From a practical
point of view, we should probably allow 4-5 months for organizing
the composition of the conference and allowing speakers
sufficient time to research and prepare papers on their topics.
We also plan to put together a reading list in advance of the
conference to spur some thinking and enrich the discussion.
Meanwhile, we await your comments on the conference design and
composition.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Results of 24 January Consultation on the
Semantics of Disinformation
Attachments:
A. Tentative Agenda
B. Possible Speakers
C. Participants in 24 January 1985 Consultation
/s/ Wiiiiam J. Casey
z ~ ~s
Date
19 APR 1985
Director of Central Intelligence
(4 February 85)
Distribution:
SOVA/SA/
Addressee and return to originator w/att.
DCI, w/att.
DDCI, w/att.
EXDIR, w/att.
ExReg., w/att.
DDI, w/att (for chrono)
ADDI, w/att (for chrono)
DDI Reg., w/att.
D/SOVA, w/att
SOYA/PA (for chrono)
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ATTACHMENT A
Proposal for an Academic Conference
on
"Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation"
-- Tentative Agenda --
INTRODUCTION-- An overview of the nature and dimensions of the
problem
I. SEMANTICS AND IDEOLOGY: THEORETICAL APPROACHES
A. The Relationship of Semantics to Culture and Ideology
B. The Role of Semantics in Authoritarian and Democratic
Societies
C. The Soviet World-View as the Basis of Thought and
Action
II. SOVIET PROPAGANDA GOALS AND THEMES: APPLICATIONS
A. Updating The Operational Code of the Politburo: The
Durability of Soviet Ideology
B. The Molding of Soviet Self-Images
C. The Approach to Discourse in International Relations
1. The Concept of Diplomacy and Ideological Struggle
2. Dealing With Friendly Forces
3. Dealing With Adversarial Forces
D. The Lexicon of Soviet Propaganda: The Connotative
Content
III. THE ANATOMY OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA MECHANISMS
A. The Media
B. Diplomacy
C. Unofficial Relationships
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A. Lessons From Soviet Historiography: The Treatment of
World War II
B. The Peace Movement in Europe: Manipulation of Popular
Perceptions
C. The Arms Control Arena: Target on Policy Initiatives
D. "National Liberation Movements"
F. The Soviet "Defense Burden" and the Specter of War
V. IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS
A. How Moscow Rates Its Performance
B. How Moscow Copes With the Contradictions
1. Dissidence
2. Economic and Social Strains
3. Afghanistan
C. Vulnerabilities and Costs to the Soviet System and
People
ASSESSMENT -- Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Soviet use of propaganda and disinformation against
the West's national security interests.
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Proposal for an Academic Conference
on
"Contemporary Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation"
--Possible Speakers--
INTRODUCTION--An overview of the nature and dimensions of
the problem (1)
1. William J. Casey
2. Jeane Kirkpatrick
A. The Relationship of Semantics to Culture and Ideology (1)
1.
2.
B. The Role of Semantics in Authoritarian and Democratic
Societies (1)
1.
2.
C. The Soviet World-View as the Basis of Thought and Action
1.
2.
3.
4.
A. Updating The Operational Code of the Politburo: The
Durability of Soviet Ideology (1)
1.
2.
3.
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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B. The Molding of Soviet Self-Images (1)
1.
2.
3.
C. The Approach to Discourse in International Relations
1. The Concept of Diplomacy and Ideological Struggle (1)
1.
2.
3.
4.
2. Dealing With Allied Forces (1)
1.
2.
3. Dealing With Adversarial Forces (1)
1.
2.
D. The Lexicon of Soviet Propaganda: The Connotative Content
(3-4)
1.
2.
3.
4.
III. THE ANATOMY OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA MACHANISMS
A. The Media (3-4)
1.
2.
3.
4.
B. Diplomacy (3-4)
1.
2.
3.
C. Unofficial Relationships (3-4)
1.
2.
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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2. Economic and Social Strains (1)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
3. Afghanistan (1)
1.
2.
C. Vulnerabilities and Costs to the Soviet System and
People (1)
ASSESSMENT -- Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Soviet use of propaganda and disinformation against
the West's national security interests (3-4)
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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A. Lessons From Soviet Historiography: The Treatment of
1.
2.
3.
4.
(1)
B. The Peace Movement in Europe: Manipulation of Popular
Perceptions (1)
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Target on Policy Initiatives
D. "National Liberation Movements" (3-4)
1.
2.
3.
4.
(1)
E. The Soviet "Defense Burden" and the Specter of War (1)
1.
2.
A. How Moscow Rates Its Performance (1)
1.
2.
B. How Moscow Copes with the Contradictions
1. Dissidence (1)
1.
2.
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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CO ENTIAL
ATTACHMENT C
Participants in 24 January 1985 Consultation
Academic consultants:
State Department:
CRES/FICG
FBIS/AG
, SOVA/PA
SOVA/PA
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SUP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
I
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
16
D/SOVA/D
X
17
18
19
20
21
22
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CONTROL. N0.
CROS> REF:
PRIOR P;PEE',S ON T-iIS :.;U 1ECT: NO YES
Pf:IG`'. CO :RES SENT TO: -- --_--
OTC ER COi?'MEP!TS:_
EXLCI. i 1VE Rl 1S! ~~ -ILE "!0:
C., "have fought against pacifism as a program for the
revolutionary proletarian party. This is obvious. But
where, when, and who deny utilize of pacifists by this
party in order to demoralize the enemy, the bourgeoisie.
And the '72 book went on to comment, "This
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comment is of enormous significance in defining the tactics
of communist parties in the struggle for peace and
socialism," and or, and on.
In other words, Moscow's policy is not based on a
genuine desire to resolve differences but, rather, on the
manipulation of the emotions of people in the western
democracies. By building up its on nuclear arsenal, the
Soviet Union inspires fear about the future and the
expectation that people will attempt to release their
anxiety by demanding that their government do something to
end the arms race and reach an accommodation with Moscow.
I have a long quotation on that on page four.
I won't go through that. You can read it yourselves.
If the Soviet military buildup inspires fear,
though, it cannot, by itself, channel that fear in the
proper direction. For that a peace offensive is necessary,
since, quote, "The political and propaganda significance
of Soviet proposals and peace initiatives is indisputable."
That's an important article from Eshaya (?) this year. He's
not talking about the stabilizing effects or something like
that. It's the political and propaganda significance of
these peace proposals.
