THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON CONTINUING THE ACQUISITION OF THE PEACEKEEPER (MX) MISSILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000901320014-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT
ON CONTINUING THE
ACQUISITION OF THE
PEACEKEEPER (MX) MISSILE
MARCH 1985
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The attached report on the Peacekeeper missile contains
my assessment of the requirement for Peacekeeper and my
anticipated impact of the continued procurement of Peacekeeper
missiles, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 98-525,
Section 110 of October 19, 1984.
My report concludes that the continued procurement and
deployment of the Peacekeeper are essential to national
security. The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission are
still valid. One hundred Peacekeeper missiles should Le
deployed in existing minuteman silos as soon as possible.
My report also concludes that Peacekeeper is an essential
element of our arms control strategy. Without the Peacekeeper
our chances of reaching an equitable agreement with the
Soviet Union to reduce significantly the size of our nuclear
arsenals are substantially lowered. Indeed, should Ccngress
delay or eliminate the Peacekeeper program, it would send an
unmistakable signal to the Soviet Union that we do not possess
the resolve required, nor the continuity of purpose, to main-
tain a viable strategic triad and the policy of deterrence the
triad represents.
The time has come to place this issue behind pis- While
we '.ave debated the merits of the Peacekeeper program, the
Soviets have deployed over 600 Peacekeeper type missiles. If
we are to move towards an equitable treaty in Geneva, procure-
ment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles must continue.
I urge each member of Congress to approve the Peacekeeper
and join me in a bipartisan and united effort in Geneva. With
your support, and the support of the American people, our
efforts at the negotiation table could lead to the more stable
world we all seek, and lead to that day when mankind is free
of the terrible threat of nuclear weapons.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 4, 1985.
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THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT
on
CONTINUING THE ACQUISITION OF THE PEACEKEEPER (MX) MISSILE
Foreword
This report was prepared in accordance with the fiscal 1985
Department of Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts,
Committee of Conference, Section 110e and delivered in
compliance with Section 110g(2). The Act states that the report
shall include:
(1) a statement that the President has determined
that further acquisition of operational missiles
under the MX missile program is in the national
security interest of the United States and is
consistent with United States arms control policy;
(2) findings of the President concerning the effect
of the acquisition and deployment of such missiles
on the vulnerability of the United States land-based
intercontinental ballistic missile force;
(3) a discussion of the basing mode for the MX missile
(and related improvements in silo-hardening technology)
and of proposals for the basing mode for the small,
single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile.
Summary
The President has concluded that the continued production
and deployment of the Peacekeeper (MX) missiles in existing
Minuteman silos is required in order to meet U.S. national
security interests, is consistent with U.S. arms control policy,
and enhances the prospects for global stability. As a result,
the President seeks to remove Congressional restrictions on the
Fiscal Year 1985 funds that were authorized and appropriated by
the Congress for the Peacekeeper missile program. This report
provides the President's rationale and furnishes additional
information as required by the Congress.
Strategic Balance and International Stability
In February 1984, in response to the FY84 Defense
Authorization Act, the President reported to Congress on
the anticipated political-military effect of procurement
of Peacekeeper missiles. This year's report reviews major
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developments in the strategic balance over the past twelve
months. This report concludes, as did last year's document,
that continued procurement of Peacekeeper and deployment of
100 missiles in Minuteman silos "...is a necessary part of
our concerted effort both to improve deterrence and strategic
stability and to enhance our ability to achieve deep and
meaningful arms reductions." The passage of one year has given
the Soviet leadership an opportunity to make adjustments in its
strategy and policy. Thus, from the perspective of this report
it is useful to determine what changes have occurred in these
areas.
No change is apparent in the Soviets' continued efforts to
build-up their strategic nuclear forces both quantitatively and
qualitatively (the magnitude and pace of which over the past 23
years are portrayed--in sharp contrast to U.S. efforts over the
same period--in Figure 1). They did not slow any aspect of
their program, as indicated by these developments that occurred
during 1984:
o Modernization of the Soviets' fourth generation
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) continued with
the modification and deployment of an additional 30 SS-19s
(carrying a total of 180 highly accurate warheads). At
the same time, development and flight test of both the new
SS-X-24 ICBM with 10 warheads and the single-warhead
SS-X-25 ICBM continued (despite the fact that SS-X-25
testing violates at least two provisions of the unratified
SALT II Treaty as documented in the February 1985 Report to
Congress on Soviet Noncompliance). We anticipate that both
SS-X-24s and SS-X-25s will be deployed in silos as well as
on mobile launchers over the next few years.
o Three types of strategic bombers are in production or
development. Production continues on the Backfire and Bear
H bombers. The Bear H achieved its Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) with the new AS-15 air-launched cruise
missile during 1984. This deployment is advancing
more rapidly than we projected one year ago. Advanced
development of the new Blackjack bomber, similar to but
larger than the B-1B, also continued, and we expect it
to be ready for deployment before the end of the decade.
o An additional Typhoon-class missile submarine (SSBN) (the
third) joined the Soviet Navy, as did the first and second
ship of a second new class of SSBNs, the Delta IV. Testing
of the Delta IV's sea-launched ballistic missile, the
SS-NX-23, also continued throughout 1984, and an IOC in the
near term is expected. In a related development, flight
testing of a long-range sea-launched cruise missile
(SS-NX-21) appears to have been completed and the missile
may already be operationally deployed on submarines near
U.S. coasts.
