A MANIFESTO ON THE INDOCHINA POW-MIA ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002504160011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 30, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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STAT
30 OCT 85
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Because you are a responsible figure in our Government, one who has
a non-delegatable obligation to be as fully informed as possible on
all major issues, I commend to you the contents of the document en-
closed herewith.
7 ! -~y Executive
Dear Sir:
It is the most objective, factual treatment I have read of a tragic
issue which has placed a great and tragic stain upon the honor and
integrity of the United States of America for the entire world to
see.
As a fellow citizen who served his country honorably in three wars,
and one who loves it as much as I believe you do, I submit that the
contents of the enclosed document will provide you with insights into
the MIA impasse which have heretofore not been so articulately and
knowledgeably expressed.
Once you have read and reflected upon the facts the document brings
to light, I pray that you will be motivated to act to redress the
terrible wrong done to our fighting men by that repulsive element in
our Government which regards those who fought two, no-win, undeclared
wars in far-off lands in answer to the call of their Country to be
expendable--mere throw-aways--because of a base and venal foreign
policy toward Vietnam. Our fathers, brothers, and sons deserve far
better than to be betrayed and abandoned by psuedo-intelligentsia in
their own Government.
I am sure that those who serve in Washington are aware of the relevant
words of a former Chief Executive of the United States who stated,
"Nothing ever just happens in Washington, Somebody makes it happen."
I pray that you will be that "Somebody."
Respectfully,
--/LtCJ
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Memorandum
from
J. C. DONAHUE
A MANIFESTO ON THE INDOCHINA POW-MIA ISSUE
'Accountability' on the POW-MIA issue is a two-way street. It is logical that
we look to the Vietnamese to provide an accounting of our missing men. But,
within our own country we find that there is no one in the government who is
accountable on the issue. No President, no Secretary of Defense, no Secretary
of State has stood up and said, 'I am accountable for the POW-MIA's.'
Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter and all their staffs have come and gone and
President Reagan is into his fifth year of office, and the POW-MIA issue still
is unresolved. It remains to be seen if the status of 'highest national
priority' assigned to the issue by the Reagan Administration will bring any
live men home and account for the missing ones, but the results to date
suggest that 'highest national priority' and 'accountability' are two entirely
different matters.
It is easy to understand the failure of this country to bring its POW-MIA's
home: in the absence of accountability there is no responsibility for
resolving the POW-MIA issue. In the absence of responsibility there is no
leadership. In the absence of leadership there are no solutions. Despite
overwhelming evidence that men are alive and in captivity -- and admissions by
the Laotians that they were holding live Americans, none have been brought
home. Very simply, this is nothing more than a failure of leadership within
our government. Is it any wonder, then, that the POW-MIA issue has languished
for so many years?
America must realize that an accounting for the POW-MIA's starts at home. We
must demand that the President publically declare his accountability on the
issue and that he exercise leadership and assemble the human and financial
resources necessary to resolve it.
For the American public to support the government's POW-MIA policies, the
government must first have credibility on the issue. There must be honest and
unencumbered communication with the public and Congress. To achieve this, we
must reconcile the past and understand why and how the issue evolved into what
it is today.
A) Servicemen were known to have been left behind in captivity. The Defense
and State Departments know this to be a fact. In addition, the Laotians told
us so. Why, then, did the State Department and the Defense Department adopt a
policy immediately after the war of 'There are no Americans alive and in
captivity in Southeast Asia'? What was the precedent for this policy and who
promulgated it?
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At the same time, we must understand that when the State and Defense
Departments went on record saying there are no Americans in captivity, this
then became official U.S. policy regardless of knowledge to the contrary.
Therefore, all efforts -- including the House Select Committee and the
Woodcock Commission -- were engineered to promulgate the policy and ignore the
fact men were left behind in captivity. In other words, with careers and
reputations being at stake in the policy, the efforts of government were
turned solely toward its perpetuation and the protection of those involved but
not toward an accounting for the POW-MIA's: Presidents were shielded from the
evidence and Committees/Commissions affirmed the policy despite the evidence
available to them. Again, this helps us understand why the issue has gone
unresolved for so many years.
B) The State Department has deliberately and skillfully kept the Central
Intelligence Agency out of the POW-MIA issue (the CIA, for example, does not
serve on the Interagency Group). All CIA information pertaining to servicemen
alive and in captivity is classified 'secret'. We must remember that the CIA
ran the war in Laos (there were no U.S. military forces in Laos) and was
heavily involved in Vietnam and Cambodia. The CIA continues to collect
intelligence on POW-MIA's. The CIA and the DIA are two entirely separate
organizations reporting to different chains of command. DIA does not have
unrestricted access to classified CIA data and has no operational or audit
capability over the CIA. We cannot allow the CIA to remain outside the
POW-MIA issue; the evidence the CIA has on servicemen alive and in captivity
unequivocally must be made public. We have nothing to fear from knowing the
truth.
