SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY REMARKS TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000901130012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 30, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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on Intelligence
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY
REMARKS TO THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
JANUARY 30, 1985
Record
Usually on this Committee I do not make many formal statements.
I prefer to leave as much time as possible for questions and
discussions.
You will all doubtless be happy to hear that I intend to
continue that custom.
However, this is a special occasion, and I hope everyone will
bear with a somewhat lengthy statement on what I think this Committee
needs to do.
Congratulate New Members
First congratulations to our nine new Members, and, welcome
back to the band of six holdovers.
Partisanship has no place on this very unique Committee. I
believe we Democrats understand this and will work constructively
with the majority to maintain as effective an intelligence capability
as possible.
Introduce Key Staff
As all of you know, the Chairman and I are committed to
building a professional and nonpartisan staff to serve the Members.
Let me introduce two key Committee staff appointed by the Minority.
First is Mr. Eric Newsom, the new Minority Staff Director. Eric
was my designated staff representative for two and a half years, and
I have the greatest confidence in him.
Second is Mr. Daniel Finn, the new Minority Counsel. Dan was
Danny Inouye's designee for over two years. I am delighted to have
r
him remain as Minority Counsel.
As far as I am concerned, Eric and Dan work for the whole
Committee, as should all of the staff. The Committee's rules
provide that the Minority Staff Director has the right to know
everything that the Staff Director knows. That right is essenti
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to the proper functioning of the Committee, both to ensure that
the Minority Members are fully informed, and to enable Eric to
assist the Staff Director in managing the staff efficiently.
Cooperation with the Chairman
The Chairman and I have kept in close touch over the past
several weeks, and have worked harmoniously together in preparing
for the grueling year ahead. I believe a cooperative relationship
is essential for the Committee to deal with the difficult and
sometimes controversial issues facing us.
Relations with the Democratic Members
At the same time, I believe my role as Vice Chairman requires
me to represent to the Chairman the views of the Minority on the
Committee. Every Member will have particular interests or issues
he wishes the Committee to pursue in hearings or through the staff.
I fully intend to support the interests of the Democratic
Members of the Committee when decisions are made about allocating
the Committee's time and staff resources.
Special Nature of the Committee
Before I turn to the Committee's agenda, T'd like to supplement
some of the things the Chairman has said about the special nature
of the Intelligence Committee.
I've already mentioned bipartisanship. This Committee works
successfully only on a genuinely bipartisan basis. We have access
to the most sensitive intelligence information. Our role is to
make proper use of that access for very specific purposes ... and
political advantage is definitely, repeat, definitely, not one of
them.
We have three basic tasks:
One. We must ensure that the Intelligence Community has the
resources necessary to provide the information the Nation needs to
protect its security and advance its interests. Over the last
several years the Committee, and the Senate, have been generous
in providing those resources. However, decisions about how much
we can afford for intelligence are not going to be as easy this
year and into the future.
Two. We are responsible for carrying out effective oversight
of the Intelligence Community. The Committee has been entrusted by
the Senate and the American people to ensure, virtually in complete
secrecy, that the intelligence agencies operate efficiently, within
the law, and according to fundamental American values. Our
guardians must never become the instruments of our oppression.
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There is no doubt the confidence of the Senate and the
American people was shaken by events last year relating to Central
America. We have a special duty to restore that trust.
Three. On behalf of the entire Senate, relying on our access
to sensitive intelligence, we must provide to the intelligence
agencies policy and political perspectives on their activities
and responsibilities. In the area of covert action or clandestine
operations, this means we have to make sure the Executive Branch
gives adequate consideration to whether a contemplated activity is
politically sustainable. This-Committee can offer objective
judgment on the value of planned intelligence activities for American
policy.
We will be expected to make a judgment for the Senate ... and
ultimately for the entire government ... on the verifiability of
any arms agreement. We cannot just wait until the President
presents a treaty for ratification. The Committee must follow
the evolution of proposals at every step of the way, injecting its
views at the time so the President can take them into account.
