PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON CENTRAL AMERICA; NEWS ITEM ON NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802750004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 12, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
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United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
Executive Reg-_, 1
724
February 12, 1985
MEMORANDUM TO DISTRIBUTION LIST A
FROM: S/LPD - Otto J. Reich
SUBJECT: Public Opinion Polls on Central America;
News Item or. Nicaragua
Enclosed are some items of interest we thought you
might like to have:
1. In several polls taken from May 1983 to November
1984, you will see that support for U.S. aid to the anti-
Sandinistas in Nicaragua has risen steadily from 25% to
49%. The second poll summary, dealing with El Salvador,
indicates that support for increased military assistance
to that country has also risen gradually from 22% in May 1983
to 32% in February 1984.
2. A recent article by Humberto Belli, entitled
"Drifting Toward Totalitarianism: A Report on the
Nicaraguan Elections," reviews the many ways in which
the Sandinistas manipulated the electoral process, making
it impossible to have open, fair elections in November 1984.
Mr. Belli also discusses the methods the Sandinistas are
using to tighten their control: eg. press censorship.
Mr. Belli had much personal experience with press censorship,
since he was once the editorial-page editor of the independent
Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa. Having once supported the
Sandinistas, Mr. Belli became disillusioned and finally left
Nicaragua in 1982.
Enclosures:
As stated.
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SUMMARY OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
MAY 1983 - NOVEMBER 1984
NICARAGUA
May, 1983
Los Angeles Times poll asked respondents whether "the
CIA should support an invasion of Nicaragua to overthrow
the leftist government there."
YES 10%
NO 62%
NO OPINION 28%
Gallup/Newsweek poll asked: "Should the United States
be giving ass stance to the guerrilla forces now opposing
the Marxist government Nicaragua?
YES 25%
NO 56%
NO OPINION 19%
April, 1984
A CBS/N.Y. Times poll asked, "The Reagan Administration says
the U.S. should help people in Nicaragua who are trying to
overthrow the pro-Soviet government there. Other people say
that even if our country doesn't like the government in
Nicaragua, we should not help overthrow it. Do you think we
should help the people trying to overthrow the government of
Nicaragua, or not?"
YES 27%
NO 55%
NO OPINION 18%
October, 1984
CBS/NY Times poll: "Do you think the United States
government should provide military assistance to the
people trying to overthrow the pro-Soviet government
of Nicaragua, or not?"
YES 30%
NO 44%
NO OPINION 26%
November, 1984
Lou Harris poll: "Step up the CIA assistance to the
rebels in Nicaragua who are fighting to overthrow the
Sandinista government there?
YES 49%
NO 39%
NOT SURE 12%
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EL SALVADOR
May, 1983
Response to a Gallup poll asking, "President Reagan has
asked Congress to approve an additional $60 million in
military aid for El Salvador. Do you think Congress
should or should not approve this request?"
YES 22%
NO 68%
NO OPINION 10%
September 1983
Roper poll: "Send increased military aid to El
Salvador to help its government fight against
the leftist guerrillas."
YES 29%
NO 59%
February 1984
Roper poll: "Send increased military aid to
El Salvador to help its government fight against
the leftists guerrillas."
YES 32%
NO 58%
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CATHOLICISM IN CRISIS JANUARY 1985 Pgs. 13-16
Drifting Toward Totalitarianism:
A Report on the Nicaraguan Elections
The Nicaraguan elections last fall could have been a road to peace in a wartorn
country, a stepping back from the slide towards totalitarianism. They were not.
HUMBERTO BELLI
T HE NOVEMBER 4 PRESIDENTIAL election in
Nicaragua has drawn remarkably little attention. The
arrival of a Soviet ship at Port Corinto on November 7 in-
itiated the "crisis" between the United States and Nicaragua
which has been preoccupying the media: The elections have
slipped quietly out of view. No doubt the Sandinistas would
have it that way. With almost everyone calling their bluff.
they stood only to lose additional ground from continued
focus on the elections.
It is important to analyze the elections. however, for
they provide insight into the nature -of the Sandinistas
regime and to its intended direction. But before going into
the implications of the elections let us first state some basic
facts about the way in which they took place.