C) Many tens of thousands of refugees came out of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
before there was any debriefing effort. The Defense and State Departments
admit this. For many years (1975-1980, for example) the effort to interview
Indochinese refugees was pathetically non-existent. After that, it was (and
remains) terribly understaffed and underbudgeted. A publicized worldwide
campaign must be initiated to alert refugees previously not debriefed to come
forth.
D) Refugee sighting reports have been evaluated in totally discretionary
fashion against criteria which are virtually impossible to satisfy (a man
could be sentenced to die in the U.S. on less evidence than in the refugee
evaluations). Furthermore, there has been a clear bias to discredit the
refugee reports on the flimsiest technical points. (For example, a refugee's
sighting having been discredited because he saw a pilot in captivity 50
kilometers away from where he was shot down 10 years earlier.) Therefore,
there must be independent (non-DIA and CIA) and objective re-evaluation of
refugee sighting reports.
E) Concerning the servicemen who were POW's and whose bodies have been
returned, the autopsy reports -- specifically citing the estimated time (year)
of death -- should be made public. If necessary, independent analysis of the
remains should be conducted.
A) The government, notably the State Department, must reorder its
priorities. Resolution of the POW-MIA issue is not subordinate to Southeast
Asian foreign policy in any manner whatsoever. The missing men are not
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expendable in support of the State Department's foreign policy. Their return
-- especially those who are alive -- is the highest priority of foreign
policy, not normalization of relations with Vietnam, not ASIAN relations, not
support of the Cambodian resistance movements, not the defense of Thailand,
not relations with the PRC. There is no greater moral imperative than
accounting for the men who served their country.
B) The Defense Department and the State Department must publically
acknowledge that men were known to have been left behind in captivity.
C) Simultaneously, the State Department and the Defense Department must
change their policy to a truthful one, from one of, 'We operate on the
assumption that at least one serviceman is alive and being held against his
will,' to one of, 'The evidence clearly indicates that servicemen are alive
and in captivity.' The State Department, the Defense Department and the
League must immediately drop their spurious line that we have no proof today
men are alive and in captivity. We have proof that they were left behind in
captivity when the war ended. We have proof that they have been seen in
captivity since then. Therefore, the only logical conclusion is that they are
alive and in captivity today. By analogy, I know that my mother was alive in
Florida last week because I got a letter from her. Am I to conclude that I
have no proof she is alive today and that in the absence of proof I must
conclude she is dead? Such reasoning is ludicrous! By the same logic I must
believe that no one is alive unless they are in my physical company or on the
other end of the telephone to me.
It is clear that the 'proof' the government claims it does not have
(therefore, it operates on the 'assumption' that men are alive in captivity)
simply is unobtainable within the DIA's modus operandi. Effectively, this
means that the only irrefutable evidence the government will accept is a
handshake from one of the POW's in captivity. The absurdity of the
government's approach can be easily understood when one realizes that the
source of sighting information is refugees and that by definition any
information a refugee supplies is many months, if not years out of date.
Therefore it cannot be proved even if 'all the intelligence resources of the
country are focused on the POW-MIA issue' (as the government claims). For
example, a refugee who spent ten months getting out of Vietnam or Laos is
debriefed and says, 'I saw an American eighteen months ago at such-and-such a
road crossing'. The DIA immediately dismisses this -- even though the refugee
passes a polygraph -- because it is unprovable. Of course it is unprovable::
The DIA (or CIA) does not have an agent or any intelligence resource who can
verify that the refugee saw an American eighteen months ago at such-and-such a
road crossing (if it did, it would have evidence!). The refugee's information
is unacceptable as proof because it cannot be proved. In other words, in the
eyes of the U.S. intelligence community, if we cannot prove the proof, we have
no evidence.
And, we should understand that even if the government does decide to
reconnoiter the road crossing (if it can find it) the serviceman obviously is
not going to be there. In summary, the government's case on evidence is
tautological and unacceptable. It is a perfect example of circular reasoning
and only serves to make sure that more men die in captivity unaccounted for.
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D) The CIA must be brought out of the closet on Laos. The war in Laos was
totally a CIA operation and the CIA is bursting at the seams with intelligence
on servicemen in captivity there.
E) We should realize that if the truth were being told by the government on
the POW-MIA issue and that if it were taking actions commensurate with the
'highest national priority', then there would be no 'disinformation' on the
issue and we would not have to waste our resources countering
'disinformation'. We should realize that only the failure of leadership
causes disinformation.
F) We must work to reformulate the government's approach to the POW-MIA
issue. The Iranian hostage crisis was resolved without an Interagency Group,
a House Task Force, a half-dozen Congressional sub-committees, a House Select
Committee, several hundred resolutions and innumerable proclamations. So was
the recent Beirut hostage crisis. They were resolved because there was
accountability and leadership which made the State Department exercise every
diplomatic resource imaginable to quickly settle them. At the same time,
there was great political mileage realized in resolving them. The Indochina
POW-MIA issue (which very much is a hostage crisis) persists because there is
no leadership. All these Task Forces, Interagency Groups, Committees,
Sub-Committees, proclamations, resolutions, etc. are merely symptomatic of
the lack of leadership on the POW-MIA issue. They are not going to resolve
the issue. All they will do is put a guarantee on the State Department's
efforts to negotiate the return of dead bodies over some period of time. To
have the accountability and leadership which will resolve this issue, we must
seek the President's accountability in every manner and forum possible. We
must bird-dog the President to the point he has no choice other than to bring
home the men who are alive. Iran and Beirut prove it can be done.
