HOW DO WE MAKE USE OF THE ZIA VISIT TO PROTECT OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000300470002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 26, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1982
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT:
How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to
Protect Our Strategic Interests In the Face
of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Activities
ISSUE FOR DECISION
As requested by Judge Clark in his memorandum of November
8, the Department of State, in consultation with the Department
of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the NSC staff,
has prepared a review of options for dealing with Pakistan's
nuclear program.
The U.S.-Pakistani relationship is essential to achieving
our strategic objectives in Afghanistan and South Asia, and is
potentially of major importance to our broader Middle East
strategy. Those strategic interests, as well as the
credibility and effectiveness of our longstanding non-
proliferation policy, are now threatened by Pakistan's nuclear'
weapons program. The issue for decision is how do we make use
of the Zia visit to protect our strategic interests in the face
.of Pakistan's nuclear weapons activities. _
ESSENTIAL FACTORS
A. Pakistan's Nuclear Program
-Pakistan is in the advanced stage of a nuclear weapons
development program. in addition to programs to produce the
necessary fissile material, Pakistan has been working on the
design and development of the nuclear explosive triggering
package, including sending designs for components of a
relatively sophisticated nuclear weapon to purchasing agents in
Europe for the purpose of having the components fabricated for
Pakistan. More recently the Pakistanis have also sought. to
purchase specialized machines to permit indigenous fabrication
of these components. We believe we have located a nuclear test
site in Pakistan.
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India has made preparations to conduct additional nuclear
tests; information indicates that India is preparing the option
to respond to a Pakistan test. At some point India or Israel
may decide to launch a preventive strike at Pak nuclear
facilities, but we have no indications that military action is
likely in the near term.
B. Our Earlier Approach to the Problem
Our efforts to block Pakistan's nuclear weapons program
have taken two tracks. First, we have begun to build a new
security relationship, including a significant aid package. We
have hoped that this would reduce the principal underlying
incentive for acquisition of nuclear weapons. As the elements
of that relationship have been put in place, we have been
trying to persuade Pakistan that acquiring nuclear weapons is
neither necessary to its security nor in.its broader interest.
However, Pakistan's nuclear program is motivated in large part
by fear of India, and we are unwilling to provide a security
guarantee against India. Second, we also have worked with
other nuclear supplier countries to block sensitive nuclear
exports to Pakistan and thus slow the nuclear explosives
program.
Last year we received assurances from Zia that Pakistan
would not manufacture nuclear weapons, not transfer sensitive
nuclear technology, and not "embarrass' us on the nuclear issue
while we are providing aid. (We both understood this clearly
to mean that Pakistan. would not test a nuclear device; it was
left ambiguous as to what it meant short of a test.) In July,
Dick Walters warned Zia that if Pakistan's newly discovered
effort to procure nuclear weapons components did not cease, or
if unsafeguarded reprocessing were-begun, it was virtually
certain that Congress would terminate the aid grogram.
Zia categorically denied our allegations and assured
Walters orally for the first time that Pakistan would not
manufacture a nuclear explosive device of any kind. When
intelligence indicated that this procurement activity was
continuing, I warned Yaqub Khan in September, and Walters again
warned Zia in October, that the aid program was in grave
jeopardy. Zia again denied the accuracy of our intelligence
and expanded his assurance to cover the development, as well as
the manufacture, of any sort of nuclear explosive device.
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There is overwhelming evidence that Zia has been breaking
his assurances to us. We are absolutely confident that our
intelligence is genuine and accurate. Moreover, intelligence
available since Ambassador, Walters' last visit to Islamabad
indicates continued Pakistani weapons activities.
The intelligence community on balance believes that if
forced to choose between U.S. aid and a ,nuclear weapons
capability, Zia will opt for the latter. (Others do not
believe that that is a forgone conclusion.) Zia could well
believe that we will never pose that choice for him, and will
bail him out if Congress moves to cut off aid as we previously
did. The intelligence community thinks it likely that in
response further to U.S. warnings Zia will try to disguise the
weapons program and will delay the more politically. risky and
detectable phases in order to preserve the U.S. supply
relationship. Additionally, the Pakistanis have alleged that
we have publicly ignored the Israeli nuclear program and that
it has not affected in any way. our military and economic aid to
Israel. Zia may think he is offering us diplomatic cover: the
Pakistanis will not acknowledge publicly when and if they
acquire a nuclear capability.
C. U.S. Strategic Interests
In making these approaches to Zia, we were mindful of the
essential role Pakistan plays in support of the Afghan
resistence. Since our opposition to the Soviets in Afghanistan
is clearly the most visible evidence of the U.S. commitment to
counter Soviet military thrusts worldwide, sustaining our new
relationship with Pakistan bears directly on U.S. global, as
well as regional, interests. The fighting in Afghanistan also
constitutes a continuing drain on Sov-iet resources.
A rupture of our relationship-would call into question a
central tenet of this Administration's foreign policy -- strong
support for our friends. Pakistan has also helped on occasion
to advance U.S. interests among the nonaligned and with other
Islamic countries, e.g., by opposing rejection of Israeli
credentials at the UNGA this fall. Over the longer term we
would also hope that U.S.-Pak relations would evolve to the
point where we could closely coordinate our efforts in certain
types of Southwest Asian military contingencies.
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D. Implications of Pak Weapons Activities
It is highly likely that if the Pak program continues on
its current course, Congress would move to cut off. aid at some
point short of a nuclear test. If the Administration decided
to oppose such a move we could fail even with a major
commitment of Administration resources, including your own.
