COUNTERPOINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000700950026-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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COUNTERPOINT
A Periodic Newsletter On Soviet Active Measures
The World Youth Festival, scheduled to
take place in late July in Moscow, is of
great importance for the Soviet Politburo.
Soviet specialists on Active Measures will
make a major effort to manipulate the
activities of hundreds of young people
from the free world countries who will be
present at the Festival for the dramatic
enhancement of anti-US and anti-NATO
propaganda in all continents.
From our many years of experience as
members of Soviet intelligence organs, we
can confidently predict what much of the
planning of Soviet intelligence and counter-
intelligence (KGB) will entail.
Lists of the most active Soviet dissidents
are compiled. During the Festival, all of
them will be detained, either locked up in
jail or under house arrest.
KGB technicians are thoroughly
checking the audio bugs installed in all the
hotel rooms where the foreign delegates
will stay. Bugs are also installed at every
table in restaurants which will be used to
feed the foreign crowd. At this moment
the KGB is working together with the
Soviet Youth Organisations Committee
(one of the International Department's
fronts) to finalise plans and draw up charts
as to where each delegation will stay.
This is to allow the KGB time to install
the most sophisticated bugging devices in
the rooms of delegates from the USA,
Great Britain, France, and certain other
Western countries regardless of whether
the delegates are pro-Suv-et ur nut. The
JUNE 1985
KGB does not trust its own citizens and
never trusts foreigners.
The KGB is arranging seminars for the
guides and interpreters, the majority of
whom are witting or unwitting KGB
informers, to coordinate their reporting to
the KGB case officers on every foreign
delegate. Young KGB officers are being
assigned to each busload of delegates so
that they will be able to react immediately
to any unexpected situations.
The KGB's First Chief Directorate (the
external intelligence service) has already
sent top secret coded cables to every KGB
residency abroad. The cable requires each
residency to obtain, through agents in
political circles and through semi-overt
contacts, information on the political
standpoint of the delegation to the Festi-
val. If criticism is intended of the Soviet
Union's external policy, such as the
invasion of Afghanistan; or its domestic
policy, such as the persecution of dis-
sidents, the residency must make every
effort to get the position revised in a way
favourable to the Soviet cause. The resi-
dency has to submit its proposals regarding
young academicians, politicians, and busi-
nessmen who are already KGB agents.
These individuals should be included in the
member lists of delegations, or be invited
as guests of the Festival, to use their visit
to the Moscow Festival as cover for special
training in techniques of espionage.
The huge division of the KGB's First
Chief Directorate that is responsible for
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espionage against foreign countries from
the territory of the USSR is also working
out its plans regarding the Festival some
time during the events manv of the dele?
gates will be approached by `liberal-minded'
Soviet citizens -who are in tact case
officers from the First Chief Directorate -
who will try to establish close contact
with the delegates which can be exploited
when the visitors have returned to their
own countries.
Because the Soviet leaders are eager to
avoid any problems with the Festival, the
Kremlin has ordered a Politburo member,
Gevdar Aliyev, to assume all responsibility
for the coming event. Mr Aliyev has had
a 26-year career in the KGB, the culmina-
tion of which was his appointment as
Chairman of the Azerbaijan KGB. He
understands what the whole event is about
and is tluent in professional terminology.
The other Soviet leader responsible for
the Festival is 80-year-old Boris Pono-
rnarev, candidate member of the Politburo
and chief of the International Department
which is the Politburo think-tank on
strategic external policy, Active Measures,
the world communist movement and
Soviet front organizations. The Politburo
will feel more comfortable with the
seasoned Ponomarev's guidance of the
resolutions and appeals of the International
Department's directed show which will
start in the last days of July.
A Moscow Radio broadcast has pro-
vided aclue as to who has taken over the
important function of senior Party Secre-
tary responsible for ideology and foreign
affairs.
This position. held for many years until
his death in 198? try Mikhail Suslov, is
one of the key posts in the Kremlin
hierarchy The incumbent controls vir-
tually the entire external propaganda and
subversive apparatus of the Soviet State,
including foreign Communist parties, front
organisations and 'Active Measures', whr.l~
although carried out by the KGB, bast t~~
be submitted for approval to the (-cnt,al
('nmmittee (CCl ucnally thnn,Klt the
International Depetunenl.