A final word on the special nature of this Committee.
Secrecy is our normal mode of operation. Unlike practically
everything else we do as Senators, it is necessary to resist the
temptation to seek public recognition for what we do in secret.
For my part, I pledge the greatest care in my contacts with the
press, as I have in the past. I strongly urge all my colleagues
to exercise the utmost restraint in contacts with the press.
The Chairman and I have decided to name David Holiday to
serve as Press Spokesman for the Committee. Dave was recommended
by Senator Boren, and is a superb choice. This appointment should
improve the Committee's relationship with the press, which has not
been good, while helping individual Members deal with the press
on specific matters without infringing on our commitment to
secrecy.
Committee Organization and Agenda
The Chairman has outlined how he plans to proceed over the
next few months. We have consulted closely on this, and I support
his approach. Our first priority is to scrutinize the Intelligence
Community budget. That will take practically all our time and
attention through the month of March and into April.
Eventually, we must look at the Committee's structure and
consider what subcommittee organization would best serve the
Committee's needs. Frankly, the old subcommittees had become
practically moribund, with the exception of the Budget Subcommittee,
and it was practically overwhelmed during the budget hearing cycle.
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In addition to the budget review, I see several additional
items on our agenda this year.
? Nicaragua. The Chairman wants to deal with the issue of
aid to the Contras in the budget hearings when and if we receive
a request from the Administration to renew funding. More than
anything else, this issue was responsible for the problems this
Committee had over the last two years. Because it has become a
major foreign policy issue for the Senate and the whole country,
it does not fit into the normal mold of Intelligence Committee
issues.
For the moment, let me simply say that I will work with the
Chairman and the Members to find a constructive means to deal with
this issue, consistent with defending my own strongly held views.
? Compliance with Arms Agreements. Within a few days, the
President is to submit a new report to the Congress on Soviet
compliance or noncompliance with its obligations under various
arms agreements. With our special access to intelligence gathering
capabilities, we will be faced with a major policy problem: What
should this Committee tell the Senate about Soviet compliance with
arms control treaties?
In my view, the Chairman and I should speak to leaders of
Foreign Relations and Armed Services and see if a workable approach
could be developed to consider the foreign policy, defense,
negotiating and intelligence implications of whatever the President
says.
? Arms Control Verification. The President is resuming
formal negotiations with the Soviets on strategic, intermediate
and space weapons. The Senate will look to us to be thoroughly
versed in the verification question when and if the President
submits an agreement. We cannot wait until we see the text of
a treaty to start learning. Hearings and briefings on each side's
proposals and U.S. monitoring capabilities and judgments should
begin as quickly as possible. In that connection, the Chairman
and I have invited Ambassador Paul Nitze to the Committee in early
February to talk about where the arms negotiations may take us.
We plan to follow that with a general session later in the month
with Secretary Shultz.
? Terrorism. This is a special concern to me. I fear the
growing danger of a terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear
device or a chemical weapon capable of mass destruction. Terrorism
is clearly spreading, both as a tactic of subnational groups like
the PLO, Islamic Jihad and the Red Brigade, and as a policy
instrument of certain states such as Iran. The target is mainly
the West, and the United States in particular.
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The Administration is attempting to devise an effective
counterterrorism policy and capability. From my own briefings
into their activities, I personally do not believe we are much
better prepared to fight terrorism than we were during Desert One
or the bombings of the Embassy and Marine headquarters in Beirut.
Thorough hearings on.terrorism and our counterterrorism capabilities
is one of my top priorities this year.
Last week, I asked Democratic Members to put forward their
own agenda items. I know Senator Nunn is concerned about what DoD
is doing in the area of Special Operations, as I am. This is one
of our main weapons against terrorism, yet I am convinced the
whole Special Operations effort is bogged down in inter-Service
rivalries, tangled lines of command and responsibility, poor
training and inadequate equipment, and lack of attention by the
JCS. I hope Sam will help the Committee pursue intelligence aspects
of the DoD Special Operations issue.
