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November 25, 1985
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Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 STAT Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 United.States Information Agency NOV 2 55, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William J. Casey Director Central Intelligence Agency FROM: Charles Z. Wick Director 2660/3 SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 29" Attached is the latest "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by our Office of Research. During the period October 1 - November 10: o Soviet propagandists maintained that the Reagan Administration is "deeply divided" and has not been preparing seriously for the November 19-20 summit. o Soviet spokesmen publicized Gorbachev's proposal for a 50-percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and claimed that the USSR's bold "initi- atives" had had a profound impact on world opinion. o High-level Soviet officials continued an all-out attack on SDI and accused U.S. officials of mis- interpreting the ABM treaty. o They also warned that without an agreement on the "nonmilitarization of space," it would be impossible to limit or reduce nuclear arms, and an unchecked arms race would ensue. o Soviet propaganda continued to charge that the U.S. supports "state terrorism." o It also linked AIDS to U.S. research for bacterio- logical warfare. Attachment: "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 29" 1--,316 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 No. 29 Soviet Propaganda Alert November 15, 1985 This report discusses Soviet propaganda between October 1 and November 10. It concentrates on arms control and other issues relating to the November 19-20 meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. During this period, as the Soviet Union intensified its pre- summit propaganda, Soviet commentators claimed that the USSR's bold "initiatives" had had a profound impact on world opinion. The Soviet media portrayed Gorbachev as a dynamic and effective statesman during his visit to France and subsequent trip to Bulgaria. Meanwhile, Gorbachev gave every indication of being firmly in control at home, where he made additional high-level appointments and unveiled a draft of the new party program. Prospects for the Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting ......... See pp. 1-6 As in prior months, Soviet spokesmen maintained that success in the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev meeting depended on the serious- ness and good faith of the U.S. Challenge to the U.S.: Con- tinue to affirm that the U.S. combines a strong commitment to peace with a realistic assessment of the Soviet Union. Soviet Commentary on Arms Control Issues .......... See pp. 6-11 In early October, Gorbachev disclosed that the USSR had pro- posed a 50-percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. While attacking SDI, Soviet spokesmen accused the U.S. of distorting the ABM treaty and seeking to "neutralize" Soviet "initiatives" on arms control. Challenge to the U.S.: Stress that the U.S. placed serious proposals on the table in advance of the Soviet counterproposal, responded quickly to the counterproposal, and remains willing to negotiate. The USSR also made several moves which appeared designed to create fissures in the Western alliance. Gorbachev called for separate talks with France and Britain over intermediate-range missiles and sought to forestall the Netherlands' decision to deploy U.S. cruise missiles. Challenge to the U.S.: Emphasize that the Western Alliance remains unshaken in its commitment both to its common defense and to negotiations with the USSR. Other Current Propaganda Themes .................. See pp. 11-12 Soviet propaganda charged the U.S. supports "state terrorism," was implicated in the kidnapping of Soviet diplomats in Beirut, and had kidnapped and drugged KGB official Yurchenko. It also linked AIDS to U.S. research for bacteriological warfare. Office of Research United States Information Agency Washington, D. C. Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 PROSPECTS FOR THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING Virtually all the public gestures of Soviet leader Gorbachev appeared calculated to improve Moscow's position prior to his November 19-20 summit meeting with President Reagan. Q Gorbachev's Visit to France Hailed as Success On October 1, the eve of Gorbachev's departure for Paris, French and Soviet TV aired an interview between the Soviet General Secretary and French journalists. The interview, which was given wide coverage in both Soviet domestic and foreign media, was crafted to project an image of an open, reasonable, and flexible Soviet leader and to stress that the USSR and West European countries shared common interests. When asked whether he thought his forthcoming meeting with President Reagan would achieve substantive results, Gorbachev saia that "it would be a great luxury for the leaders of such countries as the USSR and the go to Geneva in order to exchange handshakes, take a look at one another, and smile pleasantly for television." He called for "the President of the USA