In the words of Boris Kanymayrov (?), "The cause
of peace requires an approach from both ends, from above,
through diplomatic efforts by peace-loving states, and
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from below, from a mass anti-war movement." It is in this
context that Brezhnev's soeech to the 24th Party Congress,
the arms control proposals that flowed from it must be
judged.
I now want to go through some of the history of
the various important negotiations and arms control
initiatives, beginning with strategic offensive arms. The
Soviets have attempted to claim that they want an agreement
on MIRVs, multiple, independently-targetable, re-entry
vehicles. A statement to this effect was made in "New
Times" in 1979. One can understand why they like to claim
that, since it is generally agree now that MIRVs are highly
destabilizing and we'd like to get away from them.
Yet, despite this claim, the record indicates
that it was the United States and not the Soviet Union
that first tabled a proposal on limiting MIRVs, at SALT.
According to John Newhouse's account called "DORN", quote,
"The Russians never mentioned MIRV themselves. When in
April, 1970 the US proposed a total ban on MIRVs, along
with on-site inspection, the Soviets promptly rejected
it. Instead, Moscow proposed that testing of MIRVs should
be permitted, but deployment and production should be
prohibited. This proposal was not regarded as serious, for
in the absence of on-site inspection MIRVs can be produced
and deployed secretly, after they have been tested."
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Shortly after the United States rejected Moscow's
counter-offer, the Soviets indicated to the American
delegation that they were not seriously interested in
including MIRVs in SALT I. As the chief US (Soviet?)
negotiator, Vladimir Simyonev (?) told our chief
negotiator, Gerard Smith, and Smith recounts this in his
memoirs, "On June 9, 1970, Simyonev privately questioned
whether reductions in MIRV control would not be premature
and complicate an initial agreement. Was he suggesting that
a first agreement omit a MIRV ban or reductions? He seemed
to think so and mentioned the difficulty of MIRV
verification. He remarked that, quote, 'Both sides had
spoken about MIRVs', unquote, in a way that implied our
duty had now been done. It seemed clear that the Soviet
preference was for a limited initial agreement riot banning
MIRVs. Soviet officials commented to this effect."
In short, far from taking the initiative on
prohibiting MIRVs, the Soviets, by their negotiating
behavior, indicated a desire to see MIRVs deployed. And
one can understand why.
The same is true of Cruise missiles. Although
they have made a big fuss about that since we had a
breakthrough on Cruise missiles in the mid-1970s, it should
be recognized, according to Paul Nitze's testimony in
1972, quote, "It was then, in SALT I, our position, the
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US position, that Cruise missiles should also be
included in the SALT I Treaty. The Soviets objected to
the inclusion of Cruise missiles." Ray Gartoff (?) has
also confirmed that.
But perhaps the most outrageous misrepresentation
of the strategic arms negotiation occurred last year. In
an interview on the "Today Show" on September 10th, 1984,
Marshal Sergei Arkonayev (?), newly-appointed chief of the
General Staff, told his American audience that, quote,
"The US delegation in START insisted on leaving aside,
outside the framework of the negotiations, US strategic
bombers," unooute, because the US did not want to limit
itself in an area in whicd hit had an advantage. This was
a flagrant lie. As Arkonayev undoubtedly was aware, a year
earlier the United States had proposed to limit its bombers
in exchange for limits on Soviet land-based ballistic
missiles, the area of Moscow's greatest advantage.
This "tradeoff proposal", as it's been called,
was promptly rejected by the Soviet Union. In the words
of Pravda which, of all places, first revealed the
existence of the American offer, "In putting forward
one-sided offers that are to the advantage of the United
States with regard to both ballistic missiles and bombers,
Washington is cynically offering to exchange the Soviet
advantage in missiles for the American superiority in
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bombers. That is an empty gesture. After all, what is
in question is nothing other than an offer to write off
B-52 bombers that are mothballed in the reserve and are,
in any case, already objectively liable to replacement.
And, in exchange, the Soviet Union would have to reduce
its modern ICBMs that are deployed in positions. That may
be cunningly conceived, but it is designed for fools."
In short, whereas Arkonayev accused the United
States of -- on American television, yet -- of being
unwilling to consider limitations on bombers, because of
its advantage in this area, in fact the United States
did propose to limit bombers, but the USSR rejected the
proposal because it considered its new ICBMs too good to
trade for old American bombers.
Arkonayev's aggregious distortion of the
negotiating record is, in my opinion, an outstanding example
of official Soviet disinformation.
Turning to the INF talks, there are three
instances of disinformation that I select. The first I
just took right out of The Economist of Land, which cited
a paper, a Soviet paper, presented by General Chervov ('?) of
the Soviet General Staff in 1981, claiming that NATO
possessed 1,031 delivery systems, INF systems, against
1,055 for the Pact, thereby alleging some sort of parity.
Among the distortions noted by The Economist,
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the Soviets included American F-4s but not Soviet
fighter-bombers with equal or greater range. They included
Pershing I missiles but not their own longer-range missiles,
and so on and so forth.
After correcting for these and other errors,
The Economist concluded that NATO had 864 INF systems
against 2,441 for the Pact.
A second piece of disinformation involves the
range of the Pershing II missile. According to NATO
sources the P-2 has a range of 1,800 kilometers, which
means it cannot reach Moscow. This is important, because
the Soviets have claimed that the P-2 represents
decapitating ability, that it can, in five minutes,
decapitate the Soviet leadership. In order to do that it
has to reach Moscow.
Evidently realizing the political advantages to
be gained from attributing such range to the P-2, Soviet
spokesmen increased its range so it could cover Moscow.
Defense Minister Ustinov himself claiming in July, 1981
these missiles had a range of 2,500 kilometers. It appears
that Soviet specialists do not believe thsi figure, because
in the professional journal, "Foreign Military Review",
which is used to describe western weapons systems to
Soviet officers, in October, 981, that is, after Ustinov' s
remark, the range of the Pershing II is accurately reported,
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1,800 kilometers.
But perhaps the most serious example of Soviet
disinformation, however, concerns the proposal to reduce
the number of Soviet warheads and missiles so they would
equal the British and French totals. This involves
confusing the M-I-R-V warheads, on the SS-20s, with the
M-R-V warheads on the British Polaris missiles. This
inequity was pointed out by Alexander Bc'lvina (?), a Soviet
journalist, in a 1983 visit to Greece.