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U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES
INTRODUCTION OF SYSTEMS BY YEAR
SOVIET UNION
I 1960 I 1 I 1 I I I I I SALT I AND ABM TREATY - I I SALT II - 1979
1 1 I 1972 I I I
1 SS.NK31
AS 15 /
I5~ a$ 5 T85
~
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1
sE ss ,I;.. ,
5 M ' ~ 1/' M 2 ' 3
I ~ 0 J
MI ~ ~ 2 \~~ 1 ~~' 2 Z
HOTEL III
GOLF II
HOTEL II
YANKEE I
h Q
GOLF III 1 .. TYPHOON
DELTA II
YANKEE 11
DELTA III
MK-12A
II PEACEKEEPER
fi
I I I I I I
1979 1984 1987
LAFAYETTE I I I I I
GEORGE WASHINGTON I I I I I I I I I I
1960 1972
* AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE SS-16 IS INCONCLUSIVE, BUT INDICATES PROBABLE DEPLOYMENT.
Figure 1: Introduction of Nuclear Systems by Year
In addition to this accumulation of offensive interconti-
nental nuclear forces, the Soviet Union in 1984 continued to:
o improve its massive air defenses;
o upgrade the Moscow anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and
construct large phased array radars (one of which consti-
tutes a violation of the legal obligations under the ABM
Treaty);
o perform extensive research and development (R&D) on a
rapidly deployable ABM as well as extensive R&D on a
space-based strategic defense system, and on new air
defense missiles with capabilities against some types of
ballistic missiles; and,
o Deploy significant numbers of new intermediate- and
short-range nuclear missiles and artillery systems.
I I 1984 1
1
I 1987
II
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As last year's report made clear, this accumulation of vast
military power, coupled with current Soviet advantages in
strategic forces, could--if unchecked--result in the Soviet
leadership becoming far more confident about using its political
and military leverage to exert influence against other nations
around the globe. A perception that the United States is unable
or unwilling to take the steps necessary to offset this growing
Soviet power could further increase the Soviets' inclination to
become involved in regional conflicts, even if such involvement
would risk engaging U.S. interests. Furthermore, a growing
risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union would cause
regional powers to become more inclined to accept a greater
level of Soviet interference in their affairs. Finally, and
most dangerously, this perception could over time begin to
suggest to the Soviet leadership that the threat, or actual use,
of military force--including nuclear weapons--against United
States forces or against those of our allies could result in
significant military advantages for them. Thus, from this
evidence we can only conclude that the Soviets have not changed
either strategy or policy. They continue to build and modernize
at a very high rate.
To reverse these dangerous and destabilizing trends, this
Administration initiated the Strategic Modernization program in
October 1981. The program resulted in some improvements in our
deterrent capabilities in 1982 and
1983.
In 1984 this
long-range program began to secure
enhancements to our forces.
truly
significant
o The remaining two squadrons of B-52Gs identified for
conversion to air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) carriage
became operational, bringing the total to five squadrons
(90 B-52s with 1,080 ALCMs). Additionally, preparations
to begin ALCM conversion of the B-52H force proceeded on
schedule, with modification of the first aircraft scheduled
to start in July 1985. Moreover, our
first
new long-range
strategic bomber aircraft in over
30
years,
the B-1B, was
delivered for test and evaluation
in
October
1984. The
B-lB is scheduled to enter the Strategic Air Command's
inventory next year.
o The Trident submarine USS GEORGIA began operational patrol,
the fourth Trident, USS FLORIDA, was commissioned and the
fifth Trident, USS HENRY M. JACKSON, began sea-trials.
FLORIDA began operations recently, and the JACKSON will
begin regularly scheduled operations later this year.
Additionally, in June 1984, the nuclear version of the
Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM-N) achieved its
scheduled IOC aboard selected submarines and surface
combatants.
o The Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) achieved its
initial connectivity capability, thereby increasing the
difficulty of attempting to preempt U.S. retaliation by
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attacking our command, control and communications (C3)
system. The third electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) hardened
National Emergency Airborne Command Post (E-4B) was
delivered last year. Additionally, we began improvements
to the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS).
o 1984 also witnessed three more highly successful
Peacekeeper test flights (the fourth, fifth and sixth tests
in that series) concluding Phase I of the test flight
program. The seventh test flight, which occurred on
February 1, 1985, was also successful. The Peacekeeper
continues to perform exceptionally well, achieving
accuracies which are better than design requirements.