The new man ie most probably tieg~n
lrgachev, a Party Jacretary stnce 19r+? ..r.,
was made a full Politburo member ut A{~?~
this year.
The clue came in a domestic M~~s.~~.
Radio broadcast on 3rd June annuun.u:~
a new First Secretary of the Krasru~.;ar
Kray Party Committee. This appuuttmcr~r
was said to be in connection wuh t!x
confirmation of G. P. Razumovsk} a~ IIcaJ
of the Organisational Party Wurk LkP.n
ment of the Central Committee. Tlur, Myr.
the post previously occupied by I~ga.fie.
and the fact that he has now reGnyui~f>.d
it is a strong indication that he It:u ta-s~G
over Suslov's function. Earlier dur- havt
added to this likelihood: fur e>,ampie.
Pravda of 14th May reported ttr.t ly{a
chev had attended a Central Cuntrtutnet
conference of newspaper and msga~we
editors and heads of information a~rn.rw~
"and other ideological institutiun~".
Yegor ligachev (64) graduated a ra:
engineer from the Moscow Asutas;
Institute in 1943, but a year tati,
embarked on a full-time career tit 1'wt~
work, initially in the Novosib-rsk re?+e~
From 1961 to 1965 he served as Ikpur~
Head of the CC Propaganda and Ag,tsth,a
Department for the RSFSR beturc ba;r
appointed First Secretary of the nn{~?~rtua
"obkom" (regional committee) ltr
remained there, acquiring Central (,~+ra
mittee membership in 1976, until An1,,?
pov brought him back to Mus.~~N u. 1~~~
as a CC Secretary to be in charl;c ,~t 1'.rt~
organisation and personnel ap{xw,t?.cwt~
A further indication is expc~trd Mhcn tiw
Supreme Soviet Session takes pla.c ~~r~ :aa
July, at which ligachev may he a{~la:u.ua
Chairman of the Foreign ,lttau~ t ..,.?
mission of the Council tit the t r,,,u,
This is a post with nu puw~?r ~? ?~~
sibilities of its own, but it h;,s t,~J:r...r.~r,.~,
been held by the senior Part} Jc,,ctat. I:N
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ideology/foreign policy as it enables him to
meet high level foreign dignitaries wearing
a Parliamentary `hat'.
THE INDEX OF SOVIET SECRETS
Perechen Svedeniy Sostavlyayushchikh
Gosudarstvennuyu Taynu is the official
name of the 'Index of State Secrets' which
tells the Soviet Union's censors what
information must be protected as state
secrets. The larger volume of the two-
volume work is about 400 pages long and
covers topics concerning the entire Soviet
Union. The second volume, about 200
pages in length, focuses on local matters.
The text is not printed but typed and
mimeographed on grey paper and bound in
cardboard. The Perechen is printed every
five years and is periodically updated and
revised through supplements that are sewn
into the butding.
Every major Soviet censor and selected
olticials such as KGB 'Rezidents' abroad
keep a copy in the office. One journalist
who had worked ut the Soviet Union for
twenty years reported that while the
existence ul the Index is well known, in
those twenty years he had seen the
Perechen only once, in the desk drawer of
the Deputy ('href Editor of the Litera-
turrrat~a Ga:ctu. On that occasion, he was
shown only one page of a supplement
which u>ntauted a hst of dissidents, in
alphabetical order, whom it was forbidden
either to menuun ur to quote.
The Index pruvtdrs t;wdehnes on every
topic which the guvcnurtent ~unsrders unfit
to prlnl. ~,Iltt u( the forbidden topics
are:
? Tit' .1:.iC1._. :Ii: i'r:...l~:'I I'. n; l'
ICI ~?1~1'. ~.~. it ~ ~ LN~I .LIIr .~I r;.ll 11 /.Ill ill)
IuiatrJ al Alla)tii,ly I'lll)r/d, alnl ~til
dlre~tly .'^?~~lute the Ih~tel kusiya
? Nuclear Nrapun te~hnolugy artci
location of production. The Ministry of
Medium Machine Building is responsible
for nuclear weapon development and
manufacture, liquid fuel rocketry is
masked behind "General Machine
Building", solid fuel rocketry behind
"Special Machine Building".