"The SS-20s have three warheads," Bolvina said.
"The French missiles have one warhead. The British
Polaris missiles have three warheads, but all destined
for one target. They are not aimed at multiple targets
at the same time, and in this sense we agree that for each
of our missiles the other side should have three."
Intrigued by Bolvina's offer, Paul Nitre, US
Chief Negotiator, pursued the matter at the INF talks. His
efforts met with no success. Moscow told him that they
had no intention of making such large reductions in their
missile force.
Thus, unless Bolvina was speaking completely
without authorization, his remarks must be regarded as an
exercise in disinformation, designed to affect the
political situation in Greece. At the very least, by
acknowledging the unfairness of the official Soviet
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he exposed the Kremlin's manipulation of popular ignorance
concerning technical military matters.
MBFR: The problem with MBFR has been the
data-base problem, disagreements about the size of Warsaw
Pact forces. The point of dispute apparently concerns the
status of some Pact support troops. In the words of a
Soviet spokesman -- I won't quote the words here, they're
on page 13 -- but evidently they have everybody in uniform
and we have some contractors who aren't in uniform that do
the services that their people in uniform do and it's
unfair to count their people in uniform in the totals.
This was stated in 979.
This explanation, however, contradicts the
assurances given by the Soviet government in 1976, when it
first revealed its totals. According to TASS, the Soviet
government, quote, "presented figures concerning the total
numerical strength of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact."
Thus, the Soviet statements are at odds with each other,
despite official claims that the original figures comprised
the total strength of the Pact forces. They evidently did
not, judging from the subsequent explanation.
When challenged on the discrepancy, the Pact
effectively confessed that its original figures were
incomplete. But in explaining the reason for the
discrepancy they neglected to mention its earlier
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assurance. Presumably Pact officials, forced to make the
best of a bad situation, simply hoped their NATO counter-
parts could prove to have short memories. With this kind
of an attitude it's not surprising these negotiations have
made such little progress.
On strategic defense, it is well known that the
Soviets are complaining about the US strategic defense
program. What is not as well known is that they were
talking, before the President's March, 1983 speech, of
"Protecting the rear from aerial attack is becoming one
of the most important tasks of war," The Director of
Soviet Civil Defense, General Alexander Altunin (?),
wrote in 1980. "The modern means and methods of armed
conflict have produced an urgent need for creating a
system which would ensure protection of the rear from the
air over our country's entire territory."
Indeed, even while they criticized the US
program, Soviet spokesmen take it for granted that the
Soviet government should try to protect its own people
against nuclear attack. "To save just one percent of the
Soviet population would mean to save just 3 million people,
Lev Someko (?), military affairs specialist, explained
just last year. "No one in this country would understand
the government if it failed to strive for this."
Anxious to stop the American program, Soviet
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officials initially insisted strategic defense was so
important it had to be discussed by itself. And American
efforts to link discussion of defensive with offensive
weapons were condemned in uncompromising language.
To cite Sorneko again, quote, "Space is an
independent problem, and to link the question of preventing
its militarization to the question of nuclear armaments is a
red herring and a waste of time." The United States stood
firm, however, and the Soviet government yielded, agreeing
in January, 1585, to conduct negotiations on offensive and
defensive weapons simultaneously in one negotiating forum.
Not being ones to bear a grudge, or one suspects, expose a
retreat, Soviet spokesmen promptly reversed field and
explained that, quote, "It was only as a result of
persistent hard work by the Soviet side that the US
delegation finally had to adopt the viewpoint that questions
relating to space and nuclear armaments are inseparable
and must be discussed and solved together." (Laughs.)
No first use: This has been a very popular
Soviet proposal, no first use of nuclear weapons. Three
comments on that. First of all, their position is based
on a misrepresentation of NATO policy. They argue that
since NATO does not adopt a policy of no first use, it
intends to use nuclear weapons first.
On the contrary, NATO has no desire to use
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nuclear weapons early or first, but recognizing that
uncertainty about the chances of success restrains military
aggression, it refuses to make the job of an attacker
easier by limiting its options.
This leads to the second point. The Soviets are
seeking a legal bar to the initiation of aggression, if
that's the purpose of "no first use", that already exists
in the UN Charter. As a signatory of the Charter, the
United States has already pledged not to use any weapons,
including nuclear weapons, first.
When confronted on this point, however, Soviet
spokesmen are unimpressed. In the words of a Soviet
journalist, "Let us look at everything through the eyes
of the unsophisticated, or as you say here, the man in the
street. Here you have two powerful military/political
groupings, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The UN Charter is
just a charter, whereas if the custodians of military
strength in the West and the East sign a non-aggression
treaty, this commitment would acquire an entirely new
quality, would it not?"
In other words, the Soviet proposal is designed
entirely for propaganda purposes, not to diminish the risk
of war, but to influence the perception of the man in the
street. This brings into question the sincerity of the
Soviet pledge, especially if the importance of the Charter
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can be so casually dismissed.
These doubts are reinforced by Soviet military
publications that appeared following the promulgation of
the "no first use" pledge. Some of these materials make no
acknowledoement of the "no first use" pledge, but to cite
one which appeared several months after the pledge was
given, quote, "At the present time the course and sometimes
the outcome of the meeting engagement will depend to a
great degree on which of the sides delivers the nuclear
strike first. Consequently, timely maneuver by nuclear
means is the basis of maneuver in the meeting engagement."
I find that difficult to reconcile with the
doctrine of "no first use".
In conclusion I'd like to quote Josef Stalin,
who once said, "With a diplomat words must diverge from
acts. What kind of diplomat would he otherwise be?
Words are one thine and acts something different. Good
words are masks for bad deeds. A sincere diplomat would
equal dry water, wooden iron."
You can find these same things coming out in
Soviet publications today, although not as bluntly. Soviet
diplomatic proposals are replete with calls for peaceful
co-existence, et cetera.
But to quote one recent publication, "The
striving for peace, detente, and disarmament are not
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abstract appeals, but purposeful, practical, steps of the
Communist Party, combined with strengthening the state' s
"
economic and defense might.
This was hardly the common western understanding
of striving for peace, detente, and disarmament, but -- I'm
quoting a Soviet academic now -- "In view of the keen
political and ideological struggle in the world today, it is
important to remember that when two classes say one and the
same thing, it is not one and the same thing," and that
quote could be the theme of our conference.
