ISSUE FOR DCI/NIO DISCUSSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000400690019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: September 6, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87R00029R000400690019-1
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87R00029R000400690019-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87R00029R000400690019-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87R00029R000400690019-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87R00029R000400690019-1
6 September 1984
NOTE TO: Hal Ford, NIO/AL
FROM: David B. Low, NIO/ALA
SUBJECT: Issue for DCI/NIO Discussion
The Islamic Bomb: Chemical Rather than Nuclear?
Iraq employed riot control agents against Iranian forces in July 1982
and began using mustard agent in August 1983. 1984, Iraqi
aircraft dropped bombs containing nerve agent on Iranian troops. This was
the first overt use by any country of nerve gas in a combat situation.
Iraq has over the last several years developed a substantial domestic
CW production capability. CIA presently estimates that Iraq is capable of
producing at least two tons per day of mustard agent and two tons per day
of nerve agent. The Iraqi stockpile was recently estimated to amount to
165 agent tons of mustard and 55 agent tons of nerve.
This brings to 16 the total number of countries having an offensive
chemical warfare capability. In addition to the growth in number over the
last 20 years, there also has been a dramatic shift in nations possessing
offensive CW capability from the industrialized to the developing nations,
primarily in the Middle East and East Asia.
This proliferation, coupled with apparent international tolerance for
CW weapons use in local conflicts, increases the probability that chemical
weapons will be used more frequently in the future and complicates the
ability of the U.S. to conclude an effective chemical weapons treaty. In
addition. it increases the likelihood of terrorist acquisition and use. F
The Iraqi capability, in particular, raises significant regional
questions. What will Iraq do with its stockpile and production
capabilities after the war with Iran has subsided? Will Iraq sell agent to
friendly neighbors? Will it conduct research on more sophisticated agents
or delivery systems? One can even speculate that Iraq perceives its
domestic production capability as the cornerstone of an Islamic deterrent
to the Israeli threat in the absence of having been able to develop a
nuclear weapons capability.
cc: VC/NIC
NIO/NESA
PO/NIC
T(1D crrP
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87R00029R000400690019-1
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