Fritz Hollings told me he is deeply concerned about the
hardships and dangers our men and women in intelligence are facing,
and the growing disincentives for the best people to go into
intelligence work. This is a serious problem, and I look to Fritz
to get the Committee involved in that area.
Obviously, the Committee will spend much time on issues which
arise in the course of the year. Following a set agenda too rigidly
is not possible. Still, we need a sense of what is important in
the longer term for the Committee to dedicate itself to. I hope
my Democratic colleagues, and the Republic side as well will come
to the Chairman and me with your own interests and concerns.
Conclusion
I promise not to make another speech as long as this one.
I'll end by saying I am proud to be on this Committee, and
stimulated by the challenges which are ahead of us. I'll miss
the Members who have departed, but I am absolutely confident
that with the strong new Membership we now have, the Committee
will meet its responsibilities to the Senate and to the American
people.
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REMARKS
OF
SENATOR DAVE DURENBERGER
CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AT
FIRST ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING
JANUARY 30, 1985
Today is a very special day in the history of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, for it represents our coming of
age. We have gone through a full eight years, the term
contemplated for members, and we are entering the second
generation. This means that the Committee is no longer an
experiment; it's a vital and functioning part of the Senate and
of the oversight system through which the intelligence community
gets general guidance on the conduct of our national security
policy.
There were many people who questioned whether the Senate
could or should conduct the kind of sensitive business this
Committee undertakes. Some skeptics thought we could not be
trusted with classified information. Others thought we would be
incapable of asking the kinds of questions which separate real
oversight from simple pedantry. Still others thought we would go
native, and fail to represent the interests and concerns of our
colleagues and constituents.
The fact that we are sitting here today, heading into our
Committee's second generation, should put those kinds of doubts
to rest once and for all. We wouldn't have attracted such able
new members, if our first eight years had not been marked by
success. And for that, we and the nation owe a great debt to a
few people: Howard Baker and Bob Byrd, who helped create this
committee; Danny Inouye who was its first Chairman, and who set
the tone of responsibility which the Committee has since
followed; Birch Bayh, Barry Goldwater, and Pat Moynihan who led
us through some very rough times; and the various Senators who
over the past eight years have taken the time to engage in a very
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demanding and thankless duty to their country and their
colleagues by serving here.
And that brings me to the first point I want to make about
the Committee. Its roots lie in a unique and limited mandate,
and its fundamental essence is thankless duty.
There is a good deal of mystery -- and a lot of curiosity --
about what this Committee does. I recall a constituent who
introduced me to an audience by noting that I served on both the
Ethics and Intelligence Committees. He said, `this is a
surprising oxymoron, since senators are reported to have
neither.' But more common than this kind of kidding by friends
is an intense and continuing curiosity about what we do, from our
friends, from our colleagues, from the press, and from others.
It's difficult under those circumstances to remember that our
first duty is discretion. And I know from experience how
frustrating it is to sit in a meeting or on the floor and hear
things said which I know are either untrue or incomplete. It's
tempting -- very tempting -- to enter a policy debate and correct
the views of
people we know are barking up the wrong tree. On any other
Senate Committee, we would be expected to do so. Here, all we
can do is ask our colleagues to trust us.
President Eisenhower, who had a sound understanding of
intelligence matters, described the profession as follows:
Success cannot be* advertised; failure
cannot be explained. In the work of
intelligence, heroes are undecorated and
unsung, even among their own fraternity.
Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism --
their reward can be little except the
conviction that they are performing a unique
and indispensible service for their country;
and the knowledge that America needs and
appreciates their efforts.
I think the same applies to us on this Committee.