Such purposeful semantic confusion is complemented
by outright deception and distortion. Gerhard Wettig
mentioned that disarmament is the ideal socialism
quotation. I give two examples of how it's been abused
by Gromyko and Chernenko. Chernenko did it very recently,
shortly before he died, in a letter to a Canadian student,
and I give on pace Si the full quotation from Lenin on
disarmament as the ideal socialism, in which he says, "To
put disarmament in the program is tantamount to making a
general declaration, 'We are opposed to the use of arms.'
There is as little Marxism in this as there would be if
we were to say, 'We are opposed to violence.'" In other
words, disarmament is the ideal socialism but it can come
only after the victory of the communist revolution in the
western democracies. Until then the task of disarmament
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and arms control is subordinate to the task of triumphing
in this global struggle.
Thus, despite the rhetoric about the value of
disarmament, the Soviets reject this course as a path to
peace. "In merciless polemics with bourgeois pacifists
and social democratic dogmatists," declared an article in
"World Economy and International Relations" i n 1983,
"V.I. Lenin demonstrated that the one true path of
struggle against war is an upsurge of the revolutioary
movement and the victory of the socialist revolution."
The message to the magazine's Soviet readership could not
have been clearer. Anyone who believes that arms control
and political reconciliation, rather than revolution, are
the way to peace, is not a communist, but a member of the
bourgeoisie.
The implications of such a warning do riot require
elaboration, and the fate of Sakharov and other independent
peace advocates testify to the seriousness of the Kremlin's
purpose. It is clear, therefore, that Moscow's arms control
policy is based on a double standard, encouraging peace
movements in the West to out pressure on their governments
to make concessions, while suppressing any independent
peace movements in their own country.
To charges that such a strategy is unfair, the
Soviets are likely to respond that fairness is a function
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of class positions. Quote, "The ruling classes of the
bourgeois states are unable to accept as a norm of
international law the socialist conception of fairness,"
a Soviet legal scholar has observed, "for the same reasons
the socialist states are unable to accept the bourgeois
conceptions of fairness."
In assessing Soviet arms control initiatives we
should do well to keep this interpretation of fairness in
mind.
MR. SEABURY: Thank you very much, Stan. A
very interesting paper.
Our next commentator is David Yost from the
Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California.
MR. YOST: Thak yo. I'd like to begin by
praising Stan's paper for its many virtues. If you net a
chance to read it you'll find out it's very clearly and
concisely written, based on excellent original sources,
and it has a wonderful insight to space ratio. He pets a
lot of insight into a small amount of space. He has a
perceptive framework, a thesis to illustrate, and he
illustrates it with several solid examples.
Arid his conclusions really can't be faulted. The
Soviets do see arms control activities as instruments to be
used, along with others, to achieve Soviet world hegemony,
or as they would put it, "world peace through the worldwide
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triumph of Soviet-directed communism". Thank goodness,
however, Stan did leave me a coule of nits to pick, a
couple of grounds for nit-picking.
With regard to MBFR, for example -- I know this
is a dangerous topic to bring up at this time of the day,
and everyone's feeling sleepy, but the situation's a little
more complex than the paper implies. It is absolutely true
that one of the principal obstacles to an MBFR agreement is
the data problem, the East-West disagreement as to the
number of Warsaw Pact forces within the guidelines area.
It is also true that the Soviets have regularly claimed
for nearly a decade now that there is approximate East-West
parity in the guidelines area, and they have hinted that
the West is mistakenly assuming high levels of manning in
Warsaw Pact units or in the quotation that is in the paper,
that soldiers in support functions are being unfairly
counted.
But these rationalizations or excuses, whatever
you want to call them, that the Soviets have proffered to us
really do not explain the East-West disagreement on numbers
of Warsaw Pact troops. The disagreement is on the order of
(END OF TAPE SIDE 7. BEGIN SIDE 8.)
-- moreover, this misrepresentation is fundamental
to the basic Soviet deception in MBFR. That is, the Soviet
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agreement, in quotes, "in principle", to parity and the
verification of parity, this agreement in principle is
deceptive in that the Soviets have steadfastly- resisted, for
almost 12 years now, the asymmetrical reductions that would
be necessary to reach parity, and because they have also
rejected the associated measures that would be necessary to
verify the reductions to parity and their maintenance.
And so it all reminds you of one of thoses cases
that Bismarck noted in dealing with the Russians, "If they
apree in principle, you know they have no intention of
doing it in practice."
Now, another nit-pick concerns INF,
intermediate-rance nuclear forces. The paper points out
correctly that one of the major Soviet misrepresentations
during the 1979-83 INF affair was to claim that approximate
parity in INF numbers already existed in Europe, and that
the Soviets based this claim on force counts that excluded
Soviet delivery systems comparable to the US systems that
were included.
But, this is my nit-pick, there are much better
sources on-.this than The Economist item that is cited.
Above all, there is Gerhard Wettig's classic article in
Ausenpolitick (?), "The Soviet INF Data Critically
Reviewed".
Moreover, The Economist item cited and this
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paper, I'm sorry to say, play the Soviet game by making it
a NATO-Warsaw Pact INF comparison, when it is a US-Soviet
negotiation at issue. This relates to my other nit-pick
about INF, the Soviet attempt to count British and French
forces with those of the United States.
The paper is absolutely correct, that this ploy
was, to quote it, "Perhaps the most serious example of
Soviet disinformation in the INF affair." But the reason
given, that the Soviets equated three warhead MIRVed
SS-20s with single warhead French SLBMs and IRBMs, and
British SLBMs with MRVs, really misses the point. It
misses the important political point. The political point
is that the Soviets were able to use the British and
French forces as an argument in their favor. They were
able to make many people think that the Soviet Union
deserved compensation from the United States for the
existence of the British and French forces. They made the
United States seem unfair in refusing to go along with this.
They made Britain and France look like the obstacles to an
arms control agreement. And they did succeed. This can
be documented. The SPD and its party congresses, beginning
in 1982, the Greek Socialist Party, Pasoc (?), and several
other West European political groupings adopted the Soviet
position and said that the US, British and French
governments were wrong.
