(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200330013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
24 September 1 31
State Dept. review completed
NOTE FOR: NIO/NESA
Special Assistant tor Nuclear
Proliferation Intelligence
The attached is furnished FYI and in
preparation for a meeting (to be scheduled
later) to discuss the advisability of pre-
paring an assessment of the prospects for
a Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
Attachment:
As Stated
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington. D.C. 20451
September 1, 1981
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NFAC.~-- z-j jt
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Ephraim Evron,
Israeli Ambassador'to the US
Ambassador Hunan Bar 'On, Deputy
Secretary General of the Israeli
Foreign Office
Eugene V. Rostow, Director, ACDA
PLACE: Madison Hotel, Washington, D. C.
COPIES TO: S - Secretary Haig
D = Judge Clark
P - Amb. Stoessel
T --Mr. Buckley
M - Mr. Kennedy
NEA - Amb. Veliotes
PM - Mr. Burt
DOD - Secretary Weinberger
DOD - Under Secretary Ikle
DOD - Mr. Perle
DOD - JCS
NSC - Mr. R. Allen
CIA - Mr. W. Casey
INR - Mr. R. Spiers
Amembassy Tel Aviv - Amb. Lewis
Ambassador Evron had invited Mr. Rostow to lunch, to
meet Ambassador Bar 'On, whom Mr. Rostow had known some
years ago.
In the course of lunch, the following topics were
discussed, Ambassador Bar 'On taking the lead in each case.
1. Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Development. Israel was.
increasingly concerned -- and very seriously concerned --
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Classified y VR
Review for declass on: 9/1/93
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about nuclear developments in Pakistan. Ambassador Bar 'On
gave Mr. Rostow the attached memorandum (Tab A), along
with a copy of Israel's letter on the subject to the
Secretary General. Israel intends also to inform France
of its concern, and to ask France likewise to take
appropriate steps to persuade Pakistan (and China) to
draw back from the brink.
Mr. Rostow welcomed the expression of Israeli concern.
He said that the USG was also concerned and was actively
pursuing the lines Israel suggested and others to persuade
Pakistan not-to become a nuclear weapons state. USG
thought its influence in Pakistan was improved by US-
Pakistani military cooperation.
2. Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
Ambassador Bar 'On reiterated Israel's positive interest
in the projet. There were of course a number of pitfalls
and traps, which should be anticipated now, so that Israel
would not be in the position of having to vote against
the Resolution. Israel would try to coordinate with
Egypt before the UNGA, but in fact the habit of such
coordination did not exist, despite the Egyptian policy
in certain circles -- notably USG and American Jewry --
of implying that Israel and Egypt worked closely together.
Cooperation of that kind occurred only at the top between
Sadat and Begin. If any effective preparatory work was
to be done on the subject, USG would have to do it, both
with Egypt and with Israel.
Mr. Rostow said that USG was now actively considering
the positions it would take with the Egyptians before and
during the UNGA and the diplomatic scenario it would follow
thereafter. We should certainly keep Israel informed and
work closely with her. He explained that Egypt had
indicated Its strong interest in remaining the leader-in
the effort, a position USG would fully respect, coordinating
its efforts with those of Egypt, Israel, and other interested
nations. Among the points being examined within the USG, Rostow
mentioned (1) the desirability of amending the Egyptian
resolution to make it clear that peace in accordance with
S.C. Resolution 338 and 242 was a necessary condition .
precedent to the establishment of a MENWFZ; (2) the question
of an Experts Group, as recommended by the Egyptians and
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supported with reservations by the Israelis in 1980; and
(3) broader questions about the geographical scope of the
area covered, defense considerations, and others.
Ambassador Bar 'On commented that Israel was adamantly
opposed to any plan which would have the MENWFZ come into
existence, or seem to come into existence, by the action of
some deus ex machina -- the Secretary General, the General
Assembly, or the Security Council. In Israel's view, the
only possible procedure was to have the states of the area
negotiate a treaty which Would then of course be deposited
with the UN. The Zone would be established by the Treaty.
That had been the procedure used in reaching the Treaty
of Tlatelolco. He gave Rostow the attached package of
documents (Tab B) and called attention particularly to the
comments of Ambassador Fisher (US) at p. 47 of the excerpt
from the GA debate.
Ambassador Bar 'On said Israel was equally opposed to
an experts group chosen and created by the Secretary
General. Only experts chosen by governments of the area
could be effective.
Mr. Rostow said USG had not made up its mind on
this point. Israel's views were helpful. If a group
including states from outside the Middle East were es-
tablished, all sorts of difficulties would arise, includ-
ing an inevitable Soviet presence; on the other hand, if
the meeting were confined to the states of the area, could
such a group produce any results? Who would provide the
necessary catalyst? Perhaps it was the only way to go
forward, starting with Israel and Egypt, plus Morocco
perhaps, or Saudi Arabia, with the United States in the
corridor. The Camp David procedure, after all, should not
be dismissed by any means.
