POSSIBLE KGB INVOLVEMENT IN MURDER OF POLISH PRIEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001602330007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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17 January 1985
The above Current Intelligence Memorandum, SOVA M-10013CX,
dated 10 January 1985, was issued with an incorrect
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Central In ig nce Agpxy
vV4slrngon,ncrosos
10 January 1985
Whatever the outcome of the trial currently in progress in
Warsaw, definitive evidence clearly implicating or absolving
the Soviets in the mid-October murder of human rights activist
priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko by officials of the Polish
Internal Affairs Ministry may never surface. This speculative
memorandum examines possible disadvantages and advantages the
Soviets could have seen in arranging or allowing the murder.
Whether or not the KGB was actively involved in the murder of
Father Popieluszko, the Soviets bear some indirect
responsibility. By encouraging hardline factions in the Polish
party and police to push for harsher measures against
Solidarity, they helped create the climate in which such an act
could occur.
Case Against Soviet Involvement
Several arguments can be advanced against the hypothesis
of Soviet complicity in the murder:
-- It is not at all clear that the Soviets see any viable
alternative to Jaruzelski. If they do not, they would
not wish to take any action aimed at weakening his
ability to rule.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments or questions Addressed to the
Chief, Policy Analysis Division
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Even if the Soviets wanted to remove Jaruzelski or to
increase pressure on him to hew more closely to Moscow's
wishes, they could not be confident that they could
control developments in Poland following the murder.
They might have feared that the murder would backfire,
leading to an undesirable level of popular turmoil or to
a strengthening of Jaruzelski's position. For example,
the Soviets might have anticipated Jaruzelski would use
:the murder as a pretext for a lower-level housecleaning
of the pro-Soviet faction of the Interior Ministry. He
now appears to be trying to single out Soviet-backed
Politburo member Miroslaw Milewski for negligence,
setting the stage for his removal.
-- The timing of the murder argues against KGB
participation. At a time when the Italian Government is
trying a Bulgarian for the attempt on the life of the
Pope amid suspicions of KGB complicity, the Soviets
might well hesitate to undertake an operation that could
draw attention to a possible KGB role in a political
assassination.
-- It is not necessary to posit KGB involvement to account
for the,priest's murder. Sentiment for harsher measures
against Solidarity exists within some circles of the
Polish party and security forces. A Polish faction
could have acted independently to kill the priest in
order to scare Solidarity, to cause unrest that would
force the government to crack down harder, or to create
a complete impasse between the regime and Solidarity
elements and thereby undermine Jaruzelski's position and
strengthen the hand of hardliners.
Case for Soviet Involvement
On the other hand, several reasons can be adduced that
could have impelled the Soviets to seek the priest's death:
-- The Soviets have faulted Jaruzelski for not moving
effectively to rebuild the Polish party and for being
too accommodating to opposition elements (e.g.,
Solidarity, the church). They could have believed the
murder would be instrumental in reminding Jaruzelski of
their ability to create problems for him, in creating an
environment that would make his objective of
establishing a modus vivendi with the church impossible
to achieve, or even in weakening the Polish elite's
confidence in his ability to control events and thereby
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in~c the stake for a move against him.
sett
-- The Soviets had publicly raised concerns about the
activities of Polish church figures. In September 1984,
for example, before his abduction and murder, Izvestiya
had attacked Popieluszko by name as a
counterrevolutionary. Since his murder, Soviet media
have reiterated the need for the Poles to get tough with
"political clericalism."
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Internal Distribution
1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - SA/DCI
4 - EI/DCI
5 - Executive Registry
6 - DDI
7 - Senior Review Panel
8 - 13 OCPAS/IMD/CB
14 - Chairman NIC
15 - NIO/USSR-EE
16 - NIO/EUR
17 -,C/DDD/SE Reports
18 -
19 - D/SOYA
20 - DD/SOYA
21 - C/SOYA/PA
22 - C/SOYA/TF
23 - C/SOYA/SF
24 - C/SOYA/EA
25 - C/SOVA/DI
26 - C/SOYA/SE
27 - C/SOYA/TW
28 - C/EURA/EE
29 - DDS&T/FBIA/AG -
30 - PDB Staff
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SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Attached is a speculative memorandum
assessing the possibility of KGB involvement
in the murder of the Polish priest Father
Jerzy Popieluszko. I have made no further
dissemination of this but we plan to send
a copy to Matlock, Armacost and Palmer.
Richard err
Associate Deputy Director
for Intelligence
SECRET Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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