DCI/DDCI MEETING WITH THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, 3 JANUARY 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990046-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: January 7, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRETISENSITIUE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
7 January 1985
SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, 3 January 1985
1. Mr. McFarlane said that the President had spent a great deal of
time studying and absorbing the arms control issues during his recent
trip to the West Coast. Mr. McFarlane said he was pleased with how the
President had handled this matter including his instructions to Secretary
Shultz.
2. Regarding Larry Gershwin's paper on the Soviet fear of SDI, the
DDCI offered that the Soviets will try to have Congress do their, work for
them; that they will string out negotiations, use their propaganda
machine to portray the US as a producer of space war machines, with the
hope that Congress will impose a moratorium on SDI.
3 Mr McFarlane said that he was impressed with the briefings by
and Larry Gershwin which were well-balanced, well-articulated
and well -presented.' The President is very comfortable with the US
position. He said that Secretary Shultz was duly impressed with Larry
Gershwin's brief on the Soviet strategic situation.
4. Mr. McFarlane noted he had brought the DCI's two papers to the
President's attention and the latter was sobered by their outline of the
verification issues. The President also noted these papers addressed the
strategic implications of the verification problem rather than .iust
dealing with specific events.
5. The DDCI commented that we will win or lose SDI in the media.
The Soviets are already seized with SDI, they are way out in front with
their propaganda while the US side will be too late--once again, in a
reacting mode. Rather, the USG should have a press campaign mapped out
now which anticipates how the Geneva talks may go so we can get our view
out instantly. Mr. McFarlane took notes and said he would look into this.
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8. Mr. McFarlane gave a rundown on Congressional briefings to
advance the Arms Control/SDI and MX programs. The DCI commented that
this seemed to be going well but the same effort should have been made a
year ago The DCI noted that CIA cannot be the
point on is a e i at we can't rely on legislative technicians
but that substantive people have to be involved and that not enough is
being surfaced in the US public media about the threat posed
9. Mr. McFarlane asked about the Budget and the DDCI briefed on
where we are on NFIP.
10. Mr. McFarlane noted he had discussed the MX issue with Senator
Goldwater who indicated that if this was a pivotal issue with the
Soviets, he could change his position. In Mr. McFarlane's view, this
12. The DCI noted it was important that the right person had to be
found to replace Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Richard DeLauer and recommended Bud Wheelon. Mr. McFarlane suggested
that the DCI mention Wheel on to the Secretary of Defense (which the DCI
did the next morning.)
SF('RFT/. FF.VIT!VF
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