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The Soviet argument is really fraudulent-on nine
grounds of a political and strategic nature. Before
everyone faints, let me reassure that I'm not going to go
into -- (laughter) -- all nine of the reasons, but if you're
interested I can tell you sometime. They're rather
fundamental reasons. For example, the fact is that the
United States does not control British and French forces,
the United States has no operational release authority
over them. The fact is that the British and French forces
can only protect Britain and France, if they can even do
that, and they certainly cannot be used to threaten limited
nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union nor can they be
used to offer a nuclear guarantee to non-nuclear countries
in Europe.
My final nitpick about the paper concerns the
recurrent theme of Soviet insincerity. The paper keeps
telling us that the Soviets are deceitful and most of the
proofs consist of one Soviet spokesman contradicting
what another Soviet spokesman has said about Soviet
intentions. Obviously, one set of Soviet statements is
regarded as more truthful than another set. And I generally
agree with Stan's judgments as to which ones come closer to
the truth. However, I think the paper could have placed
more emphasis on the Soviet arms control proposals that
are amazingly sincere and candid and really very frank
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in their intent.
The best example of this, in my mind at least,
is the Soviet principle of equality and equal security.
The Soviets have made little effort to conceal that this
principle means that they think the Soviet Union should
be accorded the right to nuclear equality with the
combined arsenals of the United States, Britain; France
and China. This would, obviously, make the Soviet Union
superior to any of these countries in isolation.
I have no reason to doubt Soviet sincerity in
holding to this principle. (Laughter.) It's a very
Orwellian, "Animal Farm"-like definition of equality.
It turns out in the Soviet view, "Some nuclear powers
should be more equal than others."
I also believe that Andropov and Chernenko were
sincere in offering to negotiate the strategic nuclear
disarmament of Britain and France. They said that they
would be willing to do this on a missile-for-missile
basis. For each British and French missile dismantled,
the Soviet Union would dismantle one until they had
reached what the Soviets called, "a bilateral zero option.
(Laughter.)
Now you may say, perhaps you're cynical that
this would leave Britain and France with zero and the
Soviet Union still heavily armed with nuclear weapons.
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But the fact of Soviet sincerity remains. I believe they
would be prepared to carry out this proposal. (Laughter.)
Now I'll go even further. Tass said that
Britain's complete nuclear disarmament and the removal
of relevant foreign bases would create conditions in which
the Soviet Union would guarantee that its nuclear weapons
would not be trained on British territory. This may be
sincere. The Soviet Union could afford to offer such a
promise if all British nuclear capabilities were destroyed
and all US installations removed from Britain. If war
comes, the Soviets could then probably prefer to subjugate
Britain by conventional means.
This relates to Soviet proposals for nuclear
weapons free zones. Since 1980, the Soviets have been
reviving their expressions of interest in the idea of
nuclear weapons free zones in Europe, especially in
Scandinavia and the Balkans and they have made promises
not to use nuclear weapons against those countries, for-
bidding any deployments of nuclear weapons on their soil.
Once again, I think there's an element of
sincerity here, not only because the Soviets would like to
win without the risks and uncertainties associated with
operational use of nuclear weapons. They would also like to
gain the right to verify compliance by these new nuclear
weapons-free countries, but also because Soviet operational
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research calculations indicate that in mountainous areas
like Northern Norway, Greece and Turkey, the use of nuclear
weapons is very disadvantageous for the attacker. It slows
down the rate of advance even more than on normal terrain.
In the light of this principle that the Soviets
may sometimes be sincere, it might be wise to look again
at what is in the paper about the Soviet no-first-use of
nuclear weapons pledge.
The paper says that despite Brezhnev's pledge,
Soviet military literature still talks routinely about
the desirability of using nuclear weapons first. Therefore,
the paper concludes the Soviets are hypocrites and liars.
I would at least mention a more nuanced
interpretation. If we entertain the possibility that
the Soviets may be sincere, how could they reconcile
their military doctrine and the no-first-use pledge.
John Hines and Phillip Peterson have suggested
this logic. First of all, Soviet doctrine holds that the
Soviet armed forces must be prepared to fight and win both
with and without the use of nuclear weapons. Their doctrine
also recognizes the many risks, uncertainties and drawbacks
associated with using those weapons.
Those weapons can disrupt their own command and
control, create hazards and obstacles that slow down the
rate of advance and, to say nothing about contaminating
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what they're trying to conquer. In other words, their
doctrine does recognize the desirability of winning
without use of nuclear weapons if all nuclear use, that
is use on either side, can be avoided. But how can they
avoid all use of nuclear weapons? The answer, the
restraining effect of blackmail of Soviet nuclear strike
capabilities, of Soviet escalation dominance, if you like
that term. That may possibly dissuade the US from using
nuclear weapons. There are a number of Soviet statements
to the effect that Soviet nuclear strike capabilities may
neutralize US nuclear threats, that the US may not go
nuclear, for fear of Soviet retaliation. They may be
increasingly confident of an ability to deter our
deterrent.
On the other hand, the same doctrine tells us
that if the Soviets detect any enemy intention to use
nuclear weapons, they intend to beat the enemy to the
punch, as they put it, to forestall the enemy in using
nuclear weapons by pre-empting his use, because of the
advantages of going first, that the paper properly calls
attention to.
But this is not inconsistent with the Soviets
preferring to win without use of nuclear weapons and in
the Soviet mind, it's probably not inconsistent with their
no-first-use pledge because they play claim at least they
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would only be acting prudently on evidence of enemy
intentions to go first. However you resolve the question,
we can be sure that if the Soviets ever use nuclear weapons
they will claim that they were force to pre-empt by
Western action.
Let's assume the Soviets are sincere with their
own interpretation of their no-first-use pledge. What can
NATO do about it? They have put NATO into an uncomfortable
propaganda position because they have simultaneously put
NATO into a constrained strategic situation.
The West has become increasingly dependent on
nuclear threats that Western public opinion finds less
and less reassuring and so when they make a no-first-use
pledge, it's a way of underlining the diminishing consensus
behind NATO strategy in the West and, in fact, in addition
to underlining that consensus, it's a way of undermining
that consensus.
And so this is my conclusion, this is the main
lesson of Stan's paper. Although Americans and other
westerners tend to see arms control as somehow an
alternative to developing military strength, the Soviets
see arms control as a means to improve their own military
strength to move the correlation of forces further in
their direction. They work to make arms control the means
of competition, a means of eroding our security. We play
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into their hands if we assume that the Soviets see arms
control as we tend to as an enterprise for mutual benefit
and common security. They're exploiting the West's interest
in arms control to seize and maintain military advantage.