The reason for this derives from our unique mandate -- a
mandate rooted in this Committee's earliest history. Basically,
as I see it, we have four jobs here. Each of them entails
oversight.
The first job is to quietly exercise our judgement -- not our
technical skills, but our best judgement -- on behalf of the 85
Senators who do not serve here and do not deal with the sensitive
issues we cover. If we are to be the Senate's source of
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judgement, we have to ensure that all points of view are
covered. That's why the Committee is appointed on the
recommendations of the Majority and Minority Leaders, why it
draws eight crossover members from pertinent committees, and why
it is expressly bipartisan. Here, we sit as Senators, not as
Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives. And we act
as a body, not as 15 individuals. If we lose sight of that, we
will lose the trust and respect of the people who have given us
this duty. And without their trust -- without their confidence
when we assure them that matters of interest are being attended
to -- we lose our mandate. There is no more pressing reason to
maintain at all times the greatest discretion about this
Committee's business.
Our second job is to ensure the integrity of the intelligence
which is produced for the use of policy-makers, including our
colleagues. James Schlesinger is fond of saying that "everyone
is entitled to his own opinions, but no one is entitled to his
own facts." Intelligence is not opinion, and it is not policy.
It is unbiased and unblemished information drawn from a variety
of sources. If it is not timely, concise, and relevant to
policy, it is not intelligence. And if it gets mixed up with
matters of partisan or factional opinion, it becomes propaganda.
It's our job to ensure that it doesn't. And part of that job --
the hardest part for all of us -- involves keeping this Committee
out of the policy and political issues which are properly the
business of the Senate at large, and focused simply
on the data. It's usually a tough line to draw, particularly
when things like the paramilitary program in Nicaragua become
front page news and feed debate in the Senate over policy. But
if it's not easy to draw the line, it is still vital. And that
is why Senators run this Committee instead of staff. Our
colleagues know and trust us.
Our third oversight task is again peculiarly Senatorial and
calls uniquely for our judgement. In some sense, we sit as a
board of directors. In this capacity, we consult with the
Director of Central Intelligence and other officials about what
are termed "significant anticipated intelligence activities."
And we are asked to exercise our judgement, not just our
technical wizardry. We have to ensure that somewhere along the
line the right kinds of questions are being asked -- questions
rooted in real-world considerations and the kind of judgement
which comes form a lifetime of addressing a host of complex
issues.
Finally, we serve as both a visible symbol and active
guardian of basic constitutional safeguards. Every senior
intelligence official in this country's history has strongly
cautioned us to make sure that our intelligence system is an
American intelligence system, reflecting and living within the
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limits which define our country. It does not run contrary to the
canons of good intelligence to watch for abuses of or by the
agencies. Our intelligence system will thrive when the public is
ensured that someone is available to keep an eye on it. We.play
a big part in that mission.
What I have been outlining here, of course, is a concept of
oversight which is a bit different from what we see with other
committees. It is an affirmative form of oversight, not a
negative one. It involves assisting the community, not simply
publicly slapping its wrist every time a good headline is
available. Our relationship with the intelligence community is
defined by necessity as well as by tension, by support as much as
by suspicion. We do more than simply appropriate money and look
for symbolic pecadillos. We help to define the intelligence
process for the United States.
There are three aspects to this affirmative mission that I
would like to have our Committee focus on over the next few
years. None is new, but.each is important if we are to do more
than simply warm 15 chairs here.
First, I think it's important that we take a prospective
definition of oversight. It's easy and tempting to focus on the
business of the moment. Nicaragua is a good example. It's
current, exciting, tangible, and on everyone's minds. Obviously,
it deserves attention.
But we have a key responsibility here, which is to help
prevent intelligence failures. And the time to begin working on
them is years before they might arise. A few dollars of
investment today can save us untold amounts of money -- and lives
-- later. Frequently, however, we can get so caught up in the
business of looking at today's problems -- or yesterday's -- that
we forget to put the proper emphasis on tomorrow's problems.