and his colleagues... to carry out sound preparations for our meeting in Geneva so that...good bricks can be laid in the edifice of future peace." U.S. "Not Serious," in Disarray Throughout this period, Soviet commentators continued to argue that the U.S. was not making serious preparations for the high- level November meeting. Major Soviet propaganda themes were as follows: o SDI. President Reagan's "blind" devotion to SDI would make any agreement extremely difficult, if not impossible. o Administration in disarray. Because the U.S. Adminis- tration was still deeply divided over how to deal with the Soviet Union, it had been unable to formulate a coherent policy -- a fact that seemed likely to "doom" meaningful results. o Attempts to undermine the ABM treaty. According to Soviet commentators, Administration hardliners were doing their Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 utmost to undermine the ABM treaty. The so-called "broad" interpretation of the accord enunciated in early October by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane raised doubts about U.S. intentions and whether the U.S. could be trusted to keep its word in the future. o Efforts to divert attention from Soviet proposals. Caught off guard by the Soviet Union's arms reduction proposal in early October, the Reagan Administration has tried to divert attention from arms control and its own failure to advance sensible proposals. The President's October 24 address to the UN General Assembly was described as an effort to divert attention to "secondary issues." o Words vs. deeds. Despite its high-flown rhetoric about "peace," the U.S. Administration continued in its errant quest for military superiority and unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. People throughout the world, however, were putting pressure on the U.S. to become serious and do something to advance the cause of peace. o Worldwide public opinion leaves some room for hope. As Izvestiia stated (November 1): "The disillusionment caused throughout the world by...[the President's October 24 UN speech] was only surpassed in strength by the denun- ciation of Washington's obstructionist positions. The pitch of public criticism ran so high the Administration did not believe it could continue -- up to the start of the actual Geneva talks -- to openly reject the demands for a constructive approach to the Soviet Union's propo- sals." Soviets Claim Propaganda Effective Meanwhile, Soviet commentators claimed that Moscow's "peace offensive" was succeeding. For example, writing in Sovetskaia Rossiia on October 15, Gennadii Shishkin argued that the Soviet arms proposal announced by Gorbachev had established a "new psychological climate" and had laid the groundwork for "a new stage in East-West relations." He added: This turn of events dealt a palpable blow to the stance of militarists of all kinds. NATO has clearly been thrown into confusion; the [Western] bloc's propaganda apparatus was unprepared for the USSR's actions. As for the United States, the Washington administration has been gripped by real panic. The feelings now prevailing in Washington's corridors of power are described eloquently by The Los Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Angeles Times: "The fact that the hardliners in the Defense Department are anticipating the U.S-Soviet summit in Geneva with fear and loathing is hardly new. They were always opposed to arms control agreements and, of course, to summit meetings. The difference is that this time the White House, the National Security Council, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as the State De- partment, are trembling at the prospect of the meeting." Shishkin asserted that in order "to counteract the Soviet ini- tiatives," the Reagan Administration began "dismantling" the Soviet proposals piece by piece while still refusing to give "a constructive response." "In the opinion of many observers," he noted, "the U.S. Administration, faced with the Soviet peace offensive, will ultimately have to make adjustments in its un- constructive policy unless it wants a further deepening of the differences with Western Europe." In a later commentary (Izvestiia, November 5), four Soviet jour- nalists stated: "The Soviet initiatives have made a powerful impact on the international climate. The general that Moscow has taken over the initiative in the political and psychological the period before the Geneva meeting. The Soviet Union's arguments and practical actions have exerted such influence that Western politicians can no longer ignore them." President Reagan's UN Address: "Rehash of Bankrupt Policy" President Reagan's October 24 address to the UN General Assem- bly was reviewed critically by Soviet commentators. An October 24 TASS dispatch charged that the President's speech offered merely a "rehash of Washington's well-known and bankrupt for- eign policy" and represented an effort to conceal Washington's "refusal to take any real measures" on arms control. Attempt to divert attention from arms control. Soviet com- mentators maintained that the President's emphasis on the resolution of regional conflicts was an attempt to divert international attention to issues of secondary