Additionally, production of the first 21 Peacekeeper
missiles is underway, as well as support facility
construction. All aspects of this program are progressing
smoothly and are well within cost estimates. In fact, with
the release of the FY85 funds, the program will be over 50
percent complete in terms of total program funds.
An ICBM test program does not, however, constitute a
deployed asset. Despite the success of the Peacekeeper test
flights, and the progress we have made in starting to rebuild
the bomber and submarine legs of the Triad, the inevitable
length of time required to modernize all of our strategic
assets demonstrates that we have not yet acquired an operational
capability that redresses the Soviets' destabilizing advantage
in prompt hard-target capability. The planned deployment of
100 Peacekeepers beginning in late 1986 represents the
best--and only--near-term solution to begin to correct this
strategic imbalance. The rationale for this--deterrence of
Soviet aggression through the maintenance of a stable strategic
balance--has not changed for the past 12 months, nor has it
changed in the last 40 years. The Report of the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission), which
provided the blueprint on which our ICBM modernization program
is based, was quite clear about the need to balance Soviet
power:
This is central to our understanding
of how to deter war, how to frustrate
Soviet efforts at blackmail and how to
deal with the Soviets' day-to-day conduct
of international affairs.
Neither has the importance of the contribution of the ICBM
force to the Triad's deterrent capabilities changed. The
intrinsic qualities of the ICBM, and in particular the
Peacekeeper with its hard-target potential, are most appropriate
for placing at risk precisely those Soviet targets (military
forces, leadership and C3 capabilities) that the Soviet leader-
ship values most for a war-fighting rather than deterrent
posture. Air-breathing systems (bombers and cruise missiles)
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles both play valuable and
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complementary roles in deterrence; however, neither of these
forces alone possesses the requisite combination of promptness,
rapid retargeting, and nearly 100 percent alert rate which is
available in our ICBM force, and which we need to ensure that
the United States can respond credibly and effectively against
the entire range of Soviet war-making capabilities in the event
deterrence fails.
In particular, the inherent high alert rates, low
day-to-day operations cost, and responsiveness of the ICBM
force, which includes Peacekeeper missiles, provide a powerful
disincentive to a Soviet first-strike. With 100 Peacekeeper
missiles in our inventory, the Soviet leadership finally will
have to weigh more seriously the vulnerability of key elements
of their own forces to retaliation. Peacekeeper thereby will
help to induce caution and restraint into Soviet geopolitical
activities by removing any perceptions the Soviet leadership
might harbor about its ability to dominate a crisis or to
conduct and emerge successfully from a nuclear conflict with its
most valued assets intact and its war aims achieved. As a
result, deployment of Peacekeeper starting in 1986 will clearly
decrease the risk of war. These facts have not changed in over
a decade of debate about this missile.
At the same time, however, the size of the Peacekeeper
force was not chosen arbitrarily. A limited deployment of
100 missiles will not give the USSR legitimate grounds for
fearing a first-strike from U.S. forces. With 100 missiles,
U.S. strategic forces will fall far short of possessing a
first-strike capability--given the numbers of hardened military
assets and the dispersal of Soviet nuclear forces.
A force smaller than the planned 100 Peacekeepers, however,
would have significantly reduced military significance in the
eyes of the Soviets. As we begin our new negotiations such
reductions to the Peacekeeper program could cause the program to
appear as tokenism and thus reflect unfavorably on U.S. resolve
to carry through its programs.
Without question, the asymmetry in ICBMs between U.S. and
Soviet strategic forces remains very much in their favor. In
the absence of continued Peacekeeper production, this asymmetry
would become even more skewed in the USSR's favor. Moreover,
decisions demonstrating that the United States does not have the
determination to proceed with the Peacekeeper program would
affect significantly the Soviet leadership's assessment of our
national will to meet their political and military challenges.
We believe that our ICBM modernization program, based
on the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission Report (and Executive
and Legislative branch approval thereof in 1983) continues to
offer a sound basis for needed improvements to the ICBM leg of
the triad. Further delay on the Peacekeeper will be counter
productive to national security. Our program also reduces
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significantly the risks inherent with the failure to modernize.
Prompt Congressional approval of joint resolutions lifting the
FY85 funding restriction on Peacekeeper production and, later
this year, approval of the request for the Peacekeeper in the
FY86 budget--in keeping with the Scowcroft Commission's
recommendations--will promote global stability, help prevent a
deteriorating strategic balance, and reflect a cohesiveness and
a sense of common purpose that will strengthen our ability to
deter aggression, furnish a foundation for arms reductions, and
promote the prospects for continuing peace.
