STATEMENT BY ROBERT GATES CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000300250011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 25, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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/ OLL 85-0676
RECORD ('IJ'Y
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?r f'n CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Liaison
Washington, D. C. 20505
Telephone: [phone] March 198
The Honorable Dean A. Gallo
House of Representatives
1724 Longworth House Office Building
Washineton. D.C. 20515
Per our telephone conversation today,
enclosed is a copy of a CIA press release dated
25 February 1985 concerning the Agency's testi-
mony before the Joint Economic Committee on the
overall performance of the Soviet economy.
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533 ED OB
EDITIONS
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/enc
1 - OLL Record w/enc
1 - OLL Chrono w/o enc
LD/OLLI I(1 March 1985)
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Statement by Robert Gates
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
and
Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA
My testimony of 21 November 1984 before the Joint Economic
Committee of the Congress is being portrayed as setting forth a
major split between CIA and the Department of Defense on the
Soviet military effort. This is not correct.
My testimony three months ago was on the overall performance
of the Soviet economy. It is wholly unjustified to draw any
conclusions about Soviet military capabilities past, present, or
future from that testimony. As I told the Committee, the best
measure of Soviet military capabilities for use by US decision-
makers is what the Soviets actually have bought, are deploying
and are developing -- rather than an artificial reconstruction of
what it cost them (and which has value only when used as an
analytical tool by experts who understand its very significant
limitations). Our knowledge of Soviet military procurement --
what they produce and how they deploy it -- is far more precise
and reliable than our estimates of Soviet military spending which
are subject to great uncertainties.
The awesome fact is that despite a temporary leveling off in
the rate of growth in Soviet military procurement, the Soviets
consistently not only outspent the US throughout but produced far
more missiles, planes, warships, tanks and other weapons than the
US -- adding these to already huge stocks, as the charts released
on Friday vividly demonstrate. Also, my testimony reported only
on our estimates up to 1983. The slight improvement in overall
Soviet economic performance, the number of new weapons ready for
or being deployed, an aggressive and immense R&D effort, and
continued expansion of weapons production facilities all suggest
a return to historic rates of growth.
Detailed and comprehensive examinations of the Soviet
military effort are presented to the Executive Branch and
Congress throughout the year in a series of national intelligence
estimates. There is little disagreement in the intelligence
community with respect to either trends in or specifics of Soviet
military capabilities, procurement, or weapons research and
development -- the measures that really count. It is most
unfortunate that testimony on the Soviet economy which we agreed
to release to enhance public knowledge and.understanding of our
principal adversary is being misread and misused.
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
22 February 1985
The Joint Economic Committee on 21 February released CIA testimony of
last November on the Soviet economy. The testimony was not on Soviet military
capabilities. Because the information released by the Committee presents a
narrow view of Soviet military growth, the Central Intelligence Agency wishes
to emphasize the broader context of its testimony and to convey a more
balanced--though still partial--picture of the Soviet military buildup.
As CIA noted publicly in November 1983, the cost of defense activities
has exceeded that of the United States by a large margin, despite a decline in
the rate of growth. The dollar cost of Soviet defense activities in 1981--in
the middle of this period of decline--was some 45 percent greater than for the
U.S.; procurement costs alone. were some 45 percent larger. While this margin
has narrowed with the growth in U.S. defense spending, the Soviets still
outspend the U.S. overall and in important specific categories by substantial
margins. CIA also stressed in last November's testimony evidence of an upturn
in Soviet defense spending in 1983.
CIA has repeatedly emphasized that trends in Soviet military spending are
not a sufficient basis upon which to form judgments about Soviet
capabilities. The rate of increase in spending estimates does not give an
appreciation of the large stocks of strategic and conventional weapon systems
deployed by the Soviets during the past decade.
As the testimony states, current Soviet levels of spending are so high
that despite the procurement plateau, Soviet forces received in the years 1977
through 1983 a total of 1,100 ICBMs, more than 700 SLBMs, 300 bombers, 5,000
fighters, some 15,000 new tanks, and substantial numbers of new additional
major surface combatants, nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, and
attack submarines. During the same period, the U.S. added to its inventory
135 ICBMs, 390 SLBMs, no bombers, 3,000 fighters, 5,000 tanks, and 106 major
warships. The attached charts illustrate the extent to which Soviet military
.costs, equipment deliveries and military.manpower exceed those of the U.S.
Soviet efforts to develop advanced weapon systems continue in the 1980s'
at least at the rapid pace of the previous two decades. Among these weapons
are fighter and airborne control aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles,
space systems and submarines. The new systems cover the.full range of
technologically advanced weaponry the Soviets will need to modernize all their
forces.
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USR STR.q t ,c EWIF%tnt OEUVERIES AS A I Cr L r, DQJMICS 21 rm un
BALLISTIC
MISSILE
SUBMARINES
SLDMS
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.11 593 C Tcgq PIKE EWIWENT CEUVERIES `AS A PE}UNT CF LS CEJVERIES 21 rm tae
TANKS
OTHER
.COMBAT
VEHICLES
TACTICAL
-COMBAT
AIRCRAFT
MAJOR
SURFACE
SHIPS
ATTACK
SUBMARINES
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FIGUREE 3
ccM AR,sm cF is AW S(MET MIuwiy IwIQM' u4 V74 APO t983 21 rm moo
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us
U5
5
IZ174Dilllon Dollars
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1605B1111on Dollars
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US MD 9WIET MIUTARY C06T5 UIWCIYS CF IM E]Jfi25 71-rn
USSR
US
usf
Cumulative Costs
3339 Billion Dollars
13647 Billion Dollars