? The organtLation of the secret police,
in past or present form (OGPU, NKVD,
MVD, KGB); location of labour camps;
the number of prisoners and executions per
year, month or week.
? That the First Section of any Soviet
enterprise is the security section and the
Second Section is the mobilization corn-
ponent.
? The geographical coordinates of Soviet
towns. (Soviet cartographers sidestep this
problem by publishing maps overprinted
only with major longitude and latitude
lines.)
? The location of sensitive installations.
(If those are too well-known to be denied,
they are administraively `moved' hundreds
of miles to a new location.)
? Embarrassing history such as any
mention of `renegades' like Bukharin,
Trotsky, or Tukhachevsky.
? Public health statistics on epidemics,
contagious diseases, general mortality and
current infant mortality are forbidden.
Permanent `official' mortality rates for
cancer and heart diseases have been estab-
lished and no higher rates may be printed.
? Nothing may be reported on the mili-
tary except parades, awarding of medals,
and romanticized accounts of manoeuvres.
? How much people are paid, especially
the privileged. No references are allowed
to salaries, dachas, to elite resorts and to
the elites' special access stores.
~-~_~ - i
tillvtct Illsiniurmatiun experts is the use of
various devices to employ an eminently
respectable Western publication or insti--
rution to purvey apro-Sovtet line.
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L
A re,Ynt case came to light when it was
du;o~rrcd that a special edition of the
&ttufr O.rj~rJ Student's Dictionary of
Clu-ent E'rrgluh, produced for distribution
to the So~~et Union, had altered the
definitions of certain key words to suit
Soviet Cunununist ideology.
The Soviet edition produced for the
USSR for example defined `Communism'
asp "A theory revealing the historical
necessity for the revolutionary replacement
of capitalism by Communism", whereas
the usual Oxford dictionary definition is:
"A theory of society according to which
all property should be vested in the com-
munity and labour organised for the
cornmon benefit". The Soviet edition also
describes `imperialism' as: "The highest
and last stage of capitalism". The usual
definitions given by Oxford dictionaries
are: "1. The rule of an emperor esp. when
despotic. 2. The principle or spirit of
empire: advocacy of Imperial interests."
Similarly `Marxism' is rendered in the
Soviet edition as: "A teaching on the main
laws of development of nature and society,
on the revolution of the exploited masses,
on the victory of socialism and the building
of Communism: ideology of the Working
Class and its Communist Party". The true
Oxford definition is: "Pertaining to or
characteristic of, an adherent of, the
doctrines of the German Socialist Karl
Marx (1818.1883)".
Other terms which had been changed in
the edition produced for the USSR
included Socialism, Capitalism, Bolshevism,
Fascism and Internationalism.
The treatment of Bolshevism betrayed
a particular Soviet sensitivity to the facts
of history which they prefer to gloss over.
The usual Oxford Dictionary entry for this
word is: "A member of that part of the
Russian Social-Democratic party which
took Lenin's side in the split that followed
the second Congress of the party in 1903,
seized power in the `October' revolution
of 1917, and was subsequently renamed
the (Russian) Communist party." The
references to the Bolsheviks merely as a
faction of the Russian Social Democratic
Party and to a "split" were clearly unac?
ceptable, and the Soviet edition shortens
the definition to: "A revolutionary
Marxist trend of political thought in the
World Labour Movement which appeared
in Russia at the beginning of the 20th
Century embodied in the Proletarian party
founded by V Lenin."
A total of 100,000 copies of the 'doc-
tored' dictionary, as well as 70,000 copies
of the two-volume Oxford Adnanccd
Learner's Dictionary of Current F)rglislr,
similarly altered, were produced and have
been available since 1982 and 1983 in
specialist hard-currency books}iops in
Moscow.