With regard to arms control, we are encouraged that the
prospects for negotiations have been improved since our last
report. Important developments have occurred after the
one-year hiatus that followed the Soviet walk-out from the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks and concomitant
refusal to set a date to begin new START negotiations.
Contrasted with the prospects last year, we now have reason for
cautious optimism. We and the Soviet Union are about to begin
new negotiations in Geneva, in which a central objective will be
to seek agreements on significant reductions of strategic
arsenals. As we enter these talks we recognize that our ability
to negotiate effectively--and to achieve our goals of deep and
effectively verifiable reductions--is heavily dependent on the
Soviet leadership's view of our purpose, will and strength.
Recent experience has confirmed, despite Soviet propaganda
attempts to the contrary, that they have responded to the
steady, responsible actions of the NATO Alliance in fulfilling
missile deployment commitments taken under the December 1979
decision. They agreed to negotiate initially, only when it
became clear NATO would make a coordinated decision to deploy.
They agreed to resume negotiations only when it became clear
they could not destroy NATO's resolve through threats and
bluster. Likewise, if we are to succeed similarly in our new
strategic negotiations, we must demonstrate the same constancy
of purpose and determination as shown by the Alliance in INF.
Conversely, if we fail on the eve of these new negotiations in
Geneva to proceed with Peacekeeper production and deployment,
the impact could be far-reaching, extending not only to failure
of the strategic negotiations, but may affect the broader
East-West relationship as well.
We hope these new negotiations will lead eventually toward
agreement on deep reductions, but they are at a critical
stage--the first step. That step must be on firm ground because
it will set the direction for a lengthy but ultimately rewarding
journey. Most of all, it is essential at this time that we not
appear hesitant or otherwise lacking in resolve. Cancellation
of, or slowing, the Peacekeeper deployment would unavoidably
give such an appearance to the Soviet leadership. In fact,
should the Congress decide to terminate the Peacekeeper
production and deployment program during these early stages of
negotiations, the Soviets would have every incentive not to
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negotiate seriously, but to anticipate that the United States
would take additional unilateral actions which would further
reduce U.S. strength without them having to make equitable
concessions of their own. There would be comparatively little
reason for the Soviets to continue negotiating seriously in the
START area, because they would have achieved much of what they
want and could be expected to stall to see how much additional
they could obtain without concessions.
This result would not be mitigated by cancelling the
Peacekeeper and opting only for deployments of the new small
missile. The Soviets would observe that the IOC for this
alternative is planned (i.e., not a certainty) for 1992, some
seven years from now. This additional delay, coupled with 12
years of debate on just the development and deployment of the
Peacekeeper, certainly will not convey national resolve to
correct the long-standing strategic imbalance. Certainly it
will not encourage the Soviets to move toward deep
reductions--especially if they conclude that the higher costs
associated with a mobile ICBM (they have relevant experience)
will give additional support to the arguments that the U.S. will
not be willing to spend the money necessary to procure
sufficient small ICBMs to correct the imbalance.
It is useful in this regard to recall the comments made by
former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, a Senior Counselor to
the Scowcroft Commission, at the time the Commission published
its report:
To [abandon the MX and] say that the United
States will modernize in the early 1990s
with a small single-warhead missile will
just not be believable. The Soviets would
be justified in calculating that any new
U.S. ICBM system will be aborted by some
combination of environmental, doctrinal,
fiscal, and political problems.
Thus, this report reaffirms the wisdom of the bipartisan
Scowcroft Commission to proceed with the full program featuring
phased deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles beginning in 1986
and development of a new small ICBM for a 1992 operational
capability. In addition, Peacekeeper will be instrumental in
producing an arms control reduction of Soviet forces which will
guarantee the viability of the small missiles deployment in
fiscally reasonable numbers.
The Effect of Peacekeeper Deployment on ICBM Vulnerability
In requesting this report, the Congress directed that it
include the "...findings of the President concerning the effect
of the acquisition and deployment of such missiles on the
vulnerability of the United States land-based intercontinental
ballistic missile force."
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From a technical or engineering viewpoint, the
vulnerability of Peacekeeper missiles based in existing
Minuteman silos will be roughly equivalent to the Minuteman
ICBMs currently deployed in those silos. But because the
Peacekeeper was built to withstand greater lateral motion than
the Minuteman, there would be some increase in survivability
when nuclear-induced ground shock/motion occurs.
