COUNTERPOINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
COUNTERPOINT
A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures
As each new leader ascends to the post
of General Secretary of the CPSU, the
Soviet agitprop workers create an image for
him and `sell' it to the West. Because of
the secrecy that surrounds the private and
public lives of the Soviet leadership, the
West eagerly consumes what little know-
ledge is made available. Ever hopeful that
one day communism will assume a human
face, the West time and again `buys' the
image and ignores the reality.
There was kindly Papa Lenin, forceful
Uncle Joe, the folksy Khrushchev, the
peace-loving Brezhnev and the westernized
Andropov. Now we are given Mikhail
Gorbachev - a man who is more like us,
an intellectual reformer and a pragmatist
with whom the West can deal effectively.
Mr Gorbachev, his press clippings note,
is a lawyer and the best educated Soviet
leader since Lenin. As Stalin liquidated
anyone of his generation who was brighter
than he was, this is not too surer;sing.
Mr Gorbachev, although trained as a
lawyer, never practised law but devoted
himself to party work instead. As a Soviet
lawyer's job is to see that the formalities
of Soviet law are maintained, being a
lawyer does not necessarily mean that
Gorbachev is either awell-educated intel-
lectual or a champion of justice.
Mr Gorbachev's reputation as a
`reformer' was earned by his efforts to
improve Soviet agricultural performance.
He served as the CPSU's Secretary for Agri-
culture, a no-win/no-lose position: no-win
because Soviet agriculture is hopelessly
mismanaged by the Party and no-lose
because it is impossible to do a worse job
than your predecessor. In the Soviet
Union reform takes place within the
system and does not entail any change of
the system itself. Gorbachev's 'reforms'
were little more than tinkering with an
already discredited system of management.
There is no reason to believe that he con-
templates any significant change in his
country's economic or governmental
structures.
There is also no reason to see Gorbachev
as a reformer of foreign policy. Although
as a specialist on agriculture he has not
focused to any great extent on inter-
national relations, Gorbachev has sup-
ported the Party line on foreign affairs
and has not given any indication that he
disagrees with it in any way. He has
praised the Vietnamese invasion of Laos
and Kampuchea, attacked the West for its
`psychological warfare' against the Eastern
Bloc, and defended the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. His few statements on
foreign policy hardly support the image of
Gorbachev as a young liberal intent on a
less belligerent approach to the West.
Mr Gorbachev has been labelled a
pragmatist, it seems, because he does not
use Marxist-Leninist slogans in his conver-
sations with Western leaders and reporters.
No doubt, he will also refrain from using
his shoe ~ la Khrushchev to make a poli-
tical statement. But perhaps a far more
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
 Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
realistic indicator of Gorbachev's prag-
matism is his rapid rise to the pinnacle of
the Soviet power structure.
It is only possible to achieve what
Gorbachev has by conforming to the
Kremlin's unwritten rules, by being a team
player and by having some very powerful
friends. And Gorbachev's friends were two
of the most powerful men in the Soviet
hierarchy - Mikhail Suslov and Yuri
Andropov. It is not known how Gorba-
chev became a prot~g~ of Suslov and
Andropov but all three shared links to the
Stavropol region between the Caspian and
Black Seas in the USSR. Whatever brought
them together it certainly was not devotion
to liberal ideas or freethinking. Suslov, as
the Party authority on orthodoxy, would
not have furthered the career of anyone
who challenged the Party's supremacy or
questioned the `true faith' of communism.
Similarly, it is impossible to imagine
Andropov as Chairman of the KGB suppor-
ting anyone who was either `Westernized'
or a closet liberal. If Gorbachev is a
reform-minded liberal, he has hidden it
well.
What does not need to be hidden, and
what his press agents have exploited, is
Gorbachev's personal style. Unlike his
immediate predecessors, he appears
healthy, relaxed and aware of how to use
the media. He has a reputation as the best
public speaker in the leadership and quite
obviously works at projecting an image
abroad of self-confidence and sophisti-
cation. Gorbachev and his wife look like
us. And the Kremlin's marketing experts,
and the disinformation specialists, have
immediately pushed the resemblance as far
and as fast as possible.