Under world copyright agreements,
signed by the Soviet Union, the alterations
could have been made legally only with the
consent of the Oxford University Press
(OUP), and a spokesman for the OUP
admitted, according to the London Dail-~
Telegraph of 8th April 1985, that the
changes had been made in accordance with
Soviet wishes, but that the decision was
taken at a "low level" in the publishing
fiiTrt and "just slipped through". He alw
revealed that the Oxford Student's Uic-
tionary of Current English was an impor-
tint work in foreign publishing terms and
he called it "the world's most pirated
book".
It is not unlikely, therefore, that the
Russians may be trying to distribute ttreir
own "ideologically correct" version, ntas?
querading as the real thing, in uttrcr
countries, particularly in the Third World.
Whatever one's opinion of President
Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI
might be, there can be no doubt tftat the
Kremlin has responded with a worldwide
Active Measures campaign that is even
broader than their 1978 campaign against
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the neutron bomb. Just as the Soviets
sought to manipulate Western concerns in
1978 to achieve their own foreign policy
objectives, so too they are turning to
Active Measures to stop, or at least slow,
the SDI.
The campaign, begun when President
Reagan first made his proposal, soon
shifted into high gear to elicit support for
the Soviet Union's bargaining position in
Geneva. To this end, the Soviets are pur-
suing atwo-tiered campaign to mould the
opinions of both the general public and the
policy-making elite.
I. In an attempt to play on the fears and
legitimate concerns of the general public,
the Soviets have generated as many argu-
ments against the SDI as there are identi-
fiable blocs of opinion. The main themes
of this effort are easily delineated.
According to the Soviets, the SDI would:
? result in a "militarisation of space"
? create an isolated "fortress America"
? be easily countered or technologically
unpossible to attain
? create a new arms race
? have a destabilizing influence on the
superpower relationship
? be so costly that domestic programmes
and foreign aid programmes would have to
be curtailed.
The main themes of the Soviet anti-SDI
campaign contradict one another as well as
previous Soviet positions on arms control
and international relations.. For example,
tf the SDI is technologically impossible,
then America can neither transform itself
Into a fortress of isolationism nor mili-
tarise space. Obviously, the Kremlin
a>,umes that the general public will
approach these themes like a menu, selec-
ting one's personal favourite without com-
paring the menu items for logical
consistency.
:. The Kremlin is running a parallel
campaign to manipulate the policy makers
directly. Not for the first time in the
wperpower relationship, the Soviets are
suggesting that there exists a "window of
opportunity" for arms control.
With the death of Mr Chernenko and
the accession of Mr Gorbachev, the Krem-
lin is suggesting that the West should "give
the new man a chance". Now is the time
to be flexible in our approach to arms
control. The Soviets suggest that it is
important to allow the new man a few
successes, not only to create a positive
climate for international relations, but to
strengthen Gorbachev's position vis-~-vis
the `hard-liners'. This persuasive strategy
was first tried out after Stalin's death and
has since been repeated at each change in
the leadership. It has never proved to be
more than an exercise in wishful thinking.
Now more than ever, Soviet analysts
and insiders tell us that the West must not
add ~ttel~ to the fire of Soviet paranoia.
With the. death of Ustinov, the disap-
pearance of Ogarkov and the reduced
visibility of the military in ruling circles,
it is best not to alarm the `hard-line'
military faction. The West must be careful
to give no excuse to the military for
suspecting our intentions and motives on
the subject of East-West relations. We
must seize the opportunity to take a
positive stance in the arms control talks
in order to avoid giving ammunition to
Moscow's `hawks'. This would give the
Soviets a greater sense of security which
would inevitably lead to a relaxation of
domestic repression and an increase in
emigration.
The Kremlin no doubt hopes that
between the `stick' of public pressure and
the `carrot' of increased emigration, it can
manoeuvre Western policy makers into
softening their positions on arms control
in general and the SDI in particular.
SOVIETS EXPLOIT
NUCLEAR WINTER THEORY
A controversial study in which a
number of US scientists concluded that a
nuclear war would destroy all life on earth
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THIS NUCLEAR WINTER WOULD
RF AwFUL ! CAN YOU IMAGINE
SIBERIA ALL OVER THE WORLD''
by radically changing the world's climate,
has been adopted, with some important
modifications, by the Soviets. This time it
is not just Soviet diplomats, the Inter-
national Department or the KGB who are
trying to manipulate Western fears and
concerns, but the Soviet scientific com-
munity.