The question of force survivability, however, is not the
same as that of silo vulnerability. Because the three legs of
our Triad each have different characteristics, a Soviet planner
seeking to construct an attack against U.S. strategic forces
faces significant timing problems. As the Scowcroft Commission
noted:
...the different components of our strategic forces
would force the Soviets, if they were to contemplate
an all-out attack, to make choices which would lead
them to reduce significantly their effectiveness
against one component in order to attack another. For
example, if Soviet war planners should decide to attack
our bomber and submarine bases and our ICBM silos with
simultaneous detonations--by delaying missile launches
from close-in submarines so that such missiles would
arrive at our bomber bases at the same time the Soviet
ICBM warheads (with their longer time of flight) would
arrive at our ICBM silos--then a very high proportion
of our alert bombers would have escaped before their
bases were struck. This is because we would have been
able to, and would have, ordered our bombers to take off
from their bases within moments after the launch of the
first Soviet ICBMs. If the Soviets, on the other hand,
chose rather to launch their ICBM and SLBM attacks at the
same moment (hoping to destroy a higher proportion of our
bombers with SLBMs having a short time of flight), there
would be a period of over a quarter of an hour after
nuclear detonations had occurred on U.S. bomber bases but
before our?ICBMs had been struck. In such a case, the
Soviets should have no confidence that we would refrain
from launching our ICBMs during that interval after we had
been hit. It is important to appreciate that this would
not be a 'launch-on-warning,' or even a 'launch under
attack,' but rather a launch after attack--after massive
nuclear detonations had already occurred on U.S. soil.
As a result, the Commission concluded that:
... the vulnerability of such silos in the near term,
viewed in isolation, is not a sufficiently dominant part
of the overall problem of ICBM modernization to warrant
other immediate steps being taken. ...
These judgments remain valid today.
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It is also important to recognize that compared to
Minuteman, the increased capability of Peacekeeper to place
at risk even the hardest Soviet targets will strengthen substan-
tially our ability to deter nuclear attacks. The extent to
which a Soviet planner is deterred from undertaking an attack
depends significantly on his calculation of our retaliation
exacting heavy damage on Soviet assets. The deterrent value of
Peacekeeper must be viewed from the Soviet perspective and their
estimate of risk to their key assets. Peacekeeper's
capabilities ensure that such an estimate of risk will be very
high. The same cannot be said for the capability of the
Minuteman force against these same key assets, because Minuteman
is not sufficiently effective against these installations. We
believe, therefore, that Peacekeeper's ultimate survivability
resides in its ability to deter attack in the first
instance--and, thereby, increase the survivability of not only
the entire ICBM force but of the entire Triad as well.
ICBM Basing
It was the intent of Congress that this report should
provide:
...information regarding options to enhance the basing
mode survivability of deployed Minuteman II and III
missiles, the soon to be deployed Peacekeeper (MX)
missile, as well as information about the basing
options under consideration for the small ICBM. This
should include an assessment of the merits of hardening
existing silos, constructing new super-hardened silos,
multiple aim point configurations and closely spaced
array basing options. Such an assessment should
address the availability, possible siting, and
potential cost issues for each basing option, as well
as any environmental and arms control considerations.
In March 1983, the Department of Defense completed and
forwarded to the Congress the "Strategic Forces Technical
Assessment Review." This document, which served as a technical
input to the Scowcroft Commission's deliberations, reviewed 11
basing proposals and four alternative missile deployments on the
basis of:
o Strategic capability: deterrence, military capability,
survivability, endurance, resiliency, and defendability;
o System Feasibility: cost, schedule, technical risk,
operability/supportability, siting, environmental, and
public interface;
o Policy considerations: arms control and foreign policy.
Each basing and missile alternative combination was
evaluated at the subfactor level by measuring the alterna-
tive against a standard of evaluation for the subfactor.
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Application of the standard resulted in a rating of either
outstanding, good, fair, marginal, or poor for the
specified subfactor. In turn, they were combined to yield
a resultant rating for the criterion. No attempts were
made by the Commission to weight any subfactor; all were
treated equally.
For this Report, we re-examined the sections of the
Technical Assessment Review (TAR) pertaining to the multiple aim
point and closely spaced basing alternatives. After that
review, we concluded that the TAR's judgments of the evaluation
criteria for these two basing alternatives remain largely valid.
The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of those
assessments.
o Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS)
The MPS concept proposed a force of Peacekeeper
missiles shuttling throughout a larger number of horizontal
shelters placed approximately one mile apart. Its
rationale was to force Soviet war planners to target each
shelter because they could not know with sufficient
confidence which ones actually contained missiles. The
review showed that, absent real and verifiable arms control
restraints, the Soviets could have placed this basing
concept at risk either through increased fractionation of
their existing missiles (putting a larger number of smaller
warheads on the missiles) or by adding new missiles, thus
reducing its potential for survivability to a marginal
level. Such a basing concept would incur high acquisition
costs and evoke significant environmental issues in
comparison to the basing option selected for the
Peacekeeper. For these reasons and subsequent Soviet force
developments this approach was rejected.
o Closely. Spaced Basing (CSB)
The Closely Spaced Basing (CSB) proposal involved
placing missiles in super-hardened silos positioned
optimally about 1,500 feet apart in an overall geometric
arrangement occupying about seven square miles. This
concept was designed to enhance survivability in two ways:
(1) by protecting the missile in super-hardened silos, and
(2) by forcing the attacker to sequence the attack (to
avoid fratricide) of the silos such that his successive
waves of attacking missiles would take hours to complete
it, thus furnishing time in between waves to launch a
retaliatory strike before the missiles can be destroyed.
