PROPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200400017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 9, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
DDI 2874-82
9 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence
SUBJECT: Proposal for Nuclear Proliferation Study
I visited last week to
present an intormal proposal (attached) to do a study of a number
of aspects of the proliferation problem. The proposal looks quite
good to me especially the task concerning the impact on US and Soviet
relationships (p. 5). I would like to further explore the proposal
with Sayre (who would be in charge of the project), but would like
first to discuss funding of the project with you at your convenience.
Depending upon the fruits of the effort, we could satisfy that part
of our production program concerning Soviet nonproliferation policy
and the effects of proliferation on the strategic balance that you
recently reviewed and approved.
Attachment:
As Stated
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SUBJECT: Proposal for Nuclear Proliferation Study
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DDI Registry
2 - SA/NPI files
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11 March 82
Nuclear proliferation continues to cast an ominous but uncertain shadow
over international relations. Though it has been slow to occur relative to
the expectations of two or three decades ago, the earlier technological
barriers to its accomplishment have substantially eroded. Now a large
number of states stand within fairly rapid reach of nuclear weapons should
they decide to go for them. They are deterred by political or economic
considerations including sanctions, international agreements, and bilateral
support that is conditional upon their not doing so. Whether or not these
restraints will continue to operate depends upon perceptions of national
interest and the contribution nuclear weapons will make to their fulfillment.
These interests with associated opportunities and threats can only be assessed
in situationally specific terms. But certainly somewhere, at sometime,
one or another of these states will conclude that the possession of nuclear
weapons would have greater value than the losses imposed by restraints.
Another group of states, generally disadvantaged states, lack the
capacity rather than the will to build nuclear weapons. They are separated
from this objective by technical hurdles and economic demands. They too are
restrained from openly pursuing a nuclear weapons program by political and
economic considerations, but these tend to foster the concealment of such a
program more than its dismissal. Or, at least, they may.
Still other groups, the terrorists and their patron states, are only
prevented from building and using--or threatening to use--nuclear weapons
by their inability to acquire one by any means whatsoever. No delicate
restraints for them; only hard-nosed security measures protecting weapons or
special nuclear material in storage or transhipment have an effect. And surely
there will be a slip-up some time.
This proliferation shadow has a significant effect on international
relations by generating fears that the means of massive military destruction
will appear in the hands of states whose behavior in such circumstances is
not altogether predictable and whose stake in international order and
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stability may well be dominated by more immediate national concerns. Not only
could such situations have a big effect. on regional affairs but they would
undoubtedly have an impact on the relationships of the major powers. Although
both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on the desireability
of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they have different perceptions of
the proliferation threat and views about its prevention or control.
For the Soviets it is a threatening phenomenon indeed. They find them-
selves ringed with states who are candidate proliferators without the close
relationships that can provide any assurance that they will not suffer from
the existence of nuclear weapons in uncertain hands. Moreover, proliferation
would tend to diminish the impressions made by the ostentatious projection
of Soviet military power. Soviet ability to capitalize on such displays of
strength have in the past served to make up for difficulties in competing on
the work scene on the basis of economic strength or the promise of achieving
a better quality of life through Soviet tutelage. Proliferation would also
make the Soviet practice of "fishing in troubled waters" a substantially
more dangerous strategy if regional and more general nuclear conflict were a
possible outcome. Thus, it is not surprising that the Soviets have demon-
strated as thorough-going a concern for thwarting proliferation and exercising
restraint in its own exports of nuclear technology.
For its part, the United States has no less an abhorrence of nuclear
proliferation but its geographic isolation serves to ease more immediate
concerns so that it is more of a theoretical than a directly threatening worry.
Moreover, the U.S..relies on economic strength and attempts at moral suasion
in dealing with the Third World to an extent that reduces the importance of
raw military power. Fewer of the candidates for proliferation in the near
term can be envisioned in circumstances in which a nuclear threat to the
continental United States might emerge. The United States, like the Soviet
Union, must worry however, about circumstances in which nuclear threats or
actions against its friends or its vital resources might draw it into a nuclear
confrontation. Concerns about the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East
are a'case in point.
To assess the significance of these differences in outlook between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. requires that the matter of proliferation be considered
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with situational specificity. But there are some common dimensions of the
problem that serve to organize it. Some of these dimensions have peculiar
significance to the intelligence treatment of the problem. The key dimension
of this sort is the matter of uncertainty. To a large extent the feature
of proliferation that makes it almost unbearable is that of uncertainty. It
is the uncertainty about the course of proliferation, uncertainties about the
capabilities of individual states to actually build reliable weapons, about
the effectiveness of safeguards to prevent their doing it, about their
intentions and perceptions of advantages gained that serve to stultify and
cloud policy making to deal with proliferation. The latter tends to generate
larger uncertainties that affect major power relationships involved in a
much broader range of interactions.
