WARNING REPORT - CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001501880005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 31, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP87M00539R001501880005-1
TRANSMITTAL
SLIP
31
IT July 1985
TO: Executive
Secretary/DCI
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM: A/NIO/AL
Ro9~t14NA.
BUILIJ
EXTENSION
1 FEB 56 24 1 WHICH MAY BE USED.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP87M00539R001501880005-1
 SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
tgence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/06: CIA-RDP87M00539R001501880005-1
NIC 03809-85
31 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Acting National Intelligence Officer at Large
SUBJECT: Warning Report - Chemical and Biological Warfare
1. Representatives of the Intelligence, Policy and Research and
Development Communities met on 16 July to discuss chemical and biological
warfare issues. Discussion focused on the contribution of arms trade and
technology transfer to the proliferation of chemical weapons.
2. While no warning/forecast issues per se were raised, the meeting
highlighted the complexity of potential and actual control measures,
which necessarily draw upon intelligence, economic, political and
military equities. We anticipate that chemical weapons will continue to
spread, in part because the technology can be obtained from many
different sources.
3. My summary of significant items from the meeting is attached, as
is the list of participants.
25X1
Attachments:
As stated
(2 - 14~~l 0
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SECRET
NIC 03809-85
31 July 1985
SUBJECT: Warning Report - Chemical and Biological Warfare
DCI/NIC/A/NIO/AL(CBW)
Distribution (Internal):
/txecutive Secretary/DCI
SRP
Each NIO:
NIO/AL (H. Ford)
NIO/AF
NIO/CT-NARC
NIO/EA
NIO/EUR
NIO/FDIA
NIO/GPF
NIU/LA
NIO/NESA
NIU/SP
NIO/S&T
NI0/USSR-EE
NIO/WARNING
NIC/AG
AD DI
Each DDI Office Director:
D/GALA
D/OEA
D/OEURA
D/OGI
D/ONESA
D/OSOVA
D/OSWR
D/OCPAS
D/OCR
25X1
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Iq
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26 July 1985
Proliferation of Chemical Weapons:
Contribution of Arms Trade and Technology Transfer
Current Status
The capability to produce chemical weapons and to wage chemical warfare is
spreading throughout the Third World. This proliferation has been stimulated
in part by the growing arms market and the broad availability of necessary
technology. This trend is likely to continue because:
--the numbers of suppliers of arms and technology are growing;
--suppliers may benefit by gaining political leverage;
--provision of arms and/or technology is financially lucrative; and
--thus far, control measures in technology transfer have been generally
unsuccessful.
How rapidly a country is striving to achieve CW-capability may affect the
potential for interdiction. A country attempting to become CW-capable quickly
will have to rely heavily on purchase of finished or nearly finished products,
some of which are unique and already subject to export controls. With greater
time available, the acquiring country can establish several alternate supply
routes and/or develop the building blocks domestically, thereby reducing
dependence on external suppliers for unique materials and expertise. In the
latter case, points of possible interdiction in the process are fewer and the
liklihood of arresting development less.
Publicity about the spread of chemical weapons will make the task of
monitoring proliferation even more difficult because it reinforces the
inclination to make the program covert.
SECRET
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