Basic fact number one is that there were no true
choices. The Sandinistas succeeded in eliminating by force
or voluntary exclusion all real alternatives. Their "op-
ponents" in the elections were a cluster of tiny. splinter party
candidates, most of whom were Marxist and most of whom
were close allies of the government. Among the significant
political leaders who were either outlawed or exiled were
men such as Alfonso Robelo, former member of the San-
dinista government junta and head of the National
Democratic Movement (MDN), of center-left orientation:
Adolfo Calero, president of the large Conservative party.
imprisoned by Somoza in 1979: Eden Pastora. former head
of the Sandinista militia and hero in the war against
Somoza; Wilfredo Montalvan, head of the Social
Democratic Party; Brooklyn Rivera and Stedman Fagoth,
the top leaders of the Miskito Indians: Jose Davila. a
Somoza antagonist who is head of the Social Christian Par-
ty: and Edgard Macias, former viceminister of labor in the
Sandinista government and head of the People's Social
Christian Party.
The Sandinistas denied these men participation in the
elections on the grounds that they were 'criminals" who
have supported the armed struggle against the present
regime (some have: some have not).- The Sandinistas also
brand them "Somocistas." a charge obvious) at o s with
their political past M w is is often echoed by some oreign
)ourna fists.
-77o-se leaders who have fought against the current
government had offered to lay down their arms if allowed to
participate in the elections. But a call at Easter 1984 by the
Nicaraguan Catholic bishops. asking for reconciliation
among all Nicaraguans and for dialogue between the San-
dinistas and the rebels, was rejected by the government with
the utmost hostility. The bishops received epithets such as
"criminals" and "traitors." Sergio Ramirez, a member of the
Sandinista junta, announced that with the "contras" there
would only be dialogue "through the barrels of guns."
The Sandinistas' flat rejection of any reconciliation or
dialogue had international and domestic repercussions. In
the United States. Senator Edward Kennedy said that the
Sandinistas' words were not those of people who are gen-
uine y p e ge to ura ism.
n Nicaragua the Sandinistas* refusal of dialogue led to
the boycott of the remaining independent political forces.
together represented by Arturo Cruz. himself a former am-
bassador of the Sandinista regime to Washington. Among
these forces were the Social Christian Parry, the Conser-
vative Democratic Parry, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party.
and the two independent labor organizations still functioning
in the country: the Nicaraguan Workers Center (CTN) and
the United Confederation of Labor (CUS).
The Sandinistas tried to fill the political vacuum thus
created by resorting to a tactic used by the Somoza regime:
induce the participation of minor political figures, especially
people from the figures of the major political parties.
Nicaraguans scornfully called such candidates "zancudos."
that is, "mosquitoes," a term expressing their smallness and
lack of true bite.
The "mosquito" candidates enlisted by the Sandinistas
were from several small parties. The Nicaraguan Socialist
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Parry. a Marxist-Leninist organization of unknown member-
ship. the Nicaraguan Communist Party, a recent splinter
party that separated from the Sandinistas: the People's
Christian Social Party. an organization that broke with
Edgard Macias' larger party in 1982, when Macias objected
to the road being taken by the Sandinistas and was forced
into exile: the Peoples' Action Movement. a Maoist
organization that worked under the Sandinista Front during
the insurrection against Somoza; and the Conservative
Democratic Party. This last party is a splinter organization
formed a few months before the elections when the major
Conservative Democratic Party decided not to participate.
This splinter organization claimed the name of the parent
organization and, not surprisingly, the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court. which is controlled by the Sandinistas. granted the
use of the name Conservative Democratic party to the new-
ly created organization.
The party with the most political clout coming into the
elections was the Liberal Independent Party, led by Virgilio
Godoy But Godoy dropped out of the race just weeks
before election day on the grounds that the minimum prere-
quisites for a free contest had not been met by the San-
dinistas.
asic fact number two is that there was coercion of both-
the public and the politicians
There was
to begin
.
,
with. the state of emergency. The Sandinistas had promised
to lift the state of emergency, but only-partially. Individuals
were thus deprived of most of their rights and personal
guarantees. People could be arrested without trial and held
incommunicado for lengthy periods. In addition.
Nicaraguans were also subjected to the omnipresent control
exerted by the Sandinista Defence Committees (CCDS).
These are partisan, paramilitary organizations established by
the Sandinistas since 1979 on every neighborhood block in
the urban areas. The CCDS's, called the "eyes and ears of the
revolution." have as their primary function to spy on the sur-
rounding neighborhoods. to report any "suspicious ac-
tivities." to enforce night watch, while requesting the
''voluntary" participation of the local citizens. Most impor-
tant, the CCDS's issue the rationing coupons that enable
Nicaraguas to buy their food from the state-controlled super-
markets, and the CCDS's collaborate with the People's Courts
for the summary prosecution of alleged "counterrevolu-
tionanes."
