COMMENTS TO UNITED STATES SIGINT PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001201560048-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: June 13, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DCl/IC 85-041
JUN I 9 35
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
STAT
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT:
Comments to United
States SIGINT Plan
STAT
REFERENCE:
United States SIGINT Plan
The SIGINT Committee Staff has completed its review of the 1985 edition of
the United States SIGINT Plan. The Staff endorses the Plan but believes that
you should know that it contains only a single reference to the Future SIGINT
Capabilities Study (FSCS). This undoubtedly resulted from the concurrent data
call and publication schedules for the two documents. The SIGINT Plan was
prepared before FSCS conclusions were available. There is no cause for
concern however, since the SIGINT Plan is still largely consistent with the
results contained in the FSCS. I expect that the next edition of the Plan
will incorporate those items agreed upon in the FSCS that are not reflected in
the current (1985) edition.
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT
ARE UNCLASSIFIED
STAT
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
NO FOREIGN
DIS SEMINA
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APPROVAL OF NSA/CSS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY NSIVCSS
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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
le Sources APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS
noting Agency's CODEWORD MATERIAL
ion Required
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TCS-58105-85
22 April 1985
UNITED STATES SIGINT PLAN (U)
1985
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
NOFORN
NOCONTRACT
WNINTEL
ORCON
Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify On: Originating Agency's Determination Required
APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND
NSA/CSS ?SSP
LETTER OF PROMULGATION
The United States SIGINT Plan provides executives
with an understanding of the U.S. SIGINT System (USSS)
and an appreciation of the direction the U.S. SIGINT
System will take in coming years. The courses of action
are formulated on the basis of our projections of the
environment in which the USES will operate, an estimate
Mf the nature of SIGINT requirements likely to be levied
during the planning period, and the resources and tech-
nology which will be available to maintain and improve
the SIGINT System.
In describing our concept of the SIGINT System of the
future, this edition of the U.S. SIGINT Plan reflects some
of the key initiatives identified in plans prepared in
accordance with the NSA/CSS Planning System.
Since this document reflects the latest in Agency
planning, we have called it the 1985 edition of the U.S.
SIGINT Plan. There will not be a 1984 edition.
We welcome your comments on the U.S. SIGINT Plan and
on related future SIGINT needs. Please send them to the
National Security Agency/Central Security Service, ATTN:
Director of Plans (01).
(Zte,
ROBERT E. RICH
Deputy Director
ITNCI, A SSIFIED
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UNITED STATES SIGINT PLAN (U)
I. INTRODUCTION (U)
A. The United States SIGINT Plan (USSP) (U)
1. (U) The USSP constitutes a corporate estimate
of what must be done to attain the most effective posture
for the U.S. SIGINT System in the future. It is published
annually to provide a reasonably current analysis of SIGINT
targets and requirements for signals intelligence, and to
describe plans and strategies for achieving an affordable
level of capability for major technical specialities or
? functional components of the U.S. SIGINT System. The 1985
edition identifies specific courses of action proposed for
the mid-range (FY86-90) as well as more general perspectives
produced by the new NSA long-range planning system.
2. (U) The USSP is intended to provide to those
who direct governmental policy or military operations:
o An appreciation, in nontechnical language,
1110 of the SIGINT System targets and the process used to derive
SIGINT information;
o An understanding of the inadequacies of the
U.S. SIGINT System in meeting anticipated SIGINT requirements;
O An explanation of the NSA/CSS strategy for
investment and resource allocation to overcome these short-
falls; and
?? A perspective on the specific plans and
actions which will promote a more effective U.S. SIGINT
System.
?
B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Defined (U)
(FOUO) Signals intelligence is a generic term
for the effort to exploit foreign communications and non-
communications signals as a means to satisfy U.S. intelligence
requirements. SIGINT consists of three elements: Communi-
cations Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (FLINT),
and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT),
however transmitted.