Currently, it appears that the only practical means
of attacking optimally spaced targets is with specialized,
very high technology weapon systems. These include
maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with earth penetrating
weapons, very high accuracy MaRVs with homing sensors,
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and synchronized fuzing systems that allow virtually simul-
taneous detonations of all attacking weapons. Even with
these advances, the degree of operational precision
required is so high that overall confidence in an attack
would probably be very low.
However, one of the potential problems associated
with closely spaced basing is the possibility of a
"pin-down attack." Such an attack might be able to prevent
a retaliatory strike, for long periods by detonating
weapons over the deployment area every 30 to 60 seconds.
Obviously, this would be an inefficient use of their assets
that could be mitigated by deploying U.S. missiles in a
greater number of arrays separated by at least five to
eight miles. Thus, each must be "pinned" separately,
raising the number of weapons expended in a pin-down attack
to an exorbitant level; also, some believe that this type
of attack could be mitigated by an active terminal defense.
The overall performance of this basing mode is
-outstanding for its deterrent, military capability,
survivability (both current and projected threats),
defendability, siting, and public interface. Its costs
and environmental impacts are moderate in comparison to
the basing mode selected for the Peacekeeper and the other
alternative basing modes. Because of these attributes,
notwithstanding some technical uncertainties, it was recom-
mended as a basing mode for the Peacekeeper in 1982.
Subsequently, it was rejected by the Congress.
o Modification of Existing Minuteman Silos
Existing Minuteman silos could be modified to an
upper-bound hardness level of three to four times that of
current silos (new super-hardened silos can be made vastly
harder--see the following section). This would add
some degree of survivability to any ICBM deployed in
them--Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, and the
small ICBM. However, the modification would be extensive.
The silos would receive a new circular top closure about
two or three feet thicker than the current covering device.
At launch, it would be lifted by the new missile canister,
then tipped off to one side as part of the egress process
during the initial launch sequence. The structure of the
silos' launcher equipment room and the launch tube would
be substantially strengthened by adding more steel and
concrete. The launch tube to hold the missile's launch
canister would be lengthened, from 5 to 55 feet (deeper),
depending on whether the small ICBM, Minuteman (II or
III), or Peacekeeper were to be deployed in it. The opera-
tional support equipment would be repackaged and mounted in
a saddlebag configuration near the top of the missile
canister. Other changes involve EMP protection and changes
above ground at or near the silo for interfacing with
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completely new maintenance and transport vehicles. Cost,
both acquisition and life-cycle, for such modifications
would be high. Environmental impacts would be low.
o Peacekeeper Basing
As noted previously, however, the Scowcroft Commission
took a very different approach to ICBM modernization. Its
recommendations for, and the Administration's approach to,
the modernization of the ICBM force separated the problem
into its near- and longer-term elements. This approach to
the problem resulted in the following conclusions:
oo None of the short-term needs for ICBM force
modernization would be met by deploying any missile
other than Peacekeeper.
oo Deployment of Peacekeeper in Minuteman silos would
permit fielding the missile at the earliest possible
date and at the lowest cost.
0o No other basing mode would be available in time to
meet the missile's initial, or for that matter,
realistically meet its full operational capability
dates, nor is it clear that we could capitalize on the
effectiveness of alternative basing options in the
near term to warrant the additional cost associated
with them.
oo For the longer term, Peacekeeper survivability can be
improved by additional measures including the
super-hardness described below, active defense, or a
complementary combination of these and other measures.
We believe these conclusions remain sound and correct.
We believe that the overriding national security necessity is to
get the new Peacekeepers with their vastly improved accuracy and
yields, deployed and operational as soon as possible.
Construction of New Super-Hardened Silos
We have made remarkable progress over the past two years in
our research program on silo hardening. It is now possible to
construct new silos perhaps 25 to 40 times as hard as current
silos. The resistance of these silos to nuclear effects would
be significantly above the level of both our current silos and
the estimated hardness of Soviet silos. Initial results from
scale-model tests have been highly encouraging.
