VISIT OF PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000300480001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/03 :CIA-RDP87R00029R000300480001-4
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
tiational Inte{ligence Council 28 December 1 982
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Hans Heymann
National Intelligence Officer At Large
Sl7BJECT : Zia~_Vi.ce President Memcon
Subject memcon is dtitached, FYI.
Hans Heymann
~c : "~ NIC
DI
IO/NESA
~I O/ EA
~VIO/USSR-FF
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~,~=-' ~ , ~ ~ S/S 8238389
'82 DEC 14 P 7.54
December 14, 1982
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December Z3, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject:
Visit of Pakistani President Zia
Attached is a memorandum of conversation for the
meeting between the?Vice President and Pakistani
President Zia whicH took place on December 8 in the
Madison Hotel suite of President Zia.
1
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
W ashinQtcn, D.C. 20520
As stated.
ted:NEA:HBSchaffer~ "' i~IC,~Of(L~FD
/82 ~ B~
.S/S.~
{UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAIf OF ATTACHMENTS)
T~F(`T. ? nrno
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~~.
SECRET
December 13, 1982
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS;
United States;
Vice President Bush
Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers
Admiral Daniel Murphy
Mr. Gregg, Vice President's
Office
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Howard B. Schaffer, NEA
DATE:
PLACE:
Pakistan?
Pakistani President Zia
Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan
Finance Minister Ghulam Ishak
Khan
General K.M. Arif
Ambassador Ejaz Azim
Governor of Baluchistan
Rahmuddin Khan
Foreign Secretary Niaz Niak
December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m.
President Zia's Suite, Madison Hotel
Vice President Bush called on President Zia of Paki-s tan at his
suite in the Madison Hotel for a meeting of approximately thirty
minutes. The Vice President was accompanied by Admiral Daniel
Murphy and Mr. Donald P. Gregg of his staff. Also present on the
U.S. side ~7ere Ambassador to Pakistan Ronald I. Spiers and NEA
Deputy Assistant Secretary Howard B. Schaffer. The Pakistan side
included Foreign Minister Yaqub-Kahn, Finance Minister Ghulam Ishak
Khan, General K. M. Arif, Ambassador Ejaz Azim, Governor of
Baluchistan Rahimuddin Khan, and Foreign Secretary Niaz Niak.
The discussion largely focused on two issues, the Zia-Andropov
meeting and prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan;' and Sino-U.S.
relations.
Zia's discussion of his meeting with Andropov closely paralleled
the description he had presented earlier to Secretary Shultz at his
White House meeting with the President. Once again he stressed t2-iat
both the Soviets and he himself had stuck to their positions. He
asserted again that the tone of the Soviet side was better. For
example, for the first time in any conversation with the Pakistanis,
a Soviet leader had acknowledged that Moscow and Islamabad might
have different views of the Soviet move into Afghanistan in
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December, 1979. Foreign Minister Yaqub-Kahn, picking this up, said
that they suggested that Andropov waswof a school which may have
been opposed to the move in't:~i`"`anistan. Zia concluded by
r.~.~.-,_._ _w._...
a~~-i~5"g ~~e Vice Presi~t~"C?~e h'~c1-~"1ef"t"~ndropov in na doubt that
Pakistan wanted a peaceful settlement on the basis of the principles
it had consistently insisted upon.
Speaking more generally of relations with the Soviet Union, the
Vice President said that we should not be insensitive to whatever
'suggestions the new Soviet leadership now makes. We will be
watching carefully for these. If we begin to see signs of movement,
it will be incumbent on us to react to them. a mentioned his own
bac faun.dd~as..-D~,.~~ctor_?o.~,_P~the, vCentral Intelligence Agency_ an~~~~ ~~
.,__ ~___ ~L_~ __ _ ~,.......... -,.,~a ,;~ ,-i,o'ur_n nnr~rnnnv ~ni~lc~
_.._.__ _ --. -..-.,t.....,_---
m~ iar wit the process o ma ing_.a.. ~u _gmen _ _ _, .._..