1
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? COMINT is the technical and intelligence
information derived from foreign communications by other than
the intended recipient. COMINT results from the collection
and processing of foreign communications passed by radio,
wire, or other electomagnetic means and the processing of
foreign plaintext and encrypted communications, however
transmitted.
' FLINT is the technical and intelligence
information derived from foreign noncommunications, and
electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic
detonation or radio-active sources.
o FISINT is the technical and intelligence
information derived from the intercept, processing, and
analysis of instrumentation emissions associated with the
testing and operational deployment of foreign aerospace,
surface, and subsurface systems which may have either
military or civilian application.
C. The United States SIGINT System (USSS) (U)
1. (S-CCO) The worldwide USSS comprises the
National Security Agency/Central Security Service, the Service
Cryptologic Elements (SCEs) of the Military Departments, and
integral cryptologic elements of military tactical or combat
commands. The SCEs are the Army Intelligence and Security
Command, the Naval Security Group, and the Air Force Elec-
tronic Security Command. The USSS encompasses units of the
SCEs at both fixed headquarters and field sites and also
those organic to tactical commands. Also included in the
USSS are certain collaborating U.S. agencies with defined
SIGINT responsibilities. In addition, a number of cooper-
ating foreign governments contribute to the SIGINT System.
2. (C-CCO) The key objective of the USSS is
responsiveness to validated needs of all SIGINT users, from
tactical to national levels. Statements of requirements
primarily are handled by the SIGINT Requirements and
Evaluations Subcommittee (SIRVES) of the DCI's Signals
Intelligence Committee. Once validated, the requirements
are documented in the National SIGINT Requirements List
(NSRL) for NSA/CSS tasking of the USSS.
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4. (S-CCO) NSA senior management has also
identified Third Party relationships as significant issues
for long-range planning. Strategies for these relationships
are under development.
E. National Plans (U)
(C) In addition to the plans produced under the NSA/CSS
Planning System, the Agency plays a vital role in the devel-
opment of the following national plans:
? The National ELINT Plan (NEP) - The NEP is a
document used to coordinate FLINT activities throughout
the U.S. Government and to enhance the use of FLINT. A
? revised NEP is being written for publication in early
1985. This effort is a continuation of the FLINT planning
that the Secretary of Defense directed NSA to lead in
1981. The revised plan is being prepared and will be
monitored by the National FLINT Group, which is comprised
of representatives of the Military Services and the major
intelligence agencies.
? The FIS Processing Master Plan - Foreign Instru-
mentation Signal processing activities currently exist at a
110 wide number of Government laboratories, military agencies,
and contractor facilities. The FIS Processing Master Plan
provides the necessary mechanisms for the coordination of
these activities. It was developed under the leadership
of the National Security Agency and the Military Service
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Agencies (the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Missile Intelligence Agency of
the U.S. Army, the Naval Intelligence Support Center of
the U.S. Navy, the Foreign Technology Division of the Air
? Force), and the Central Intelligence Agency.
?
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0
X
UNCLASSIFIED
DIGITAL COMMUNICATION SIGNALS
STACKED CARRIER
SPREAD SPECTRUM
?
1960
DIRECT
SEQUENCE
TDM
1970
CDMA
TCS-58105--85
LPI
FREQUENCY
HOPPED
SATELLITE SWITCHED
?
STATISTICAL MULTIPLEX
TDMA PACKET SWITCHED
1980
CDMA = Code Division Multiple Access
LPI = Low-Probability-of-Intercept
TDM = Time Division Multiplex
TDMA = Time Division Multiple Access
Figure 1
UNCLASSIFIED
7
1990
?
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NUMBER OF TRANSPONDERS
?
?
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
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SATELLITE TRANSPONDER GROWTH
(36MHz BANDWIDTH)
1980
1985
1990
Figure 3
UNCLASSIFIED
10
1995
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Functional Improvements
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there are other vital objectives on which communications
plans or studies will be conducted. These objectives
include:
o Hardening of SIGINT
facilities against the effects of radiation or physical
disruption;
o Reviewing the ini-
tiatives required to provide survivable and enduring
communications to the USSS; and
o Providing the capa-
bility to manage the bandwidth available to the USSS more
efficiently.
