US STRATEGY ON BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS AND USMLM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001301600008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 27, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
Fritz Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
NIC No. 01656-85
27 March 1985
SUBJECT: US Strategy on Berlin Air Corridors and USMLM
1. In the USMLM incident we are talking tough, asking for a full
investigation and Soviet apology, are prepared (along with the British
and the French) to confine to Soviet missions in West Germany to their
compounds for a few days, but have not formulated a strategy designed to
produce meaningful Soviet actions.
2. The shooting of the USMLM officer also comes at a time when the
USG, after over a year of relative passivity, is finally getting ready to
tell the Soviets at the Dobrynin and possibly Gromyko level that it will
no longer tolerate the unilateral Soviet imposition of reservations in
the air corridors and will stage demonstration flights through these
reservations to prove its point.
3. It is very possible that the Soviets will interpret this new US
determination on the air corridor issue to be an outgrowth of the USMLM
incident. In our view we should encourage this Soviet perception and try
to take advantage of it to improve both the air corridor and the MLM
situations. Specifically:
CL BY SIGNERS
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When SECSTATE sees Dobrynin he should tell him that Soviet
actions are undermining the quadrapartite arrangements in
and around Berlin. He should detail the year long Soviet
unresponsiveness to our air corridor concerns. We want the
unilateral im osition of reservations to stop an a
mutual acceptab se otution wore out. e s ou then
point out t at oviet actions are a so endangering the
continued existence of the Missions (for instance, the
imposition in spring 1984 of expanded and extremely
bothersome PRAs, the intentional ramming by an East German
truck of a French Mission car that resulted in the death of
a French NCO, the Glienicke Bridge affair, and now the
unacceptable use of firearms by a Soviet soldier). He
should conclude by saying that unless the Soviets change
their behavior, we will be forced to conclude that they are
intent on unilaterally changing the four-power arrangements
and we will be forced to take ap ro riate action. Ne can
add a w~ a approac Ong ~s oviet
counterpart on the MLM issue.
-- Simultaneously, CINCUSAREUR should be instructed to seek a
meeting with his Soviet counterpart CINCGSFG and tell him
that, for their own protection, the Soviet Mission in
Frankfurt (and hopefully in the French and British zones as
well) is confined to its quarters. Until the Soviets take
satisfactory steps to ensure that the Missions can continue
to operate safely within the terms of the agreements
setting them up. Specifically we want to talk about strict
instructions to all security personnel about the treatment
of Missions and about a mutual build-down of the permament
restricted areas that, as now es~gne grea y impe a an
even en anger the travel of the Missions by forcing upon
them lengthy detours, some on very poor minor roads. If we
cannot get a CINC-to-CINC meeting, we should request a
meeting at the next-lower military level.
4. There is no guarantee of success in this approach, and indeed we
are not likely to get all we want. But we should try to extract the
maximum advantage of the defensive position into which the Soviets have
been forced by the action of one of their soldiers. To have any chance
of success, this strategy must be implemented without delay ( Rick Burt
is seeing Soviet DCM Sokolov this afternoon and SECSTATE will probably
see Dobrynin Saturday.)
~ ~ ~~ ~ ~
f ~~
z Ermarth George Kolt
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NIC No. 01656-85
27 March 1985
MEMO FOR: DCI
FROM: NIO/EUROPE
NIO/USSR
SUBJECT: US Strategy on Berlin Air Corridors and USMLM
DIstribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - (handcarried original)
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/EUR chrono
1 - NIO/EUR subj.
NIO/EUR/GKOLT/sb1,~~27MAR85
SECRET
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~t II
Central Intelligence Agency
26 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeffrey Gallup
Office of Central European Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
SUBJECT: CIA's Comments on Draft State Memorandum
for Mr. McFarlane on Berlin Air Corridor Planning
/330
1. As stated in the DDI typescript of 20 March 1985, subject Soviets
Take Tou her Line on Berlin Air Corridors, we believe that "the Sovie~-
pro a y wi not move to rea t e ea ock on the (corridor) issue
unless faced with stronger Allied pressure." We, therefore, agree with
the basic intelligence judgment of State's draft memorandum, namely that
"further firm pressure on the Soviets" will be required to obtain
"greater (Soviet) cooperation and consideration of Allied rights and
requirements."
2. We would wish to add, however, that the recent shooting of a
USMLM officer in East Germany should be taken into account when deciding
on a precise US course of action. Although the shooting and the air
corridor issues are not directly related, we believe that the Soviets may
well perceive any firm US action in the air corridors now -- after over
one year of general passivity -- has been precipitated by a US/Western
desire to get tough in the wake of the shooting. In undertaking the
firmer course on the air corridors posited in the State draft memorandum,
we should take this possible Soviet perception into account -- either to
disabuse them of it or to encourage it for our own ends.
