CHEMICAL WARFARE AND TOXIN USE: NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE FOCAL POINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000400800028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 3, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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DDI/NIC #4690-82
3 June 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : Hans Heymann, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer at Large
SUBJECT : Chemical Warfare and Toxin Use: Need for
Intelligence Focal Point
SUMMARY Because of the growing national security significance of the
CW/Toxin Use issue, this memo recommends the designation by the
DCI of a central point of responsibility for monitoring,
energizing and coordinating the Intelligence Community's far-
flung efforts to collect, analyze and interpret technical and
episodic information (including human and environmental samples)
pertaining to CW/Toxin use in Third World conflicts, to provide
a single, authoritative point from which intelligence findings
will be conveyed to the policy community, and to assure
coordinated briefings and appropriate intelligence liaison in
support of overall US goals. It further recommends that this
central point of responsibility be of OSWR
who would be responsible to the Director through the airman of
the NIC. would work with and through an upgraded
Community mechanism, e.g. a revamped WSSIC CBW working group.
DIA is prepared to cooperate in such restructuring. The DDI,
D/OSWR and concur in this recommendation.
1. Is There a Continuing CW Use Intelligence Task?
With the issuance of the SNIE on CW/Toxin use in February, the
publication of the declassified version as a public document in March, and our
global briefing tour to propagate the findings in April, the US Government's
case on this issue has been about as well established as can be expected in an
environment of public resistance and skepticism. This does not mean, however,
that the major intelligence task is now behind us. On the contrary, the need
for a substantial intelligence effort, -- both current and long range -- will
almost certainly intensify.
0 DCL R RVW JUNE 1988
25X1
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On the supply side:
o The chemical attacks appear to be continuing -- at least through
April -- and the flow of samples is accelerating. The efficiency
and technical adequacy of out sample analysis program, however,
continue to be called into question by knowledgable US scientists.
We need to improve that program.
o Sustained use of CW and toxins in Third World conflicts and a
growing belief that these weapons are cost-effective may lower
existing social inhibitions against their use and could lead to
actual or alleged proliferation of such use.
On the demand side:
o Public and media interest in the issue has been piqued and their
appetite for "conclusive proof" seems insatiable. Though we may
feel that the USG has now adequately proved its case, we will be
under continuing pressure to provide a steady flow of reinforcing
evidence.
o In terms of US arms control concerns, our finding that the USSR is
systematically violating international conventions has disturbing
implications for US-Soviet and Soviet-multilateral relations. It
further erodes what little public trust remains in Soviet compliance
and poses intractible problems for verification intelligence.
o In terms of US national security concerns, some crucial unanswered
questions about the potential toxicity of tricothecenes, the
solvents in which they might be disseminated, and other, even more
lethal kinds of toxins that may be developed in the USSR or
elsewhere, pose an new set of tasks for intelligence.
In sum, the Community will be expected to produce more rather than less
intelligence on this issue for the foreseeable future.
2. How Well are we Organized?
Our performance is uneven. Some aspects of our modus operandi are
working well:
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o The physical movement of medical and environ~nental samples from
field to headquarters (DIA) seems to be functioning smoothly.
o . Routing of samples from headquarters (DIA) to laboratories is now
done routinely and expeditiously, and reasonably good track is being
kept of the location and disposition of samples in train.
Other aspects of our performance, however, are seriously deficient:
o Assignment of samples to laboratories and presentation of results.
-- Collateral intelligence on attacks -- medical symptoms, victims'
statements, suspected CW agents involved, etc. -- are not
carefully reviewed as the basis for determining what tests and
measures should be undertaken and with what priorities, and for
selecting the best qualified lab to conduct the tests.
-- Those having the responsibility and resources for assigning
laboratory tasks are effectively decoupled from those in the
analyst-user community who ought to be driving the requirements.
-- The exposition of analytic results is not being couched in
appropriate scientific language or presented in sufficient
detail to satisfy the needs of the intelligence analyst or the
expectations of the broader scientific community.
o Interpretation of the findings. There is at present no requirement
that laboratory results be reviewed and evaluated by analytic
elements of the Community before they are released to policy
agencies. Thus no agreed intelligence judgments on these results
are prepared. Direct release to policy elements of raw laboratory
results -- without any evaluation of their significance and
limitations -- has repeatedly led to official misinterpretations and
overstatements.
o Absence of a Community focal point. There is a pressing need for
having an authoritative person or place charged with managing the
interagency analytic process and with responsibility for conveying
technical intelligence judgments on CW use to US policy elements.