411 b. Networking_ (U)
(1) (S) Current ADP networking capabil-
ities are based on packet-switching technology. Approximately
100 Agency and Second Party computing systems are interfaced
with the network. Common protocols are employed to control
transferring data in small packets over optimal routes
for high reliability. Uniform interfaces are provided for
40 computer-to-computer communications, data manipulation,
and interactive and bulk data transfer services. In addition,
standard computer software and hardware are used for ease
of implementation and efficient life-cycle support. The
current ADP network, although generally centralized at
NSA, has a growing number of spurs for remote sites and is
maintained as a general-purpose utility to support a variety
of users and applications.
? (2) (U) Networking will have to be
extended to a larger number of customers, both in-house
and in the field. The quality and functionality of the
networking services provided must be improved, and the
cost of connecting to the present Agency network must be
reduced.
(3) (U) Growing attention to support
of tactical forces will probably result in a major thrust
for networking development and deployment. The customers'
requirements in this area should result in the need for a
very flexible and dynamically configured network. The
loading that results from the above and from other, more
conventionally evolving requirements may temporarily and
adversely influence the level of networking services provided.
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(4) (U) Four factors will generally
influence Agency networking in the mid-range:
o Because of their speed and
relative low cost, there will be a greatly increased demand
for electronic information transfer services;
o The sharp drop in costs in
computing power will ease the cost and problems currently
associated with networking;
' Continuing development of
protocol standards will result in easier development of new
applications and a greater variety of networking equipments;
and
o The use of satellites for
communications will continue to be cost effective.
(5) (FOUO) These factors should be
included in the broad use of packet-switched networks
and a growing number of local area networks. The communi-
cations costs for local access circuits will still be
relatively high, and the NSA tendency will be to deploy
network interfaces closer to the user. The proliferation
of networks of various kinds will keep inter networking a
problem and cause some awkwardness in customer usage.
(6) (S) In terms of the recent FY86-90
Capabilities Programming and Budgeting (CPB) process, the
general thrust of funded ADP-networking initiatives will
be to specifically capitalize on unique satellite communi-
cation technologies for packet-switching networks, to develop
local area networking technology for analyst connectivity
and field site architectures, to provide a standard modular
interconnection mechanism tailored to specific requirements,
and to develop a capability for real-time protocol execution
over the network for command and control, speech, and
instrumentation applications.
(7) (S) The need to facilitate the
timely distribution of various types of data to support the
USSS will continue to grow in importance over time. The
current approach of wiring users' networks and equipments
together is unacceptably rigid for tomorrow's changing
application needs. Computer technology advances are
allowing major thrusts in the distribution of functions on
a global scale. This is resulting in the need to support,
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as a standard operating procedure, a level of interoper-
ability only rarely experienced today. The key to this
interoperability is an extensive ADP-networking capability.
It will require a major investment over a long period of
time.
c. Time-Sensitive Processing System. (U)
(1) (U) This system comprises the
communications and computer resources that support processing,
analysis, and reporting of events that are characterized
as "time-sensitive" and require rapid responses.
(2) (U) To cope with growth trends and
responsiveness requirements, the time-sensitive system
planned for the future must be a practical extension of
the present system, implemented in a controlled, gradual,
low-risk approach. The future system will maintain many
of the centralized functions on highly reliable modular
target computers. The gradual move toward target-oriented
modular computers, instead of the use of a large central
processor, will provide high reliability, operational
flexibility, and ease of expansion. The building blocks
of the improved system are terminal access, an application
processing component, a communications interface component,
and a local network for exchange within the time-sensitive
complex.
