ANGOLA: US STRATEGY AND COMMENTS ON THE PAPER IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 5, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhinaton, D.C. 20505
NIC #01833-85
NationallntelligenceCouncil 5 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering ~~
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Angola: US Strategy and Comments on the Paper
"Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements"
REFERENCE: Memo for NIO/AF from DCI, dtd 3 Apr 85,
Subject: Angola: Impact of Alternative
Regional Settlements
1. The paper "Angola: Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements"
which you forwarded to me for comment is the standard State recitation on
Angola. Although the paper is by and large factually accurate, I find it
overall a useless and unfixable document.
2. The paper correctly suggests that three of the four "strategies"
posited are not feasible--a judgment in which I heartily concur. I also
would argue that the fourth "strategy"--some form of UNITA-MPLA
reconciliation--is wishful thinking and unattainable. In my judgment the
lack of political and military realism reflected in the paper undercuts
its value. Just as importantly, the paper fails to address core strategic
US interests or suggest how we best can get from here to there.
3. I draw your attention to what I believe are errors of fact and
interpretation in the original paper--which I assume came from State. The
paper in its "current scene" analysis overstates the interest in
reconciliation within the MPLA leadership. The "reliable sources"
primarily are MPLA interlocutors speaking to State officers. These
statements must be regarded with suspicion. Both MPLA public and private
conduct, as well as intelligence reporting, points to the lack of support
at senior MPLA levels for any genuine power-sharing or reconciliation with
UNITA. There is some evidence to suggest that the statements to State in
fact are disinformation (the Zambians, for example, have so concluded).
This error is multiplied in the fourth "strategy" where the paper suggests
the possibility of a reconciliation even though admitting serious
CL BY SIGNER
SECRET DECL OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
SECRET
problems. I think more needs be said about the problems. For example,
the paper makes no allusion to the 1975 coalition between MPLA and UNITA
which ended in July 1975, with an MPLA campaign of massacre and
assassination of all UNITA cadres in reach. This experience certainly
constrains any UNITA participation in any future coalition with the MPLA.
None of the scenarios mention UNITA and MPLA suspicion of and outright
hostility to American or other outside-proposed solutions, yet evidence of
this exists. Finally, the original paper suggests that the MPLA-UNITA
deadlock is a permanent feature. Neither I nor DDI nor DIA analysts
believe this to be the case. In the recent IA "Angola's Civil War:
Outlook for 1985," the DDI foresaw the very real possibility that
continuing pressure by UNITA will eventually break the MPLA, producing a
dramatic MPLA collapse--albeit admitting that such an outcome is more than
a year away (relevant two paragraphs attached as Tab 6).
4. Given the serious deficiencies in this paper, I have drafted what
I consider to be a more useful examination of US interests and discuss how
these interests would be affected under four scenarios. As such, I judge
which scenario best serves US end-game interests (UNITA victory), examine
current US policies and suggest policy adjustments that would facilitate
the desired outcome.
5. In sum, I do not believe the original State paper is fixable or
helpful to policymakers since none of the strategies are reasonably
attainable. I offer my paper, attached, as a different way to analyze the
same policy problem.
Fredet'~ick L. Wetteri
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
5 April 1985
I. US END-GAME INTERESTS IN ANGOLA
It is vital to articulate the core US strategic interests--referred
to here as "end-game interests"--that we wish to see served in Angola.
US diplomatic as well as other efforts can then be better geared to
ensuring that these interests are attained.
Our end-game interests can be summarized as follows:
Ending the civil war in Angola and thus eliminating the
justification for Soviet and Cuban military presence and
influence in Angola.
Creating a situation to force the removal of the Cuban
military expeditionary force from Angola, thereby invalidating
the belief that such intervention is an effective technique of
Soviet Bloc power projection.
Reducing Soviet influence with whatever government exists in
Angola and eliminating Soviet military air and naval use of
port and harbor facilities at Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe which
threaten US control of the South-Central Atlantic and
facilitate Soviet military power projection from the West
Coast of Africa to Cuba and within Africa.
Limiting Soviet-Cuban opportunities for politically and
militarily influencing developments in neighboring states,
especially Namibia.
Limiting opportunities for armed confrontations between South
African and Soviet-Cuban military forces in Angola--
conf rontations which could escalate to a point where they
weaken South Africa or become a serious global issue between
the US and USSR.
II. LIKELY END-GAME SCENARIOS
The critical factor in achieving these interests is the coming to
power of a regime in Luanda capable of reducing or eliminating the Soviet
and Cuban military presence. At the same time, this regime must be able
to conclude effectively the MPLA-UNITA civil war. The key question then
becomes: what regime is best equipped to carry out these tasks? Four
scenarios--ranging from least to most likely--are presented below.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
Scenario 1: MPLA-UNITA power-sharing in a coalition government.
There are no precedents in Africa for genuine or longlasting
power-sharing arrangements between two rival political forces. Although
UNITA leader Savimbi has paid some lip service to the possibility of such
a coalition, other UNITA officials openly point to the January-July 1975
power-sharing arrangement between MPLA and UNITA under the Alvor Accord.
This effort ended with MPLA forces suddenly and treacherously moving
against UNITA elements, murdering those caught and driving the remainder
into opposition in the bush. MPLA leaders--for their part--have shown a
pathological fear of Savimbi; MPLA objections to elections in 1974-1975
reflected their fear of Savimbi's popularity even among their own rank
and file. No MPLA senior leader has evinced strong support for genuine
reconciliation, although at least one has ruminated on the possibility of
using reconciliation talks to entrap and murder senior UNITA leaders.
The conclusion is almost inescapable that prospects for a genuine
reconciliation and power-sharing are so remote as to make this scenario
extremely unlikely.