As can be seen, there are many different sorts of uncertainty that must
be dealt with in addressing the problem of nuclear proliferation. Each
presents a different sort of problem to the intelligence analyst and each
offers different possibilities for the collection of relevant information and
for reduction within tight and credible bounds. A list of plaguing un-
certainties about proliferation would certainly include the following:
- Uncertainties about the direct access of terrorist groups or their
patron states to weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials; the cases
of Lybia, the PLO, the Red Brigades, Jewish emigre groups, etc.
Uncertainties about the technical or technological foundations for the
successful development of nuclear weapons; the cases of Taiwan, South
Korea, North Korea, etc.
Uncertainties about the effectiveness of established safeguards; the
cases of Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt and Taiwan.
Uncertainties about existence of a complete fuel cycle made more
complicated by new technologies; the cases of South Africa, Brazil,.
Taiwan, etc.
Uncertainties about the purposes of suspect programs; the cases of
South Africa, Iraq, Brazil, and Taiwan.
Uncertainties about the intentions of nuclear-capable states to move
quickly to the development and production of weapons and about the
circumstances in which they might do so. The cases of Japan, West
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Germany, East Germany, etc.
- Uncertainties about intentions of state's who have developed nuclear
devices to actually produce weapons stockpiles; the cases of India,
Israel, and, perhaps, South Africa.
- Uncertainties as to the circumstances underwhich available weapons
might actually be used for one purpose or another; the cases of Israel
and India.
- Uncertainties about the readiness of the nuclear powers to support
restraints on the transfer of technology and materials relevant to
proliferation in the face of political and economic pressures to.do
otherwise; the cases of France, Italy and the United States.
- Uncertainties about the perceptions of individual states as to the
advantage or need associated with the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
From the point of view of the intelligence analyst, it is useful to
disaggregate the sources and types of uncertainty that are plaguing him.
For years, for example, there was a general belief that the proliferation
problem was in hand because we kept watch onthe technical capabilities of
various states to perform all the steps leading to weapons development. But
other types of uncertainties proved to be more important in changing circum-
stances. Later, primary attention was put on dealing with perceptions of
value associated with the acquisition of nuclear weapons in cases where
other uncertainties were dominant. No case is characterized by only one type
of uncertainty. The importance and significance of various types shifts and
changes with time. Moreover, the problems associated with bounding them
adequately differs from case to case.
The proposal that follows is one to address these uncertainties system-
atically and to assess their significance in terms of specific cases of
proliferation possibility.
TECHNICAL APPROACH
proposes to address the problem of nuclear proliferation through the
fulfillment of four tasks.
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Task 1 - Identification and Characteristics of the Pr_ inci al T es of
Uncertainty Surrounding Nuclear Proliferation. Specific types and sources
of uncertainty of the sort delineated above will be identified and character-
ized in terms of their basic causes, amenability to intelligence attack,
degree of elasticity, and likely lower bounds. This will be done in
generic fashion in such a way as to pose the general type of problem posed
to intelligence in each case.
Task 2 - Situationally Specific Characterization of Proliferation Uncertainties.
In undertaking this task, SPC will select some actual cases in which nuclear
proliferation is currently a cause of major international concern. Cases
will be chosen to emphasize the dominance of various sorts of uncertainty,
though in each case more than one type is likely to be significant. In each
case we will characterize the nature of the uncertainty in situationally
specific terms dealing with the factor more generally developed above. From
this work a specific analysis of the proliferation problem faced by the
intelligence collector and analyst in dealing with the selected country
should emerge.
Task 3 - Impact on U.S. and Soviet Relationships. The effects of the nuclear
proliferation possibilities in each country on regional stability and U.S.
and Soviet relationships will be gauged. Differences in perceptions by the
two countries of the proliferation threat and the associated uncertainties
will be identified and appropriate implications drawn. This work should provide
a basis for considering the relative priority of various developing situations
and for guiding the response of the intelligence community to the pro-
liferation problem.
Task 4 - Implications for Proliferation Intelligence ]I will use the work
done previously to identify those analytical and collection initiatives the
intelligence community might take to most efficaciously reduce the uncertainties
about nuclear proliferation in those cases where they are having greatest
impact. The focus will be on defining analytical approaches and information
that are most needed in resolving key uncertainties about specific proliferation
cases.
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