Before the West swallows the image,
hook line and sinker, however, it is worth
recalling a comment made in the Times
after Gorbachev's visit to Great Britain in
December: "A guest appearance by a
rising star of the Soviet apparatus will not
alter the underlying nature of the system
which produced him ...his foreign policy
will be inspired by the same hostile ideo-
logy and determination to expand Soviet
influence which prevails at present and
which has had his loyal support since he
began his career over thirty years ago."
WHO TRAINS SOVIET DIPLOMATS?
There is a tendency in the West to
underestimate the Active Measures efforts
of diplomatic personnel (real diplomats,
not dressed up KGB officers). The West
usually works on the assumption that
diplomats are quite obviously pushing their
government's interests and that all diplo-
mats tend to work in essentially the same
ways. If this assumption is valid, then why
does Sergey Leonidovich Tikhvinskiy, a
major-general in the KGB, serve as head of
the Soviet Diplomatic Academy?
Tikhvinskiy, born in 1918, has been a
Communist Party member since 1941. He
graduated from the Chinese Department of
t;ie Philological Faculty of Leningrad
University and after intensive espionage
training was posted to China.
From 1943 to 1950, Tikhvinskiy was
first an assistant and later the Chief of the
Soviet spy network in Urumchi and in
Peking, all the while under diplomatic
cover. As assistant chief of the Soviet
Intelligence in Moscow from 1950 to 1953,
he served under the diplomat/KGB officer
Aleksandr Panuskhin. Panuskhin had
earned his reputation by serving as Soviet
Ambassador and chief of the spy apparatus
in both Washington and Peking.
Once again a `diplomat', Tikhvinskiy
spent 1953 to 1957 as chief of the Soviet
spy networks in Great Britain and in Japan.
He was responsible for placing Ilya Ehren-
burg, the veteran Soviet literary figure and
propagandtst, under surveillance while he
was in Vienna for a Communist peace rally.
This time Tikhvinskiy, for a change, was
travelling as a `correspondent' for Pravda.
Tikhvinskiy uses a different cover now
for his spy work - he appears in Soviet
publications as a Doctor of Historical
Sciences (1964). He got his doctorate after
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
 Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
he wrote the book Kang Yu-wei and the
Reform Movement in China in the Late
XIX Century. All the research on this
book was done by his subordinate officers
in the KGB.
Tikhvinskiy has been rector of the
Soviet Diplomatic Academy since early
1982. One can conjecture as to the kind of
training Tikhvinskiy's Academy is giving to
young Soviet diplomats. Perhaps it is only
coincidence that 49 Soviets were officially
declared persona non grata in 1982, while
in 1983 the figure jumped to 135. These
figures do not include those Soviets who
were quietly asked to leave a host country
or who were simply not given visas or visa
renewals because of illegal intelligence
activity.
Last year. ~n its 50th anniversary, the
Soviet Diplomatic Academy was awarded
the Order of the Red Banner `for services
in training highly skilled diplomatic
cadres'. Training them to do what?
COMMUNIST MEDIA AND THE
ETHIOPIAN TRAGEDY
According to Soviet and pro-Soviet
media, the Ethiopian government has taken
prompt action to limit the effects of the
recent drought and, with aid frotn the
Soviet bloc, now has the situation under
control. This assessment, however, was
news to the United Nations officer in
charge of aid to Ethiopia, who recently
issued a report warning that 7.5 million
people are without food or medical care,
and that a third of them may die from
starvation.
Although drought, primitive agricultural
techniques and armed rebellion contri-
buted, it is the Ethiopian regime itself
that is largely to blame for the famine.
Addis Ababa's rulers were warned in a
1982 UN study that unless they reversed
their wasteful agricultural policies, a major
disaster would soon strike. The Ethiopian
government not only ignored the study but
continued to destroy the country's peasant
farming society in favour of an unpro-
ductive and expensive system of Soviet-
style state farms. The government has also
continued to channel its funds into arms
for sub-Saharan Africa's largest standing
army and has misused its foreign aid by
investing it in consumer goods rather than
agriculture.
