LETTER TO WARREN H. DONNELLY(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000300480007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 23, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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i r
National Intelligence Council
Mr. Warren H. Donnelly
Senior Specialist
Congressional Research Service
The Library Qf Congress
Washington, 0. C. 20540
Thank you for the Petit paper--I have given copies to Harry Rowen
and others in this building.
At your convenience, say within the next month or so, Hans Heymann
and I would appreciate it very much if you would pay us another call.
Of greatest interest, of course, is "our" issue(s) and the next
Congress.
Assistant NIO At Large
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V-Y OF
g~M'z Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
December 20, 1982
Assistant National Intelligence Officer at Large
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
It was good to see you at the Wilson Center seminar. I also greatly
appreciate your remarks about our work.
You may find interesting the enclosed brief paper by Andre Petit of
France in which he reviews non-proliferation developments during 1982.
Sincerely,
Warren H.-Donnelly
Senior Specialist
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? I PREPRINT OF REMARKS THE URANIUM INSTITUTE,
Non-Proliferation and related issues:
A review of developments over the past year*
Andre Petit
This Symposium is, for most of us, the occasion of a pleasant and
most interesting annual review of the overall context in which our
industry functions. When we met a year--.ago the preceding 12 months
appeared to have been occupied by many events, both in the field- of , non-
prolif eration policy, and more generally in the political context
affecting international nuclear trade. This sense of movement was of
course something to which we had already grown accustomed. In September
1981 we were all aware of the failure of the Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) review conference, the reorientation of US policy following the-
Reagan election; the Franco-Australian agreement on generic approval-for
reprocessing,. the bombing of the Tammuz reactor, etc. At the last"
Symposium, Mfr Malone's speech .concerning the new US administration's
approach to'non-proliferation was a confirmation of the intended
evolution in his country's policies, following President Reagan's
election.
In contrast, this last 12 months have witnessed few such spectacular
devel'opments.- The important events of the year have tended to be much
more confirmations or developments of previously announced or adopted
policies, rather than departures from such policies.
The French parliamentary debate on energy which took place in the.
autumn of 1981 resulted in the definition of a policy which includes both
greater emphasis on coal and conservation, and a major nuclear domestic
programme, together with changes in the. procedures for its implementation'
aimed, amongst other things, at winning the acceptance of the public. In
the field of non-proliferation, the French Government has confirmed its
willingness to provide developing countries with nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, steadily strengthening measures against proliferation.
The US Gov,,:rnment has been developing a policy along the lines
announced at the 1981 Institute meeting by Mr Malone. It was marked by.
the Presidential statement in October 1981 concerning mainly domestic
nuclear policy, and by the US policy on plutonium which appeared in June
1982. But it did not go as far as amending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act -- which paeans that many of President Reagan's intentions may still
be in conflict with legislation inspired by a quite different policy.
As regards the highly controversial problem of prior consent rights
on reprocessing, the move towards a compromise, initiated by the Franco-
*(Opinions expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author,
and in no way commit either the CEA or any other French authority).
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Australian agreement, was continued through the Australia-Euratom
agreement in September 1981, the Canada-Euratom Agreement in November UV
1981, and the US statement already mentioned in June 1982.
Notwithstanding the fact that US policies still appear more restrictive
than those of the two other countries which support the principle of
prior consent, there now seems to be an international consensus that
reprocessing is a legitimate need for countries having sizeable nuclear
programmes; and that, in such circumstances, case-by-case prior consent
rights need not be retained by exporters.
This absence of sensational events during the past 12 months should
not be considered unexpected. The anomaly, in my opinion, was the large
number of such events during the preceding years. How can an industry
live and develop normally, if the rules of the game for international
trade are affected every year by a number of unilateral or multilateral
changes in the political conditions governing such trade?
However, the fortunate return to a quieter period does not mean that
no significant moves are taking place. But it probably means that most
governments now understand that the most efficient developments are not
necessarily the most spectacular, and that the first prerequisite for an
effective non-proliferation policy is a real worldwide consensus, rather
than attempts to dictate new rules through unilateral decisions.