In late 1983 a number of US scientists
published a series of articles that claimed
a nuclear war would disrupt the earth's
climate so severely as to endanger all life
on the planet. A few weeks after these
articles were published, Soviet scientists
involved in their government's nuclear
disarmament propaganda campaign
adopted the 'nuclear winter' theory as their
sandrov, head ul the t.'hmate Mudellutg
Laboratory of the Suvlct Academy of
Science's computer .ruts. ~latmed in an
April 19214 article puhh~hrd by the Soviet
Nuvusti Nress A2;en.) that a hla,t u(~nly
15O ntegatuns uuulJ ulr;l:rr a new i.e age
and thus dcst nt) .,II . n res ur F urupe and
North Anteri~a. the lS study, however,
was based un a uu~lrrr e>,.hange tnvulvutg
at least 5,000 mct;atun~ Lien this figure
was cunstdrre~ .untnl~crsrally I,Iw in
Western s~lenuli~ .Ir.lc~
~. It the Suv,et~ arc s,n~crcl) ~uncerned
w-th the pulenUal I/lt .i,.a~ter Ulat nuclear
wnltrr re `treunt~, the) ~h1n,l~ he willing
to allow ~lunrest,. drs, w>n~n 1~t the theory.
Irtatead. all ~~! tlu?n clh~rt5 .,rr Jrre~ted at
~?liil~l~: it ~.I Ilic ~,l~l~,l~:. ,Il~,.l ~.':1 ...
111111!?!11 1~1111t?1 ~~t'llgll~~~ tlNl?. ~ll~~a.-n I..
e\,t1;~,eldle l~t~lh the iaUScS alld the etlr~l5
of a nuclear winter for foreign puhcy
Innhnses. l~or example, Vladimir Alek?
I...1 1 11 11.. ~ .I ~,,,t ,,,1, I~~, Iln'
lln~au.1 ..I uu~!~at wu~t~l ~~nlt ~~n 1:~IU
and the l nuc.l St~tr- \~?ucl I~r,ie Nuuter
Andrei 1akl,arl,~ was tLc Ulst klviet
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tircritrst to examine the possibility of
??.~~~r war's effects on climate and sun-
+~rJr~ . Yet the work of Soviet scientists
i?~c S.+kharov, who support mutual rather
+I~ar just Western nuclear disarmament,
r.c~cr appear in print.
Tfre use of scientists to support Mos-
? ~+'a iureign policy is reminiscent of the
arc ~~f Soviet psychiatry to support
"rnc~trc policy. Western scientists,
MtKtlrcr ur not they support the nuclear
?u,tcr theory, have noted that this Soviet
-..b~rJination of science to government
.t~r+trul will make a serious discussion of
tt.c unplications of nuclear war very
1ilti~ult.
TRUfH -MADE TO MEASURE
~ part of a continuing series of actual
.~K histories, the Editors present the
SuUuM rng (in four chapters) to illustrate
AuM Soviet or Soviet-inspired media
wnrpulate Western news items.
~~pter I
T/u? Keat~a Times (December 26, 1984)
rcpurt~ a controversial allegation about the
w..llcd 'Operation Africa':
"A 'confidential report' compiled in
L?~r;J~m has accused the US Central Intelli-
u.e Agency (CIA) of plotting to have
~cn).~s Dennis Akumu thrown out of the
tht~nuauun of African Trade Union Unity
IUATIUI es Secretary-General. According
c.~ the report, some 1.4 million Kenyan
~.,uutgs have been set aside for `Operation
Atn.~'.?'
(>V per
Tt~c l!S Embassy in Nairobi immedi-
?u1> dents that there is an `Operation
~tr~?.' with a budget of 1.4 Kenyan
~~++~~> tappnrx. 100,000 US dollars):
"~1 trunt?page article published in the
~r{>> ~ l nnes entitled `CIA's Bid to Oust
~ti,nu' r, based upon a fabrication. .
tr a rct;rrttable that it (The Kenya Times)
.. ,.,J publish `disinformation' of this
nature. There is no such activity as
`Operation Africa'.