(3) (C)
This plan
will facilitate replacement of outdated systems and will
dramatically improve reporting capabilities at several of
the large surveillance and warning centers.
d. COMINT Signals (U)
(1) (C-CCO) COMINT signals processing
converts intercept that is on magnetic tapes to individual
data streams for follow-on processing that leads to the
production of signals intelligence. The processing needs
created by the changing signals environment and by planned
improvements in collection and forwarding will require
replacement of older, ineffective systems, development of
new systems, and the capability for on-line/sequential
processing of a large number of high-interest signals.
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h. General ADP and User Supp.drt (U)
(1) (C) General ADP and user support
systems provide the NSA Operations Organization with a
large-scale automatic data processing complex and analytic
support capability that improves the efficiency, quality,
and timeliness of the entire SIGINT production process.
The volume and complexity of collected data continue to
demand large-scale computers, high-volume data base facil-
ities, and accessibility through general and tailored
terminal access systems. The present complex supports the
full range of SIGINT production, is accessible from more than
1,000 terminals, and extends access to overseas locations.
(2) (S-CCO) Annual processing capacity
growth has ranged from 20 to 50 percent. This growth may
be sustainable without increases in future funding if
technology trends for ADP systems are sustained. NSA's
ability to collect the more complex and advanced signals
will require a commensurate capability to process that
portion of the total collected data considered of highest
interest.
(3) (U) During this decade, signifi-
cant advances will be made in providing flexible and easy
access to very large computers with the capability for
significant local (at the analyst's desk) processing and
fusion of data from many sources. Technological advances
will allow users to have "smart" terminals with processing
power to do a much higher percentage of work in local
centers connected by networks.
(4) (C) The user environment will he
supported by a move to the User Interface System (UIS).
This will provide more commonality across the Operations
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Organization and will reduce the number of tailored user
terminal access systems. During this decade, more than
5,000 terminals will be placed on-line with large processors.
(5) (U) To continue to provide the
required support, NSA will need to recruit, develop, and
maintain a stable, highly competent work force for hardware
and software maintenance as well as for development and
acquisition of new systems. There are many dangers in an
overdependence on contractor support for functions vital to
the continued production of SIGINT. The need is for a
proper balance in order to retain the skills to keep systems
working, particularly in times of crisis. NSA will continue
the effort to attract, hire, and retain engineering and
computer science professionals as well as the technicians to
maintain the proper balance between in-house and contractor
support.
(6) (U) In order to increase the capa-
bilities and productivity of support personnel, a greater
effort will be made to utilize computer and electronic
techniques in the support area. Office automation, word
processing, text editing, programmer and maintenance
terminals, personal computers, and data base management
will all be expanded and extended in the ADP and user
support area.
(7) (U) Software engineering tools
and methodologies will be vigorously exploited to improve
the productivity of NSA software developers and maintainers.
Ada, the DoD standard language, for embedded computer
applications, will increase in importance for NSA software
use. Artificial intelligence tools will also be introduced
to assist software developers.
i. Information Resources Management (U)
(1) (U) Information resources manage-
ment is concerned with the effective management and optimal
use of the information resources within the USSS and in
support of the national cryptologic mission. This includes
operational direction and exploitation of information
resources and systems, maintenance of library and archival
facilities, and administrative direction of a records
management program.
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(2) (U) Information handling tech-
nology is evolving at a rapid pace, affording the opportunity
to process and distribute digital data quickly, to store
and retrieve large quantities of information in full text,
and to interact with customers on-line. These developments
are creating a new environment for information support
and a requirement to install new data base management
systems.