G) We must all realize that the State Department and the Defense Department
have completely buffaloed Congress on the POW-MIA issue to the extent that
Congress is impotent. As long as Congress continues to be so cornered by them
there is little hope of bringing back the men who are alive. We need a change
of faces and a change of policies in the State and Defense Departments. We
must have new policy initiatives and must ask the President to dismiss from
the issue all the senior State and Defense personnel presently involved.
RELATIONSHIPS-WITH THE VIETNAMESE
A) The U.S. should not be interested in having to 'save face' with the
Vietnamese on the POW-MIA issue. That is an unnecessary encumbrance. If,
however, a full accounting requires a solution which will enable the
Vietnamese to save face, then the U.S. must endorse it and pursue.it. The
Vietnamese have given us every indication that they need a face-saving
solution (because they are holding live servicemen), but the State Department
appears unable to understand this.
B) If Vietnam's pecuniary demands are reasonable and our criteria for a full
accounting will be satisfied, then we should be willing to provide
reconstruction and development aid to the Vietnamese.
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C) The State Department's approach to the Vietnamese must be changed. The
State Department seems completely unaware that the Vietnamese will lie
blatantly to achieve whatever objective they seek. Thus, instead of spouting
the Vietnamese line that there are no Americans alive and in captivity in
Indochina -- which was totally refuted by the. repatriation of Bobby Garwood --
the State Department must pursue exactly the opposite approach and publically
announce that the evidence proves that the Vietnamese are holding American
prisoners.
D) The State Department must come to grips with the objective reality of the
situation in Indochina. Vietnam is forcibly resettling Laos and Cambodia with
Vietnamese; Ho Chi Minh's dream of an Indochina Federation is now becoming
fact. The Cambodian and Laotian governments are just as much puppets to the
Vietnamese as Hungary and Poland are to Russia. To negotiate for years to dig
up a single crash site in Laos is a shocking waste of resources and is further
proof that the State Department will negotiate the POW-MIA issue into oblivion.
A) We, the concerned American public, must realize that the absence of
accountability on the POW-MIA issue has changed the nature of our adversary.
He is no longer without; he is within. The State Department has been and
remains fully dedicated to not letting the POW-MIA issue interfere with its
conduct of foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The unequivocal long-term
objective of foreign policy is the normalization of relationships with
Vietnam, just as its greatest diplomatic achievement in the past twenty years
was the normalization of relationships with China. The State Department
simply is not going to allow the POW-MIA issue to get in the way. It will
negotiate with the Vietnamese in perfunctory fashion on the POW-MIA issue and
involve other nations in the process (e.g., Indonesia), giving the impression
that it is making great efforts to account for the men, when all it really is
going to do is arrange for remains to be repatriated over some time schedule.
This is a necessary step in the normalization process. Meanwhile, all the men
who are alive will have died and frustration will have depleted our ranks.
B) We must not let this happen. Indeed, I .firmly believe it is time to
remove the State Department from the POW-MIA issue and have the President or
his special representative handle the diplomatic issues directly.
C) In June, Israel said to the world, 'Drop dead', and exchanged 1,200
Palestinian POW's for 3 Israelis:: It, indeed, would be an act of uncommon
valor for this country to have the same commitment to those who honorably
served it.
D) If there are any 'heroes' on the POW-MIA issue then they are, indeed,
Messrs. Hendon, Applegate, Dornan and Tighe, whose courage and candor is
unassailable. Bobby Garwood is a hero, too; he demonstrated courage far
beyond anybody in the White House, the Interagency Group or the State
Department on this issue. All of these men should be cited for their
outstanding dedication to the truth -- that men are alive and in captivity.
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STAT
E) We perhaps should exploit the schism which is emerging between the
Departments of Defense and State on the POW-MIA issue. Almost exclusively,
those who have come forth to tell the truth have been military men, knowing
that they (the military) merely jumped when the State Department said 'frog'
and that their buddies were left behind and are in captivity in Indochina.
Many more military men probably will come forth plagued by the consciences and
the painful reality of the situation. Indeed, perhaps we should actively
encourage military men to speak up, using as examples those who already have
chosen to tell the truth.
F) There are millions of people in this country who believe and care and who
are willing to help us bring the missing men home. For the National League of
Families to shun them and to proclaim that a small group of families is the
exclusive voice on the issue is to partake in the same deceit and dishonorable
activity as the Departments of State and Defense have done for years. For the
League not to welcome these people with open arms and to proclaim that we,
too, believe is shameful. The League must sever its umbilical cord to the
U.S. government and instead seek the broadest possible support from the
American people. We must become the advocate of the men who are alive and in
captivity and not their funeral director.
Comments and suggestions on this Manifesto are welcome.
Please send them to:
Dr. J. C. Donahue
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