Structures have been designed and tested which will survive
near the edge of a nuclear crater. Techniques developed for
earlier hardened systems are generally applicable, but excep-
tional technical development can enable us to deal successfully
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with air-blast in the very high overpressure region and with
near-crater ground shock and electro-magnetic pulse. The
super-hard silo design approach uses steel to confine concrete
sufficiently to resist loads rather than carry these
airblast-induced loads. For example, the percentage of steel
has increased over the current Minuteman design by a factor of
four to eight, depending on the design alternative. One other
factor also has come to play on the potential effectiveness of
these new silos--U.S. construction material technology. Commer-
cially available construction materials have improved signifi-
cantly in strength since the first Minuteman silos were con-
structed over 25 years ago.
The missile lateral and vertical shock isolation capability
has also been increased through some new technological advances.
Current lateral shock isolation technology is based on
canisterization of the missile and new Peacekeeper-type shock
isolation materials and designs. The canister acts as a
strongback, uniformly distributing the shock isolation loading
along the missile through many pads. New, high efficiency
foam/crushable materials have been developed which distribute
a nearly constant force against the missile canister even when
the outer silo structure moves violently, thus mitigating the
otherwise destructive effects of a nuclear blast.
However, airblast in the very high overpressure region,
crater size, and near-crater ground shock and fratricide effects
among attacking weapons are the most significant and uncertain
areas of nuclear weapons effects associated with super-hard
silos. As recommended by the Scowcroft Commission, we have
concentrated our recent effort on reducing the uncertainties in
these specific effects or, in the case of fratricide, the many
nuclear effects that could destroy, damage, or change the
trajectory of an incoming weapon following the detonation of
another weapon.
Recent analyses by the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
have encountered physical relationships that complement the
developments in silo hardening technology. These analyses
indicate that craters resulting from nuclear detonations are
much smaller under certain circumstances than previously pre-
dicted. This fact, coupled with improved shock isolation system
design technology, has increased our ability to protect a silo's
contents within a constrained silo volume. Furthermore, missile
egress now appears feasible through debris depths twice as thick
as previously believed possible. Taken together, these develop-
ments suggest that Peacekeeper deployments in super-hardened
silos could, in the future, greatly enhance Peacekeeper's
survivability.
This technology is not now ready for full production.
Larger-scale tests are required to confirm the scale-model
results, and to reduce the uncertainties associated with all
these new technologies. Nevertheless, it seems clear that silos
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can be built many times harder than predicted in 1983. This
program, which is about 30 percent complete, is discussed in
detail in the Secretary of Defense's ICBM Modernization Program
Annual Progress Report to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and House of Representatives, 15 January 1985. This
report concluded on the following note:
While encouraging progress has been made, much
work remains to be accomplished to resolve
uncertainties and validate hardening technology
through large-size tests. If successfully
validated, hardening technology holds great
promise as a survivable ICBM basing mode.
Should a decision ultimately be made to proceed with
hard silo deployment for Peacekeeper to enhance mid-term
survivability, additional funds would be needed. Because the
Soviets will always try to improve their missile accuracies, to
the point where even super-hardened silos begin to become
vulnerable, the importance of the Strategic Defense Initiative
becomes more evident, not to protect silos but to prevent Soviet
missiles from reaching any of their targets.
Small Missile Basing
The FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act also required a
discussion "...of proposals for the basing mode for the small,
single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile."
In accordance with the Scowcroft Commission's conclusion
that deploying the small ICBM in more than one mode would serve.
stability, we are currently examining three potential basing
options for the small ICBM: hard mobile basing; continuous road
mobile basing; and super-hardened silo (the same technology
applicable to future Peacekeeper) basing. Several developments
of note have occurred in the past year.
Competitive contracts were awarded for weapons system
concept definition, propulsion, C3, and guidance system alterna-
tives. Thus far, results stemming from these initiatives
indicate that difficult, but not insurmountable, technological
challenges still exist in (1) building an affordable guidance
system; (2) developing a safe, high-energy propellant that meets
the missiles' weight restriction; (3) designing an effective C3
system; and (4) reducing the overall cost of ownership. Our
work on these and other development efforts indicate that the
design goals for the missile are within reach. The Secretary of
Defense's Report on ICBM Modernization, cited previously,
contains additional details.
o Hard Mobile Launcher
The hard mobile basing mode is currently the primary
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focus of attention as a basing mode for the small ICBM.
The concept employs launcher vehicle hardness and mobility
to provide survivability by imposing a heavy price on the
attacker to negate the system. The hard mobile launcher
would likely be deployed on existing Department of Defense
(DOD) or Department of Energy (DOE) controlled land, where
it would be dispersed randomly and moved periodically. The
associated launch control centers, which are ground-mobile,
will probably operate both on and off government land to
ensure survivability.
In order to assist the basing mode and area selection
decisions associated with entering full-scale development
next year, efforts are underway to prepare a Legislative
Environmental Impact Statement by late 1986. The Legislative
Environmental Impact Statement will address any potentially
significant environmental impacts that may be created as a
result of stationing the small ICBM at candidate deployment
areas. Preliminary systems and operational requirements are
being applied as criteria for screening available DOD- and
DOE-controlled lands to eliminate unsuitable areas.