The Soviet press has attempted to play
down not only the extent of the famine
that threatens more than a fifth of
Ethiopia's population, but the pro-Soviet
Ethiopian government's culpability in that
famine. The Soviet foreign political maga-
zine New Times, for example, reported last
December that "hardly had the size of the
catastrophe been recognized before the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the
Ethiopian Workers' Party had taken into
its hands the direction of the ftght." The
famine itself is scarcely mentioned. By
emphasizing the drought, which after all is
an act of Nature, the Soviet and Ethiopian
press hope to deflect criticism of the fact
that the Ethiopian Workers' Party adopted
the Soviet agricultural model with
disastrous results.
Neither the Soviet nor the Ethiopian
media mention this. They both, however,
are quick to give credit to the fraternal
socialist countries for helping to save
millions of Ethiopians.
The Soviets, in a departure from their
usual practice of providing only milttaty
aid, have delivered 10,000 tons of rice - a
total that the Washington Post notes is less
than one third of the European Com-
munity's pledge, one fourth that of the UN
World Food Programme, one tenth of the
pledge of Canada and one twentieth of the
pledge of the United States. Most of their
help has been logistical: 12 aircraft, 24
helicopters and 300 trucks to distribute aid
provided by other nations. Bulgaria has
donated 18,000 tons of food and other
Soviet allies have sent tents, clothing and
medical supplies. The Soviet Union has
also generously provided Addis Ababa with
an exhibition of more than 400 pictures
and posters on the life of Soviet youth.
"Other countries too have reacted to
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
 Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
calls for help," New Times noted, but did
not elaborate on which countries res-
ponded or how much aid they sent. This
'help' from other countries has amounted
to over 400,000 tons of food and US
$250 million worth of medical, trans-
port and other emergency aid, or roughly
13 times as much food as the communist
nations have provided. More Western aid
is un the way, whereas the late Soviet
president, Konstantin Chemenko, sent
Ethiopian leader Colonel Mengistu Haile-
Mariam home empty-handed after his
December visit to Moscow. Chemenko
promised only to send help "so far as is
possible". The Soviet Bloc media never-
theless reported Mengistu's "deeply felt
thanks" for this "unselfish" assistance.
Perhaps conscious of their own meagre
efforts, the Soviets have begun to denigrate
the humanitarian aid offered by others. In
a ,'Vew Times article, the Soviets imply
that the Western aid effort is motivated not
by generosity but by greed. "Many Wes-
tern firms have leapt at the chance
afforded by Ethiopia's plight to get rid of
shop-soiled goods (which as `charity' are
not taxable)."
Moscow lia.l apparently instructed the
Ethiopians to play down the significance
of Western aid. While praising such "un-
selfish" Soviet assistance as a shipment of
200,000 sets of plastic picnic utensils-
which Moscow sent to Ethiopia in January,
or the promised arrival of a team of Soviet
aerobics instructors who are "to improve
the conditions for the population," the
Ethiopian media practically ignore Western
aid.
Por example, a US pledge of 50,000
tons of food was only reported by The
E'thiupian Herald nineteen days after it was
made and even then was buried in a piece
on worldwide aid to the stricken country.
A United States pledge of an additional
$400 million in emergency food and
medical aid for Ethiopia's starving millions
went unreported.
As Colonel Mengistu noted, Ethiopia
does not keep count of did offered, either
in dollars or any other currency - especi-
ally since the totals would no doubt prove
embarrassing to his chief ally, the Soviet
Union.
SOVIETS TRY TO IMPLICATE US
IIV SPY SCANDAL
The Indian government recently dis-
closed that a major spy ring which had
infiltrated the top levels of the New Delhi
bureaucracy was selling Indian state secrets
to several bidders including Prance, East
Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union.
While the French maintained a discreet
silence the Eastern Bloc countries not only
denied their guilt, but tried to implicate
the United States and unnamed NATO
countries in the scandal.