I don't know if I should give a couple more examples or
should call it to an end. What do you think, Mr. Chairman?
MR. SEABURY: You've got a couple of minutes.
MR. YOST: Okay. If you'll indulge me, I will.
I would say that they're doing this on two
levels. One level is the Gerhard Wettig level, what
he called the "government to government level," and
that is the actual treaty constraints negotiated with
governments and the other level is the level of process
and public opinion. On the level of treaty constraints,
let me give you an example from SALT I in 1972.
In SALT I, the Soviets were given the option,
which they exercise, of building almost 300 more SLBMs,
sea-launched ballistic missiles, than the United States
was allowed by SALT I. Now why did the United States
agree that the Soviets should have more missiles like that?
One of the reasons, according to Henry Kissinger
and other US negotiators, was that the Soviets stressed,
quote, "geographic assymetries," which the Soviets argued,
favored American submarines. They pointed out that the
United States has excellent warm-water ports, has easy
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access to the open ocean while the "poor old Soviet
Union" has to face a lot of ice, Soviet submarines have
a long way to go to get to the open ocean, and-the Americans
bought this argument. Kissinger, at least, used this
argument, made it public in helping to sell SALT I and
the assymetrical force levels allowed in that treaty.
However, the very next year, 1973, the Soviets
tested their main SLBM on the new Deltas and arranged 4,200
nautical miles and they then got it up to 4,900 nautical
miles range. This means they can launch these missiles in
port in Murmansk, Archangel and elsewhere and strike the
United States. So much for the "geographical assymetry
favoring the US.
Another example, and this is, again state-to-state
disinformation, is the definition of the heavy missile in
SALT I. This concerns ICBMs this time. Throughout the
negotiation, the Soviets consistently rebuffed American
attempts to define a heavy missile in writing. They kept
saying, "We all know what a heavy missile is. There's
no need to write down a definition. In the end, all the
United States got was a unilateral statement by the United :
States defining a heavy missile, which the Soviets were
under no obligation to observe and which they did not
observe and a very vaguely worded common understanding,
limiting increases in ICBM silo volume, and I quote the
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agreement, "to 10 to 15 percent of the present dimensions."
Now the Soviets interpreted this to mean they
could increase the size of their silos by 10 to 15 percent
in height and in diameter rather than in total volume. And
the result was a much greater increase than the US assumed
could happen. As a result, the Soviets now have
approximately 360 SS-19s in silos that were originally
much smaller. Each of those SS-19s is about the same size
as the MX and yet they're called "light ICBMs" by the -
Soviets, and appropriately so, because they are light and
yet the SS-18s have twice the throw weight. This enormous
Soviet ICBM force, about three times as many warheads on
ICBMs as the United States has, has made the US ICBM force
vulnerable to Soviet destruction.
This has happened despite the arms control process
in which the United States attempted persistently to educate
the Soviets about how destabilizing it was to threaten
retaliatory forces.
The Soviets were more persuaded by the unilateral
advantages of being able to limit damage to themselves by
being able to attack our forces than by US arms control
theory.
Finally, at the level of process, the arms control
process is a valuable instrument for the Soviets to the
extent that it can be used to undermine the Western will
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to compete in investments in military strength. **Yhe*
very existence of arms control negotiations raises
public expectations about non-competitive solutions.
As Mr. Bittman said this morning, people want
to believe in this message of reassurance. The existence
of negotiations promotes a belief in arms control as an
alternative to unilateral means of assuring security. It
makes the public think the Soviets have endorsed Western
concepts of security, has a depressant effect on Western
military programs and the process has this impact on
governments and on intelligence services, not only on the
informed public.
The existence of the SALT process helps to explain
why the US intelligence community, for most of the 1960s and
1970s, chronically underestimated Soviet force procurement
plans.
Well, I think my time has come to an end. Thank
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SESSION 1i
COLLUDUiUm: "THE SOVIET DEFENSE BURDEN
AND THE SPECTER OF WAR"
PAPER: CORNELL UNIVERSITY
COMMENTATOR: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
STAT
STAT
(Sneaker already in prcipress.)
-- war wasn't iminent. where I thin STAT
almost certainly he Knew otherwise. But I think he oid
sneak his true beliefs about the lono-terra cancer. Europe
faced a war that ievitably would involve the Soviet Union.
He stated this in an unpunished speech in 1952l and
repeated it publicly in 17. The problem for Soviet
security policy was to delay Soviet involvement as lonp as
then intervene in the war under the most favorable
possible.
circumstances for the Soviet Union.
In the 1930s. esceclally as several commentators
have noted just before me, especially between 139 arc 141,
there was a strc'nc o isparity between Stalin's public
downplay of the specific dancer of a German attack on the
Soviet Union, and his real fears of such an attack, fears
that let him to devote trerilencous resources to prepare for
the war, as several sneakers have just noted.
The effect of Stalin's public depreciation of the
war oanoer in those years was to deceive the Soviet :eonie
ant the Soviet Army tnat tnev were ta?-.en by surer .se weer!
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the Germans attacked. Once the war was over, in 146.
Stalin took credit for anticioatinc the war, and for
effectively orecarino for the war by develooino the
necessary economic cotent ial to suoocrt war, ano I believe
both claims have merit. There's no Guest i Dn that he was
responsible for the tremencous losses they suffered. But
1 thin, those two claims stano up. He did anticipate. over
the lonp term, a real danger of war. and he old try to
prepare for it by concentratinc on economic develooment,
and particularly the bevelooment of heavy industry.
In 146 Stalin offered a similar analysis of the
situation followino the war, and proposed a similar
stratecv to cope with Russia's security problem in the
?d. Both in 1946 and in 1952, Stalin scone
oost-war oeric
oublisly of the inevitably of war between the capitalist
states, nut not of the inevitable war acainst the. Soviet
Union. That is to say. Stalin imol i.cit v downpraded the
danger of war to the Soviet Union. He did this in '46.
he reoated it in 152. in The Economic Problems of
Socialism". I think this was the line. Of course. he
didn't Dive major speeches in between. But I think this
really was the line that he established for the oust-war
period.