A lot of this derives from the normal tendency to focus on
only what's hot at the moment. But a lot derives as well from
the failure of the right people at the right time to question
assumptions which are driving policy. For instance, very few
people in the mid-1960s took the time to question whether-their
assumptions about international economics would prove as sound in
the future as they had in the past. So very little effort was
devoted to problems we are now living with -- international debt
patterns which make lenders as much a hostage as borrowers;
shifts in the terms of trade; the cartelization of various
natural resources. If we had foreseen what the 1970s were to
look like, we might have saved a lot of money. .
So in addition to looking at current oversight issues, I
would like to see us begin to continuously examine the question
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of future intelligence requirements. Enough things are going on
that we simply can't be confident that systems which work well
today will do so tomorrow. Arms control is one area where this
stands out. There are others. And I think that a major
responsibility of this Committee in its oversight capacity should
be to help identify such areas and track the success of the
agencies in coping with them. Particularly since many of you
will be here for a number of years, it's important to get started
now.
A second area I'd like to see us address is the overall
question of public understanding of and support for the
intelligence process. To people who grew up on Ian Fleming and
Robert Ludlum, the intelligence process is described in a few key
words: Maserattis, Berettas, and bedrooms. At the time I
enlisted in Army Counter-intelligence, 30 years ago, I hoped for
the same things. What I found, of course, was something very
different.
At its heart, good intelligence work is dry, somewhat boring,
and very concerned with detail. It's a lot like academic
research. And its payoff is enormous; as I mentioned earlier, it
saves money and lives by making the future a little more clear to
over-burdened decision-makers.
I can't think of anything more harmful to the support needed
for intelligence agencies than the kinds of fantastic stories
which are repeated. And when the agencies themselves get caught
up in things like dropping manuals out of balloons and planting
mines in Corinto harbor, the image is only fed. The result is
the kind of thing that happened just a few weeks ago at the
University of Minnesota -- CIA recruiters were greeted by angry
demonstration.
Clearly, intelligence must operate with the greatest degree
of secrecy possible in order to preserve the security of sources
and methods. But there are some aspects of the process which
might usefully be discussed a bit more openly. I am confident
that, if handled with discretion and with an absolute commitment
to avoid making comment simply for the sake of comment, a few
public hearings of this committee could help sow the seeds needed
for the growth of long-term public understanding.
In this regard, I will soon be polling you on the appointment
of David Holliday, currently Dave Boren's Legislative Director,
as the Committee's Press Officer. Mr. Holliday is an experienced
journalist. He has worked as administrative assistant to several
governors of both political parties. He has done Senator Boren's
national security work for a number of years. And, as I know
you'll realize when you meet him, he is a man of great maturity
and discretion, who will do a lot to help this Committee.
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I anticipate that the Press officer will play the same kind
of role that a Defense Department Press Officer plays. He will
handle the inevitable press inquiries which come to this
Committee and to our individual offices about SSCI business.. He
will answer what he can. He will let our Committee speak with
one voice. And I think that over time, he will help us foster an
understanding for what this Committee and the intelligence
community are all about.
Finally, as you have learned form my earlier letter and
perhaps from comment in the press, I want to return the staff
system to the role envisioned for it in the Committee's original
resolution. I know there has been a lot of attention paid to
this issue, so I thought it would be good to clarify just what I
think should and should not be done with the so-called "designee"
system.
,At bottom, I think the issue is whether we intend to live up
to our unique mandate as a bipartisan Committee engaged in
discreet and prospecitve.oversight. If so, then the staff will
be sufficiently busy with Committee business, and sufficiently
out of the public eye, that each one of them is going to need to
be a specialist of some kind, working for the full Committee
under the supervision of the Staff Director. That's what was
called for in S. Res. 400.