Chapter 3
Nevertheless, the original allegation is
replayed in Havana's Prensa Latina
(January 5 1985) but with the Kenyan
shillings now transformed into dollars:
"The spark for this situation was a
Kenya Times article based on a confi-
dential report secured by the London
news media. The report reveals an `Ope-
ration Africa' directed and financed by the
CIA... The report notes that US espio-
nage services had assigned $1.4 million to
implement `Operation Africa'.
Chapter 4
Not content with turning Kenyan
shillings into dollars, Moscow shifts the
decimal point in an English-language broad-
cast to Africa on January 24 1985:
"American special services have deve-
loped aspecial plan of subversive activities
against it (the Orgar.~sation of African
Trade Union Unity) codenamed Operation
Africa. The Kenya Times quotes a confi-
dential report discovered by African trade
union activists and newsmen as saying that
the CIA has allocated $14 million to the
operation."
SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
IIV THE PACIFIC REGION
The Soviet Union is stepping up its
efforts to extend its influence in the Pacific
region. Negotiations over granting Moscow
access to Kiribati's maritime economic
zone of two million square miles are an
example. While persisting with attempts to
establish diplomatic and commercial links,
the Kremlin is resorting increasingly to
Active Measures.
Three major front organisations have
held conferences within the past eight
months, focusing on the Pacific. This is an
unusually high figure. The similarities of
these meetings reveal a carefully co-urdi-
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Hated campaign.
? The `International Conference on Peace
and Security in East Asia and the Pacific'
in Manila (30 November to 2 December
1984) was sponsored and organised by the
World Peace Council (WPC), the main
Soviet front organisation, and attended by
representatives of the Afro-Asian Peuple'i,
Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), the
Christian Peace Conference (CPC), the
International Union of Students (lUS), the
Women's International Democratic Fede-
ration (WIDF), the World Federation ut'
Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the World
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). A
declaration called for the removal of US
bases in the Philippines.
? The `Asian and Ocean Trade Union
Conference on Development and a New
International Economic Order' in New
Delhi (4 to 6 February 1985) was attended
by 101 participants, representing 57 trade
union organisations. The meeting was
hosted by WFTU's affiliate, the All?Indian
Trade Union Congress (AITUC). WFTU
however was the driving force behind the
event.
A message was sent to the Pacific regum
demanding "removal of all bases and tltc
termination of the use of land, ocean anJ
sky of the region by all nuclear-armed and
nuclear-powered ships, submarines and atr?
craft". Support was given to the prupural
of the Malaysian Foreign Minister fur the
establishment of a nuclear-free South E.art
Asia. A message to the 12th World Youth
Festival was adopted.
? The latest front meeting, the confcrcn~c
`Trade Unions for Peace and Co-uper~ttun
in Asia and Oceania' was held in the
Mongolian capital Ulan Bator from 13 to
14 May 1985. Representatives from 3.
trade union centres of ?6 cuuntr-cr
attended this event. Support was vut.cJ
fur 5?~--ct "IKa,c~ j r. j~.?u:- ?t.t:c the
l'nttc.l ltatc- +a- t,ca,a. .. r.,;r.r:r.cd fur
11 t- n,~t -.,rj rurry tt.rt thr -y:nrti.ant
bwld-up ut ~?.ut ru~aJ ?r.J ur 1>??er to
the 1 ar I a-t anJ ,. ,.tr. tart Aua. partt-
cularh tt- rru,iur -t~n.~~+t, ?a- r:,.t unct
ment-.mcJ
N't havc Icarc.t ..! r rr.errt ~.-rct galtc
with the Ind-wr. ?t,-,h bad .a~Kd much
tmharrar-rr,eat l)p ,' AIa-! the l,ntet
kmhar-y u, !~tw Iltitu ~-Y r lur,.h fur
Ieaduyl lu,iaacu ?+ ? raa, vp (., ~ L Day
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