And early inc the Cold War, Zudunov (?) mace
this point exolicitly, oownpradinp the dancer of war to
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the Soviet Union. Here I'm cuc+t inc. Tnis is from his
speech to the Cc+minform in 1947. "All the hullaballoo of
the imperialist acents about the danoer of war is desipne
to frighten the weak-nerved and unstable, and to extort
concessions to the a! aressc'rs by means of int imicat ion. "
anti ncint+ to anticipate a little nit what comes later, to
say that tn: is really a perfect description of the
Soviet scare carr+paipn and the war danger that developed in
the early 1980s.
but he clearly was dc+wr+eradinp the danoer of an
attack on the Soviet Union during the Cold War and this
accords with Stalin's implicit estimates.
Though the aim of the public assessment of the
war c!aneer, dciwncradino it, clearly was desipned to ci iet
the fears of the Soviet people who had, of course, lust
suffered the terrible war with tremenoc+Lts losses, put I
think it also corresponded to Stalin's real assessment of
the war cancer. I think, in his own mind, he dc,wnDraoed
tnat danoer.
1 don't think we can understand Stalin's actions
in the Cold War. in Eastern Europe. in Korea, in the Berlin
blockade. unless we suooose that he thc+uoht the danoer of
war really was very slight. Otherwise such actions really
would have been unacceptably risky. when the United States
hac the nuclear bomb and the potential to develop strategic
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forces to employ acairist the Soviet Union.
To sum up on Stalin, he rnanioulated the specter,
of war. publicly exaoceratinc the threat in the early years.
in the twenties, when he must have known it to be remote,
and downcradina the likelihood of a German attack on the
Soviet Union in the 1930s. when it manifestly was high,
and even in 1941, wnen war was irninent. By t yen Stalin's
power was so Great that ne had no need to justify to the
Politburo or to the public a raoidly prc'wino defense
burden.
in the Cold War also. Stalin's vast oersonal
mower enabled him to impose a massive defense burden on
the country, even while publicly downdradina the war
danger.
in the Cold War, however, unlike the ore-war
years, Stalin truly downcraded the risk of war.
The post-Stalin lea.dersnio initially lackec
Stalin's confidence that trte war dancer could be
controlled. Hence, there was the early cc n sent ua l
decision to end the Korean War. which was cone. as you
remember. very shortly after Stalin's death.
Subsecuently Knruscnchev. in oarticular,
became confident that the war cancer could be controlled.
He denied, at the 20th Party Congress. Lenin's doctrine
on the inevitability off- war wile canitalisr,i existed, anc
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he evert spoke of the oossi.oility of exc.ludiri0 world war
from the life of society, while ca.oitalism still existec.
And. here again. I think this is suDDOrted with
his real beliefs. Khruschchev clearly behaved as though
the war dander was slight, anc controllable by the
Soviet Union. Otherwise, it would be iriincssible to
understand why he imoosed two Berlin crises and out the
missiles into Cuba. That action in oarticuiar represented,
I think, the heiqnt of conficence that the dancer of war
could be controlled by the Soviet Union. In that case. of
course. it involves accent ino a tremendous cef"'eat.
So, I thiny there was an accord in the -- under
r hruschcnev between his oownoradinp of the dander of war
in orocapanda and in doctrine, and his real beliefs about
the small danger of war.
In the early Eire: hnev period, oropacanda ana
political behavior, again, were in rc'uph accord. This was
at the time of the Vietnam War, when the Soviet leadership
Declared there was an increased dancer of the US-Soviet
military conflict. The dancer of war had increased.
Andl at the same time, tnev substantially
increased defense spendinq, as though they took this
dancer seriously.
However, with detente in the early seventies,
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bepinnine around 1974, a new disparity appeared between
Soviet ceclaratory doctrine on the reduced banner of war
and Soviet defense soendinc, which continue to rise as it
had from 165, from the period of the Vietnam War, at a
substantial rate. throuphc'ut the whale period of ce.ente.
in other words, the Soviet Union failed to
capitalize on the reduced war darner. to reduce tneir
mount inc defense burden. They chose, instead, to use
detente to improve the military balance with the United
States. That's part one. l hat' s my brief interoret ive
survey that carries us tnrouph the 1970s.
NOW I'd like to discuss the ascendencY of the war
dancer theme since 24 June MO.
Throuchout the 1970s, despite the dcwnwarc trend
in US-Soviet relations. the basic Soviet line was that
the dancer of war had been pushed pack. However, adverse
develooments after the Vienna summit of 079, iec to an
abanconment of this position.
June 24, 1980, the Central Committee met in
plenary session and adopted a resolution on the
international situation and Soviet foreicn policy. That.
of course, is the stereotype desienatiDn of the discussion
of tnat to:lic.
Hnd in that resolution they announced a chance
in the Soviet assessment of the war Canner anc instructed
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the Politburo to continue the General line adoptee at
the previous Congresses, the L4th and the 25th, every in
the chanoed circumstances, when US action haC riven rise
to an increase c-anper of war. The resolution caller for
vinilance and the strengthener defense caoabiilty.
The reasons given for the increased war dander
were basically two. The NATO bui 1 dum, oesignec to chance
the military oalance, and they specified particularly the
deol.ovment of the Euromissi les. Second, the rapprochement
of the Unites States and China, on an anti-Soviet basis.
This was the secono reason for the increased dancer of war.
Now. the second reason later was droomed, leaving
as the root cause of t +e increaser war daneer the Unites
States-NATO military buildup.
Now. there was -- desoite the enunciation of this
malor chance in Declaratory Doctrine. there clearly were
disacreements amonc the too leadership on the sionifi.cance
of this new doctrine on the war dancer. Sreznnev clearly
was reluctant. He tried to limit the consecuences f c.l iowin.a
from this chance of doctrine. And he clearly was trVinR
to maintain the lines of policy as he had established
them in the period of oetente, with some modifications.
Androoc uv. on the other hand, attemoted to draw
wider imolications from the chance of Doctrine. The
dander was acute. The worid was slidin^ towards_ toe
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brink of nuclear war. On one occasion he said it was
already at the brink, the United States nad pushed the
world to the brink of nuclear war.
There was a sense of urcency that he communicated,
in connection with the darner of war. The Politburo
o ivided. Androoov was suoocirted, after a time, by
Ustinov, and very strongly by Grornykc'. Brezhnev was
supocirtea by Tikhc'nov and Chernenko, his factional allies.