Mr. Rostow said he had not thought of Ambassador-
Bar 'On's point about the deus ex machina, which was
obviously important. He would consider and discuss it,
and come back to him or Ambassador Evron as proved
convenient.
Bar 'On asked also about where within the United
States government the talks would be focussed. Rostow
replied that ACDA was in charge of arms control
negotiations, under the direction of the President and
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the Secretary of State, and would continue to coordinate
American efforts on the project.
Rostow asked how the Israeli Foreign Office had
reacted to his formula with respect to Israeli's adherence
to NPT and Israeli's acceptance of IAEA safeguards.
Bar 'On replied that if peace were made with Israel by
the states of the region and a NWFZ negotiated, Israel
would be living in a different world, and Israeli
adherence to NPT could not be excluded. Evron added
that perhaps "hope" was a more appropriate word than
"expectation," which Rostow had used, but GOI couldn't
object.
3. The Attempt to Expel Israel from IAEA. Bar 'On
gave Rostow the attached document (Tab C) on the subject
of the effort to expel Israel from the IAEA or to suspend
its membership. Rostow noted that the United States had
weighed in with an extremely strong statement the day
before, and would continue to oppose the effort
categorically.
Bar 'On inquired about our evaluation of the struggle
over the Presidency of IAEA. Rostow said we were coming
to the-view that all the candidates should withdraw so
that a new effort could be made. Bar 'On commented that
this would mean another year for Eklund.
Eugene V. Rostow
Tab A - Memorandum
Tab B - Documents
Tab C - Document re Israel/IAEA
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0 Confidential
Israel's concern with the Pakistani nuclear program is based on the
following considerations:
1. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program
Israel has learned that, in spite of frequent official denials,
Pakistan is carrying out activities aimed at the establishment of
a nuclear infrastructure which, upon completion and expansion, will
enable her to produce and test nuclear weapons. Pakistan will. be
able to build a nuclear arsenal using weapons grade materials from
one or both possible production courses: Uranium enrichment by
centrifuges and plutonium separation by reprocessing.
For further details, see the enclosed document.
Recent reports indicate that Pakistan may soon carry out its first
nuclear test on a site provided by the P.R.C.
2. The continuation of nuclear exports to Pakistan
Israel is aware of and concerned at Pakistan's close relationship
with nuclear exporting countries in Europe from which Pakistan
acquired most of the'components and material for its nuclear
weapons program. In spite of reports about Pakistani preparations
for nuclear weapons production, some governments in Western Europe
did not take concrete steps to prevent various firms from supplying
sophisticated nuclear technology for the Pakistani nuclear weapons
program.
Israel has learned that following the disclosure of Pakistani
intentions to build nuclear weapons, the French Government banned
in 78-79 the export of sensitive components necessary for the
construction of a large reprocessing plant (KNC2). There are
signs, however, that Pakistan intends to reverse *this trend and
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renew cooperation with France for the purpose of completing the construction
of the reprocessing plant.
3. Changes in the U.S. attitude towards Pakistan
Israel followed closely the recent negotiations between the U.S. and
Pakistan which might involve a lifting of the Symington Amendment's
application to Pakistan and the resumption of American military and
economic aid to'`tfiis country, despite the latter's activities aimed
at the production of nuclear weapons. The result of such :changes
will undoubtedly mean the undisturbed completion of Pakistani re- /
processing and enrichment projects.
4. Pakistan's relationship with the Arab States
Israel cannot lose sight of the fact that Pakistan and some of the more
extreme Arab States maintain similar standpoints in their hostility towards
Israel. Therefore, the reports on high-level contacts between Iraq and Pakistan
for the development of a framework for cooperation in the nuclear field,
are particularly significant for Israel. One cannot exclude the possibility that
Pakistan could provide Iraq with a short cut to nuclear weapons. There have
.also been reports of Libyan and Saudi Arabian involvement in the Pakistani nuclear
program.
Israel is fully aware of the deep concern of U.SI at the deterioration of the
security of the strategically important Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region.
It is precisely becsuse of this that the Government of Israel believes that it
would be important that steps be taken to stop the Pakistani efforts to obtain
nuclear weapons. It is within this context that consideration to'the following
measures might be given:
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1. That West European Governments be persuaded to stop the export
of nuclear materials and technologies to Pakistan and tighten nuclear export
regulations in.order to prevent Pakistan from exploiting loopholes.
2. France be asked to abstain from renewing its nuclear cooperation
with Pakistan for the construction of the reporcessing plant KNC2.
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