The pervasive effects of these networks of control were
intensified by the way dissent is defined in Sandinista
Nicaragua. "Counterrevolutionaries" may not only be those
who openly disagree with the policies of the regime but
.whoever fails to support them. As recent history. in which
not even the Pope has been immune to haTrassment. has
shown, life for the so easily defined opponents of the revolu-
tion may be rough. There are no death squads in Nicaragua.
But journalists have been jailed, kidnapped, and beaten;
churches have been stormed by government-organized
mobs: priests have been beaten and expelled - 16 so far:
Rather than a first, faltering step toward
democracy, the elections were the most that
the Sandinistas could offer in terms of political
openness and tolerance toward dissent.
Christian lay leaders have been murdered, have "disap-
peared." and have been tortured in the countryside.
especially in remote areas: headquarters of independent
labor unions and parties have been attacked; radio stations
have been vandalized: and peaceful rallies of political parties
have been broken up by force.
- If these were hardly acceptable conditions for free elec-
tions. the curtailment of freedom of expression made things
even worse. These subjected to abuse or arbitrary actions by
the government had no outlet to voice their grievances.
Complaints of human rights violations have been customari-
ly censored in Nicaragua. and in general. the Ministry of the
Interior prevents political and social critics or commentators
from speaking out. This fact not only shields from criticism
the coercion that citizens experience in various walks of life.
but it renders the regime's political opponents practically
powerless to reach out to the public. Even today, Catholic
Church officials must submit their homelies to state censorship
prior to radio braodcasting. Television is a party monopoly: it
belongs to the Sandinista Party, which. in addition, controls
nearly all the radio stations and two of the three newspapers
in the country. Through this control of the mass media, the
Sandinistas attacked their opponents and propagandized
their goals and accomplishments in a ceaseless bombardment
of insults. chants. and slogans.
B asic fact number three is that due to the melding of
state and party. true pluralism was necessarily preclud-
ed. Even since the first days of the revolutionary regime, the
boundaries between the two have been erased. Youths, do
not join the Nicaraguan Army but the Sandinista Party's Ar-
my. The name "Sandinista" is not a general patriotic label; it
is legally reserved for party organizations. Thus, the televi-
sion. the police, the CCDS's and mass organizations which
are funded by the state, all of which bear the title Sandinista,
officially belong to the Sandinista Party. The party's budget
cannot be separated from the state's (the reason, perhaps,
why the state's budget is kept secret). The Sandinista Party,
thus, is not a party that stands before the law and the state
on an equal footing with the others. Instead. it is an armed
party, funded by the state - and thereby by the taxes of all
citizens, a party whose power and privileges far outweigh
the leverage of any other political organization. One reason
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the Sandinistas lowered the voting age to 16 years is
because the forced enrollment of the Nicaraguan youth in
the party's army kept a large segment of the population con-
fined to barracks - and to the daily indoctrination of the
party's political officers.
Basi, fact number foi, that there were no safeguards
aga.nst`-e - d. There was no sound preregistration system
for vc.. and Nicaraguans lack any standard ID. Often,
they ha ,to ID at all, precluding the possibility of electronic
tabulation. The ballots, on the other hand were to be
counted by committees on which Sandinista delegates had
decisive majorities. The Supreme Electoral Council was
headed by three Sandinista officials: Mariano Fiallos, Leone]
Arguello. and Amada Pineda (all with membership cards in
the Sandinista Party). Requests by the opposition political
organizations to have the elections supervised by the
Organization of American States or some other respected
international organization were turned down by the San-
dinistas.
It is no wonder, then, in view of all these considera-
tions. that the elections in Nicaragua were regarded with
widespread skepticism. But while there was wide interna-
tional agreement that the Nicaraguan elections hardly
deserved to be called by the name, there was. at the same
time. disagreement as to how to interpret the election pro-
cedure and what to expect in the future from the Nicaraguan
political process.
