THE INDIA YEARS: POWER FROM AFAR THE MEMOIRS OF JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280050-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: March 29, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R 00200280050-3
?
1 April 1981
A marvelous Galbraith memoir snippet, worth reading
(attached), including his own
First Law of Intelligence: You
cannot know the intentions of a
government that doesn't know them
itself.
(As our analysis proceeds concerning where the Indians are
going in their nuclear program, we should keep in mind
another passage: "Indian politics has its own uncontrollable
dynamic; as such it proceeds independent of any possible
external influence.")
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP8R00029 000200280050-3-
?
AY:. 1 e
0 ttTYI.C1LG2 ~q~
roh,, K aaiatb Golbraat& teas not ale ,s
matters I-Ie was bons seventy-two years
ago on -a farm in . 'Canada, : graduated.
from Ontario Agrirrltural College.. and
went to work. in forlower reaches.of the
Department of Agric !tare; durixg, `the.
If success eanrs-early by.1941 hi-
avas administering` ce controls. under
aP DR (where one ty' is .employees was a
young man named Richard Nixon) -
Galbraith. icon developed-the- knack of
t etping success in=perspective.' A casualty
c f - wartime . bureaueratsc; maneuvers :,tn
went `ors to a sicond'
Jashington;- he
career rn journalism :befinr-returning to-
academia at a rofessor-. qf econ sues ar
Harvard While- there. 1 958,-he pub-
fished his best -knotoa, ;'work;;: The Af-
_ ln,1960'Galbraith-wasorriirtimate-
terms with two conteadersfirthe Demo
Stevenson acrd John' Kennedy.. acrd fneiid-
ers will learn next- week.
As Part One, f -tki excerpnorr;o,
Galbraith's forthcoming memoir, A
i n Our Times, opens,. KE)rnedy has been
friend, . not an eminently vulnerarile
chairman of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers close to home. but an eminently re-
proved yet unusually influential anrbassa
don to India. - - y1~-=F.d
THE BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE
29 March 1981
-: ~wT?h.ris'I~enrit
:Galbraith :
resident Kennedy was'pleased to
have me in his administration as
:he took office in 1961, but at -a
suitable distance, such as in--India.
This saved him froth. a ' too dose iden-
tification with my -extensively.' irtieu
lated economic views. 'At his very first
press conference in Los Angeles after
his nomination in 1960, he was asked
if he and the Democratic party could
now be considered committed-to the .
ideas in my book The _Affluent Society.
He evaded with skill and grace. A few
daj+'.after the election he asked Arthiurl
Schlesinger if I wanted! to be chaieznan
of the' -Council of -Economic Advisers
Schley er mentioned- my-interest in
India. Kennedy, Arthur said after-
ward, seemed far from distressed.. -
n March 27,- 1961,,
shortly before depart-'
ing for. India, I -had
lunch: at_, the Metropolitan
Club in Washington with G.
Lewis Jones, a- foreign service
officer of conservative. tem-
peramene, then' the. r assistant
secretary - of state for Near_
East and South Asian affairs:
He- told me.that he considere~dd
past or intended. CIA activities
in India a blot : otr the demo-
cratic processes-we praised and .
affirmed. He-urged. me to in-.
form: myself. and .bring them
.to _an end. Lewis Jones was a
good 'man
Two moeiingseci.had'
a briefing on intelligence: op-
erations-tn,India by the CIA.
Richard. M:.' Bisse_ll,. Jr., joihed-
it and sliodved me a paper.
with the proposed budget for-'
the cotton; year. Bissell .*as
an economist of ability and inn
telligence and an early Ceyne
sign, who; iii.- the New Deal
days, had. held himself. aloof
from the political enthusiasms
of the time. - Keynes, was one
'thing; - liberal politics.-was.
something: else.. In conse-
quence, his. professional cor-
petence,.combined- with his in.
ner conservatism, - made: hiin
highly acceptable to the buss,.
nessmen ? who were associated
in later 'years with the-.Mai-!:-
shall Plan,. and `he avas 'par-:
_ticularly--influentiab figure--in=
its'. management and success.'