importance and to justify U.S. efforts to subvert regimes it opposes. Speech overlooks major trouble spots. A report in the military newspaper Krasnaia zvezda (October 26) pointed out that "the President studiously omitted those regions in which the United States together with other reactionary regimes is trampling underfoot the right of the peoples to self-determination and independence." The article singled out the Middle East, "where Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 the United States is encouraging Israel to commit armed ban- ditry," and southern Africa, "where the South African racists, with Washington's connivance and support, are unlawfully occu- pying Namibia, perpetrating acts of aggression against neigh- boring countries, and trying to preserve the apartheid regime with terror and repression." "Family of free nations" based on force. Writing in Izvestiia (October 30), political observer Aleksandr Bovin warned that it would be-a mistake to "resurrect the notorious 'linkage' con- cept" ana make disarmament conditional on the "state of affairs in certain parts of the world." Bovin also ridiculed the President's conception of the "settlement" of regional con- flicts: After a "settlement" the happy people will return to the "family of free states." Everyone is well aware of what kind of "family" this is. It is a family of capitalist states. Allende was killed precisely in order to guaran- tee Chile remained part of this family. And was it not for the sake of keeping South Vietnam in the same family that the United States dropped more bombs on Vietnamese soil than throughout all of World War II? In much the same vein, Vitalii Kobysh wrote in Literaturnaia gazeta (October 30): Understandably, the U.S. President did not mention that in each of the countries he listed, the United States is basically waging undeclared wars. He uttered not a word of truth about Nicaragua, where...the United States is continuing the task begun by their henchman and puppet, the criminal Somoza -- that of committing genocide. The White House chief did not mention that [in Afghanistan] the bandits who kill peaceful inhabitants... and cut off the heads of teachers and doctors are openly supplied with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Washington's leaders.... And, of course, he did not explain that this lavish assistance is provided with one goal -- that of sending Afghanistan back to the Middle Ages: to hunger, fanaticism, and savagery. Reagan Interview Sharply Challenged On November 5, the Soviet daily newspaper Izvestiia published the text of the interview that President Reagan had granted on October 31. Even though some of President Reagan's remarks were. cut from the published text, most of the interview was Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 reported accurately. On the facing page, however, the Presi- dent's remarks were rebutted in a long, polemical commentary by the four journalists who had conducted the interview. The interview was the first with an American president since November 1961, when John F. Kennedy was interviewed by the editor of Izvestiia. Its publication was all the more note- worthy because it presented a point of view at variance with the official party line. While explaining the U.S. desire for peace, the President was also able to tell Soviet readers that the USSR has been engaged in research on space weapons, that Soviet troops had used booby-trapped toys in Afghanistan, and that the Soviet Union was occupying Afghanistan, Angola, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. Omissions from the text. A number of points were evidently too sensitive for the Soviet authorities to allow. The text did not include, for example, President Reagan's statement that the Afghan government that "invited the Soviet troops in didn't have any choice because the government was put there by the Soviet Union." Gone, too, was the President's comparison of the Afghanistan and Grenada situations. Other omissions included the statement that Eastern European countries were denied the self-determination promised by the Yalta agreement, that Warsaw Pact troops outnumbered NATO troops in Europe, that the Soviet Union had not reciprocated gestures by the U.S., and that the USSR had not shown restraint in developing its weapons system. The Soviet response. The response by the four Soviet jour- nalists received much more attention in the Soviet media than the interview itself. The journalists emphasized that the President's answers showed "the world seen through the eyes of an American conservative who is prepared to forget or not to notice obvious facts that are known to all, if they fail to correspond to his views." After roundly criticizing the substance of the President's remarks, they nonetheless ended on an optimistic note: The interview turned out to be contradictory. The good words about peace and a striving for accord with the Soviet Union were accompanied by unfounded accusations about our country's foreign policy.... Still, the very fact of the recognition of the need for extensive Soviet- American dialogue is a positive sign.... One would like to believe that the USSR's readiness to achieve a drastic turn for the better in Soviet-American relations will elicit in Geneva a constructive response from the U.S. Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Subsequent press treatment called attention to the "clarifica- tion" that was needed for the President's comments about shar- ing SDI research with the Soviet Union and under what conditions the U.S. might deploy a defensive system. A TASS report from Washington (November 5) said that the hasty "explanations" by the President's staff raised the question "Who decides U.S. policy?" Negative Reaction to the President's VOA Address Responding to President Reagan's address to the Soviet people (broadcast on the Voice of America on November 9), TASS and Soviet television said that his remarks included deliberate falsifications and raised doubts about U.S. attitudes toward the Geneva meeting. TASS observed that Reagan had "uttered a good many words about peace," but that "one cannot so far... conclude that the U.S. Administration is make its contribution to the cause of preventing an arms race in outer space or of radically curbing it on earth." Appearing on the evening news the same day, Vitalii Kobysh noted that Reagan used "good words" about Soviet-American rela- tions. But, he said, "if one familiarizes oneself thoroughly with what they are saying in Washington now, there are grounds for...a gloomy conclusion" about the prospects for the summit meeting. SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES Clearly, much of Moscow's maneuvering prior to the November Reagan-Gorbachev meeting related to arms control issues. As in the previous several months, Soviet propaganda focused on the importance of preventing the "militarization of outer space," the dangers connected with SDI, and alleged U.S. efforts to undermine the ABM treaty. In his October 1 interview with French journalists, Gorbachev repeated his opposition to the arms race "on earth" and to "transferring" it to space. As evidence of Moscow's sincerity, he cited the Soviet Union's recent moratoriums on the testing of nuclear weapons and anti-satellite weapons. Without men- tioning the U.S. explicitly, he went on to contrast Moscow's purported restraint with the "new nuclear explosions" and the tests of anti-satellite weapons that occurred after the USSR had announced its unilateral moratoriums. Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 -7- Soviet Counterproposals Disclosed In his October 3 speech to the French parliament, Gorbachev publicly confirmed that the Soviet Union had presented propo- sals to the U.S. negotiating team in Geneva. As described by Gorbachev, the proposals had three main components: o Deep cuts in nuclear strategic forces. Gorbachev said that the Soviet proposal called for a 50-percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. (Gorbachev included in this category U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces that could reach the Soviet homeland.) o A ban on "space strike arms." The speech called for a "total prohibition" of space-based weapons, but whether such a ban would rule out the research envisioned by SDI was unclear. (In his August 28 Time magazine interview, Gorbachev had argued that a ban on space weapons must "embrace every phase of their inception," but had added that a research ban would not extend to the "fundamental sciences." In agreement with this position, Yulii Kvitsinskii, the head of the Soviet space weapons dele- gation in Geneva, was cited by Western media as having said on October 3 that "basic research" would be permitted under the proposed ban.) o Separation of INF from the other arms control issues.. Gorbachev proposed that the matter of intermediate-range missiles could be resolved separately from the issues of space weapons and strategic arsenals. Previously, Soviet statements had stressed that, in accordance with the U.S.- Soviet understanding of January 1985, all three issues had to be dealt with in their "interrelationship." Gorbachev's Appeals to the West Europeans Concurrently, the Soviet leadership made appeals to the West Europeans. The intent was clearly to drive a wedge between the West Europeans and the U.S., or at least to encourage the West Europeans to put pressure on the U.S. to modify its arms control negotiating posture. In his October 1 interview with French journalists, Gorbachev sought once more to stress the commonality of West European and Soviet security interests. He emphasized that the Soviet Union and the West Europeans "live in the same house" and expressed a belief that the West Europeans "will not, be found wanting in Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 wisdom" when it comes to protecting the continent's security. (In a February speech, he had emphasized the same point by urging the West Europeans to prevent "Europe, our common home, from being turned into a theater of military actions.") On October 3, addressing the French parliament, Gorbachev put forth two proposals which appeared designed to try to separate the West Europeans from the U.S.: o Dealing separately with Britain and France. For the first time since the December 1979 NATO decision to deploy U.S. Purshing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, the Soviet leader advocated separate talks -- and impli- citly a separate agreement -- with France and Britain. (In prior INF negotiations, the French and British mis- siles had been repeatedly cited as a major obstacle by Moscow. The U.S., France, and Britain maintained that these missiles constitute independent strategic forces and are not a subject of negotiation in the U.S.