STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN CHARLES E. BENNETT BEFORE THE JOINT HEARING OF THE SEAPOWER AND STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000500610014-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 18, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN CHARLES B. BENNETT BEFORE THE
JOINT REARING OF THE SEAPOVER AND STRATEGIC AND
CRITICAL MATERIALS AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEES
APRIL 19. 1995
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today in
behalf of legislation long needed. Since 195 1. I have persistently
sponsored bills designed to help government employees avoid
conflict-of-interest situations in the procurement process.
Congress has enacted some legislation in this area. The most recent
occurred in 1978 after Senator Proxmire and I introduced legislation
similar to my current bill. After extensive hearings in the Senate, the
Senate voted unanimously to pass Senator Proxmire's bill. Unfortunately,
all the House did was to enact the rather insufficient language of the Ethics
in Government Act (Public Law 95-521), codified at 18 United States Code,
section 207.
These provisions were designed to stop someone from using his
former government position to influence decisions in favor of his present
employer. However, a 1983 report by the General Accounting Office on the
BW= in Government Act stated:
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"During our current review, ethics officials at several agencies and
other individuals we talked with told us that agencies have made few
referrals of post-employment violations to the Department of justice, and
Justice has prosecuted few violation cases. Agencies also have made little
use of the administrative enforcement authority given them by the Ethics
Act. In 33 agencies we surveyed, we found that the authority was used in
one instance. Because of the lack of information, it is difficult to determine
whether this represents an adherence by former employees to the
provisions of the post-employment statute, or an inaction or inability on
the part of agencies to identify violations, handle them administratively or
refer them to the Department of justice, and for justice to prosecute."
As the result of an inquiry in January 1983, I received a letter from
the Office of Government Ethics commenting on the enforcement of existing
conflict of interest statutes. One point in particular from that letter is of
interest now. It points out that Section 208 from Title 18 of the United
States Code prohibits a government official from taking action on any
government matter which affects a firm with whom that employee is
negotiating for future employment. However, there is left the
conflict-cif-interest situation where a job is clearly a possibility, even if not
openly stated. The letter notes that "unilateral efforts to please or impress
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a contractor with whom one is dealing as a government official with an eye
toward getting a job with the company are not covered by the existing
criminal conflict of interest statutes."
My bill, III 272, attacks this problem directly. It prohibits any
former government employee who was personally and substantially
involved in a procurement contract during his last three years of
government employment from accepting, for a period of two years, any
employment or compensation from a firm involved in that contract.
Former employees who violate the employment prohibitions
established in this bill would be subject to a maximum fine of $5,000
and/or a maximum prison sentence of one year. Anyone employing such a
person in violation of this bill would be subject to a maximum fine of
$25,000 and/or a maximum prison sentence of one year.
I believe the prohibitions in this bill will help Federal employees by
discouraging the unwanted advances of contractors who may try to
influence the employee's decisions with offers of future employment.
I should stress that this legislation does not prohibit all private
employment for contracting officials and employees leaving the
government. A major objection to this legislation has been that it would
hamper the Department of Defense's ability to recruit individuals with
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superior credentials because those individuals may fear a restricted future
job market. However. the two-year ban only applies in those particular
cases where the employee goes to work for a company with a direct
interest in a contract in which that employee participated. The employee
would not be barred from taking employment with other companies in the
same field. There are some 20,00 prime contractors in the defense sector.
The employee would only be barred from seeking employment from the
few companies with which he or she directly dealt, and then only for a
limited time.
Most government employees bring the highest integrity to their work.
But temptation is often present. The purpose of my legislation is to
remove this temptation and to secure public confidence in the proce ss.
The need for legislation to deal with this kind of conflict of interest
has long been apparent. In 1956, a report on the inquiry into aircraft
production cost and profits stated:
The presence of retired military personnel on payrolls, fresh from
the 'opposite side of the desk' creates a doubtful atmosphere-companies
whose business is so closely interwoven with the military establishment
ought to lean over backward so that no suggestion of favoritism, influence
or 'old school tie' could be read into their conduct."
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In fact, these companies do not lean over backward, but often act in
ways that encourage the suspicion of favoritism and influence on the part
of former government officials.
In 1960, the New York City Bar Association issued an excellent report
entitled, "Conflict of Interest and Federal Service" that noted:
"Interviews revealed a substantial body of opinion that government
employees who anticipate leaving their agency someday are put under an
inevitable pressure to impress favorably private concerns with which they
officially deal."
In 1975, the Council on Economic Priorities published the first
systematic review of Department of Defense personnel who had left for
jobs with defense contractors. The study showed that many former DOD
employees had gone to work for military contractors after playing an
active part in negotiating defense contracts with those same contractors. It
was reported that 27 percent of the employees who left the Defense
Department to take positions with defense contractors were working in
conflict of interest situations.
In 1983, the last year for which there are figures, almost 2200 people
filed reports stating that they had left the Department of Defense within
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the last three years for jobs with defense contractors. The problem may be
even larger than is evident from the available statistics, since many
transferees do not file any reports, as required by law, and the review of
their reports is spotty when they do file.
To capsulate the matter: my bill will make it a crime, under the
circumstances at out, for the employee to take a job with the company,
and for the company to provide the job. This differs from the present law
which requires proof of an intent to secure this employment, which is often
very difficult to prove.
? It is abundantly clear that the current legislation is not adequate, and
that, in fact, it has scarcely reduced the problem.
The defense establishment must earn the complete confidence of the
American people. We cannot let instances of corruption or favoritism--or
even their appearance --lessen that confidence.
We need this reform because the present situation weakens public
support for greatly needed, strengthened national defense measures.
Finally, we need it because our government, like Caesar's wife, must be
above reproach.
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