This period may therefore be a good moment to reflect on the present
situation, and to analyse the trends which could lead to future developments.,
The picture shows that the N.P.T., the London Guidelines, and the
IAEA safeguards still remain the legal-political instruments on which the
largest degree of international consensus exists, even though this falls
short of unanimity.
The NPT still faces objections from the non-nuclear-weapon states
which retused to sign it, the most important of which are Argentina,
Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain etc.
The London Guidelines also are contested by these countries, and in
addition by some third world countries which have signed the NPT, but
which claim that these Guidelines are in opposition to the spirit of
Article IV of the NPT; and furthermore that they are a way for-
industrialized nations to maintain "'technological colonialism"' over
developing nations.
But whatever the objections, these two diplomatic instruments remain
in the centre of the picture. On one side, countries which had earlier
decided to go much further in their non-proliferation policies are
progressively stepping back, as evidenced by what has happened in the
field of prior consent. On the other, developing countries which had,
for a time, combined in attacking the US Non-Proliferation Act and the
London Guidelines, have started to recognize that the latter offer
considerable flexibility, and that even the caution they adopt towards
the transfer of sensitive technologies may be applied in a way which is
compatible with these countries' own development.
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As for the IAEA safeguards, the objections are fortunately more
limited; we will say a word later about recent developments.
Around this hard core discussions have continued over the past year
on a number of major issues which oiodasp contributing,
trade without contributing, or even being perceived the risk of proliferation.
A first line of approach which seems to have made some progress
during the year is related to the real_ +~r' n
problem.
The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) hadthfrcou se
already emphasized that the problem is essentially 2alilt 1
technical. But this idea was often only mentioned briefly in national
non-proliferation statements, which failed to give it the importance it
deserves, or to draw out the implications. Much progress seems to have
been made in this respect during the year. I should like, for example,
to mention the very clear and convincing iCanadian ngovwhich it ernmenti onmentioned
Canadi an in
.the official booklet published by
non-proliferation policy.
.But I am afraid there is still a long way to go in this direction if
we are to succeed in convincing public opinion, as well as many
politicians, that the most likely route for a would-be-proliferator
government is not via the misuse of safeguarded electronuciear power
stations and their normal fuel cycle, especially for light water
reactors. *
iour of some governments is far from
h
b
av
e
In this respect, even the
being entirely rational. In some cases where governments refuse to.export.
nuclear reactors, because they suspect the possible parallel existence in
the importing country of a military nuclear programme, they are
simultaneously giving to the same recipient government the fullest
diplomatic, military and financial support. In such circumstances, one
can be forgiven for wondering whether the export of a safeguarded .'e'.ctor
would really add anything significant to the proliferation risk already
existing in such a country.
The reasoning and reflections in this respect are similar to those
which relate to possible sanctions following a move towards
proliferation, where the distinction is not always made whether such a
move is, or is not, the result of a breach of international safeguards.
It is quite clear that if international safeguards are breached the
continuation of peaceful nuclear trade becomes impossible, because
exporting nations can have no assurance that what they export will not be
diverted to military uses.
But when this is not the case, and when the problem stems from item ay
possible parallel existence of an unsafeguarded nuclear programme,
be asked whether an embargo on safeguarded electronuclear trade is
necessarily more appropriate than the withdrawal of military, financial
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necessarily more appropriate than the withdrawal of military, financial--
or any other type of assistance or cooperation. Cheap energy is probably
more necessary to the health and well-being of the population of such
countries than military aircraft; so if sanctions are to be taken against
what appears as an abnormal super-armament, why should this sanction not
be taken first in the military and diplomatic fields, rather than in the
field of energy?
The only reason for the present attitude of some politicians and
governments in this respect is the implicit postulate. that there is
normally a link between electronuclear reactors and nuclear weapons.