Scenario 2: Partition, either de facto or de jure between MPLA and
UNITA.
There is little evidence to suggest partition is being seriously
proposed. Third World and African states--citing the examples of Biafra
and Katanga--would vigorously oppose such a solution especially since
South Africa would be the only party to directly benefit from division.
Any de facto partition or "ceasefire in place" almost certainly would be
seen by one or both principal parties as a tactical breathing space to be
used to re-equip and rearm for further struggle. Neither the MPLA nor
UNITA is likely to abandon for long their national ambitions and accept
"half a loaf." While such a scenario probably could be hammered out with
difficulty, it would not provide a durable solution.
Scenario 3: MPLA victor over UNITA includin absor tion of
elements of UNITA but probab y not its eadership .
There are elements of the MPLA leadership which have indicated
dissatisfaction with the Cuban presence and could conceivably dismiss
most of the Cuban troops in the wake of an MPLA suppression of UNITA.
Such an outcome, however, would change the circumstances of a Cuban
withdrawal from ignominious exit to victorious withdrawal. Moreover, it
is unlikely that the paranoid vanguard MPLA leadership would dispense
entirely with the Cuban military presence (witness Ethiopia). It also is
most unlikely that such a regime would restrict significantly Soviet
presence and influence. Militarily such a scenario is conceivable but it
would require a long time frame--several years--as well as an
increasingly active and aggressive role by Cuban and other forces. It
also would require a lessening or elimination of South African and other
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
outside support to UNITA. It is difficult to see how such an outcome
serves US end-game interests.
Scenario 4: UNITA victor over MPLA includin absor tion of some
elements of MPLA but roba not its eadershi
A victorious UNITA regime almost certainly would move to quickly
remove Cuban troops and restrict the Soviet presence and influence. This
clearly serves all US end-game interests. Moreover, such a scenario is
militarily conceivable, though obviously not without difficulties. It
would require an accelerated Cuban reluctance to engage in combat and the
withdrawal of Cuban troops to enclaves. It also would require the
defection of significant elements of the MPLA military and possibly
elements of the MPLA political apparatus to UNITA's side. Increased
external support from South African and other sources also would be
required. As with Scenario 3, such an outcome will require several
years, although a rapid MPLA collapse--ala the South Vietnam
government--cannot be ruled out. ~
III. US STRATEGY
To best achieve US interests, our strategy should be directed
toward ensuring the evolution of Scenario 4--a UNITA victory. Given
legal constraints (Clark Amendment) as well as probable lack of
Congressional and popular support for a direct US role in supporting
UNITA, our ability to influence the situation is limited. Even excluding
direct military or covert engagement, however, other avenues--some of
which already are being pursued--are open to us. These include:
Encouraging South Africa, France, Zaire and other suppliers
and supporters of UNITA to expand their materiel, political
and diplomatic support.
Manipulating US contacts with the MPLA regime to magnify
factionalism by weakening the pro-Soviet elements and
encouraging factions which could be "reconciled" (in effect
absorbed by UNITA). This also would involve encouraging
anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet attitudes. This manipulation
obviously must be done subtly so that the US is not perceived
as openly working against the MPLA.
Discouraging Western investment which provides hard currency
to the MPLA regime, much of which is used to pay the Soviets
and Cubans for their support and presence.
Discouraging the supply by Western sources of economic aid and
military and military-related materiel to the MPLA regime.
SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
SECRET
-- Facilitating expanded UNITA contacts with conservative and
moderate foreign governments and forces which could provide
increased political, diplomatic, and military support to UNITA.
-- Facilitating the increase of pro-UNITA, anti-Cuban and
anti-MPLA propaganda to weaken Cuban and MPLA resolve and
increase UNITA'e legitimacy.
The USG, in fact, currently is pursuing elements of all of the
above proposed steps, although with differing amounts of intensity and
consistency and without a clear conception of strategic purpose. The
proposed strategy does not call for new or dramatic departures from
current policies, but rather renewed emphasis and enthusiasm in acting
along existing lines. Given the foregoing analysis, we should not be
disheartened if diplomacy fails to attain an unreachable goal such as
MPLA-UNITA reconciliation.
What is needed is the shared vision that US interests are
attainable, that the basic elements of an appropriate policy already are
in place, and that patience and perseverance with these policies can have
a pay off .
As evidence that the framework of current US Angola policies is
working towards the desired end-game, one only has to look at a map of
Angola. Since 1981, UNITA fortunes have flowered. UNITA has expanded
its area of operations from one-fourth of the country to the entire
country. South African, French, Zairian and other support has
increased. The costs to the Soviets and Cubans have increased, and there
is evidence that the Cuban will to remain engaged may be flagging.
Overall, the MPLA has been weakened by the emergence of yet more
factions, including what appears to be a putative peace faction and a
black nationalist faction that could be absorbed by UNITA. The current
military stalemate could very conceivably be ended, not by any single
dramatic military action, but by gradually mounting pressure by UNITA
until the MPLA loses the will to continue the conflict. At such a point,
MPLA collapse could be rapid and dramatic.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDSBT
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/Pers
14
D/Ol~
15
D/PAO
16
SA/IA
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPD/OIS
NIO
V I
C AF DO
E ecutive Secretary
Apr 85
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
3 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Angola: Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements
Take a look at this paper and see how you can improve it, reflecting
recent reporting, particularly Mobutu's and Zavimbi's apparent attitudes
that Crocker may be leading them down a arden path. This came out quite
clearly in a discussion that and I had with Ambassador Grove
yesterday morning.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
~,~~ ~` 25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5
Q
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/16 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950012-5