(3) (U) The increase in the amount
of information available, the increasing sophistication
of the information requests to be answered, and the need
for life-cycle management of information require the imple-
mentation of the following initiatives in the 1980s:
o Acquisition of a mass storage,
high-speed text search and rapid retrieval system for the
large amount of hard copy documentary and graphic material
now being handled in its original form;
? Acquisition of an integrated
library automation system, which will provide bibliographic
control of the materials and rapid access to holdings in
the multiple collections of the NSA/CSS Libraries;
o Establishment of an information
center that will provide ready walk-in or phone access to
open source and classified source information, and which
will feature a facility to demonstrate the Agency standard
personal computers, a software library, access to Agency
history, specialized country or geographically-oriented
information stores, and specialized collections for technical
users;
o Acquisition and exploitation of
new commercial data bases, and the development of specialized
files to enhance the research capability of information
resources management;
o Development of a fully automated
storage, retrieval, and distribution system accessible
through analyst/transcriber/professional/executive work
stations, taking full advantage of user support systems
that are in place or are planned;
o Development of an integrated
life-cycle records management system that includes SIGINT
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management information; collateral, scientific, and techni-
cal documents; life-cycle support cost information; and
that captures the bibliographical description of archival
records early in the processing cycle;
o Participation in the development of
a Community Information and Retrieval System (CIRS), iden-
tification and sharing of data bases of common interest
and utility with other Intelligence Community members, and
use of the Community On-Line Intelligence System (COINS)
network;
' Development and promulgation of
policies and standards for the efficient, effective, and
economical management of NSA information resources; and
o Development of a Vital Records Program
responsive to SIGINT System survivability and Continuity
of Government (COG) planning.
j. Administrative ADP (U)
(1) (U) The administrative ADP facility
provides a central computer capability to support the
essential corporate management processes and execution of
responsibilities through man-machine interaction. This
system supports every NSA/CSS organizational element and
employee.
(2) (U) The use of state-of-the-art
hardware and software to modernize man-intensive NSA admin-
istrative procedures and to meet regulatory and legal
410 requirements is planned. The intention is to provide a
large number of users with the capability to retrieve and
update time-critical data on security clearance status,
travel orders, job applicant data, general personnel data,
and finance, payroll, logistics, training, and planning
and programming information via an interactive terminal
network and on-line storage facility. The system consists
of a large-scale central processor with the requisite
peripherals and as many as 210 interactive terminals and
remote-job-entry stations. Planned system upgrades will
keep pace with projected increases in user requirements
for processing support, most of which will be interactive.
The principal NSA organizational users are the Directorates
of Administration, Programs and Resources, Plans and Policy,
and Logistics.
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(3) (U) The one administrative ADP
system now in use will be augmented by two modern hardware
and software systems that will support the finance and
logistics functions of major NSA/CSS support organizations.
These systems will have their peripherals connected through
a network and will support over 120 interactive terminals.
A phased implementation is planned. Full operating capacity
is expected in 1987.
k. Community On-Line Intelligence System
(COINS) (U)
(1) (C) During the next decade, NSA
will continue to expand use of the COINS network as the
primary means for distributing SIGINT product on-line and
for providing users with full-time, direct on-line access
to SIGINT product. Access will be consistent with the
security and need-to-know requirement of each user. The
objective is to reduce the amount of routine SIGINT product
distributed electronically or in hard-copy form.
(2) (C) The COINS network is currently
providing on-line service to more than 50 organizations
worldwide. All of them have access to the formatted SIGINT
product files in the NSA batch retrieval system. A majority
also have access to the NSA SIGINT On-Line Information
System (SOLIS).
(3) (C) NSA operates two host proces-
sors in the COINS network:
? RYE/TIPS: This is a batch-retrieval
system which has been in operation at NSA since the late
1960s. It provides analysts within NSA and some external
users with on-line access to 17 formatted SIGINT product
files. Its remote terminals are the principal means by
which NSA analysts can access other agencies data bases
in the network.
? SOLIS: This system contains full
text of the latest 14 months of SIGINT product. The data
base is updated every 30 minutes with electrical reports
issued or received by NSA during the preceding half hour
from field sites and collaborating centers.
(4) (S-CCO) Three major initiatives
are being undertaken to improve COINS for NSA:
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o Replace RYE/TIPS with a new system
capable of handling both batch and interactive interrogations
of formatted SIGINT product files;
o Install a gateway between COINS and
the NSA PLATFORM network so that an NSA user in PLATFORM
can access non-NSA files and user. services available in
COINS in either a batch or interactive fashion, depending
on the capability of the host being accessed.
