THE CONTINUED SANDINISTA MILITARY BUILDUP IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780007-6
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 05851-85
25 November 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: The Continued Sandinista Military Buildup in Nicaragua
1. On 22 November, I briefed Deputy Secretary of State
John Whitehead on the continued military buildup in Nicaragua and the
threat it re resented to regional stability. I was accompanied to the
briefing by Deputy Director of DDI/ALA. The session was
also attendea by to Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs; Frank McNeil, Deputy Assistant Secretary/INR; and
William Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central America.
2. At the conclusion of the briefing, the Deputy Secretary expressed
his concern that additional steps needed to be taken to prevent a further
buildup, including the potential delivery of sophisticated air defense
missiles to Nicaragua. Assistant Secretary Abrams pointed out that the
United States had laid down three demarches to the Sandinistas: the
first against the delivery of advanced fighter aircraft, the second
against the presence of Cuban combat units, and the third against direct
support of terrorist acts against US citizens. The Deputy Secretary
commented that obviously more had to be done, but that it was difficult
to formulate policy measures that would have widespread domestic and
international support.
3. 1 pointed out that a selected quarantine or naval blockade of
Nicaragua would be very effective in preventing a further military
buildup, particularly if it were targeted against further deliveries of
petroleum. A blockade, in conjunction with a strong anti-Sandinista
insurgent movement, would put considerable pressure on the Sandinista
regime to compromise or risk losing total control of the country.
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The Deputy Secretary commented that he believed such a step by the United
States would provoke a considerable domestic and international outcry
and, therefore, was not politically feasible at this time. Assistant
Secretary Abrams commented that we were looking at further steps that
could be taken to politically isolate the Sandinista regime and which
ultimately may make low risk military actions by the US more acceptable.
4. The scheduled NSC meeting on 10 December will be devoted to the
topic of how the US can continue to keep the pressure on Nicaragua.
V
Rbert D. Vickers
cc: DDI
DD/ ALA
C/LAD
Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780007-6
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780007-6
SECRET
SUBJECT: The Continued Sandinista Military Buildup NIC 05851-85
In Nicaragua
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - DC I
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - C/LAD
1 - DD/ALA
1 - NIO/LA
NIO/ LA/RVickers/
25Nov85 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780007-6