TALKING POINTS FOR THE 5 SEPTEMBER NSC MEETING ON SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001502000012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 5, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #04471-85
5 September 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering Zv
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Talking Points for the 5 September NSC Meeting
on South Africa
1. The NSC will convene at 1500 hours on 5 September to discuss
US-South Af rican policy and you are scheduled to give a 5-minute
intelligence update. Attached are talking points for your use which have
been coordinated with DDI/ALA and NIO/Economics.
2. My understanding from the NSC Staff is that the primary area of
discussion will be over how to handle the forthcoming sanctions bill from
Congress and to discuss a public diplomacy strategy to explain the
Administration's South Africa policy. The policy may be briefly outlined
by Mr. McFarlane or Secretary Shultz. I understand that Mr. McFarlane
extracted the South Africa-only parts of the draft NSDD which was the
subject of active discussion and has cast that into a South Africa-only
NSDD--we do not have a copy of this. The NSC Staff assures me that the
broader policy questions on Southern Africa--Namibia, Angola, and
Mozambique--will not be on the agenda or in the NSDD.
3. I understand that Secretary Shultz, based on a conversation he
had with Federal Reserve Chairman Volker, takes a more pessimistic view
of the short-term prospects of the South African economy than we do. We
have not yet been able to ascertain Volker's views or information leading
to that pessimism. Absent this, we remain comfortable with our
assessment.
4. You may wish to note that our new South African SNIE is going to
press toni ht and copies will be available in a day or two. The Key
Judgments copy attached) were disseminated last week.
Atts: A. Talking Points
6. Key Judgments,
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
~/tl~ ~
Frederick L. Wetterin
v ~ ~~
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NIO/AF
TALKING POINTS FOR NSC MEETING, 5 SEPTEMBER 1985
o South African Government attitudes: President P. W. Botha's
15 August speech is illustrative of his government's intentions.
Botha played to conservative Afrikaner attitudes, showing his
predominant concern for maintainin the support of his core Af rikaner
constituency. Polls show most Afrikaners strongly
favor restoration of law and order and cautious reform, in that
order, despite pressures from some white church and business
leaders. The subsequent major crackdown on demonstrations,
disturbances, and detentions of nonwhite oppositionists, while
opposed by many liberal Af rikaners, including Foreign Minister Botha,
reflects the priority the Botha government gives to restoration of
order before proceeding with new reforms. The increased
outspokenness of the white business community--mostly Anglophone
rather than Af rikaner--in favor of more fundamental reforms is having
little perceptible effect on Botha.
o Black attitudes: A recent poll indicates that township black
residents nonrural) are increasingly pessimistic about peaceful
reforrn and anticipating continuing violent black-white
conf rontations. The 14 million rural blacks remain unpoliticized and
passive. The current security crackdown has had the effect of
driving moderate, nonrevolutionary black opinion leaders away from
any dialogue with the government. The recent abandonment by the
mineworkers' union of a partial strike does illustrate that moderate
black trade unionists do not favor a-suicidal,
conf rontation-at-all-costs strategy. The arrest of UDF and student
leaders has largely destroyed any national mechanism for
orchestration of protests and violence; the township violence
continues to be largely led by unorganized youths. The mostly
external African National Congress has increased inflammatory calls
for violence against whites, but lacks an effective internal
organization capable of anything beyond isolated incidents.
o Internal violence: Despite a heavy increase in security measures,
episodic vio ence--mostly on a small scale--continues to flicker
throughout black townships. This violence shows little orchestration
and seems largely reactive to local events. Two incidents yesterday
involving minor nonwhite violence in white areas in Cape Province may
trigger a massive government security reaction, both to intimidate
would-be perpetrators and to preempt possible white vigilante
reaction. The incidents immediately followed an ANC external radio
call for blacks to bring the violence into white residential areas.
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o Economic crisis: A short-term solution to South Africa's economic
crisis has not yet emerged, and depends largely on the willingness of
Swiss, German, and UK banks to roll over short-term loans and extend
new credits. The fluctuations in the rand are having a negative
psychological effect both on white South Africans and external
investors. The SAG is also running short of foreign currency. We
anticipate that the SAG will succeed in rolling over its short-term
debt (~6 billion due in the next six months) and borrowing foreign
currency against its gold reserve. New loans are more dependent on
external perceptions of stability. We do anticipate a stabilization
of the rand, debt rescheduling and new borrowings but at a
significantly increased cost. In order to accomplish short-term
stabilization, the South African Government is jeopardizing both an
economic recovery in 1986 and longer-term growth.
o Outlook: We do not anticipate any significant government action on
reform until after the 30 October by-elections. Following those,
reforms will address already introduced subjects--citizenship,
modification of influx control, and cautious moves toward a new
federal constitutional arrangement. Such reforms will be introduced
slowly and already have been discounted by black opinion leaders as
insufficient. We do not see black opinion leaders other than tribal
homeland leaders engaging in any dialogue with the SAG in the next
several months. We do anticipate continuing township violence
despite heightened security measures, but not orchestrated in any
effective way. Occasional attacks on white residential areas may
occur which could provoke a severe government reaction and some white
vigilanteism. The possibility of significant (and visible) black
casualties in the government suppression of disturbances remains
high. IVeither the continuing black violence nor the economic crisis,
in our judgment, will stampede the Botha government into more
significant reforms in the next year.
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