(5) (C) The intention over the next
few years is to expand and improve customer access to
SIGINT product via COINS, and to promote NSA use of other
agencies' data bases accessible to NSA through the network.
Actions required include:
o Raising the security level of the
information;
o Providing for the automatic distri-
bution of routine SIGINT product to specific customers by
subject category via the COINS network;
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o Ensuring that all major customers
have on-line access to both formatted and unformatted SIGINT
product;
o Improving the reliability and per-
formance of NSA systems and files in the COINS network;
o Making available additional types
of SIGINT product to the Intelligence Community via COINS
by dual-connecting additional NSA host processors to the
COINS network;
o Demanding improvements in the reli-
ability and performance of both the COINS network and other
hosts operating in COINS that are being used extensively
by NSA analysts; and
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VII. STRATEGY FOR CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT TO MILITARY
OPERATIONS (U)
A. Introduction (U)
1. (C) Cryptologic Support to Military Operations
(CSMO) is the set of actions taken to provide SIGINT infor-
mation to U.S. commanders and other recipients in order to
plan, exercise, and execute strategic or tactical military
operations. CSMO also includes those Communications Security
(COMSEC) measures designed to protect the integrity of U.S.
communications in support of military operations. All
segments of the USSS perform CSMO to facilitate commanders'
decisions and initiatives, with emphasis on the production
and rapid, secure dissemination of accurate information
to support planning, force allocation and maneuvering,
command and control, weapons targeting, and other combat
functions.
2. (C) In 1982, NSA published "The USSS Concept
of Support to Military Operations," which addressed the
development of a single interdependent USSS that is fully
responsive to U.S. commanders' intelligence needs. To that
? end, a guide is being written which will implement specific
planning procedures for ensuring the coordinated development
of CSMO matters at NSA. In addition, "Cryptologic Area
Architectures" are being developed to enhance tailored
support to operational commanders. One such architecture,
being developed to support Allied Command Europe (ACE),
will serve as the model for CSMO in other regions; it
will also be appended to ACE's Theater Intelligence
Architecture Program as a SIGINT annex.
3. (C) NSA/CSS also publishes SIGINT Support
Plans (SSPs) in support of certain JCS and Unified and
Specified Command contingency and war plans. SSPs
establish the concept of cryptologic operations, identify
the resources to be employed, and specify the elements
of the USSS to be used to provide SIGINT in satisfaction
of military commanders' intelligence-related requirements.
These requirements include Essential Elements of Information
(EEIs), COMINT and FLINT requirements, nuclear strike
assessments, OPSEC support, and SIGINT-related communi-
cations support.
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B. Information Requirements (U)
(U) CSMO responds to the cryptologic requirements
of commanders at various decisionmaking echelons. These
commanders have different informational needs based on their
responsibilities and assigned missions, and the nature of the
CSMO provided to each level of command varies accordingly.
1. (C) When engaged in combat, operational or tac-
tical commanders require the most time-critical CSMO that can
be provided. CSMO for these commanders includes the support
necessary for battlefield targeting and surveillance relevant
to the commanders' Area of Operations (AO).
2. (C) The CSMO requirements of Unified and
Specified and Component commanders are generally broader
and less time-critical than those of operational commanders.
The CSMO provided must enhance mission planning, mission
assessment, and, to a lesser degree, mission execution.
This level of CSMO permits a comprehensive view of the AO
in support of both joint operations planning and joint
Service coordination of tactical forces.
3. (C) CSMO provided to the National Command
Authorities assists these officials to direct the conduct
of military operations in pursuit of national goals and
objectives through the provision of SIGINT-derived political,
economic, and strategic military information.
4. (S) SIGINT must support the operational
missions required to prosecute the commander's warfighting
concepts. This requires an understanding of the timing and
geographic relationships between friendly and enemy operations
and determination of "critical time" vulnerability to guide
selection of high-value SIGINT targets and to tailor reporting
of results to action recipients. The goal is a precise
SIGINT attack synchronized to the dynamics of specific
military operations rather than pursuing a more costly all-
signal collection and correlation approach.