Through news stories planted in pro-
Moscow Indian newspapers like The
Patriot, the Soviet Bloc intelligence services
have long tried to portray the Western
nations, and particularly the United States,
as enemies of India intent on stealing its
most important military, political and
economic secrets. So quite naturally on
January 21, The Patriot falsely reported
that six West German, American and
French diplomats had been expelled from
India for espionage. Indian Home Minister,
S. B. Chavan, quickly told the press that
the report was false but, as in any good
Active Measures operation, the "news" was
not allowed to die but was replayed as
often as the Soviets could fmd a ready
listener. In this way, the story that began
with the Patriot article was picked up by
the Soviets, replayed by TASS, and even-
tually reappeared in The Hindustan Times
of January 25.
Sometimes these anti-Western stories are
initiated by the Soviet media, and then
picked up by the Indian media as part of
its overseas coverage. Last June, for
example, several New Delhi papers re-
ported that Western "subversive activities
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
 Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
SPY? DA, COMRADE, OF COURS
I AM AMERI K~NSY SPY!
in India had been stepped up". The report
had been published originally by Pravda,
then had been carried by the Soviet TASS
wire service, and eventually was picked up
and distributed by the Indian UNI News
Service.
Not too surprisingly, Eastern Bloc
officials, who have been quick to comment
in support of the "news" stories about
Western subversion in India, are reluctant
to discuss their own problems. Polish
Ambassador Ryszard Fijalkowski called the
Indian government's charge that his em-
bassy was involved in the spy ring "base-
less". The Soviet Ambassador refused to
comment on the expulsion of two of his
diplomats. The East Germans have also
remained quiet on the expulsion of one of
their representatives in India. The Soviet
Bloc media, needless to say, have not
reported their governments' involvement in
the Indian spy case at all.
The Indians have learned that if unchal-
lenged these stories take on a life of their
own and soon assume the aura of truth.
They have also learned, most recently from
the false allegations surrounding the
Gandhi assassination, that if refuted
quickly the effect of the lie campaign can
be diminished. The Indian government's
prompt denial of any U$ involvement in
the spy scandal was highly successful in
undermining Moscow's disinformation
campaign.
THE POPIELUSZKO SHOW TRIAL
The Torun trial of the murderers of
Jerzy Popieluszko is over. The four
murderers have been found guilty and
sentenced to prison. Although the trial
itself was an unprecedented event under
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
 Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
communism, still the reporting of it was no
more nor less than a communist show trial.
And though questions remain about who
ultimately was responsible for the order to
murder the Polish priest, one can be sure
that the answers will never be aired by the
state~ontrolled Polish or Soviet media.
Nothing much emerged from the trial,
ur t~rom the Polish media reporting, that
the authorities were not willing to have
revealed, except perhaps for the embar-
rassing hints of the vast authority wielded
by the powerful and mysterious Polish
Ministry of Internal Affairs, particularly
its involvement in policing the Church.
But the prosecutor stopped short of
attempting to uncover those at the top
who had authorised the kidnapping and
slaying. There was absolutely no mention
of meetings held ai the Ministry of Internal
Affairs to discuss what to do about Popie-
luszko. There was also no mention of a
fierce attack on the priest by Izvestiva last
September 12, about a month before his
death, that charged him with working with
activists of the banned Solidarity trade
union. Media coverage ignored the aspect
of official involvement and hinted instead
that some well-intended though overly-
zealous individuals had been provoked into
taking matters into their own hands.
Day after day, the Polish media aired
unproven charges of illegal and improper
conduct by Popieluszko and other clergy-
men, while omitting rebuttal statements
made by Church spokesmen. [t soon
became obvious that the government
hoped to turn the trial of secret police
murderers into a trial of Catholic Church
involvement in Polish politics. Govern-
ment radio and televison reported, for
example, testimony by Captain Piotrowski,
the acknowledged leader of the murder
team, that slandered his victim in particular
and the Catholic Church in general. Unin-
terrupted by the judge, Piotrowski accused
one Polish bishop of collaborating with the
Nazis, another of hiding money for Soli-
darity, and the victim himself of storing
ammunition in his apartment and of having
`close contacts' with a young woman.