Does this mean that Senators are going to surrender their
right to rely on individual staff in whose judgement they have
confidence? Absolutely not. We all know that such relationships
are the grease that make the wheels turn in the Senate,
particularly in the more esoteric areas. We all need to draw
upon the help and judgement of valued staff when we grapple with
a complex issue or when we need to find out something.
Given the need for security on this Committee, of course, we
can't ask our personal staff to do that job. So it's only
natural that Senators will want people on the Committee staff who
can work as individual designees.
I encourage your nominations. And I think Dave Holliday
demonstrates that the designee system can be fully compatible
with the overall needs of the Committee. Dave will be a
Committee employee, whose skills will be available to everyone of
you who might want to draw upon them And he will at all times be
available to Senator Boren for the Senator's intelligence work.
He will not do Dave's foreign policy and defense work, however,
unless we can't keep him busy here. Since he will report to the
Staff Director, like all other staff, he will be spending the
bulk of his time on overall Committee business.
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In short, we can all have our cake and eat it too. It's just
a matter of finding the right person for the job. I want to
consult with the new staff director to get a sense of what areas
the Committee needs additional help in, such as the budget cycle
or perhaps some of the hard sciences. And I want to work with
all the members so that those slots are filled by people in whom
each Senator has confidence. This is not my Committee, and it's
not Pat's. It belongs to all of us, and it will work only if its
overall needs and the individual needs of each Senator are
harmonized.
That brings me to my closing points. Until new staff are
appointed, approved, and cleared, we are all going to face a lot
of work. I would strongly endourage those of you who do not have
designees on the Committee at this time to seek one out from
among the existing staff. It's what I did six years ago, and I
ultimately decided to ask the person I selected, Ed Levine, to
remain on the job permanently. Regardless of what you intend to
do, it will take about three months to get new people down here,
and you may well need some assistance until then. The staff are
ready to give you that assistance.
Remember, of course,' that the persons whom you temporarily
select -- like those whom you ultimately nominate -- are here as
professionals. They are not here, and should not be here, to
help us run for cover in the political arena. The most important
task I face as Chairman and Pat faces as Vice-Chairman is to keep
you from being embarrassed or from finding that SSCI business is
now on the front pages of the papers. If we succeed in that, you
won't need a designee whose principal function is political:
Certainly, over the short term, I think you'll find that the
work we have to undertake is hard, tedious, and vital. It's not
the sort of thing which makes good headlines or political
slogans. It's why, until you each make a decision about
nominating a candidate for a staff slot, you will be well served
by working with the professionals on the staff.
It's also why I think we can and should do without the
subcommittee structure for this year. Pat and I have talked
about this, and we think that if we conduct the Committee's
business at the full Committee level, we will all be better
served. We will work from a common base of information,
including the intensive education that comes from working our way
through the FY1986 intelligence budget. And in the interim,
nobody will be slotted into a specialized subcommittee before
having the chance to gain a thorough understanding of the big
picture, as well as the particular sub-areas.
Our first meeting -- at the full Committee level, as they all
will be for this year -- will occur next Tuesday, February 5th,
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at 10:30. We will have Paul Nitze to tell us what happened at
the Geneva talks and to give us a chance to get into all the arms
control monitoring and compliance issues that these omnibus
negotiations are going to raise. We should have a short briefing
book on that available for all members by the end of the week.
Our second hearing will be on Wednesday the 20th, at 10:00.
This will be an informal session with Secretary Shultz. That
will give us the chance to raise anything that's on our minds --
preferably at least somehow relating to intelligence. We have
told the Secretary's office that arms control verification and
Nicaragua are possible topics, but we're leaving the agenda open.
The big activity for the Committee in the coming two months,
of course, will be the budget authorization process -- a process
that gets us into every issue there is, because the budget is our
most immediate tool for convincing the intelligence agencies to
do as we recommend. But I want to stop before asking Keith Hall,
our Budget officer, to discuss that, because I know that Pat
Leahy has some comments.
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