C. Collection Capabilities (U)
(S-CCO) Organizationally, the USSS has been
functionally divided into direct service and direct support
activities:
? Direct service activities provide SIGINT
to all levels of command, and include fixed field sites,
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overhead collection systems, and the NSA/CSS. They may
focus on any area of the world; employ a wide range of
collection systems and sophisticated or unique analytic
capabilities; exploit technically complex communications-
electronics target systems; and may detect, locate, identify,
and track hostile mobile units, but normally not with
sufficient accuracy to support the targeting needs of
tactical commanders.
? Direct support activities are normally
organic to the supported force, directly responsive to the
supported tactical commander, and exist primarily to satisfy
the tactical information needs of the operational commander.
Direct support systems focus on the battlefield situation
? confronting the tactical commander; employ mobile and
fixed systems which can rapidly adjust collection efforts
based on tactical needs; primarily exploit communications-
electronics of tactical units; and provide locating data
sufficiently accurate for limited tactical targeting purposes.
? To further enhance this mutual support in a
period of transition to war, selected fixed field stations will
be chosen to participate in Project FOUNDRY, which allows for
? the augmentation of direct support units from direct service
assets, while maintaining the capability of the fixed stations
to respond to national tasking.
1. Direct Service System (U)
a. (C-CCO) Direct service systems will
continue to emphasize improving the use of direct service
collection systems to support tactical requirements. While
the initial design of these systems may not have considered
tactical applications, their capabilities should be fully
exploited to achieve an equitable balance of strategic and
tactical intelligence production.
b. (S-CCO) Direct service systems, partic-
ularly fixed ground sites, will continue to be modernized,
capitalizing on the latest technological advances and
providing for greater selectivity in exploiting high-capacity
target communications and data streams.
c. (C) The initial efforts at NSA to develop
a system-wide nodal point for direct service operations in
NSOC will continue. The development of Special Support
Activities includes improvements in connectivity with the
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remote operations facilities, access to tactical communi-
cations channels, information handling and delivery systems,
and collection management systems that will permit direct
service assets to be managed coherently with direct support
systems, and with the components complementing and supporting
each other.
d. (S) Direct service systems will be
required to provide a broader scope of information (both
within and outside the range of organic sensors) and fill
unique collection requirements relating to exploitation
techniques in the HF, SHF, and higher frequencies. The
increased emphasis placed on C31 during crisis situations
will be accomplished by these systems.
f. (S) In advanced systems development
programs, the capability to support military commanders
is considered an integral function in design, management,
and operation. Advanced systems can be used to cue tactical
systems for target surveillance and target acquisition
purposes and may, when combined with tactical systems
data, provide the necessary accuracy for targeting. The
possibility that future advanced systems could provide
targeting by themselves will be explored.
g. (S-CCO) Second and Third Party support
is integrated into SIGINT direct service product to provide
information on activities, events, and the communications
environment in areas where the U.S. has no collection
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capability or the capability is not adequate or, for cost-
effectiveness considerations, is less productive.
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2, Direct Support Systems (U)
? a. (U) Direct support systems must be
capable of placing information in the hands of the supported
commander before it loses its operational value. This
requires that initial reporting be done as close as possible
to the point of collection. The output must be commensurate
with the user's information handling capability and be
directly transmitted in a usable form whenever possible.
In joint and combined operations, SIGINT tactical systems
must be interoperable with other operational sensors across
Service lines, regardless of echelon.
b. (C) Direct support collection systems
are designed to be responsive to the wartime needs of the
supported commander and flexible enough to accommodate
changes in the commander's requirements at any given point
during the battle. At a minimum, the peacetime collection
mission should provide training against targets tasked in
wartime. CONUS-based units do not have peacetime collection
missions because of their peacetime locations.