A Polish Church spokesman, Arch-
bishop Dabrowski, Secretary of the Polish
Episcopate, charged in a letter to the Polish
govemment that the official Polish media
had "tendentiously" reported on the trial
by playing up courtroom attacks against
the Church while censoring out key sec-
tions of rebuttal statements made at the
trial by Church attorneys. On behalf of
the Catholic Church, Archbishop Dabrow-
ski submitted "an official protest against
such methods of manipulating information
and public opinion".
Because of the immense interest in the
case, it was impossible for the Polish
regime to blank out domestic coverage of
the trial. Moscow, however, never has to
contend with public demand and so the
Soviet media referred only briefly to the
priest's death when it occurred and ignored
the trial completely until the court's
verdict was handed down. At that point
TASS referred to the killers only as "four
citizens", ignoring their status as Polish
security policemen. Yet TASS was quick
to point out that the accused had been
driven into action in order to "prevent
activity harmful to the state".
The TASS report, reprinted in Izvestiya
on February 8, noted that "the trial has
confirmed that there have been numerous
instances of activities hostile to the socia-
list state by representatives of the Polish
Catholic Church, of abuse by them of the
freedom of religious worship. They are
using church services for political purposes,
for various kinds of demonstrations of an
overtly anti-socialist and, not infrequently,
anti-Soviet nature."
The TASS report made the Soviet view
of the event perfectly clear: there was no
secret police involvement, the murderers
were patriotic hotheads and the real cul-
prits were the victim himself and the
Church that supported him.
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
 Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
CHERNENKO:
THE PICTURE OF HEALTH
For some reason, whether insecurity or
merely tradition, the Soviets seem unable
to allow their leaders to pass away in
peace. Chernenko, like Andropov and
Brezhnev before him, played his part in
this `cult of health' by which the Party
portrays a dying leader as neither incapa-
citated nor ailing but still strongly in
control of the government. Although the
West had long been holding a death watch
for Chernenko, the Soviets carefully staged
two different appearances by the dying
Chairman.
After atwo-month absence, Chernenko
reappeared on February 24 in order to vote
in the elections. He was shown on Soviet
television only in stationary positions =
sitting to receive his ballot-paper, standing
to cast his vote and to receive flowers.
Never was he shown in motion and he was
able to stand only with the support of an
aide. (When photographs of the voting
were printed in the Moscow newspapers,
however, the aide had been airbrushed out
of the photo, creating the illusion that
Chernenko was able to stand alone.) Those
officials present at the voting were quite
obviously concerned about the Secretary
General's ability to conduct even so limited
a performance. The room where the voting
took place did not resemble other Soviet
polling places but looked like a redecorated
hospital room. Soviet reports on the
voting failed to mention the specific
polling place where Chernenko voted, as
they did in previous years, but only gave
the name of the electoral district.
As if aware of the inadequacy of this
appearance, the General Secretary was
shown again on Soviet television on
February 28 receiving his credentials to
the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Once again,
Chernenko was shown only sitting or
standing (this time holding on to the back
of a chair), never in motion. The cere-
mony took place in a room that was
remarkably similar to the one in which he
had voted four days before. The two
rooms appeared to be the same size, both
were painted the same shade of pink and
both had the same kind of curtains. This
time Chernenko read a short statement,
despite obvious difficulty in breathing.
These last two appearances were the cul-
mination of a year-long effort to cover up
the severe illness of the Kremlin's chief.
During the visit of Greek Prime Minister
Andreas Papandreou, a meeting with Cher-
nenko was ruled out because the General
Secretary was on "winter holiday" or
maybe "out of Moscow". Chernenko had
previously missed Defence Minister
Ustinov's funeral and in mid-January a
scheduled Warsaw Pact meeting was
cancelled.
While Chernenko was missing, however,
statements were issued in his name and
interviews with him were published. In
addition, the report of a Politburo meeting
of February 7 tried to create the im-
pression that Chernenko had spoken at the
session. All these efforts, apparently, were
meant to support the contention that,
though out of the public eye, the General
Secretary was still hard at work.
Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms by Ilya
Zemtsov, PhD (Fairfax, Va; HERO Books,
1984)
"The purpose of Newspeak was not only to
provide a medium of expression for the
worldview and mental habits ...but to
make all other modes of thought impos-
sible." (George Orwe11,1984) This quote,
with which Dr Zemtsov opens his study,
encapsulates the author's approach to
Soviet semantics - that Sovspeak is
designed to control the perceptions of
those who use it and thus is an attempt to
manipulate the thoughts and actions of
both the speaker and his audience. This
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
 Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1
thesis underlies every line of Zemtsov's
study of Soviet semantics. Unfortunately,
it is not allowed to remain in the back-
ground but is constantly forced on the
reader via heavy-handed editorial com-
mentsthat weaken the study.
The author should have had more faith
in his material. In those cases where he
adopts a more restrained tone and allows
the reader to draw his own conclusions, the
book is much more effective. Sovspeak is
nothing if not cooperative. Its manipu-
lation of language, its merging of fact and
fantasy into a new argot, is not only
nefarious but highly entertaining. What
could be more absurd than the Soviet use
of the phrases socialist competition, filial
gratitude, cult of personality, or demo-
cratic centralism? What could be more
effective than the confusion generated by
the Soviet Union's corruption of terms
such as peace, freedom, revolution or even
communism? Unfortunately, Dr Zemtsov
does not seem to realize that the simple
facts of Sovspeak are much more con-
vincing than any argument he may
propose,
It is, a pity that the heavily slanted
content detracts from what could have
been a most interesting study of Soviet
attempts to control perception through
semantics. As a result, Dr Zemtsov pro-
vides no more than a cautionary example
of how not to approach a study of this
kind.
Dis-Information: A Four-Part Series by
Elizabeth Pond in The Christian Science
Monitor (Boston, USA), February 26, 27,
28 and March 1, 1985
This series is an excellent introduction
to the subject of disinformation and Active
Measures. It includes a useful, if abbre-
viated, discussion of the general history
and methods of disinformation with a
closer look at some of the more frequently
used tactics. In addition there are case
studies that focus on particular subjects,
such as Vietnam, the `Spiegel' Affair, and
the Czech Operation Neptune.
The author does a good job reporting
the disparate views held on the subject by
journalists, media analysts, government
officials and former intelligence officers.
Her frequent use of examples to illustrate
the bare facts and her lively reporting style
make the series enjoyable as well as infor-
mative reading. One could wish that there
was more discussion of agents of influence
and less eagerness to denigrate the efficacy
of influence operations in international
affairs, but these are minor dissatisfactions.
Throughout, she carefully maintains a cool
restraint that is so necessary to a reasoned
discussion of disinformation and which so
admirably supports her thesis that truth
is its own best argument.
Before his death, Chernenko paid a
quick visit to heaven and hell to find out
which was the better place to spend
eternity. Heaven was full of angels singing
and looked rather boring. Hell, on the
other hand, seemed to be full of wild
parties with everyone having a great time.
"This," decides Chernenko, "is the place
for me."
After he dies, Chernenko is taken to
hell. It is unbearably hot and the air is full
of shrieking and wailing. Chernenko is
aghast and seeks out the Devil to find out
what is going on.
"This is nothing like the place I saw
before," complains Chernenko. "No, it
isn't," the Devil agrees, "but then you were
on a visitor's visa."
Subscription Rates for 1 year (12 issues) first class inland, airmail overseas: ?25 or $35
Editors: Stanislav Levchenko and Peter Deriabin. Research Assistants: Brian Campbell
and Shelly Blumen. Publisher: Walter Spiegel, Ickham Publications'Limited,
Westonhangei:, Ickham, Canterbury CT3 1QN, England. Telephone: [phone].
Produced by Fordwich Typesetting and J & F Lockwood, Bridge, Canterbury.
Q Copyright reserved
Approved For Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950025-1