The lack of such a Community focal point has caused a State
Department policy bureau (PM) to follow the practice of simply
reaching down into any technical intelligence element or laboratory
and extracting from it unevaluated, incomplete and sometimes
misleading data or pieces of a story, and to pass these to policy
principals (and often to the media) as if they were agreed
Intelligence Community judgments. State (PM) -- and the CW Use
Working Group that it chairs -- would surely welcome a more orderly
intelligence process, better integrated support, and an ability to
rely on a responsible single point of contact.
o Uncoordinated briefings. Individual intelligence elements are
presently providing unilateral briefings to official and semi-
official audiences on aspects of the CW use issue without informing,
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consulting, or requesting participation of other cognizant
intelligence elements. This has led to embarassingly injudicious
and incomplete presentations being made to such distinguished groups
as the Defense Science Board. While we cannot impose censorship on
other agencies' briefings, better communication among Community
elements would lessen the chances of an inadvertent gaffe.
o Linkage to third country governments. There is presently no vehicle
for providing or facilitating briefings and technical support to
other Western or non-aligned governments through their
representatives, say, at ASEAN or at the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva.
o Broader estimative studies. We should anticipate a demand for
follow-on intelligence assessments of the broader implications of CW
use for US, NATO and Third World security interests.
3. Recommendations
Clearly, not all of the above deficiencies can be easily corrected,
but the single action most likely to improve our intelligence performance
ould be the designation by the DCI of a respected Community officer
25X1
to be responsible to him for the functions
25X1
described above. ensive involvement and effective performance
25X1
in all facets of the issue qualify him uniquely for this role. In carrying
out many of the listed tasks, would have to work closely with and
25X1
through a Community mechanism -- either a substantially upgraded and recast
CBW Working Gro or a newly created joint intelligence committee or
subcommittee. DIA's chief of S&T intelligence, with whom we have 25X1
discussed this proposal, is prepared to cooperate fully in any restructuring
of the WSSIC group along appropriate lines.
I should note that we have considered a number of alternative
proposals. These include the designation of an existing office in the
Community to assume a central coordinating role; reliance on the existing
WSSIC working group; creation of a new Community "center" for CW use
intelligence; or abrogation of the responsibility totally to Defense. For a
variety of reasons, we have rejected these alternatives.
Indeed, discussions with a number of senior Community officers
concerned with the issue reveal a strong consensus in favor of the proposed
approach, as well as agreement that is the best choice for the 25X1
role. There is also a strong feeling that, because of the Community nature of
the task and in order to strengthen his access to key players as well as to
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reinforce his DCI mandate, should be responsible in this activity to
the Director through the Chairman of the NIC. Bob Gates and Wayne Boring
concur in this recommendation. In view of my own involvement in the subject,
I would expect to serve as the NIO action officer for C/NIC.
Finally, on the policy side, we have discussed this issue with the
NSC Staff (Don Gregg, Sven Kraemer, Cary Lord.) They are strongly supportive
of the proposed initiative and offered their active help in sorting out the
intelligence interface with policy, especially as regards linkages among the
key players -- State, ACDA and ICA.
If you approve of the proposed approach, I could work with your
staff to develop an appropriate draft DCI directive to NFIB members for your
consideration.
Hans Heymann, Jr.
16 JUN 198Z
DATE
Director of Central Intelligence DATE
Director of Central Intelligence
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DDI/NIC #4690-82
3 June 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
THROUGH : C/NIC
FROM : Hans Heymann, Jr.
NIO-at-L
SUBJECT : Chemical Warfare and Toxin Use: Need for
Intelligence Focal Point
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - C/NIC
1 - DDI
1 - VC/NIC
1 - AC/NIC
1 - D/OSWR
1 - OSWR
2 - NIO-at-L/HH
1 - DDI Reg.
NIO-at-Large/HHeymann
(3 June 1982)
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