A view expressed by some observdrs admitted that the
elections were seriously flawed. but layed much of the
culpability for the flaws on the difficult circumstances that the
Sandinistas have been facing. The less sophisticated form of
this position holds that most of the problems with the
Nicaraguan electorial process were a direct result of U.S.
pressure. The more sophisticated form claims that we could
not expect a Swiss kind of democracy developing so soon in
an underdeveloped country devoid of a democratic tradition
and ravaged by civil war. Hence, despite shortcomings. the
elections in Nicaragua should be considered a hopeful
event, a positive step toward democracy. And, carrying this
position one step further, some argue that provided the right
circumstances - namely, external friendship and economic
aid - the Sandinistas might evolve toward elections with a
more acceptable level of political pluralism.
This is an attractive view to democratically minded
people. Would that the elections were the first fruits of an
evolution toward democracy! A careful reading of the
politics of the Nicaraguan elections, however, not only does
not support this conclusion but, in fact, leads in the opposite
direction.
Rather than a first, though faltering, step toward
democracy, the elections, as held, were the very most that
the Sandinistas could offer in terms of political openness and
tolerance toward dissent. It is well to keep in mind that the
Sandinista government did not wont to have this election in
the first place. They did so only after external pressure had
become so intense that continued delay was no longer
strategically viable. In fact, it was the closed fist and not at
open, hand from the U.S. which prompted the Sandinistai
to engage. however imperfectly. in a political process they
ultimately abhor. (Defense Minister Humberto Orieg:
declared in 1981 that elections in Nicaragua would not b.
like elections in the United States and other "bourgeois
countries": rather. they would be used "to select the bet
among the revolutionary vangard.")
I t was no coincidence that the Sandinistas began to to
elections and relax censorship of the press shortly afty
the U.S. invaded Grenada. That invasion sent shock wave
through the Nicaraguan government. Convinced that the
would be next. the Sandinistas moved quickly to beef L
their public image with talk of democracy and pluralism ar
to set a date for elections. How could the U.S. invade
country only a matter of months from its first elections? TI-
all this talk of democracy was simply a smokescreen is mac
clear by the remarks of Bayardo Arce. one of 11)!icarague
nine commandantes. In a secret speech to the central cor
mittee of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party - a pro-Sovie
Communist group - Arce said:
If it were not for the state of war forced on
us ... the electoral problem would be something
completely out of step in terms of usefulness.
What the revolution (the Sandinista government)
truly needs is the power to take action. And this
power to take action is what constitutes the
essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat ...
so. the election is. from this point of view. a hin-
drance.
r\Conceming what to expect in the future. Arce add
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ELECTIONS... Continued
We are discussing first, the idea of putting an end to all
this artifice of pluralism ... which has been useful to us up
to now." 0
What measure of political pluralism and free expres-
sion that could be found in Nicaragua in the three months
pnor to the elections was the cost the Sandinistas were pay-
ing to buy some legitimatecy for fear of their own survival. It
is particularly ominous that even under this fear of invasion.
the Sandinistas gave in so little. With the Western media
watching and waiting for signs of a democratic process. they
kept press censorship alive, harrassed opponents. and failed
to meet even the moderate demands for fairness for which
democratic opponents like Arturo Cruz were asking. Prob-
ably they could not afford more freedom. What little the
Sandinistas gave was the most they could ever give without
jeopardizing their hold on power - foreign pressure not-
withstanding.
Now that the elections are over, there is already a
resurgence of repression. Quite probably most of the hub-
bub the Sandinistas stirred up over the alleged "imminent"
U.S. invasion was a pretext for crushing the little breathing
space that they temporarily allowed before the elections.
hey have already tightened their grip again on the in-
dependent newspaper La Prensa, have militarized the high
school students engaged in the coffee harvest, forbade the
live broadcasting of religious sermons, and denied exit visas
to 26 prominent Nicaraguans.
The Nicaraguan elections could have been a road to
peace in a tired. war-tom country . They could have signaled
a change in the Sandinistas relentless march to
totalitarianism. They could have been a new beginning.
They were not. In the end. the elections were a propaganda
show, and a not very good one at that. The march to
totalitarianism continues.
Humberto Belli is the formgr editorial-page editor of the in-
dependent Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa. Once a col-
laborator with the Sandinistas. Mr. Belli converted to Chris-
tianity in 1977. He left Nicaragua in 1982. after the imposi-
tion of total press censorship. Mr. Belli is now Director of the
Puebla Institute. an independent, non-profit center seeking
Christian responses to the social issues facing Latin
America. He is the author of Nicaragua: Christians Under
Fire. available from the Puebla Institute (P O. 520. Garden
City. Michigan 48135).
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