Execi'~ive Secretary
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhin~ton, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 01602-85
25 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: USMLM Shooting Incident
1. What Happened?
-- A little over three years ago a USMLM officer had gotten
inside Soviet tank sheds and obtained excellent photographs
of a Soviet tank.
-- The MLM team that went to the Ludwigslust area on Sunday,
24 March, had the standard composition of the officer in
charge and a Sergeant-driver. As the officer reconnoitered
around tank sheds, the driver maintained a lookout from
within the vehicle and spotted a Soviet soldier. Without
warning the Soviet soldier fired first at the Sergeant (a
shot which did not hit) and then twice at the officer. One
of these last two shots proved fatal. The Soviets
prevented the US Sergeant from administering first aid to
the US officer and did not begin treating him until at
least half an hour after the shooting. They pronounced him
dead an hour after the shooting.
2. _Anal~sis. Based on my personal knowledge of USMLM operations I
believe theme -olTowing circumstances led to this tragedy:
-- The USMLM team was probably taking advantage of a normally
quiet Sunday afternoon to reconnoiter a fairly sensitive
target.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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The Soviets may have become sensitized to US collection
against their tanks, which could have induced the Soviet
high command to demand higher vigilance from its Security
personnel.
For whatever reason, the Soviet guard who spotted the US
team was probably "trigger-happy" and disregarded the
standard Soviet practice of firing warning shots and
immediately shot to kill. Alternatively, he may have
considered the shot fired in the vicinity of the vehicle a
warning shot and may then have shouted an order to halt,
which was not heard by the Sergeant in the vehicle nor by
the US officer.
The shooting was not deliberately instigated by the Soviet
high command but was the result of an unfortunate
combination of circumstances - something that has happened
before in Mission history, but up to now had fortunately
never resulted in the death of USMLM personnel. (A French
officer was killed by East German troops in a ramming
incident in 1983.).
The Soviet refusal to let the US Sergeant administer first
aid is inexcusable. It probably resulted from unreasoning
application of the normal Soviet practice of keeping
Mission personnel apart when they are detained separately
and from the high state of excitement among the Soviet
enlisted men on the scene.
3. Where do the Soviets go from here?
-- The almost immediate dispatch of the Chief of Staff of the
Soviet forces in Germany to the scene shows Soviet
realization that they have a major problem on their hands.
The Soviet rejection of any blame in the incident is a
natural diplomatic tactic. The statement of the Soviet
Chief of Staff to the USMLM chief that "you are doing
everything possible to damage relations between our two
countries" suggests some nervousness about Moscow's
possible reaction to the incident.
-- At the same time the statement by the Soviet Embassy in
East Berlin that the incident was a matter solely for the
US and Soviet militar commands indicates a desire to keep
the incident at the owest level possible.
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-- The most recent Soviet statement at the scene to the effect
that, regardless of who is to blame, the incident is a
deplorable tragedy also suggest a desire to play the
incident down.
-- If this last interpretation is correct the Soviets may
declare the Sergeant persona non grata but do not want to
use the incident to endanger the further operation of the
Missions.
4. What Should the US Do?
The real reason for this tragedy is the operational context
created by Soviet secrecy which requires the Mission to be
aggressive. Tempting as it may be to use the incident to
castigate the Soviets, doing so will not get us much.
First, as inexcusable as the shooting and the delay in
administering first aid are, the US team was clearly caught
in an intelligence operation. This is not a second "KAL".
Second, if they wish, the Soviets could publicize some
incidents in which some Soviet soldiers have been hurt in
encounters with Mission vehicles.
USAREUR has made a strong protest to the Soviet military,
demanded an explanation, and held it responsible for any
further deterioration in relations. This is the right
channel and the right approach.
We should refrain from responses that might escalate to the
point that the continued existence of the Missions is
jeopardized. The Mission has provided and will continue to
provide some of our best intelligence on the Soviet general
purpose forces.
Our objective now should be to get the incident off
newspaper pages as soon as possible. It is imperative that
no USG official give any backgrounders or "off the record"
sessions to journalists. There can and probably should be
a prepared press statement castigating the Soviets for
their callous resort to firearms but we should not let
ourselves be tempted into going beyond this.
In sum, we should not let our revulsion over Soviet
brutality make us lose sight of our objectives. From an
intelligence perspective, this should be to get the USMLM
back into operation, preferably in a climate where the
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SECRET/
Soviets are less apt to use force against the Missions. At
best, this will probably take a few months. During that
time we should reexamine whether the USG has done
everything it could to restore as wide an area of operation
as possible for the mission (that is a diminution in the
size of permament restricted areas) with as wide a margin
of safety as possible. Paradoxically the shooting may make
the Soviets more amenable to suggestions in this regard.
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/EUR chrono
1 - NIO/EUR 3.4
1 - A/NIO/EUR
NIO/EUR/GKOLT/sb~~25MAR85
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