-Soviet talks.) o Appeals to the Netherlands. Gorbachev announced that some SS-20s had been "withdrawn from standby alert" and that the number of such missiles deployed in the Soviet Union's "European zone" had been reduced to 243. He also stated that the "stationary installations" used to house these missiles would be dismantled "within the next two months." These shifts seemed designed to forestall the Dutch govern- ment's decision in November on whether to deploy U.S. cruise missiles according to the NATO plan. In subsequent weeks, the USSR continued to try to influence Dutch public opinion by arranging high-visibility placements in the Dutch media. Meanwhile, Soviet spokesmen continued to reach out to members of the West European peace movement. On October 5, for example, TASS carried a message from Gorbachev to participants in the "Perugia-Assisi" peace march. Gorbachev said that "the sword of Damocles of a nuclear catastrophe and 'Star Wars' is raised above mankind today." But through the efforts of all peace- loving people, he stressed, "it is still possible to avert this threat." Citing the Soviet Union's proposal for a total ban on space weapons and a 50-percent reduction in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, Gorbachev asserted: "We have demonstrated our good will convincingly and visibly. Now it is up to our negoti- ating partners." Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 -9- Marshal Akhromeev Blasts SDI Over the next several weeks, Soviet spokesmen continued to stress that the USSR had adopted a reasonable and forthcoming posture in the negotiations and that a response from the U.S. was due. Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, chief of the Soviet General Staff, assumed a leading role in the attacks on U.S. policy addressed to foreign and domestic audiences. (An interview with Akhromeev was published in The New York Times on October 18; an article by him appeared in Pravda the following day; and a translation of the article was reprinted as a full-page adver- tisement in The Washington Post on October 25.) In the Pravda article, Akhromeev described the Soviet Union's latest proposal on nuclear arms control as "realistic and far-reaching." The USSR, he said, had "gone its half of the way," so now it was up to the U.S. "to go its part of the way and try to bring the positions of the [two] sides...closer together." At the same time, Akhromeev sharply criticized SDI, asserting that if no ban were imposed on the development of "space strike weapons," an unchecked arms race would ensue. Moscow Media Event Focuses on SDI To focus public attention on arms control issues, Soviet offi- cials organized a high-visibility press conference in Moscow on October 22. The conference featured Marshal Akhromeev along with first deputy foreign minister Georgii Kornienko, and Leonid Zamiatin, chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department. Although the press conference covered a wide range of issues, most Soviet accounts gave greatest attention to arguments against SDI and emphasized the Soviet view that reductions in nuclear arms must be conditional on a ban on space weapons. o Reinforcing a point made in his Pravda article, Akhromeev insisted that the ABM treaty was the basis for negotia- tions on limiting strategic arms. In this connection, he cited Gorbachev's Time magazine interview to the effect that without an agreement on the nonmilitarization of space, it would "prove impossible to reach an agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons." o Akhromeev once again denied that the'Soviet Union was con- ducting work in any way comparable to SDI. "The Soviet Union," he said, "does not have offensive weapons in space. Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 We are not conducting work on the creation of offensive space-based weapons, nor are we developing systems for the country's anti-missile defense.... The Soviet Union is faithfully fulfilling the treaty on the limitation of ABM defense systems." o Akhromeev also reiterated previous warnings that U.S. deployments of space-based missile defense systems would leave the Soviet Union with "no choice" but to take countermeasures. Shevardnadze Once More Appeals for "Star Peace" In his October 24 speech marking the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze gave greatest emphasis to arms control issues. He sharply criti- cized SDI as a violation of the ABM treaty and blamed the U.S. for pushing the world to the brink of nuclear war. As he did in his September 23 speech to the UN General Assembly, Shevardnadze contrasted the Reagan Administration's prepara- tions for "Star Wars" with the Soviet Union's quest for "Star Peace." Touching on regional issues, the Foreign Minister criticized "hired assassins" in Afghanistan and Nicaragua and denounced "Israeli and