He went= one: o joiii :-Allen;
'Dulles in..the belief that "coinmunisni '`anywhere::.called ' for
an . automatic - and,
o ft e n " thinking='response and: that.' a
system so, evi 1 allowed- dany.
indecency-.in return."'
Bissell that morning .'must:
have... been =taking' time. off
from:-the..-final stages-. of -the4
planning .'of the '$ay of_ Pigs
_
operation, if:_ anything-. char`
anarc`hic' .:could = be' said to
have.been :planned:: He`was
deputy-director of the.-CIA' fot
plans,.. this"'. being -'the, euphe
raisin for,` clandestine -opera-
dons. or what,.:opvimisncally>
were assumed:so-`rm remain-
 B-isscll's list of operations so 1suaded it .was reap
hnrh a paned and depressed I that I - now-}wau,red to 1,y f Accordingly, in May 1961,
W
ashington
me. In one sense, as I then ambassador. On Cuba I wrote - ne to
with the uof brio to
noted, what was proposed a. letter to the President urg- all clandestinoperations in
it wouldn't in
was ~
inim
oitant
the costs of what I
ll
d -
g
p
;
,.
ca
e
change anything. Indian *poli- our past military and political
tics leas its own uncontrollable "adventurism," as when Mac-
dynamic, as such, it proceeds Arthur went to the Yalu
independent of any possible River, the U-2 destroyed the
external influence. Nothing Paris Summit, or when, as in
could be less related to result Guatemala,, seeming, success
than any effort of the CIA.
But the certainty of disclosure
of the enterprises being- pro-
posed and -the consequent- ef
fect on our relations with'the
Indian government (and" the
effect also' on myself as - the
American:: ambassador could
-be ver.~dama~ine,,,Sinceman
India~.as would -be.. involved
-
and- subject-to- the . changing
pressures of politic-and. con-
science; such dLsclosure'., was
inevitable. A large:-sum,`well
into the millions, : was-- to .be
made available -to help' -ton-
communist candidates in. the
elections twelve months-hence..
Smaller amounts. were to : be
set aside.. to_ subsidize.-new
papers and' a few.-key-.politi-
cians and to -sustain=s maga
zincon public affairs: of ade-
quately-anticommunist temper.
That night I wrote. in my
journal that V -had=; Been
briefed "on= various- spooky
activities, some of whiclt.I-do-
not like. I shall stop them."
was a a optimism I did- not at
all fecal; journals can be used
when all else fails, for person=
al rea surance.
day or so later -- at=
most my last~ iu Tash
! . ington -: 1learned
from the undersecretary o
state, Chester Bowles,. of-the_:
intended Bay of Pigs opera-
tion against Cuba. I reflected:
morbidly on- the. activities
with which I was becoming-
involved. I was unhappy for
the country: I was even more.
unhappy, alas,. for myself. I
was .,accepting what .1 was
meant: to oppose; one day I
would have to-answer. But as
thousands before and many-
more since, I told myself that I
by keeping the job I might
make a difference... Like .most
Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029 000200280050-3
India of all .kinds to an end. . the Individualist; no,. to say
No subsidies to parties, politi- anarchic, tendencies of.uumer-
cians, or papers; no other un- ous Indians,'.- no. oae could
necessary undercover activi- wish ?communism such -a mis-
ties. Only the normal report- fortune......
ing that is conducted with All 'sub rose operations,
-
b all
was at grave cost to our repo- --- -----
`y .
major states would remain.
tattoo elsewhere in Latin
(This would also be subject-to
America
The l
tt
I
.
e
er was
ess
-to persuade the President. than `vhat~ in those years, I called"
'Galbraith s First Law of Intel-
to
to appease m
conscience
y
..