Despite these disacr?eements. the new thesis on tne
war carver oecame the key theme in foreicn orooacarida, and
pronouncement designed to frighten the western nations and
intimidate their ^overnments, particularly, of course, in
connection with the Euromissile deployment.
But it was not limited to foreign propaganda.
I t also served to fact i s gnat a the Soviet Army and to t e l l
ordinary Soviet citizens that there was a real canner of
war. The reed for sucn a domestic cerricai on was strikingly
asserted by Marshal Ucarkov, and I'll have to read the
Quote. It will be. 1 think, almost the only one.
This is in "Cc'mrnuniste Number 10", 1981, about
a year after the Centra; Committee resolution. It is
essential to convey to the Soviet oeoole in a more orofouno
and better-reasoned form the truth about the existin:
threat of the danoer of war. It shou:d not, of course,
be aver-dramatized. But it is oolicatorv to show the
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seriousness of the contemporary international situation.
This is a task not dust for the political organs and
political workers of the Army and Navy, but also for the
party and Soviet groans, all public cmpar.izatic'fs, and for
the entire prc'papafda apparatus. This task stems from the
oerr.ands of Lenin's party rer ardir.q the further strenc!thenirip
of the country' s defense.
Now, it is rare, in my experience unprecer ent ed,
for a professional military off3cer? to task the entire
orciDapanda aDDarat._(s, and Onarkov' s attempt to do SO may
reflect a concern tiat the Soviet people dc' not see the
need to prepare for war. or DernaDs na.rbor doubts that
such preDarat ions would" imDroVe the country's DrosDEcts
in the event of war.
Elements of the military may have pressed for
the new doctrine, although, of course. this was a decision
taker, by the Politburo. Certainly the military seized on
it for their particular purposes, to persuade servicemen
that war, in.deec, coula happen, to claim increased resources
for defense. And uoark.r'v bushed that very harp. To counter
laxity in Soviet society. Ano this also became a theme.
And finally, to prod the political leaders to cope
with the secular economic slowdown., which clearly had
lone-term implications for defense.
Now, the alms of the t':'reicln prc'pe.panda campaipr.
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are clear, and they have considerable success in
frightening the nations of western Europe. But the
camoaion failed to produce a sufficiently high level of
fear to prevent the deployment of the Euroriiissi les. in
that sense it was a failure.
Pithouch, as someone pointed out earlier, there
was a residue. I think it was Professor Ellison. Ana the
campaivn has left a heritage.
To achieve success in preventino the Eurc'missile
ceolcryrnent, it rniont have been necessary to supplement the
marsh words about the war dancer with risky actions, but
the Soviet leaders were not willinc to take such actions.
The domestic campaign succeeded in raisino
oooular concerns about the war dancer, but it contained
certain anomalies. First. the Soviet peoole were told
that war was not out of the a nest i on and it was necessary
to increase military preoarat i ons to cape with the
increased war dancer.
At the same time, they were told such a war
would be a catastrophe for humanity: there would be no
victors. So, the Soviet Union was to prepare for the war,
which was becornino more probable, but they couldn't win
such a war and would suffer as the rest of the world
oooulat ion would suffer. I found this anomalous.
Second, Soviet propaganda called President !Reagan
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a dangerous leader. They compared him to Hitler.
Nevertheless, in 1983, they broke off neec it iat ions with
the Unitec States on arms control, clearly raising
military tensions even nigher.
No wonder the Soviet people became friobtened so
that it became necessary, durin^ 1`"-84, to tone down the
domestic carima l c n somewhat.
The aim or this foreic!n propaganda campaicn was
clear, but what purpose was servea by the campaign aimed
at the Soviet people? Soviet oeo7le were not asked to
masi:e sacrifices; they were not told they would have to do
without consumer oaads; the leaders kept on making promises
about improved living standards: they were not asked to worK
ionaer hours. Chernenko explicitly said that wouldn't me
necessary. They were recuired to work harder and to accept
stroncer discipline. But one may question how well this
aim was served by threateninp the Soviet people with war,
imposed on them by a vicious enemy, a war that they
couldn't win.
The impression left by these contradictory themes
is that the various camoaipns on the war danger that have
been taroetea to distinct audiences are not elements in a
comprehensive and integrated scheme. but separate strands
from a divided leadership that has lost somethinp of its
internal coherence, hence of its capacity to devise a
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coherent strategy. The thesis of the increased war danger
seemed to have served as a multi-purpose tool to intimidate
the West, Drc.vide an increased sense of purpose to Soviet
military trai.ninp, and to strenpthen popu-tlar dependence on
the Soviet state.
The thesis may serve tactical objectives in the
future as well. I don't mean to c wngrade the potential
of Soviet propaganda. It civilian consumption continues
to stagnate or, as could happen, begins to fall, the war
banner thesis may yet serve to support aemands that the
Soviet people actually make sacrifices for defense.
Abroad, western public opinion remains
susceot i o l e to Soviet scare tactics. Hence, ad hr_,c
camDaipns based on the war dancer can de expected in the
future, and especially if ComDined with provocative and
threateninc actions, could have a powerful or ever,
devastating effect.
It's now five years since the Central Committee
first ceciared that the danger of war was increasing, and
benan employing this tenet in the diverse propapanda
camoaions that I've .lust discussed. Do they actually
believe their own oropaganda or, as has happened under
Stalin. do their real views diverge from what they say
publicly?
This is obviously a very difficult ouestion.
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Only indirect evidence is available to try to answer it,
based on the level of Soviet preparations for war, and
on Soviet willingness to take risky actions in their foreign
policy.
It hardly seems credible to me that the Soviet
leaders really believed, in 1580 or subseouently. that the
United States or its allies were about to force war upon
the Soviet union. In the 1980s, even less than in earlier
decades, when the United States had military superiority,
a Soviet-American confrontation tnreateninq war was hardly
likely, absent Soviet provocative actions directed against
maior Ame`?-ican interests.
Obviously, putting missiles into Cuba and refusing
to remove them would have created a serious danger of war.
But the Soviets really were not willing to take such
p*,ovocat ive act ions. K.hruschchev accepted defeat and
nulled out the missiles.
Unless the Soviet leaders themselves, in the
1980s, conteTmlated taking such provocative act ions, and
as yet they have not done so, it is difficult to suoDose
that toey really anticipated