Advanced threats that might be able to obtain prompt
tactical targeting information for seeking mobile launchers must
still be investigated. Threats may take the form of cruise or
ballistic missiles with inflight targeting updates or terminal
homing capabilities. Even if one or more of these might become
feasible after the year 2000, mitigating countermeasures may be
available, but more research will be required in this area.
The principal cost issues for this basing mode are related
to manpower required for physical security and maintenance of
the system. The physical security concept calls for passive
delay and denial measures in the Hard Mobile Launcher to prevent
unauthorized access to the nuclear warhead, with rapid response
forces being available to supplement the crew. Because of the
large area occupied by the system, providing security for the
nuclear assets and maintenance of the system to assure readiness
tend to be manpower-intensive. Various deployment/operation
options are being studied to reduce manpower and attendant
significant costs.
The hard mobile launcher concept definition studies were
begun and simulated blast tests were completed on scale models
of candidate launchers submitted by four competing firms. Based
on these results, we have selected two of these firms to proceed
with the pre-full-scale development phase. This program is
currently on schedule and within cost.
o Continuous Road Mobile Basing
The continuous road mobile concept would achieve
survivability by dispersing minimum-hardness system
elements over a large area. These "soft" vehicles would
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utilize a continuous move-park-move cycle on all-weather
roads rather than on DOD- or DOE-controlled lands to
achieve survivability.
In concept, the Continuous Road Mobile system reduces
the technical risk of development by reducing its hardness
and mobility requirements. However, it increases potential
public opposition, security, and command and control
problems because of its large area of operations. This
system is less susceptible to advanced threats than the
Hard Mobile system because it can expand its deployments
into larger areas.
The system costs tend to be driven by manpower
requirements. As with Hard Mobile basing, the security
concept calls for passive delay and denial measures to be
incorporated for protection of the nuclear assets, with
rapid response forces available to supplement the drivers
and security escorts. Costs and manning tend to be higher
than those of Super-Hard Silo or Hard Mobile basing because
of the special physical security forces required, the
dispersal of maintenance operations over a large area of
the continental U.S., and the manning needed to operate
the system over this area. On the other hand, the conven-
tional design requirements for the launcher would reduce
acquisition costs. Also, the system tends to be
insensitive to changes in the size of the threat, since
it can easily be expanded to greater areas once it is
established.
Finally, super-hardened silos for the small ICBM could
conceivably complement a hard mobile basing concept. The
current generic hard silo research and testing being undertaken
will have application to the small ICBM as it does the
Peacekeeper.
We are proceeding on a prudent schedule to meet the planned
operational capability date of 1992 for the missile. Missile
flight tests will begin in late 1988 or early 1989 based on a
full-scale development decision in 1986. The 1986 decision will
also commit the program to a primary basing mode for initial
deployments. While we believe this represents excellent
progress for a program started only a year and a half ago, it is
clear that the small ICBM can be deployed no earlier, without
incurring unacceptable levels of technical risk, than its
planned IOC of 1992. This planned IOC, coupled with the other
attributes of the small ICBM, continues to reinforce our belief
and strong recommendation that the Peacekeeper must be deployed
as soon as possible and that the small missile is complementary
to, but not a substitute for, the Peacekeeper.
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Conclusion
This report documents the President's review of the
Peacekeeper program requested in the 1985 Department of Defense
Authorization Act. The President has concluded that further
acquisition of operational Peacekeeper missiles is in the
national security interests of the United States and is consis-
tent with United States arms control policy. The President has
reviewed the effect of the acquisition and deployment of
Peacekeeper missiles on the vulnerability of the U.S. land-based
intercontinental ballistic missile force and found that the
recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission remain valid.
The President's review also concludes that the continued
efforts of the Soviets to expand their strategic forces has
heightened the military need for the Peacekeeper missile. The
Report also notes that Peacekeeper production and deployment
is closely related to our chances of achieving significant
reductions in nuclear arsenals in Geneva. It notes that should
the Congress decide to terminate the Peacekeeper production
and deployment program during the negotiations, the'Soviets'
long-term efforts to reduce U.S. strength without meaningful
negotiating and without having to make equitable concessions
of their own would be realized in considerable measure.
Finally, the Report concludes that Peacekeeper deployment
in existing silos is essential to enhance deterrence and to
maintaining crucial options for restoring the survivability
of land-based ICBMs in a cost-effective manner in the years
ahead.
In re-endorsing the Scowcroft recommendations the
President strongly recommends that production and deployment of
the Peacekeeper missile continue as planned in parallel with
development of a new small ICBM.
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