Our aid program will come under public and congressional
scrutiny in the coming weeks. Our briefings of Congressional
leaders on our intelligence on the Pakistani nuclear program,
our coming request to the Congress for reprogramming authority
for our security assistance for Pakistan and the Zia visit will
attract attention, but we do not expect a serious move to cut.
off assistance during the lame duck session. An aid cutoff
would greatly damage our ability to realize those interests
served by close ties to Pakistan.
U.S. policy for over three decades has been committed to
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
The Administration clearly reaffirmed that commitment and has
emphasized a policy of discouraging proliferation by helping
countries meet legitimate security needs. if Pakistan's
program continues this will raise fundamental-questions about
the effectiveness of that policy. Moreover, if we implicitly
or explicitly accept Pakistan's having nuclear weapons, it will
be a major blow to our non-proliferation interests, make it
more difficult to prevent proliferation elsewhere, and the
Administration would be seen at home and abroad as not taking
the problem seriously.
Pakistan's nuclear weapons activities, if carried to
completion, will lead to a nuclear arms race on the
Subcontinent. This would result in greater regional
insecurity, including the possibility of pre-emption by India
or Israel or even eventually a nuclear exchange. Pakistan,
however, views a Pak nuclear device as a deterrent to Indian
nuclear blackmail, believing that in a-future crisis India will
use its nuclear monopoly to coerce Pakistan into making serious
concessions. Moreover, eventual transfer of nuclear technology
or weapons by Pakistan to unstable Arab countries cannot be
excluded.
The intelligence community expects that Pakistani nuclear
weapons activities will involve safeguards violations. Such
violations would gravely undermine confidence in the IAEA
safeguards system, which is critical to U.S. security and
peaceful nuclear cooperation.
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ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
The issue is how to make use of the Zia visit to protect
our strategic interests in the face of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons' activities. We believe it is'necessary for you to
raise this subject with Zia and to address the U.S. response if
Pakistan (1) materially violates international safeguards, (2)
continues the program to procure components and to develop and
manufacture a nuclear explosive device, (3) begins
unsafeguarded reprocessing, or (4) transfers sensitive nuclear
technology to other countries. The odds are against any of the
available options resulting in a complete termination of the
Pakistan nuclear weapons program.
OPTION 1:
You tell Zia now that if any of the specified Pakistani
nuclear weapons activities noted above occur, the U.S. will
terminate its assistance programs and will stop further
deliveries of military equipment.
This course makes as clear as possible to Zia U.S. concerns
about the nuclear issue and that he must choose between
Pakistan's security relationship with the U.S. and a nuclear
weapons capability. It can be argued that our taking this
position now with your full authority and personal intervention
offers the best chance of stopping or constraining Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program and thus preserving the U.S.-Pakistan
strategic relationship. Although conceding that there is a
high risk that Zia will react negatively to this approach, this
argument contends that Congress will eventually terminate the
relationship in any event unless the weapons activities stop.
Opponents of this option are convinced that this approach
will not lead Zia to renounce all these nuclear weapons
activities and that the subsequent termination of our
assistance will (1) lead Pakistan to take measures, especially
with regard to Afghanistan, which will seriously damage U.S.
security interests and (2) not only put an end to any direct
U.S. influence over Pakistani nuclear weapons programs but also
accelerate Pakistan's move towards a test. They argue that as
long as our aid program continues, enabling us to maintain a
constructive relationship with Pakistan, we can be relatively
certain that Pakistan will not test a nuclear device and that
we will continue to be in a position to seek restraint in its
nuclear weapons programs, although Pakistan could stockpile
nuclear devices as the evidence indicates it intends to do.
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(A variant of this option would be for you to tell Zia that
we would respond to the specified Pak nuclear weapons acitivies
by reviewing our assistance and suspending deliveries during
that review. The arguments for and against are basically the
same as above, although this could leave us a degree of
flexibility in responding and might be somewhat less
confrontational.)
Option 2:
You tell Zia that if the specified Pakistani nuclear
weapons activities noted above occur, this will prompt a widely
supported move within Congress to terminate the aid
relationship and will be a major blow to our non-proliferation
interests, forcing your hand and making it virtually impossible
to sustain our new security relationship with Pakistan.
The Pakistanis probably believe that because of the
strategic considerations in the region the USG will seek to
protect the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship against
Congressional moves prompted by Pakistan's nuclear weapons
activities. This option would make clear to the Pakistanis for
the first time that they could not count on you to take on
Congress if their nuclear weapons programs continue unabated.
Proponents argue that by reinforcing the seriousness of our
concern in a non-confrontational manner, this option has the
best prospect of inducing Zia to restrain, if not end,
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Opponents of this approach
do not believe that we should reduce your flexibility to try to
continue the assistance programs in the event of a
Congressional move to-terminate such assistance should the
objectionable Pakistani nuclear weapons activities occur.
Option 3:
You tell Zia that if the specified Pakistan nuclear weapons
activities noted above occur, this will seriously jeopardize
our security relationship, including the ability of the U.S. to
provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan.
This option deliberately leaves ambiguous how the
Administration will respond to future Pakistani nuclear weapons
activities. It thus provides greater flexibility in this
regard than Option 2. Proponents believe that this option
increases the pressure on Zia by reiterating previous warnings
at the highest level. It does so in a'manner less likely to
lead him to conclude that our commitment to Pakistan is
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uncertain, thus heightening Pakistani questions about the
credibility and reliability of the U.S. as a friend and
supporter of Pakistan security. Proponents also contend that
greater Pakistan confidence in the U.S. security commitment
offers the best possibility of convincing Pakistan in time to
restrain, if not terminate, the specified nuclear weapons
activities.
Opponents believe that this option squanders probably the.
only opportunity for you personally to tell Zia how strongly
the Administration feels on this issue. They believe that the
continuing ambiguity of this option will encourage Zia to
believe that we are not really serious and that we can and will
bail him out with Congress if necessary.
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