South African terror." Defense Minister Stresses ABM and SALT-II Treaties In a major Pravda article on November 6, Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov stressed the importance of maintaining the ABM and SALT- II agreements. Citing the U.S. commitment to. SDI and efforts to construct radars which could provide the basis for a terri- torial ABM defense, he accused the U.S. of trying to undermine the agreements. Sokolov also asserted that: o Only a total ban on "space strike weapons" will allow radical nuclear arms reductions. o Fundamental space research is allowed under the ABM treaty, but "any work outside the laboratory linked with the development and testing of individual parts and com- ponents" of space strike weapons is not permitted. (The same point had been made by Akhromeev on October 19.) o Deployment of large-scale ABM defense systems by either the U.S. or the USSR would lead to retaliatory actions by the other. Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87MOO539ROO2404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 Soviets Propose Scrapping Kransnoyarsk Radar -- For a Price In October, according to Western press reports, the USSR pro- posed in the Geneva arms negotiations to halt construction of a radar station near Krasnoyarsk -- if the U.S. were to stop modernizing its radar facilities in England and Greenland. The Soviet position was reported to be that if the Krasnoyarsk radar was in violation of the ABM accord (as the U.S. charged) so were the two American projects. (This reported proposal was not given prominent coverage in the Soviet press.) OTHER ISSUES U.S. Attacked for Supporting "State-Terrorism". .Throughout this period, Soviet propaganda continued to charge that the U.S. instigated terrorism around the world. After four Soviet diplomats-were seized in Beirut in October, Soviet media insinuated that the U.S. and Israel were respon- sible for the kidnapping. TASS cited. visiting Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi as saying that the kidnapping of the Soviet diplomats "had been organized by the forces of world imperial- ism and Zionism and that the action was aimed at undermining Soviet-Arab friendship." Similarly, an Izvestiia commentator alleged on October 14: "Like the U.S.-Israel partners, the inspirers and organizers of the criminal act in Beirut do not the fact that the Arab people have such a powerful ally as the Soviet Union." Following the U.S. interception of the Egyptian airliner that was transporting the hijackers of the Achille Lauro, Moscow again accused the U.S. of terrorism. Broadcasting in Arabic (October 18), Moscow International Service stated: "The Soviet Union always believes end must be put to terrorism -- and above all state terrorism -- which has become one of the bases of official U.S. and Israeli policy. One of its latest manifestations is the. interception by the U.S. military of the Egyptian aircraft over the Mediterranean." A TASS report entitled "Terrorism in Stars and Stripes" (Octo- ber 24) stated that there is no other country "whose leaders would resort so shamelessly to diktat, arbitrariness and vio- lence on the international scene and institutionalize terror as state policy so openly as the U.S. leaders do." It recited a familiar litany of charges, including the assertion that the Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87MOO539ROO2404010003-5 Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5 U.S. spends millions of dollars to "train and equip armed anti- Afghan gangs who...burn down peaceful villages, kill innocent people, desecrate mosques, and blow up bridges and highways." On November 4, another TASS dispatch reported that President Reagan had "ordered an inquiry into the leak of information on a large-scale CIA covert operation to overthrow the leader of the Libyan revolution Muammar al-Qaddafi...which constitutes nothing but a flagrant act of state terrorism." Continuing on the same track, Soviet media gave prominent cover- age to the press conference held at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, where alleged KGB officer Yurchenko asserted that he had been kidnapped and drugged by the U.S. secret services. On November 5, the Moscow evening news program reported that Yurchenko's "captivity" had "lasted almost three months, which the Soviet diplomat called true torture, and which, in essense, was none other than yet another act of state terrorism." AIDS Traced to U.S. "Bacteriological Weapons Experiments" Citing "foreign sources,"-an article in Literaturnaia gazeta (October 30) expressed the view that AIDS (the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) is the result of the Pentagon's experiments in developing new types of bacteriological weapons. The article cited the "reputable" Indian newspaper Patriot to the effect that an earlier unknown virus which destroys the body's immune system had been produced at the U.S. research center at Fort Detrick. The new virus was supposedly tested in Haiti and on arug addicts, homosexuals, and homeless persons in the U.S. (This report was also picked up by Moscow radio's "World Ser- vice" on October 30.) Approved For Release 2009/09/10: CIA-RDP87MOO539ROO2404010003-5