411 c. (S) To support tactical commanders,
direct support collection equipment must be mobile and trans-
portable; durable; as survivable as the forces they support;
flexible in frequency coverage; capable of initiating
requests for and receiving direction finding information;
modular; easily maintainable; interchangeable; and capable
of being employed by ground, naval, and airborne elements
with minimal reconfiguration. Collection systems must be
automated where practical yet be able to operate in semi-
automatic or manual modes if degradation occurs. In addition,
there is a continuing need to develop collection systems
with reduced power, weight, and size. An example of a
special capability being developed to meet these common
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requirements is the Lightweight Tactical SIGINT Payload
(LTSP).
d. (S) Since close-in tactical support
constitutes a high degree of risk, it will be necessary to
ensure that alternate coverage of tactical targets is
provided for and that deployable back-up hardware, software,
and personnel are available. Collection degradation must
be held to a minimum, with additional assets in logical
positions capable of replacing or supplementing resources
lost to such events as tactical overrun and systems failure.
e. (C) Future direct support systems must
consider integration of more sophisticated antennas to
filter out unwanted signals in very crowded portions of
the spectrum.
f. (S) SIGINT tactical modeling must be
pursued, on a geographic basis, to simulate and evaluate
the anticipated wartime signal environment in conjunction
with SIGINT systems operating against it.
g. (S) Linguistic shortfalls in direct
support units can be fulfilled partially by making the
target environment accessible to U.S. and Allied military
linguists and to U.S. and Allied civilians located at
safe havens by providing reliable and survivable communi-
cations to and from tactical commanders. Advances in
automated collection and processing techniques also offer
potential improvements in this area. Furthermore, the
Services will have to develop innovative methods to retain
and enhance their language capabilities.
h. (C) Effective tactical
lection by Service direct support elements
timely access to technical data, including
resident in NSA data bases. Therefore, an
data support capability must be developed to ensure rapid
exchange of technical data among NSA and Service tactical
elements.
SIGINT col-
is dependent on
information
automated SIGINT
i. (S) Planning must be effected for the
capability, at the outbreak of hostilities, to replace
vulnerable sites (e.g., border sites) with high-altitude-
aircraft sensor systems. This consists of remotely
tuned receiver connections to the United Kingdom and/or
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CONUS for European targets, and CONUS for Far East and
Southeast Asian targets. A simultaneous receiver control
capability must be available from at least two or three
locations. Advanced system design enhancements can help
to accommodate this need.
D. Processing Capabilities (U)
1. (C) Processing and reporting systems must
stress timeliness, accuracy, and interoperability, with
priorities based on timeliness factors derived from the
command and control system and weapons reaction times of
the supported tactical commander. Because combat infor-
mation needs differ from tactical intelligence needs,
SIGINT processing systems and reporting that address
these needs are different. There are COMSEC implications
that derive from the handling and transmission of different
types of data.
2. (S-CCO) Overall, the direction for SIGINT
processing is to selectively handle signals more rapidly,
with emphasis on identification of target events based
on the analysis of signal activity, characteristics, and
profiling (templating). Techniques developed for programs
such as Specific Emitter Identification, Signals Para-
metric Analysis, and Hull-to-Emitter Correlation, will
continue to be used for association of emitters with
specific weapons, platforms, and units.
3. (S) All future SIGINT systems must be
able to process more signals more rapidly with more
"front-end" discrimination. Field processing systems
will be as automated, compact, modular, technologically
current, survivable, and as mobile as practicable. Data
forwarding systems will be designed to handle inputs
that have been digitized, compacted, and selected for
transmission using a minimum of communications capacity.
Once certain front-end processing functions, such as
location, identification, and translation are accomplished,
another crucial facet of processing must occur--that of
tailoring the reported data to the user. "Filtering"
should be done in accordance with user priorities with
regard to subject, timeliness, and area, and the user's
ability to handle the information.
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1
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1
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1
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CSG SOUTHCOM/NCR SOUTH
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