~--P ~ fo;i'mat~=on: ~..~In ~th"at sense, Andropov s experience at
e KGB may have bee'~i""~'"'"roadening rather than confining. Such
__
background, in any event, might be more helpful than that which a
.party boss might bring to a leadership position. He recalled that
he had left Moscow somewhat optimistic about prospects but noted
that the Soviets continue .to be highly critical of us on certain
issues, most recently the President's decision on the MX.
Sino-U.S. Relations
Recalling his own personal interest in China since he served
there as U.S. Envoy, the Vice President asked Zia if he had any
advice to give us about the Chinese.
Zia recalled that he had had a long discussion with the Chinese
during his recent visit to Beijing. He said that he believed the
Chinese thought that the question of Taiwan would be settled in clue
course and that the U.S. would not abandon it. He felt the Chinese,
knowing that he would be visiting the U.5. soon thereafter, had made
a special point of briefing him on their position. He' had said he
would mention their views in the U.S. if the opportunity arose.
Zia said that the Chinese never act in a hurry; their moves are
always calm and calculated. He thought that they had expected more
technology transfer from the U.S. than had actually been
accomplished. The U.S. , _in their view,~_._h_~.d.~f.ailea.~.to keep wits word
on technology tra~~, nsfer~~.., ~ y~~
The Vice President stressed the importance of confidence in a
relationship such as the one between China and the U.S. He thought
that perhaps we had not been able to meet what the Chinese perceived
to be our commitments in some areas and that that may have affected
their assessment of us.
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Zia then raised the question of U.S. allegations to the Chinese
that xna_ s~"aS~s~?~~~~i.,n.g_._Pa,kist~n i.n _.sts nuclear program. ~ He s~,
he had already mentxonea this issue i.n ~iis private meeting with
Presid~ntReagan."T ~Th~e~M'Chinese had _told him. that General Walters .had
,,..~.. .
come to Beijing. Tie h~'b.eeng,~suzp,r_sed,~,by,_the_,,.U.S.._position. In
Zia s view, a xnese felt ghat the~U~S~,~ had_l_u~ped ,them_ w~.th
Pa is an xn a "~iuT'Iicity regarain.g. tie.. Pakistan nuc ear program.
.~.
?~,. ~-..~:_9'~ ~ ~. k e. _..~,k~,i.s , Z 1.~~,--~~n,..~,.R.,l d .h.~.m.~, ha.Z,.. h~..._w o u 1 d mention t h i s
,,~,~ing~n ?_,_ The Vice President. _s~.q,._he ,would talk about this ~~ ?
issue with the Presiden~'t~;
Discussing the broader issue of Sino-U,S. relations, the Foreign
Minister recalled an earlier experience when he was Ambassador to
the U.S. in 1976. At that time, the Chinese Ambassador had
expressed concern that the U.S. was not going ahead as quickly with
normalization of relations as the Chinese had anticipated. Their
assessment had been related to U.S. relations with Taiwan and
specifically to the increase in the number of Taiwan Consulates in
the U.S., a move which had been in the works apparently for many
years. The Foreign Minister said he cited this as an example
because he thought that Chinese assessment of U.S. relations with
Taiwan was one of the two important aspects explaining present
Chinese unhappiness with the U.S. (The other was the issue of
technology transfer). In his view, the Chinese looked closely at
the graph of U.S. relations with Taiwan. They will accept this
graph if it is going down, or even remaining flat, but if they
perceive that it is going up, even if that is not the U.S.
intention, this will affect them adversely.
The Vice President said that while he would agree with this
assessment, it is also true that the Chinese selectively choose the
?'beeps" on the graph they perceive. He noted that the Chinese had
also hardened their position. He called attention to the importance
of the Taiwan Relations Act which the President fully supports and
wishes to live by.
Concluding, the Vice President said that it will take time to
develop relations between the U.S. and China, We will not try to
humiliate the PRC. Indeed, the President is being accused of
selling out Taiwan. Secretary Shultz's visit early next year would
help. At the very least, we should know what it is that we and the
Chinese are disagreeing about. The Vice President said he was
optimistic about the issue.
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