Although the contrary was demonstrated in INFCE, this demonstration has
not yet.been fully understood and accepted by public opinion and by
politicians. I believe that it is an essential task for the industry to
continue to inform them properly in this respect, in order to eradicate
such an irrational assumption from their minds.
Another line of reflection which seems to be slowly maturing is
related to the fact that confidence in the security of nuclear supplies
through international trade is absolutely essential to the future of non-
proliferation policy.
This now seems to be understood, in particular by countries which had
earlier thought that the greater their pressures on importing countries,
the more efficient their non-proliferation policies would be. They now
seem to recognize that there is little merit in trying to impose
conditions which will be perceived by importers as jeopardizing their
security of supply, if this leads them to look for other suppliers or to
adopt autarchic policies.
This has led to the creation by the IAEA of the Committee on
Assurances of Supply, which is trying to develop new approaches in order
to enhance the feeling of security of supply among nuclear importers.
Although this Committee seems to devote at least as much time to talking
about non-proliferation conditions as in dealing with assurances of
supply, it is at least a positive fact that the Agency and its member
states have chosen to give to it, as an essential objective, the
improvement of assurances of supply.
Of course, what will be even more significant will be the efforts
actually made by exporting nations to enhance such security of supply.
A great deal remains to be done in this respect, for instance by
facilitating the diversification of supplies, guaranteeing deliveries
under long-term contracts against unilateral changes in political
conditions, facilitating retransfers, etc. But some optimism is
permissible, particularly as more moves are taking place in this
direction than in the opposite one.
I A good deal of thought has, of course, also been given to IAEA
safeguards, which are the essential tool of any non-proliferation policy.
A year ago there was deep concern that the bombing of the Tammuz
reactor and the attempt of some formercivil servants of the Agency to
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justify such bombing by criticizing the efficiency of the Agency's
safeguards system, could bring discredit to the safeguards system as a
whole. It was a major challenge for Dr Blix -- on being appointed
towards the end of 1981 as the new Director-General of IAEA, after the
position had been held for more than 20 years by Dr Eklund, -- to be faced
with this problem immediately on taking up office.
He faced it with great realism and authority, both in the Board of
Governors of the Agency and in his statement to the United Nations in New
York. He repudiated attacks on the Agency for not performing tasks which
were not part of its duty, and reaffirmed the Agency's willingness and
ability to perform those safeguarding tasks which had been assigned to it
by its statute.
This very clear and firm reaction led most governments to reaffirm
their full support for the IAEA safeguards system. Naturally, this
system, like any other human institution, is capable of improvement; and
indeed improvements are permanently under study, in order to achieve the
best efficiency without placing an abnormal burden on the nuclear
industry or on the international community. The new Director-General,
backed up by the Board of Governors, seems willing to speed up progress
in this direction in the near future.
What can we conclude from this brief overview?
First, that most of the conflicting views and policies which have
fuelled the international nuclear debate during recent years remain:
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act is still in force in the USA, a number
of countries still refuse to sign the NPT, and the London Guidelines
are still criticized by a number of developing countries.
But there seems to be a slow evolution towards abandonment of the-
more extreme positions, and more flexibility in looking for pragmatic
solutions, taking into consideration the political, economic and
industrial realities facing the parties involved. The essential role of
IAEA safeguards, and the need for more reliable international nuclear
trade, are generally recognized; together with the necessity for taking
into consideration the proliferation risks which are perceived as being
associated with some nuclear technologies.
Unfortunately it seems unlikely that this progress, real as it is,
will lead in the short term to the new and universal IDpol i ti cal arid legal
instrument which would be needeTt7o estab"l`i sh a clear. and stabl e
franiework within which the industry could develop. worldwide,. The only
-realistic hopes we may allow ourselves in the short term are that the
movement towards reducing as far as possible the pol..itical and legal
uncertainties will continue through long-term bilateral agreements and
contracts; and that the evolution of national policies will be convergent
rather than divergent, thus paving the way for a possible universal
consensus at a later stage.
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