ligenor ; YOU Cannot know
i
int
o L
ons - va a govern-
by one particularly insane meat that doesa.'t. know them
enterprise. Long flights were itself."), I wrote a memoran-
being made- by the CIA from dum detailing-my.- objections
the neighborhood of Bangkok.. and circulated it.: to-, those I
over India to : the'-- northern hoped would agree. -And I
border--of Nepal. There the took it, along with. my strong-
er oral objections, to President
munition, and other - supplies Kenned Robert Preside
for dissident. and deeply un? y' y'
hygienic tribesmen. who had and McGeorge Bundy. - My
once roamed over the neigh-' major defense: so prepared, I
then tackled Richard Bissell,
burin--?'Tibetan countryside
other senior CIA officials, and
nd
h
n
i
a
o
ow rel
eved bore-
: w
dom with raids back into the
territory from which they had
been extruded. This military
action was.:thought to- cause
great distress in Peking or, as
Dean Rusk' still. insisted,. Pei-
ping. But the tribesmen had
achieved the standing of a
faithful ally; to a faithful ally,
.in the, ethic of, the time, we
had to be? faithful regardless
of the cost-' -- -
On arriving in-New Delhi
in April, I began a full investi-
gation;:.of CIA. operations.:: I
was not troubled- by an open
mind. I was convinced that
most of the projects proposed
would be-useless for their own
anticommunist purposes and
were capable, when known, of
doing us great damage as
well.. The local CIA station
chief, an . intelligent former
history teacher named Harry
A_ Rositzke, was not strong in
their defense. Neither he. nor
others --were disappointed to
learn of my_ opposition. - i
finally Allen Dulles. In letting
it be known that I had carried
the matter to the White
House, I" encouraged the im-
pression that-- the- President
had been sympathetic, as gen-
erally ,he was. They knew, in
any case- that Kennedy had
heard, without countering
argument, that the operations
were insane.
was prepared for, a sharp
struggle; in fact, it was far
`Dulles' senior subordinates did
hoped.' My timing; if. acciden
ial, was superb.. The ' Bay, of
Pigs fiasco had - left the once
dangerously ' confident -archi-
recce of clandestine operations
in= a severely chastened mood.
Allen Dulles, . when I-: ap-
proached - him, . was almost
exclusively concerned with
learning. to whom my memo-
randum had pone so he could
get the - copies back.. They
were evidence against his ad-
ministration 'of the CIA; on
some- matters he was more
acute than on others. One-of
tell me,'at first angcidy,' ther
tearfully,. that I was turnin#
. with :,the -exception of the
ovetflights .to Nepal, . were
scratched. Later, with the help
of Robert Kennedy, I persuad-
ed the President to bring these
to an end.
ack in
the- autumn of- 9611, I encoun-
: tered: Riehar&Bise1tone day
:. at- the. Hay=Adams= HoteL He
said" he. was...leaving- the : gov-
ernment .:-The. President - had
told '..him that after the,. Bay:
of Pigs : any. future mishaps-
would -;inevitably.. _be-~blamed
-:-.On hiiiL'- He,:;would.'..be safer.
out-- It . was.:-sad. --: ;' n an : of
.,quietly courteous manner.with
a. .7 intelligent: face,; his
servace_as"a principal architect
andt::guide 'of -.thc-Marshall-:
Plan .had earned - him.- the -ad-
miration of all so?involved -: As:
Dulles was is a far`above-
his intelligenee, :Bissell had. ip
volved "himself = ln- ent erp
s
.below. his _ risv
worthL ha
not, 10-:my regre4-seen-
' IIIm
since ,s,
EXc;ZRPTZTb
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH ISPROFESSOR
_
EMERITUS AT HARVARD. A LIFE IN OUR
TIMES WILL'BE PUBLISHED BY HOUGHTON---
MIFFLIN.IN MAY;-
India over to the communists
I thought to reply that giver
:I~ r^ /P Qr F'~P,IQ 2D=03/22: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280050-3